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METAPHYSICAL ISSUES IN HALAKIC PROCESS 
FLEGG, Asher, Ph.D. University of Cape Town, 1985. 
This dissertation is a study of the method whereby the employment of 
variant philosophical, metaphysical, or theological data emanating 
from biblical or aggadic sources, yields variant practical halakic 
results. The extent to which the cogitative assimilation of these 
data directly affects one and influences one's actions in practice 
is the extent to which this process has been operationally effective 
in the concrete translation of thought into action. 
This essay will endeavour to demonstrate the existence of midot she-
ha-Aggadot veha-Midrashim nidrashot lema'aseh, . i.e., a process in 
which Aggadot and Midrashim are expounded in practice, present in 
the mechanics of halakic decision making, as well as it demonstrates 
the influence and impact of this phenomenon on the halakic system in 
general. 
The intention of our Introductory chapter is mainly to present our 
field of study as an integral constituent of Jewish Law by eluci-
dating the historical development of this field from its inception-
dating long bef~re Sinai- until the present day. One of the 
principal subjects under investigation is the Elijah theme emanating 
from R. Isserlein's responsum in Terumat ha-Deshen concerning whether 
Elijah's wife requires a divorce in order to rewed. 
This theme was selected as a paradigm model to illustrate metaphysical 
data operative in halakic process, for many reasons. Firstly as 
it clearly evinces that one can not determine the halakic status 
of Elijah's wife unless one a priori resolves the philosophical 
dilemma of ascertaining Elijah's existential identity and ontological 
nature. This dilemma embraces the entire gamut of philosophical 
complexities concurrent with the problems of the omnificience of 
G-d's Will versus the Aristotelean notion of a primordial world, the 
theory of generation and corruption as against the ability of G-d's 
Will to effectively suspend its operability, the problem of corporeality 
in heavens, as well as encompassing a host of theological motifs 
such as the distinction between transcendental man and the 
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angels, the factors which cause or terminate commandment responsi-
bility, and an effort to di ssociate the ascension of Elijah from 
Jesus. All these considerations are discussed in great detail in 
Chapter III, and conclusively demonstrate that only once the Decisor 
hascommitted himself to a clear philosophic position regarding these 
issues, can he then proceed to render a cogent ruling concerning 
the halakic status of Elijah ' s wife . Indeed we shal l also see 
that different philosophic positions produced varied halakic out-
comes concerning divorce and a wide range of other matters pertaining 
to Jewish Law . Hence a necessary conclusion of this paper is that 
as man ' s epistem~log~cal perception of philosophy and metaphysics 
changes or becomes differently conceived, so too, the Halakot which 
are contingent upon these understandings must also undergo change . 
Secondly Terumatha-:Oeshen ' s responsum demonstrates how a seemingly 
totally hypothetical discussion can have tremendous practical signi-
ficance in resolving any issue dealing with existential change . It 
determines whether anyone who undergoes an existential change, in 
one form or another, \ihether surgical or otherwise, halakically 
retains his pre- transitional or assumes his post- transitional status . 
Thirdly because it clarifies why researching the Respondent's biography 
will reveal the Respondent ' s motivation for considering metaphysical 
concepts . Since the question of whether Elijah ' s wife requires 
divorce is essential ly aquestion of whether transcendental man 
continues to retain any functional attachment with the ordinary 
halakic life of humans and of society, an investigation into the 
like history of Terumat h~Deshen, the socio-political-religious 
conditions and ideologies of his time, as elaborated in Chapter VI, 
proves most rewarding in ascertaining why the resolvement of the 
Elijah issue was of such paramount importance to R. Isserlein . 
And finally because of what we discover of the nature of the halakic 
system in its relation to man . R. Isserleiil's responsum adduces 
that whenever man undergoes transcendental experiences he continues 
to identify with his original status, and consequently, is still 
very much bound to Halaka and the observance of commandments . This 
is because Halaka itself is not only concerned with the finite domain 
of ordinary man since ordinary man himself is not a totally finite 
and limited being . There are numerous instances and moments during 
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man's everyday life within the community when man steps over the 
threshold of his human limitations and enters the transcendental 
zone. He suddenly finds himself at various stages of life in an 
undefined inexact situation of neither life nor death but somewhere 
in the parameters ranging between the two. The Aguna, whose 
husband has suddenly disappeared and not known to be either alive or 
dead, has found herself having to relate to her husband as having 
entered the transcendental zone between life and death. Today 
scientists are busy developing test tube babies who are also situated 
in the transcendental zone somewhere between life and death. Ordinary 
man is thus capable of transcending himself by encountering in life 
many experiences of this nature. R. Isserlein's responsum establishes 
that because of the great proximity and overlap between transcendental 
man and ordinary ·. man, we can clarify and define with much greater 
exactitude much of man's ordinary day to day halakic activites by 
investigating the metaphysical orbit of transcendental man. 
In order to define this category of transcendental man more clearly 
we investigated many other twilight areas, apart from the Elijah theme, 
where ordinary man engages in metaphysical experiences which engender 
halakic consequences. These included laws pertaining to such areas 
as Mazalot (planetary influences), magic, miracles, metaphysical cures, 
demonology and man's contact with spirits, preservation of spiritual 
welfare, and trends of metaphysical changes to mention only a few. 
It is precisely because the dividing line between the physical and 
the .metaphysical and the exact point at which the natural becomes 
supernatural is so unclear, that the halakic probing into these 
twilight areas is useful in pinpointing the exact precincts of each 
category. Our investigation into the halakic principles and rules 
governing man's preoccupation with various metaphysical phenomena as 
natural and legitimate pursuits, while proscribing other involvements 
as mythological is valuable in providing rules for converting abstract 
notions to more tangible forms of application. 
The Jewish legalist is capable of extracting halakic principles 
concerning the perennial metathesis of universal man by discussing 
trends of parallel changes in the life of plants, metaphysical crea-
tures, demons, constellations, and other spheres. The comparison 
between metaphysical phylogeny- the development of metaphysical 
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species, and ontogreny- the development of the individual, reveals 
a halakic relationship through which man is sufficiently enabled to 
ground himself whenever he enters the transcendental zone. 
The disclosure of our research and findings is particularly relevant 
in an age when science is speedily bridging the gap between theory 
and fact. Scientific technology is busily transforming yesterday's 
dream into today's reality. And therefore, the distinction which 
once existed between theory and reality, between Aggada and Halaka, 
is becoming increasingly narrowed by science. The more sophisti-
cated scientific· technology becomes, the more each theoretical 
notion and speculatory whim of the mind is likely to present itself 
as a nafke mina le-ma'aseh (a practical halakic consequence). Here, 
therapiddevelopment of the scientific era is thrusting Halakists 
deeper and deeper into scientific and metaphysical research. 
Thus the study of metaphysics and experimental science contribute 
to the halakic system in facilitating the processing of twilight 
developments, while a study of the halakic process contributes to 
the scientific disciplines by relating rules for converting abstract 
hypothetical notions in applied directions. Furthermore, the 
rules for determining the criteria for admitting or resisting change 
in Halaka, as seen in our final chapter Metaphysical Development, 
are important not only in dealing with evolutionary changes both 
in nature and in metaphysical trends, but more fundamentally in 
dealing with the development, evolution, and modification of Halaka 
itself. 
It will soon become exceedingly apparent that contemporary Halakists 
will not be able to even begin to approach fundamental halakic 
issues pertaining to everyday life materialising as a result of 
science without being thoroughly educated in the disciplines of 
philosophy and metaphysics. The coming generation will not succeed 
in producing Halakists proficient in their own field unless these 
erstwhile considered secular disciplines are introduced within the 
educational curriculum of even the most right wing yeshivot, as 
part and parcel of Talmud Torah. Such a trend will undoubtedly 
become an important instrument in bridging the gap in Israeli society, 
and possibly world Jewry, between religious zealots on the right 
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and secular Jews on the left. One can expect each camp to grow 
increasingly tolerant towards each other as the study of Metaphysical 
Issues in Halakic Process becomes all the more urgent. 
- v -
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Although Hartman succeeded in portraying that preoccupation with 
Halaka may tolerate the simultaneous pursuit of the other disciplines 
and does not necessarily require that r1e exclude them, nay more, 
demand of him to pursue them. Nevertheless these other disciplines 
which are to be studied simultaneously with Halaka are still indepen-
d~nt disciplines and thus the precincts which Halaka itself occupies, 
.11 . . h d 14· stl remaln very much unc ange . 
Secondly, it is important to point out that Hartman himself discusses 
an unexpected complication which his own exposition produced. 
Hartman asks: 
If philosophy alone can lead to pursuit of G~d, why then is 
Torah needed? This question is not raised, but we shall deal 
with the way Maimonides might address himself to such a 
question.20 
Hartman admits that Maimonides does not raise the question, but 
Hartman feels that he must deal with it in order to present his own 
exposition more correctly. However, Hartman perhaps did not realize 
that if he were correct in his presentation of Maimonides, this problem 
is so obvious that one can not imagine why Maimonides felt no need 
to discuss it. 
Rather it is imperative to understand that Maimonides chose the second 
way of resolving the contradiction. Namely, that some form of Halaka 
must have already existed prior to Sinai. Here it is significant to 
recall how Maimonides carefully and tactfully formulated his question: 
Maimonides asked how it is possible to understand the aphorism's 
application during the time of Shem and Eber onwards. Even Hartman 
is surprised that Maimonides recalled Shem and Eber rather than the 
Patriarchs. 21 What was so extraordinary about Shem and Eber that 
Maimonides selected them to highlight and magnify the problem con-
tained in the aphorism? 
We may obtain an inkling of insight into the matter fr.om what 
Maimonides writes of Shem and Eber in his Guide to the Perplexed: 
tau will find likewise that the Sages say with reference to the 
prophets who lived before him [i.e., Moses] the court of justice 
of Eber, the court of justice of Methusalel1, the school of 
iv1ethusaleh. ;•,22 
In his Guide, Maimonides affirms what is corroborated by the Sages 
that the exceptional feature of Shem and Eber is that they headed a 
court of justice. · Now, if Halaka was only introduced into the 
;'•Since the classical Hebrew works were generally never italicized, 




in His world from Creation until Sinai? Therefore, the aphorism 
understood as a whole, contains an inherent historical contradiction 
between its opening and closing phrases. 
There are two ways in which one would expect Maimonides to resolve 
the contradiction. One way is to accept the premise underlying 
the aphorism's closing clause at face value and concede that Halaka 
did not exist in His world prior to Sinai. In which case, one would 
have to discover a teleological "purpose" of Halaka and establish 
that this "purpose" existed prior to Sinai even without Halaka it-
self. The second way is to expand the conventional interpretation 
of the four cubits at Halaka and establish that some callow for m of 
Halaka existed in His world already prior to Sinai. ~1hile Dr. Hartman 
adopts the former approach, ours concurs with the latter. A cursory 
analysis of the differences between these two approaches will soon 
reveal the inaccuracy of the first approach. 
To begin with, Hartman reinterprets the aphorism to mean that Halaka 
is the only way to G-d. 16 If so, Hartman puts the question in 
~~imonides' mouth: How was pre-Mosaic man able to approach G-d 
prior to the existence of Halaka? Therefore, Hartman deduces, 
that according to Maimonides, there must be an alternative route to 
approach G-d independent of Halaka. N~ely, the way of philosophy. 
This exposition of Hartman necessitates a reinterpretation of the 
aphorism yet a third time to mean not that the only way to G-d is 
Halaka, but rather that the overall "purpose" of HalakA. is to approach 
G-d. Since philosophy also aspires towards that same purpose and 
.:.an be viewed "not only as a cognitive discipline, but as an impor-
tant road to G-d", there is no contradiction between the discipline 
of philosophy and Halaka.17 In fact, the pursuit of this "independent" 
field of philosophy may enhance one towards reaching the end of one's 
halakic goal. Thus, Hartman claims, Halaka is not only compatible 
with philosophy, but demands that one have knowledge of philosophy. 18 
To understand the problem in Hartman's exposition of Maimonides it 
is important for us to bear in mind that the purpose of Maimonides' 
entire exercise is to prove that the precincts of the four cubits of 
Halaka are not as narrow as the aphorism seems to suggest when taken 
in its literal sense. According to Hartman, the four cubits of 
Halaka even after his dissertation, remain extremely narrow. For 
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are merely symbiotically connected to Halaka or whether these disci-
plines constitute Halaka by themselves. Even if we were to concede 
to nversky's and Hartman's assertion that Maimonides' philosophy 
formed the "basis" of his Legal Code, we would still be reluctant 
to concede that this basis was "non-halakic" in nature. As even 
the basis of a halakic system can be shown as being itself halakic 
much in the same way as R. Lichtenstein evinced that derekh erez 
(civil ethics,)11 which is the basis of Torah12 is itself halakic, 
actionable, and legally binding. 13 
In his Introduction to the Commentary on the Mishna, Maimonides 
cites the talmudic aphorism with which this chapter commenced. 
Maimonides states that the aphorism cannot be understood in its 
simple sense: 
For if you look at its simple meaning, you will find it very 
far from the truth. As if the four cubits of Halaka alone 
are the required features and the ~~her disciplines and 
conceptual opinions are worthless. 
Mai~onides claims that if the aphorism were taken in its simple 
sense it would entrench the first world view discussed earlier. 
Namely, that a Jew's sole pre-occupation should be confined to the 
very narrow precincts of the four cubits of Halaka, to the exclusion 
of all other disciplines which are of n0 avail. For the discipline 
of Halaka alone is sufficient for man's perfection. Maimonides 
claims that this simplistic exposition is far from the truth and 
very superficial indeed. Maimonides justifies his opinion by 
posing an extremely important question: 
And during the time of Shem and Eber and onwards, when there 
was no Halaka then, could we say that the Holy One, Blessed 
be He, had no part in the world at all?!15 
The His tory of Halaka 
Maimonides' historical perspective of the world did not allow him 
to interpret the aphorism in a simplistic sense. For its opening 
words: "G-d has nothing in His world," suggest an exclusive 
interest \~ich 'G-d has had in His world from the very beginning of 
its creation until the end of time. TI1e aphorism's closing words 
state that this sole interest of G-d is none other than the four 
cubits of Halaka. Yet this sole ihterest only became introduced 
in the world from Sinai onwards! What interest then did G-d have 
- 5 -
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They endeavoured to expose this shocking phenomenon by inaccurately 
ascribing Maimonides as an adherent of this school. Leo Strauss 
writes: "Jews of the philosophic competence of Halevi and Maimonides 
took it for granted that being a Jew and being a philosopher are 
mutually exclusive."8 
Gershom Scholem in his work Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism also 
supports this notion: 
The whole world of religious law remained outside the orbit 
of philosophical inquiry, which means of course too, that it 
was not subjected to philosophical criticism. It is not as 
if the philosopher denied or defied this world. He too, 
lived in it and bowed to it, but it never became a part and 
parcel of his work as a philosopher. It furnished no material 
for his thoughts. This fact which is indeed undeniable, is 
particularly glaring in the case of thinkers like Maimonides 
and Saadia in whom the converging streams meet. They fail 
entirely to establiso a true synthesis of the two elements, 
Halaka and philosophy, a fact which has already been pointed 
out by Samuel David Luzzato. Maimonides, for instance, begins 
the Mishne Torah, his great codification of the Halaka, with 
a philosophic chapter which has no relation whatever to 
Halaka itself. The synthesis of the spheres remains sterile, 
and the genius of the man whose spirit moulded them into a 9 semblance of union cannot obscure their intrinsic disparity. 
Although both Scholem and Strauss miscalculated in ascribing this view to 
Maimonides, they were nevertheless correct in surmising that there 
existed a significant school within rabbinic thinking which d~emed 
philosophy and Halaka as mutually exclusive. 
Professor Isadore nversky and Dr. D~vid Hartman successfully demon-
strated that Maimonides was an adherent of the second world view 
which considered the other disciplines such as philosophy and meta-
physics as important aspects which formed the delicate infrastruc-
10 ture of Halaka. However, they too would appear to have fallen 
short of realising the full profundity of the way Maimonides viewed 
the relationship between philosophy and Halaka. For in Maimonides' 
mind, philosophy is not merely an important setting in which Halaka 
is rooted, as they claimed, .but exactly the reverse. As the afore-
mentioned aphorism suggests that philosophy is a component of the 
four cubits of Halaka, philosophy is rooted in Halaka, not vice 
versa. Philosophy then, cannot be conceived as a "non-halakic" 
dimension of Halaka, but rather as Halaka itself. 
This contention is not simply a semantic dabble. There is an 
important practical difference whether philosophy and metaphysics 
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3 scholarship which one is required by law to learn. Other codifiers, 
whose halakic approaches concurred with the former world view, inten-
4 tionally excluded Pardes from among the Laws of Torah study. 
One might view these two interpretations alternatively, as contesting 
the exact expanse encompassed by the four cubits precincts of Halaka. 
The former school would ostensibly adopt a minimalistic attitude 
defining the precincts of four cubits as the minimal area which 
t • t t I • t d • 5 Th • ld fl t • t cons 1 u e one s pr1va e oma1n. 1s wou re ec qu1 e a narrow-
minded world view which regards all other disciplines as external 
and irrelevant to the diminutively marginal expanse of these four 
cubits to which the Halakist must confine himself. The latter 
school, on the other hand, would obviously ad8pt a maximalistic 
approach which would extend the four cubits precincts to encompass 
virtually the entire cosmos. This would reflect a very broad world 
view which considers no discipline as either exterior or irrelevant 
to Halaka. 6 
This being the case, if one were to endeavour to resolve the question 
"Does Jewish tradition recognize a Philosophy independent of Halaka?" 
in the same way as Rabbi A. Lichtenstein embarked upon answering 
the question in an article entitled: "Does Jewish tradition recog-
nize an ethic independent of Halaka?"7 One would firstly have to 
identify oneself with a particular world view before proceeding to 
tackle the question. As clearly, if one espoused the second world 
view, the answer is an irrevocable No. Since ethics and philosophy 
are constituents of the g-2neral category of Halaka, they are essen-
tial components of the four cubits expanse. Whereas, if one adheres 
to the former view, one would have to establish whether a symbiotic 
relationship exists between philosophy, ethics, and Halaka in order 
to determine if they pertain or influence Halaka in such a way that 
they would also qualify as legitimate pursuits. If this relation-
ship does not exist then they would be considered insignificant 
"independents" falling miserably outside the diminutive periphery 
of the four cubits. 
Maimonides 
There are, to be sure, many Jewish scholars who intuitively sensed 
the narrow parameters to which the former school confined the Halakist. 
INTRODUCTION 
purposes is a waste of his energy and time. 
The latter approach, on the other hand, would interpret the aphorism 
as establishing a fundamental principle describing a Divine truism, 
roughly as : "Although there appear to be a multitude of disjointed 
and unrelated disciplines in the world, there is no discipline in 
G-d's world which does not converge and have its origin in one arche-
type discipline from whence they channel; th~ four cubits of Halaka!" 
Accordingly, other disciplines such as philosophy and metaphysics 
are integral aspects of Halaka. For the teleological premise upon 
which this interpretation is based has as its primary objective, 
the understanding of the G-dhead Himself. Man can certainly not 
hope to comprehend the intricate workings of G-d without pursuing 
the complementary disciplines of philosophy, metaphysics, mysticism 
and the like, together with Halaka. Halaka seen in this regard 
then, is not merely a codex of law which is aimed at instructing 
the individual how to "perform" before his Maker, thereby obviating 
the n~ed to indulge in other pursuits of enquiry. Rather, Halaka 
has an overall purpose of orientating man towards knowledge of G-d 
as well, and therefore considers other disciplines also aimed at 
this quintain as a vital aspect of the halakic system and hardly 
extraneous at all. 
Macro-halakic View and Micro-halakic View 
One can safely aver that it was precisely in these two variant 
interpretations that Jewish scholarship became characteristically 
split over the centuries. For according to the first view, secular 
knowledge is regarded largely extraneous to Halaka, at times opposed 
to it altogether. While the latter view regarded secular knowledge 
vital to Halaka. The famed controversy among Jewish theologians 
and Halakists through the ages over whether one should engage one's 
mental efforts in philosophical speculation, as discussed and argued 
extensively in the Responsa literature, is a direct result of these 
two world views. 2 
Consequently we find that Maimonides and R. Moses Isserles, who were 
scions of the school which adopted the second world view, as we 
shall soon see, incorporated the study of Pardes (the esoteric 
philosophy of physics and metaphysics) within the purview of Torah 
- 2 -
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Four Cubits of Halaka 
"The Holy One Blessed be He has nothing in His world except [the] 
four cubits of Halaka alone " [Berakoth 8a] . 
There are two ways in which the above talmudic aphorism can be 
understood. One is from the perspective of man, the other is from 
the perspective of G-d. The former approach is an adjunct of a 
teleological Weltanschauung which regards all biblical and rabbinic 
doctrine as aimed towards increasing man's awareness of how G-d 
envisions man. As such, it would expect to effect a change in 
man's behavior in light of such knowledge, rather than focusing on 
G-d per se which ultimately is beyond man's grasp. 1 The latter 
approach does not regard religious dogma as appealing exclusively 
to man's sense of awareness of how G-d envisions man, but is also 
directed at orientating man towards his Maker by enhancing man's 
apprehension of the G-dhead Himself. For man must react not only 
in a way which G-d expects of him, but man must model himself after 
his Maker as well. Man cannot achieve that end unless he has a 
proper understanding of the object of his emulation. 
Consequently the former approach would interpret the above aphorism 
approximately as follows: "There are a multitude of disciplines to 
which ~1n is exposed and may encounter throughout life. However, 
none of these are of any G-dly significance except for the four 
cubits of, i.e., the discipline of Halaka alone." According to 
this interpretation and the teleological disposition which produced 
it, other disciplines such as philosophy, metaphysics and the like 
are granted recognition. However, non~ of these disciplines, 
aside from Halaka, will enable man to achieve his end of realizing 
what G-d wants of man. They will not effect a corresponding change 
in man's behaviour in this direction, and therefore these disciplines 
are of no significance to man, as they are of no Divine practical 
avail to him. Hence they are regarded as extraneous to the system 
of Halaka. Man's pursuit of such disciplines for all intents and 
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world from Sinai onwards, what sort of jurisdiction apart from 
ordinary civil law could have previously existed, over which they 
could have mastered sufficient proficiency to enable them alone to 
become heads of a unique court of justice. Obviously some form of 
Halaka must have existed even prior to Sinai to which pre-Mosaic 
man was already exposed beforehand. Therefore, not only does the 
aphorism's opening clause suggest that some form of Halaka already 
existed prior to Sinai (as Halaka is G-d's sole interest in this 
world and G-d ~ertainly had an interest in His world prior to Sinai) 
but the courts of justice which antedated Sinai also indicate this 
point. Of necessity then, the precincts of the four cubits of 
Halaka must be expanded to include a great deal more than what was 
conventionally assumed to constitute Halaka from Sinai onwards. 
Therefore the conventional definition of Halaka and its four cubits' 
expanse must be broadened to include that form of Halaka which existed 
already prior to Sinai, and even before the creation of the world. 23 
Pre-Sinaitic Law 
Maimonides' sequelant task in his Introduction to the Commentary on 
the Mishna, following his citation of the aphorism and his empirical 
quesioning of it, is to establish precisely what form of Halaka 
existed prior to Sinai and to determine in which manner this form of 
Halaka differed from Mosaic Law. 
This, in fact, is the same task Maimonides undertakes in the chapter 
of his Guide where he refers to the court of justice of Shem and Eber. 
Maimonides queries: If Moses' uniqueness and greatness of phrophecy 
which distinguished him apart and above every prophet who preceeded 
or succeeded him, lay in the fact that Moses introduced G-d's Law 
into the world, did not the courts of justice of Shem and Eber also 
expound the Law before the populace? 
Maimonides responds by submitting that although both Moses and the 
prophets preceeding him expounded the Law before the populace, the 
difference between them lies in their difference in method of expoun-
ding and in their own legitimisation of their respective vocations. 
Moses was the only prophet who asserted the validity of his mission 
on the basis of his being a Divine prophet and that G-d had 
"commanded" him to promulgate His Law to the people. Shem and Eber 
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and the Patriarchs, on the other hand, did not legitimize themselves 
on the basis of their prophecy. Rather, they communicated their 
beliefs by means of providing demonstrative proofs. They did not 
"corrunand" their beliefs to others, they merely shared and corrmunicated 
them. In the words of Maimonides: 
All of them [i.e., Shem, Eber and the Patriarchs] were prophets 
who taught the people through being instructors, teachers, and 
guides, but did not say: The Lord said to me, speak to the 
sons of so and so.24 
Maimonides iterates this same thesis in an earlier section of the 
Guide, stating that prior to Moses there were those who claimed: 
.•• like Abraham, that speculation and reason had come to him 
indicating that the world has a deity ... Yet that an individual 
should make a claim to prophecy on the ground that G-d had 
spoken to him and sent him on a missiQn, was a thing never 
heard of prior to Moses, our Master.2) 
At this point one could say that according to Maimonides, the 
difference between the Halaka which existed prior to Sinai to that 
which existed from Sinai onwards, is that pre-Sinaitic Halaka was 
arrived at by means of inductive philosophical reasoning and demon-
strative proofs whereas post-Sinaitic Halaka became revealed publicly 
by means of a Divine command. 26 While pre-Mosaic man approached 
his G-d and practiced his beliefs on the basis of logical reasoning 
which he himself had arrived at or which had been "taught" to him 
by others, post-Mosaic man approached his G-d and practiced his 
beliefs on the basis of a Divine imperative. 
was "corrrnanded" to do so. 27 
That is, because he 
A careful reading of Maimonides' Introduction to the Commentary on 
the Mishna will reveal the same intention there as well. In the 
courts of justice of Shem and Eber, jurisdiction was discharged bv 
means of employing a thorough investigation into the natural sciences 
and a full examination of their "purpose." Their authority was 
vested in their recognized acumen of having sufficiently mastered 
the natural sciences and having understood their purpose to be able 
to demonstrate and teach the laws which their study had revealed to 
them. 
This exposition differs substantially from Hartman's who claims 
that Halaka did not exist prior to Sinai, even for the Patriarchs, 




Abraham, Maimonides' model of pre-Mosaic man, illustrates a 
relationship of man to G-d not grounded in Halaka. 
(Emphasis added.)28 
And reiterated again in a footnote: 
For Maimonides, the patriarchs symbolize a way to G-d not grounded 
in legislative Halaka.29 
It is unacceptable to Hartman that Abraham, in Maimonides' view, 
could have practiced Halaka. For Hartman purports to eschew that 
according to Maimonides, Halaka did not exist prior to Sinai even 
for the Patriarchs, and that they pursued a road to G-d independent 
of Halaka. Hartman's hypothesis of the non-existence of Halaka 
prior to Sinai seems to be inconsistent with Maimonides' explicit 
words codified in Laws of Kings and their Wars: 
First man was commanded about six matters: [The prohibitions 
of] idolatry, blasphemy, bloodshed, adultery, robbery and 
judicature. Although we received all these from Moses, our -
Master, and they are reasonable, it would appear, that of all 
the Torah, he was commanded concerning these things. To Noah 
was added [the prohibition of] flesh cut from a living animal, 
as it is written: 'Nevertheless, flesh with the soul thereof, 
and the blood thereof, shall ye not eat.'30 There are found 
seven commandments. And so it was in all the world until 
Abraham. Abraham came and was commanded in addition to these 
concerning circumc1s1on. He instituted Shaharit [the morning 
service]. Isaac separated a tithe and added another prayer 
towards [the end of] the day. Jacob added the sciatic nerve 
and prayed Arvit [the evening service]. In Egypt, Amram \vas 
instructed in additional commandments. Until the advent of 
Moses, our Master, and the Torah was completed by him.31 
From this codification of Maimonides it is obvious that many command-
ments had been inroduced prior to Sinai and that Moses merely 
completed the Torah by introducing additional laws which had not 
existed previously. 
Post-Sinaitic Law and the Difference Between the TWo Systems 
In his commentary to the Mishna in Hullin, i1aimonides explains 
Moses' purpose in reintroducing at Sinai those same commandments 
which had already been in existence beforehand: 
And be attentive to the great principle which is included in 
the Mishna. And that is, what was proclaimed at Sinai became 
prohibited. Because you were shown to understand that every-
thing that we abstain from or do today, we don't do except by 
the command of G-d through Moses, our Master. Not that the 
Holy One Blessed be He said this to the prophets before him, 
for example this [practice] that we do not eat the flesh cut 
from a living animal. This is not because He forbade it to 
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Noah. Rather it is because Moses forbade the flesh of a 
living animal in that he commanded at Sinai to observe the 
prohibition of flesh from a living animal. And similarly, 
we do not circumcise because Abraham, our Patriarch, circum-
cised himself and the men of his household. But because the 
Holy One Blessed be He commanded us through Moses that we 
circumcise just as Abraham, our Patriarch, circumcised. And 
similarly the sciatic nerve, we do not follow the prohibition 
of Jacob, our Patriarch, but rather the commandment of Moses, 
our Master. Behold, did you not see what they said that : 
'Six hundred and thirteen commandments were told to Moses on 
Sinai, '32 and all these are included in the commandments.33 
Maimonides very aptly explains that the reason it was necessary for 
Moses to reintroduce those same commandments which had already been 
communicated beforehand, is because prior to Sinai, these command-
ments had only been communicated to select individuals and were not 
binding on the people as a whole. Had Moses not reinstituted those 
commandments once again at Sinai, it would not have been incumbent 
upon the Israelites to obey them. Therefore, Moses' purpose in 
reintroducing these commandments was not to reveal novel commandments 
which were not known to exist before, but rather to obligate the 
people towards their observance as a nation. 
Clearly then, David Hartman's assertion that "Abraham, Maimonides' 
model of pre-Mosaic man, illustrates a relationship of man to G-d 
not grounded in Halaka," is quite curious. Hartman himself concedes 
that Maimonides knew of the talmudic tradition that: "We find that 
Abraham, our Patriarch observed the whole Torah before it was given, 
for it is written: 'Because Abraham obeyed My voice, kept My charge, 
My commandment~, My statutes, and My laws.'"34 
The reason Maimonides in his Code, only ascribed circumcision to 
Abraham despite Abraham's observance of all the commandments, is 
not as Hartman avers that Maimonides rejected this tradition. 
That is not possible, for Genesis itself affirms that Abraham observed 
G-d's charge, commandments, statutes, and laws! Rather it is because 
the commandment of circumcision was directly communicated to Abraham, 
whereas his observance of the other commandments was a result of 
Ab h I • • • 35 ra am s own ratlOClnatlon. 
Hartman's observation that : "Maimonides does not quote a biblical 
text to indicate Abrahams' missionary activity is a result of a 
divine command," does not evidence that Maimonides considered 
Ab h I • • h 1 k. 
36 R h h . d . 1 d ra am s actlvlty non- a a lC. at er, e ln ustrlous y pursue 
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halakic activity as a result of his own ratiocination, even without 
being "coomanded" to do so. 37 This being the typical form of 
halakic activity characteristic of pre-Mosaic man. In another 
footnote Hartman remarks: 
The Maimonidean Hasid who lives by Halaka has no difficulty 
understanding and accepting that the way to G-d of pre-Mosaic 
man was not based on Halaka. His knowledge of philosophy 
enables him to understand how individuals can build spiritual 
lives not grounded in Halaka.38 
It is obvious from what Maimonides writes in his Code and in commen-
tary to the Mishna in Hullin, that according to Maimonides, a halakic 
system existed already prior to Sinai. The seven Noahide command-
ments certainly existed before Sinai. Hartman seems unaware that 
the mark of distinction which differentiated post-Mosaic man from 
pre-Mosaic man is that the former was obliged to adhere to Halaka 
as a result of his own philosphical understanding without being 
''imposed" upon him, whereas the latter was compelled to adhere t o 
Halaka as a result of a divine imperative based on Sinaitic revela-
tion. Thus pre-Mosaic man was definitely a ''halakist" and not 
simply an "aggadist" as Hartman purports. The primary purpose 
of the convenant at Sinai was not so much the revelation of new laws 
per se, as it was to bind the people to their G-d in the mandatory 
adherence to these laws. 39 
Thus the returning to our aphorism, we find that the term "Halaka" 
connotes commandment activity both prior and subsequent to Sinai . 
The giving of Torah at Sinai must therefore be regarded not as 
replacing, subverting, or altering the halakic system which existed 
beforehand, but rnther as enhancing that system. Naturally then, 
many desirable elements of the old system were expected to carry 
over into the new system, the most important ones being the disci-
plines of metaphysics and philosophy, necessary for religious faith. 
This fact Maimonides discusses quite clearly in the continuation of 
his discussion of the aphorism, in his Introduction to the Co~~en­
tary on the Mishna: 
And if so, it has become clear from all that we have said that 
the intended purpose in the creation of everything that is in 
the world which exists and decomposes is none other than a 
complete person who consists of knowledge and action, as we 
have said. And when you will consider and study from their 
[the Sages] words, peace be upon them, these two matters, 
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namely 'knowledge and action' from what they explained and 
alluded to - you will know what has been correctly said: 
that the Holy One, Blessed be He, has nothing in His world 
except the four cubits of Halaka.40 
Maimonides ends his exposition of the aphorism by affirming that 
the purpose of all creation is a man who is complete in that he is 
both a man of knowledge and a man of action. His completion 
rests in his ability to combine the vita contemplativa with the 
vita activa into a wholesome unity. Maimonides describes the 
integral interrelation between knowledge and action midway through 
his exposition: 
And, therefor, you will find concerning every commandment of 
Torah, 'And you will study them' and afterwards 'that you 
may do them' [Deuteronomy 5:11 citing knowledge before 
action. For through knowledge the man will arrive at the 
deed, but he cannot acquire knowledge from the deed. And 
this is what they [the Sages] said, 'that study leads one to 
action. •41 
Maimonides stresses how the Torah itself recognised that the 
halakic process which existed prior to Sinai, namely philosophic 
reasoning leading up to action, should continue after Sinai as well. 
For man must not contain himself to the deeds which were communicated 
to him at Sinai, as, "deeds do not lead to knowledge." Maimonides 
was extremely avvare of the problem which Sinai posed in presenting 
the people with precepts to blindly follow without comprehending 
what they were doing: 
And similarly, if there will be a man who also worships, and 
is a Nazerite, and abstains from pleasures - aside from what 
is necessary to preserve his body - and he walks in all the 
natural ways in the straight path, and he possesses all the 
pleasant qualitiest but he possesses no knowledge, he is 
also deficient in Lhis] completeness.43 
Throughout many of his writings Maimonides repeatedly emphasized 
the deficiency of Halakists who zealously pursue the commandments 
without possessing knowledge of philosophy and the natural sciences. 
Probably the best known example ,is his famous parable in the Guide 
in which he denigLates the: 
..• ignoramuses who observe the commandments and jurists who 
believe true opinions on the basis of traditional authority, 
and study the law concerning the practices of divine service 
but do not engage in speculation concerning the fundamental 
principles ' of religion and make no inquiry regarding the 
ratification of belief,44 
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as being outside the Palace; Whereas the jurist who has also: 
... plunged into speculation concerning the fundamental principles 
of religion and has comprehended divine matters to the extent 
that it is possible, everything that may be ascertained -has 
come to be with the ruler in the inner part of his habita tion.45 
In his parable Maimonides draws a distinction between two types of 
Halakists - the one who has gained philosophic knowledge and the 
one who is deficient in such knowledge. He does not, however, 
distinguish between Halakists and philosophers as Shlomo Pines 
wants to suggest: 
In the elaborate parable of the palace, the philosophers, i.e., 
men who know physics and metaphysics, and the prophets who by 
definition are also philosophers, enter the castle while the 
Halakhists a:re looking vaily for a way in. 46 
Maimonides' son, Abraham, very adeptly describes the importance 
of man continuing the philosophic faculty with which he was equipped 
prior to the giving of Torah, after Sinai as well: 
And no one can deny that Torah was not given to Israel until 
the Exodus from Egypt. And to each and every one of the seed 
of Israel their knowledge was given prior to Torah. Know that 
the child, because his knowledge is incomplete, was not 
required by G-d to observe the commandments. And when he 
begins to understand, he is instructed in the rabbinic ordin-
ances until he grows in years, and his mind becomes completely 
developed he becomes obligated in Torah and the commandments 
of the Torah. And if he grows in years and he has no knowledge 
- he has no Torah. For the imbecile, even if he is old is 
exempted from the commandments.47 
Accord~_ng to R. Abraham b. Moses Maimonides, had the post-Sinai 
Halakist not continued the philosophic approach of the pre-Sinai 
halakist, he would be no more than the imbecile who is exempted 
from Torah Law. Maimonides, therefore, effectively resolves his 
own dilemma of the inapplicability of the aphorism to the period of 
Shem and Eber by metamorphosizing the conventional precincts of 
the four cubits of Halaka to encompass the philosophically and 
metaphysically orientated system of Halaka which existed already 
prior to Sinai. It is vital to Maimonides that this trend in 
Halaka should continue after Sinai. For otherwise the Sinaitic 
experience would have incurred a countereffect of producing law 
abiding ignoramuses. Knowledge is fundamental for practice, as 
practice without reflection is as valueless as the pious imbecile 
Consequently, 
Halaka in his 
who is exempted from adhering to commandments. 
Maimonides included the speculatory dimension of 
definition of a post Sinaitic Law. 48 
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Neither is Maimonides faced with Hartman's problem of why Sinai 
was necessary altogether, considering that there had already 
existed an alternative route to G-d independent of Halaka beforehand. 
For according to Maimonides, the only road which led man to G-d 
prior to Sinai was a halakic one. 
The Need for a New System and the Structure of Torah Law 
All that remained for Maimonides to explain is, given the expediency 
of the pre-Sinaitic system of Halaka, what inadequacies were con-
tained in that system which necessitated the introduction of a 
new system. And concurrently, what inadequacies would have resulted 
in the new system had it disregarded various elements fro;,t the 
earlier system? However, for this purpose, we must first investi-
gate what convinced Maimonides to codify with such certainty that 
Moses merely completed the Torah but did not initiate it. 49 
Maimonides viewed Sinai in terms of a progressive historical 
development because the Torah itself does not begin with the juris-
diction of Sinai. By beginning with the scientific Account of 
the Beginning rather than from Sinai, the Torah was legitimizing 
and emphasizing that the philosophical contemplation of Divine 
Science which began prior to Sinai should continue unrelentingly 
after Sinai. Thus, the Torah was legislating philosophical pursuit 
as an integral dimension of the halakic process. Therefore, 
the Torah, by its very structure and order, attested that Moses was 
merely consummating a halakic process which the Patriarchs discovered 
but he was not altering or initiating one. 
Whereas legists generally have no patience for legal history, the 
vast majority of codifiers having isolated Sinai from the history 
of religion which preceeded it, based their codes purely on the 
Sinaitic commandments and their interpretation by the Oral Law. 
Maimonides was unique in that he regarded the history of religion 
which he codified in various places throughout his Code, hardly 
an exercise in antiquarianism, but rather as having profound halakic 
i~plications in realising the purpose and goal of Halaka. Accor-
ding to Maimonides, the historical development of laws and institu-
tions have an intensely practical value within the system of Halaka. 50 
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As if the Torah had not stressed the primacy of reflection upon 
Divine Science enough by beginning from the creation account rather 
than from Sinai, the Torah repeated its insistence upon the para-
mountcy of Divine Science once again by structuring the Sinaitic 
tablets so that they command Divine beliefs at the start, and the 
earthly commandments only secondarily. Having taken all this 
into account, Maimonides became absolutely convinced that the 
Torah not only acknowledged the philosophically oriented pre-
Mosaic system of Halaka, but more fundamentally so, legislated 
that this system incorporate its same character, within the Sinaitic 
system of Halaka. Moses then, merely completed the halakic effort 
which the Patriarchs had begun before him. 
It now becomes important to consider, according to Maimonides' 
rationale, that if the prophets were capable of arriving at Halaka 
through their own philosophical inquiry and were able in turn to 
demonstrate the truth of these laws to others, to the extent that 
Sinai not only accredited this system but legislated its continuance 
as well, what was lacking then, in this system, which made the 
Sinaitic system necessary? 
Maimonides amplifies this matter, by describing the pre-Mosaic system 
of Halaka as a way to G-d which was accessible only to an elite who 
were intellectually capable of such sophisticated contemplation or 
who were capable of grasping the complicated proofs which were being 
demonstrated to them by others. But for the ordinary masses who 
lacked the intellectual genius to assimilate the knowledge which 
leads one to action, this pre-Mosaic system of Halaka was shut off 
to most men. 
Moreover, even the philosophers themselves who possessed mental 
astuteness, had no guarantee of arriving at correct opinions or of 
reaching truthful conclusions. To be sure, Aristotle and others 
like him were recognizably brilliant philosophers and yet they 
managed to reach conclusions which were antithetic to the Torah 
view, and certainly did not lead to halakic activity. In the first 
few Laws of Idolatry, M~imonides documents how what initially 
began as a philosophical comprehension of G-d eventually became 
misconstrued as to embrace paganistic forms of idolatry - which 
th 1 d d . h lb . ' . t d 51 never e ess were engen ere tnroug reason, a e1t 01stor e . 
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Consequently, the significance of Sinai became threefold. F~rstly , 
in prescribing a way of life which advocated precepts that focus 
upon G-d and train the mind to aspire towards degrees of sublime 
intellection. Secondly, in explicitly stating certain theological 
axioms which would prevent philosophical quest in going astray 
and reaching erroneous conclusions. And thirdly, in binding man 
to G-d by converting Divine Science from a volitional philosophical 
exercise of a select elite to a mandatory exercise in practice for 
the whole corrm . .rn.i ty, each according to his ovm capability. 
In fact all three purposes are magnificently formulated in the very 
first commandment. Firstly, it ratifies pre-Mosaic man by projec-
ting G-d as the objective of all men, no matter what their degree 
of intellection. Secondly, it clearly defines a theological axiom 
which philosophic speculation must not controvert. And thirdly 
it binds man to G-d by postulating belief in G-d not as a voluntary 
intellectual exercise but as a mandatory commandment, with sanctions. 
This portrayal is commensurate with the thesis of Maimonides, who 
contrary to some of his colleagues, identifies the first commandment 
as a mandatory imperative rather than a preamble for accepting 
commandments. 52 
Thus the primary significance of the very first cornmandment is not 
in its revelation of G-d per se, whose existence was already known 
before, but rather in its transposal of the pre-Mosaic pursuit of 
G-d from a voluntary past-time of an intellectual elite to an 
enforced obligation in .practice on the part of the community. 
Hence, the importance of Sinai was more in terms of the convenantal 
binding that it sought to achieve, rather than in the G-d it came 
to disclose. The purpose of the disclosure was merely to establish 
an axiological premise which would prevent counter conclusions 
from being reached during moments of intellection. 
Theonomy: Maimonides' Codification of Theological Norms 
Because Maimonides recognised that the primary objective of the 
first commandment was to convert the theorems of Divine Science 
from an intellectual sport to an obligatory exercise in practice, 
he modelled his Code accordingly by beginning the theological laws 
of his Code employing the format of actual norms. For according 
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to Maimonides, Sinai not only recognised theology, Sinai legislated 
theology. 
Thus the teleological motif underlying Torah and reflected in 
~iaimonides ' Code that "knowledge leads to practice" experienced a 
transition at Sinai. For this teleology went from a mere motif 
to become a legal canon. Both Torah and Maimonides' Code, by 
placing the laws of theology before laws concerning man's deeds, 
not only endorsed the teleology of "knowledge leads to practice" 
but in fact legislated it. Knowledge and practcie together 
constitute post-Mosaic Halaka. Only if taken together do they 
form that indivisible unit which binds man in convenant to G-d. 53 
David Hartman asserts that the theological chapters at the onset 
of Maimonides ' Code were "presented as the content of norms even 
though they are demonstrative proofs."54 Louis Jacobs as well 
opines that Maimonides formulated these theological chapters as 
55 if they were norms although in fact they are not. Hartman 
continues: 
By beginning the Mishne Torah [Code] in this way the halakic 
Jew is forced to perceive G-d's reality as extending beyond 
the structure of the laws.56 
It is our contention, however, that Maimonides did not present these 
theological views as if they were norms, but rather that he consi-
dered these to be in fact, actual norms. Maimonides did not simply 
write theology - he codified legislative TI1eology . For the purpose 
of Torah, after which Maimonides modeled his Code, was not merely 
to present theological opinions concerning G-d, but in fact to 
codify them as legislated axioms. These axioms were Torah centre-
posts which philosophical speculation was forbidden to controvert. 
Sinai did not merely insist that the philosophical pursuit of pre-
Mosaic man continue after Sinai as well. Sinai went further in 
stipulating the theological direction that this pursuit had to take. 
Any premise or conclusion which strayed form this course was forbidden. 
It was the legislation of predetermined axiomatic principles which 
made these laws normative rather than conceptual. 
Mo.imonides did not enter his theological vie\vS at the onset of his 
Code in order to impress upon the halakic Jew that philosophy is 
important for Halaka and that "G-d's reality extends beyond the 
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structure of the law," but more fundamentally that G-d 's reality is 
built into the structure of law itself. 
In a responsum by Radbaz-- Rabbi David Ibn Abi Zimra, the respondent 
makes it amply clear that Maimonides was dealing with a real norma-
tive Halaka of "knowing G-d" right from the very first law of his 
Code and was not merely conceptualising. As a Halakist, Radbaz 
was compelled to answer the question why Maimonides did not begin 
the first law of his Code by stating the first commandment rather 
than devolving into a metaphysical description of Divine Science . 
Radbaz resolves that each detail of Maimonides' metaphysical descrip-
tion is potently halakic in that every detail is axiomatic in 
instructing and describing the Sinaitic commandment of "knowing 
God."57 
The First Commandment as a Mitzvah and a Halaka 
At the same time Maimonides was very much aware of the limitations 
of prescribing a predetermined axiological direction. For the 
inevitable problem which would be difficult to prevent from deve-
loping, is a resultant of unquestioning acceptance of these princi-
ples on the basis of belief alone, rather than these principles 
functioning as "guidelines" for which to activate and direct 
philosophical pursuit of G-d. This purpose would become obscured 
when these principles rather than becoming demonstrated truths 
would become believed truths- without any inclination or under-
standing of the nature of these beliefs. A communicated belief 
is significant only insofar as it activates and breeds knowledge 
which in turn leads to action. "Any belief which does not foster 
knowledge is an empty belief. ,~S This intention Maimonides makes 
clear by his meticulous distinction in wording between his Book 
of Commandments and his Book of Knowledge in dealing with the first 
commandment . 
Maimonides opens his Book of Commandments as follows: 
Commandment 1: is that wherein He has commanded us concerning 
belief in the Deity; that is, we are to believe that there is 
a Supreme Cause who is the Creator of everything in existence. 
This injunction finds expression in the words 'I am the Lord 
thy G-d. '59 
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Whereas he opens his Book of Knowledge stating: 
'lhe basic principle of all principles and the pillar of all 
sciences is to know that there is a First Being who brought 
every existing thing into being. All existing things whether 
celestial, terrestrial, or belonging to an intermediate class, 
exist only through His true Existence.60 
\~en discussing the first commandment in his Book of Commandments 
as a "commandment," Maimonides employs the term to believe. In 
discussing the same commandment in his Code as a "Halaka, " 
Maimonides employs the term to know. For, according to Mai~onides, 
the purpose of G-d's commanding a belief is solely in order to 
activate and direct the halakic process of knowing G-d. This 
is why Maimonides began his Code with knm-.rledge of G-d rather belief 
in G-d. For it is knowledge, rather than belief, which leads to 
the major concern of his Code, nrunely, action. 
In his commentary on the Maimonidean Code, R. Obadiah Hediah 
explains that in describing the Sinai tic commandmc=u t i'1aimonides 
preferred the term to believe since this commandment was communi-
cated to w8men and children in addition to many men whose mental 
faculties would neither enable them to "know" G-d nor demonstrate 
the truth of these beliefs to themselves. It would, therefore, 
have been pointless for G-d to command His people to "know" G-d, 
since this knowledge does not exist on any one level and many who 
were incapable of this knmvledge altogether at any level may have 
possibly even denied G-d as a result of their inability to knmv 
G-d by way of reason. Therefore, the lowest co!Tii1on denomi~a tor 
which would minima lis ticall y apply and bind all the people ::>~ i all 
levels, had to be expressed as a belief, even if the truth of 
these beliefs could not be demonstrated in themselves: 
And now the matter is self understood why the Sages mentioned 
these two fundamentals, belief and knowledge, in G-d's existence 
[i.e.,] to teach that if his intelligence did not succeed in 
comprehending these properties he will strengthen himself on 
the basis of his belief in the tradition.61 
Likewise we find in Sefer ha-Hinnukh regarding his exposition of 
the first commandment: 
And the matter of the belief [in G-d's existence] is that he 
set in his soul that the truth is so and that this cannot be 
denied in any way ... And if he succeeds in rising in the 
levels of knowledge arid his heart understands, and in his eyes 
he sees a convincing proof, that this belief which he believes 
is true and clear, and that nothing could be otherwise, then 
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he will have fulfilled this affirmative commandment in the 
best way possible.62 
Accordingly, Maimonides understood that the "Halaka" of the first 
commandment, is to transform the "colllllandment" of belief in G-d, 
to knowledge of G-d, each person according to his own capability. 63 
That is, to transform emotionally based identification into simple 
cognitive knowledge. This "Halaka" of the first commandment pro-
pelled man to pursue his pre-Mosaic halakic activity by activating 
reflection on knowledge of G-d, through the commandment of belief 
in G-d. 1he binding of Sinai was in its legislatinr, f .12 continuance 
of the pre-Mosaic philosophic demonstration of G-d's existence, 
His unity, etc., as a halakic activity which is legally binding . 
By now it should be amply clear that David Hartman's allegation 
that "philosophic quest" is important for Halaka but in essence 
is non-halakic, is quite curious. 
The Contradiction of Non-halakic Halaka 
Perhaps Hartman was misled by Professor Isadore Twersky's article 
entitled, "Some Non-Halakic Aspects of the Mishne Torah," upon 
which Hartman's work Maimonides: Torah and Philosophic Quest, is 
heavily based. It is in this article that Professor Twersky 
puts forward the strange notion that the theological laws in 
Maimonides' Mishne Torah are "non-halakic" rather than halakic 
. 64 ln nature. 
Oddly enough, although Twersky does provide ample documentation 
that Maimonides' basic philosophical ideas, are scattered and 
diffused throughout the Code, Twersky does not substantiate his 
ambitious presumption, that these Maimonidean motifs which he 
eruditely locates are "non halakic" in nature but merely assumes 
so. In fact, Twersky himself concedes that much of what he ascribes 
to Maimonides' non-halakic emphasis "appears in overtly halakic 
contexts. "65 
The single instance which seems to corroborate Twersky's thesis is 
his notation of how R. Josef Caro in his commentary Kesef Mishne 
on the final chapters of Maimonides' Code, Laws of Kings and their 
~.Jars: "noted the essentially non-halakic character of these two 
chapters." (Emphasis added.) 66 
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Twersky is referring here to what Kesef Mishne apparently meant in 
saying: 
This chapter and the one following it; are good beliefs 
concerning the coming of our Messiah.o7 
On the surface 'it would appear that this statement of Kesef Mishne 
greatly attests TWersky's thesis that certain sections are extant 
in the Maimonidean Code which are completely non-halakic in nature. 
As Kesef Mishne himself comments that these two final chapters of 
Maimonides' Code are not in fact Halakot which deal with prohibitions 
and commands but rather good ·beliefs and opinions concerning the 
Messiah. However, a closer investigation of Kesef Mishne's comment 
reveals that this assessment is far fetched and was certainly not 
the intention of Kesef Mishne. 
To begin with, when one studies these two chapters of Maimonides' 
Code one discovers that these chapters are replete with Halakot 
concerning the laws of identifying the true Messiah and how to 
expose the pretentious impostor. Furthermore these laws are 
extremely practical considering that the true Messiah, and certainly 
a pretentious impostor could surface at any moment in time and we 
must of necessity have at our disposal halakic rules and regulations 
with which to determine whether the Messianic claimant should be 
proclaimed as authentic or restrained and silenced. In considering 
the abundantly significant halakic nature of these two chapters, 
one marvels how Kesef Mishne could have possibly classified these 
two chapters as "non-halakic" and that they are simply conveying 
good opinions and correct beliefs. 
However, when one examines the same Kesef Mishne in its entirety 
one begins to discern his real intention: 
This chapter and the one following it are good beliefs concer-
ning the coming of our Messiah. There is nothing for me to 
explain except concerning what our Rabbi [i.e., Maimonides] 
wrote 'Do not think •.. ,' until, 'he was killed for his iniqui-
ties.'rs And Rabad's words are true, and so it is in Chapter 
Helek. 0 But in Lamentations Rabbati, on the verse, 'The Lord 
hath swallowed up unsparingly'69 it says that he [i.e., Bar 
Cokhba] was killed by the Gentiles. And our Rabbi opines 
that what they said in Cbapter Helek does not accord with 
Shemuel who maintains that 'This world differs from the 70 Messianic era only in respect of the servitude of the Diaspora.' 
And our Rabbi concurs with Shemuel as is explained in the 




Kesef Mishne comments that because these two chapters deal with 
good opinions, there is no need for him to explain any of them 
except the controversy between Maimonides and R~bad. Kesef Mishne 
explains that this controversy between Maimonides and Rabad over 
whether the Messianic King must be capable of working miracles 
and wonders [i.e., the phenomenon of judging by the scent] is 
based on variant sources. Maimonides who states that Messiah need 
not perform miracles, conforms with Shemuel's view who maintains 
that the Messianic era will not manifest itself with miracles, as 
"there is no difference between this world and the Messianic era, 
except in respect of the servitude of the diaspora." Therefore 
Maimonides relies on the midrashic source which conflicts with 
Chapter Helek of the Talmud, and he explains that Ben Koziba was 
killed in battle by Gentiles and was not killed by the Sages because 
of his inability to work the miracle of judging by the scent. 
Rabad's criticism is based on the talmudic source which attributes 
his death as a result of his inability to work miracles. 72 
Thus we see that Maimonides and Rabad argue over an extremely 
important halakic issue concerning the laws of identifying the 
Messiah and exposing impostors. There is also a great practical 
difference between the two. As according to Rabad, if the Messianic 
claimant is incapable of working miracles, not only is he not pro-
claimed the Messiah, he is to be put to death. Whereas according 
to Maimonides, he may well be proclaimed the Messianic King despite 
his ordinary nature. 
Considering the significant practical halakic difference between 
them, one wonders with even greater astonishment how Kesef Mishne 
could possibly have prefaced his remark that these two chapters 
deal only with good beliefs of our Messiah in the very same appendage 
in which he elaborates upon this important halakic difference!! 
For the laws of exposing pretentious impostors apply constantly! 
We shall see at the end of Chapter III.l how consequential this 
halakic controversy was during the Bar Cokhba period. 
However, the resolvement of Kesef Mishne is exceedingly simple. 
Kesef Mishne explains how Maimonides' Halaka that the Messiah need 
not perform miracles is based on Shemuel who maintains: "This world 
differs from the Messianic era only in respect of the servitude of 
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the diaspora." Shemuel's view is nothing else but a "good belief 
concerning the coming of our Messiah." However, Shemuel's view is 
of great practical concequence. Since it is on this view that 
Maimonidean laws and criteria for identifying the Messiah and 
exposing impostors are dependent. 
Kesef Mishne, then, describes the "correct op~n~ons concerning the 
coming of our Messiah" in which he elaborates upon a greatly signi-
ficant practical Halaka- not in order to note the "non-halakic" 
nature of these chapters, as Twersky contends- but exactly to the 
contrary. Namely, to explain precisely how these "good opinions 
and beliefs" function as fundamentally essential criteria for 
determining Halaka. 
In fact, Twers~y himself seems to have reversed and somewhat modified 
his appraisal in a later work, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides 
where he writes: 
Maimonides' conception of law was organismic, oblivious to 
distinctions between practical laws and laws devoid of prac-
tical value, for these were anomalies that histor would 
rectify. 'fhe very scope o the Mishne Torah, a comprehensive 
Corpus Jurus Mosaici, discountenanced any such artificia7
3 separation and rendered it irrelevant. (Emphasis added.) 
Twersky annotates Halakot taken from these two chapters of the Code 
in evidence of laws which were impractical only from the point of 
view of history and not from the point of view of their actualisation 
or being actionable Halakot. In other words, the laws concerning 
the Messianic era are not "essentially nJn-halakic" as Twersky 
claimed in his article. Rather they appear non-halakic only because 
the Messiah has not yet arrived. However, history would soon rectify 
this anomaly and expose the inherently practical halakic nature of 
these laws. Indeed historically, Halakot describing criteria of 
the true Messiah are co ipso criteria to disqualify false Messiahs 
which are constantly relevant. 
R. Joseph Soloveichik stresses this point practically to exaggera-
tion in writing in his Ish ha-Halaka: 
The principle of all principles and the pillar of halakic 
thought is not the practical teachings, but rather the 
establishment of conceptual Halaka.74 
Rabbi Moses b. Joseph Trani (acronym ha-Mabit) in his Kiryat Sefer 
commentates on Maimonides' codification of Shemuel's view and concludes: 
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And there are in these laws rabbinically ordained matters 
which rely upon Scriptural verses as, 'Thou shalt not turn 
as ide, ' 7 5 'And you shall keep that which I have given over 
to you to guard.'76 And we are obligated to fulfil them as 
they have said: The sayings of the beloved are more dear to 
me than the wine of Torah.77 
It is most obvious that R. Trani, who was one of the foremost 
experts of Maimonides' Code, would candidly have considered Twersky's 
classification of these two chapters as "non-halakic" as a mis-
representation of the truth. 
Philosophic Halaka and Ritualistic Halaka: the Ways and the Deeds 
It wovld appear that Professor Twersky equated the term Halaka with 
ritual and therefore, he divided Maimonides' Code into Halaka and 
philosophy, 78 rather than ritualistic-halaka and philosophic-halaka. 
Consequently, Twersky classifies every Halaka which was non-ritual 
as non-halakic. 79 Although in truth we find the t~laka defined 
both in its broad macro-halakic sense as comprising all of Oral 
Law including Midrash and Aggada, and in its narrow micro-halakic 
sense, as opposed to Midrash and Aggadah, 80 it is clear from 
Maimonides' discussion of the aphorism, "G-d has nothing in His 
World except the four cubits of Halaka alone," and his codification 
of theology in the form of legislated norms, that Maimonides employed 
the term "Halaka" in its macro-halakic sense and did not simply 
"graft philosophy on to the substance of Oral Law," as Twersky 
1 . 81 c a1ms. 
It is, furthermore, evident from the Talmudic Encyclopedia's expoun-
ding of the meaning of the term "Halaka," that this term denotes far 
more than ritual and indeed involves an all-comprehensive way of 
life: 
The term Halaka is derived from the root halak [to go] and 
it means a thing which comes and goes from beginning to end. 
That is, something which was accepted in Israel and goes 
from Sinai until the present. Or, that Israel goes with it. 
That is, the accepted way that Israel must go. As it is 
written: 'And you will make known to them the way in which 
they are to walk and the deeds that they are to do ' 
[Exodus 18:20]?2 
Thus we see that Halaka by definition comprises both the ways in 
which they walk and the deeds that they are to do. The teleo-
logical purpose of Halaka [i.e., the ways] are themselves defined 




Every halakic activity is two dimentional as it involves both the 
activity of the deed (Din) and the activity of the aspiration 
(kavanah). We are charged to aspire as well as to perform. The 
performance of each activity must be coupled with the context of 
the activity. The legal as well as the supralegal. Halaka itself 
requires that we transcend the ritual corpus through aspiration. 
This enables the juridical rules to converge with the rnetajuridical 
ways. Aspiration therefore is not just a lofty ideal but a pressing 
bl . . 83 o ~gat~on. 
According to Maimonides, the demands and guidelines of Halaka are 
both so definitive and so comprehensive as to have developed a 
halakic philosophy which is apart from general theoretical philosophy. 
For the paramount purpose of Sinai was to develop a halakic philo-
sophy which prescribed its own telos. In doing so, Sinai separated 
Torah philosophy from secular philosophy in that the former became 
axiological and halakic while the latter remained teleological and 
theoretic. Philosophic-halaka is thus actionable in that its 
axiology is legislated and its pursuit is obligatory. 
Although ritualistic-Halaka and philosophic-Halaka are both action-
able, philosophy does not necessarily relate to Halaka in the same 
way as ritual in the sense that every philosophical dilemma can be 
looked up and resolved by reference to Code or canon. For philo-
sophic-Halaka is the qualitative dimension of each canonized ritual. 
This qualitative· property is multiplanar and consequently includes 
much more than is explicitly required or permitted by specific 
rules. The ways of Torah denote purpose and direction rather than 
prescribed acts. Metajurisdiction, or supralegal laws, looks 
before and after jurisdiction and legal law in that the former con-
cerns itself with results as much as with origins. 
R. Joseph Soloveichik keenly observed the expressed style in which 
Maimonides thematically presented the "ways" together with the "rules" 
consistently throughout his Code in the relation bet\veen the titles 
of Maimonides' chapters to the contents of the chapters themselves: 
The difference in nomenclature between the title and the law 
is not coincidental. It is a consistent method in Maimonides' 
system, that in every place where he deals with a commandment 
whose fulfilment is in the heart and its performance is in a 
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deed, he divides it with precision; in the laws he discusses 
the deed of the commandment, whereas in the title, where the 
definition and the introduction to the law are given, he 
discusses the fulfilment of the commandment in its entire and 
full significance.84 
Thus R. Soloveichik expertly describes the ingenious way in which 
Maimonides combined the ways of Halaka with the rules of Halaka. 
Every codified commandment has a twofold purpose: The perfunctory 
performance of a specific deed, and the intellectual fulfilment of 
its goals. 
The Educative Goal 
It stands to reason, following this same structural pattern, that 
M<limonides viewed his Sefer Maddah- Book of Knowledge- as a 
general "title" for his entire Mishne Torah in which the former 
outlined the goals and the ways of his Code while the latter concen-
trated primarily on the specific rules, with each titled section 
relating the rules back to the ways. The Code itself ultimately 
culminates in a zenith of this pattern in the Maimonidean system 
wh2re the rules of the entire Code relate back to the ways in the 
very last Halaka of the Code: 
And in that [Messianic] era there will be no famine and no 
war. And no jealousy and no competition. For the good will 
be plentiful. And all of the pleasures will be found like 
the dust .•. And the concern of the world will not be except to 
know G-d alone. And therefore Israel will become great with 
men and knowled eable in secret matters and the will attain 
their creation as ar as it is ssible 
As it is written: For the earth shall be ull o 
of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea.•8 
Thus, one can almost detect a systematic step by step process which 
Maimonides ingeniously developed in a series of writings and works, 
which if followed correctly would enable man to attain ultimate 
perfection and communion with G-d. 86 The deeds, in this sense, 
serve the purpose of actualising one's beliefs in practice so that 
knowledge of G-d becomes an active way of life, rather than a philo-
sophical repast of the mind. The practice of knowledge, in turn, 
creates a qualitative difference in the substance of knowledge itself. 
The substance of knowledge prior to and unaccompanied by the deed 
becomes enriched by the activity of the deed, in that concretizing 
one's knowledge through practice causes one to gravitate from a 
level of knowledge in which one not only knows G-d but more pro-
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foundly can commune with G-d. It ~s this sublime and superior 
level of knowledge which Maimonides in his last Halaka of the Code 
expounds at greater length in his final work the Guide. 87 
This objective of the Guide is authenticated by Maimonides himself 
in the very first quote which he selects to induct his Guide: 
'Cause me to know the way wherein I should walk, 
For unto thee I have lifted my soul' [Psalms 143:8]. 
This progressional educative role as the designed intention behind 
Maimonides' works is evident from what Maimonides writes of the 
"Torah," which his Mishne Torah even by its very title, determinately 
strove to "duplicate": 
If you consider that book which guides those who seek guidance 
toward what is correct, ~nd is therefore called Torah ... 88 
Maimonides had a unique concept of a Legal Code. As TWersky 
correctly observes: 
He aspired to produce a law code which instructs as well as 
commands, thereby providing an effective instrument of education 
and edification, for law itself is an educative force leading 
to ethical and intellectual perfection.89 
Hence the "Guide" sought to round out the educative halakic process, 
by continuing to progressively "guide man who seeks guidance toward 
what is correct"- the ultimate objective of Torah itself -as defined 
by Maimonides above. Thus we discern a dynamically organic inter-
course between the "activity of the deed" and the "activity of the 
aspiration." The contextual aspiration of the ways is necessary 
for the practice of deeds, and the performance of deeds, in turn, 
is necessary for refining the quality and substance of knowledge 
through concretization and actualization. Juridics and Metajuridics 
are on a direct collision course, each one importantly influencing 
and invigorating the other. Metajurisdiction functions as a pre-
requisite and a basis for jurisdiction90 while jurisdiction functions 
equally as a foundation for metajurisdiction. 91 Both the philosophic 
ways coupled with the ritualistic deeds are integral aspects which 
together make up the complete fabric of Halaka. It is with the 
sameness of such a halakic Weltanschauung that we can understand 
R. Joseph Soloveichik's remark: 
When the Torah expatiated on the creation of the world and 
related to us about the formation of heaven and earth and their 
whole host, it did not come to reveal cosmogenic secrets and 
metaphysical secrets of the world, but to insturct Halaka in 
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practice [halaka lema'aseh]. The section on the Account of 
the Begimung 1s an established portion of Halaka for genera-
tions, ·. that essentials [gufei] of Torah are included in it, 
just as the portion of Kedoshim or Mishpatim.92 If the Torah 
opened the scroll of creation before man, then one Halaka is 
definite from this feature, that he is obligated to preoccupy 
himself with creation and the novelty of the universe. 
(Emphasis added.)93 
Only an obsessively halakic world view which cogitated an utterly 
complete reciprocity and intercourse between the ways and the 
rituals, could possibly have described the Torah's Account of the 
Beginning as Halaka lema'aseh- Halaka in practice. 
Other Codifiers 
Not so, however, was the halakic orientation and methodological 
approach of R. Josef Caro, author of Shulchan Arukh, who conspicuously 
discriminated between creed and deed, treating each realm indepen-
dently. Although R. Caro himself excelled both as a master of 
legal law and as an archmystic, he did not allow the ways to 
impinge and encroach upon the rules. Thus he concentrated his 
Codex of Law primarily upon ritual and legalistic matters. Unlike 
his predecessors, the medieval giants of Halaka, such as R. Jacob 
b. Asher (Ba' al ha-Turin-V and Maimonides ( Mishne Torah) who determinedly 
linked the two spheres and upon whom R. Caro based his Code. As 
TWersky remarks: 
There is yet another area in which the austere functionality 
comes to the surface- in the virtually complete elimination 
of ideology, theology and teleology. The Shulchan Arukh, 
unlike the Mishne Torah or Sefer ha Rokeah, has no philo-
sophical or kabbalistic prolegomenon or peroration. The 
Shulhan 'Aruk unlike the Mishne Torah or Turim, does not 
abound in extra-halakic comments, guiding tenets and ideo-
logical directives.94 
Not only did Shulchan Arukh deviate from the structure of codifi-
cation of his halakic predecessors, the "restrictive almost styptic 
trait of the Shulchan Arukh was noticed- and criticized- by 
95 colleagues foremost among whom was R. Mordechai Jaffe." 
R. Moses Isserles, who was responsible for compiling the foremost 
gloss on Shulchan Arukh entitled haggahot ha-Rema in which he 
included the customs of Ashkenazi scholars left uncodified by 
R. Caro, introduced as well many kabbalistic and theological motifs 
and explanations. 96 His explicit purpose in doing so was 
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in order to combine the rules together with the ways, which is 
readily evident from Rema's opening statement of his gloss: 
'I have set the Lord always before me' [Psalms 16:8]. This 
is a cardinal principle of Torah and in the perfect ways of 
the righteous who wal~ before G-d.97 
We shall see shortly how Rema continues to cite Maimonides' Guide 
in illustrating how one's cognition of this psalmist verse 
necessarily must influence one's practice. 98 It has also been 
noted that Maimonides as well began the first part of his Code, 
the Book of Knowledge, by applying the same cardinal principle. 99 
In fact R. Caro himself uncharacteristically began his Shulchan 
Arukh with an ethical instruction from Pirkei Avot: 
A man should make himself strong and brave as a lion to rise 
in the morning for the service of his Creator so that he should 
'awake the dawn.'100 
It is indeed possible that R. Caro omitted the "ways" from his 
Code not because he considered the ways "non-halakic," but rather 
because of the practically impossible task of preparing a Code 
in which every moral or philosophical dilemma could be resolved 
\vith the same measure of certainty and finality as legal and ritua-
listic law. Indeed, R. Caro's exclusion of Laws of Ethics and 
the Laws of Repentance (which many of the other codifiers included) 101 
could by no means be attributed toR. Caro's regarding these laws 
as either non-halakic or non-practical, but rather because of the 
great difficulty of codifying these spiritual co-ordinates of the 
Law with the same degree of exactitude and definity as the ritua-
listic laws. 
In any event, Shulchan Arukh's unique methodology of splitting the 
indivisable in his formulation and codification of Halaka, represented 
an unconforming departure from the structure of standardized law 
followed by the majority of codifiers before him. And if it can at 
all be posited, as Twersky alleges that: 
Actually there is no need for devotees of the ShuJhan 'Aruk 
to indulge in meta-historical panegyrics, for iB~ernatural 
phenomena carry no weight in halakic matters. 
This appraisal can at most be attributed to R. Caro alone, if at 
all. But certainly not according to the majority of codifiers 
who made painstaking efforts to intentionally coalesce and unite 




of which constituted the essential fabric of Halaka. 
Gershon Scholem appears largely insensitive to the intricate 
nature of reciprocity and complementarily between juridics and 
metajuridics -the temporal and the spiritual, the contingent and 
the eternal -in positing the following statement in his Major 
Trends in Jewish Mysticism: 
It is a little paradoxical when Eleazar of Worms, at the out-
set of his Sefer Rokeah, in which he gives an outline of the 
religious law, makes an attempt to codify the Hasidic ideal 
in halakic terms. It is a remarkable fact that both Maimo-
nides and his younger contemporary, Eleazar, preface their 
codifications of the law by attempts to extend the Halaka to 
matters which, strictly speaking, lie beyond its province: 
in the case of Maimonides, a philosophic and cosmologic 
preface in which the ideas of Aristotelian enlightenment are 
introduced as elements of the Halaka; in the case of Eleazar, 
a chapter devoted to the entirely unintellectual principles 
of Hasidut. The coincidence is hardly fortuitous and throws 
an interesting light on the significance of the various 
religious trends in Judaism; nor is it fortuitous that in 
both cases the attempts failed: The Halaka was never 
or anicall linked with the uasi-Halaka which receeded it. 
· Emphasis a ded 
In contrast to Scholem, according to Maimonides at least, the 
Torah itself organically linked itself with "quasi-Halaka" by 
beginning from the Account of Creation rather than from Sinai and 
by prescribing philosophic knowledge of G-d as its very first 
commandment. Moreover, the ammoraitic and savoraic redactors 
of the Talmud as well linked Halaka with "quasi-Halaka" by contin-
uously shifting in a capricious and erratic manner between Halaka 
and Aggada, repeatedly inserting supernatural aggadic anecdotes 
in the middle of intensely halakic discussions. The talmudic 
aphorism"G-d has nothing in His world except the four cubits of 
Halaka alone," would seem to justify this systimatically metho-
dized erraticism. For if legal Halaka and Aggada are two faces 
of the same coin, then the superimposing of one upon the other 
becomes harmonious rather than chaotic. 
Philosophy of Practice and Philosophy in Practice 
Thus far we have reviewed the reciprocity between philosophic-
Halaka and ritualistic-Halaka, the "activity of the aspiration" 













we have seen that the philosophic ways can function as a propaedeutic 
and prerequisite for ritualistic rules in that "knowledge leads 
to action," Maimonides' same reason for beginning his Code with the 
Book of Knowledge. This level could be termed "philosophy in 
practice" or "practiced philosophy." On another level, we have 
seen that the ritualistic rules can function as a foundation for 
the philosophic ways in that the performance of deeds concretizes 
and actualizes abstract notions. Maimonides explicitly states 
that the purpose of the Laws of Mezuzah and Laws of Repentance 
is to corrmunicate correct beliefs and to focus one's attention 
104 on G-d and His ways. This second level could be termed the 
"philosophy of practice." This level assumes a purposefulness 
in which practice of ritual is designed to lead man to the ways. 105 The 
ta 'amei ha-mitzvot - the reasons for and rationale behind the 
con~andments ~are included in this category. For ritualistic 
rationalism and intellectualism is purposive in that it seeks G-d 
through the corrmandments. 106 
Although this second level of "philosophy of practice" whereby 
the performance of commandments propels the individual towards an 
active contemplative role, included in its general assumption of 
a rationale of Mitzvot, is generally well understood, the first 
level of "philosophy in practice" or "practiced philosophy" by 
contrast, is not so well understood. Little research has been 
attempted to date to uncover this extremely important former rela-
tionship of Halaka. 107 Even TWersky, who perhaps went furthest 
in realizing and articulating the phenomenon of the former influence 
of philosophy upon practice in the Maimonidean oeuvre, describes 
ivtaimonides 's insertion of "extra-halakicn motifs as only "topical-
conceptual, rather than utilitarian. " And, in an earlier discussion 
on the same subject TWersky states: 
The guiding principle is thus not simple practicability. 
The emphasis is on relevance, and this may be either practical 
or theoretical.l08 
It is our contention, as indeed this essay endeavors to demonstrate 
that in the intercourse between philosophy, metaphysics, and la\v 
in the Maimonidean oeuvre, or in any system of law which incorporates 
the metajuridic component, that this former component is not merely 
"conceptual-topical" or at most "relevant," but far more fundamentally 
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manifests itself as a trenchantly utilitarian feature of law. 
For when regarding the phenomenon of philosophy in practice or 
practicedphilosophy whereby philosophic considerata directly 
affects practice, one becomes acutely aware how the "metahalakic" 
constituent functions in a dynamic and practical capacity. Our 
study reveals how the halakic process computes philosophical and 
metaphysical data on an operative level which in turn effects and 
. ld . l 109 y1e s pract1ca outcomes. 
The domain of the four cubits of Halakacan now expansively be 
defined as that derivative which results from : a) the study 
and application of R. Ishmael's hermeneutic principles, 110 and 
b) the study and application of the philosophical and metaphysical 
principles subsisting in the baraita of R. Jose the Galilean's 
thirty-two hermeneutic rules of the Aggada111 and in the subject 
matter styled Pardes. Therefore, an analysis and investigation 
of the scientific workings of metaphysics in halakic process, 
proves most rewarding and practically worthwhile in that it 
exposes this little known and erstwhile considered abstract branch 
of hypothetical subject matter, as a field of study which is 
fundamentally pragmatic and intensely utilitarian. 
The basic premise of this field, whereby different states of 
cognition affect practical judgments and generate corresponding 
changes in man's actions, is readily apparent in Maimonides' 
description of this phenomenon, which as stated earlier, is 
significantly cited by Rema in his appendage to the very first 
law of Shulchan Arukh: 
Man does not sit,move and occupy himself when he is alone 
in his house, as l1e sits, moves, and occupies himself when 
he is in the presence of a King: nor does he speak and 
rejoice -vmi le he is with his family and relatives, as he 
speaks in the King's Council ... 
Know that when perfect man understands this [i.e., that G-d 
is constantly with us, examining us from on high, see thereon], 
they achieve such humility, such awe and fear of G-d, such 
reverence and such shame before Him, may He be exalted -
and this in ways that perfection to true reality, not to 
imagination~ that their secret conduct with their wives and 
in latrines is like their public conduct with other 
people .•. 112 
Similarly, in an early discussion in the Guide, Maimonides explains 
how Adam's acquisition of knowledge of "good and evil" caused him 
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to apprehend that he was naked and, subsequently, to cov.~r him-
113 self up. In his explanation for having included the laws of 
Repentance in his Book of Knowledge, Maimonides writes: 
For an individual cannot but sin and err, either through 
ignorance- by protesting an opinion or a moral quality 
that is not preferable in truth- or else because he is 
overcome by desire or anger. If then the individual 
believed that this fracture can never be remedied, he would 
persist in his error and sometimes perhaps disobey even 
more, because of the fact that no stratagem remains at his 
disposal. If, however, he believes in repentance he can 
correct himself and return to a better and more perfect 
state than the one he was before he sinned.114 
David Hartman has correctly noted how, according to Maimonides, 
''human choices are influenced by an understanding of the whole of 
be . d f I l . h' . "115 F -h d h 1ng an o man s p ace wlt 1n 1t. rom t ese an ot er 
examples of Maimonides it is clear that man's practices are 
directly affected as he aquires cognitive skills and transposes 
himself from one state of cognition to another. This intellectual 
process is converted from a theoretical exercise to become prag-
matically rel:~vant on an operative level. 
The Application of Theosophy in R. Nachman of Bratslav's Halakic 
System 
In an article "Mysticism and law," Yitzch ak Englehard describes 
how R. Na•::.hman of Bratslav (1722-1811) applied certain axiological 
principles in,hiscompendium Jures (Likkutei Halakot). An example 
of such a principle applied by R. Nachman in laws of Damages is : 
All damages are caused as a result of defective knowledge 
and intelligence ..• and necessarily in the future, when the 
i~telligence will be superior in the wolld, there will be no 
damages in the world .•• for the earth shall be full of the 
knowledge of the Lord.116 
R. Nachman's mystical approach to Halaka bears an uncanny resem-
blance to Maimonides' rationalistic approach in a virtually identical 
d . . b Ma' 'd h b' 117 c . 1scuss1on y 1mon1 es on t e same su Ject. oncern1ng 
the laws of Damages Englehard explains that : 
Responsibility for causing damages is based on guLlt in a 
mystical sense, the results of which are not felt solely in 
the reality of mankind, but leave a mark in the esoteric 
world as well. Therefore a man is responsible for damages 
\~1ile asleep. [And citing R. Nachman]: 'For although 
during the time of sleep he has no cognition, the inter-
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diction and the onus not to damage are incunbent upon him ... 
therefore one who is a man and his knowledge is perfect and 
he has belief in perfection, then certainly he will not cause 
damage even when asleep or unintentionally [beshogeg], which 
is also a type of sleep- the absence of consciousness ... 
for when the mind is fortified -he is saved from damage. for 
all damages are a result of deficiency of the mind ... and when 
a man merits that his mind become perfect and his belief is 
perfect, then he will certainly be safeguarded from damage, 
even while asleep, for faith protects the conscious and enters 
it during sleep so that it won't become deficient, so that 
he will not come to damage, so that the damagers of the world 
will not thrive on it. 
The four principal categories of damages (Avot Nezikim), according 
to R. Nachman, are also symbolically contingent upon deficiencies 
in belief. It is these deficiencies of belief which are respon-
sible for damages in the real world, and man's responsibility is 
118 incumbent upon them. 
Halaka and Aggada 
Superficially it would appear that the main contention of our 
research is substantially thwarted by the contradiction which 
exists between Halaka and Aggada expressed in the dictum "Halaka 
may not be derived from Aggadot nor from Midrashim. "119 However, 
upon closer inspection it is evident that this very dictum itself 
compels Halaka to confront Aggada from a normative standpoint, 
in order to resolve the ·tension between them. An excellent 
example of the confrontation between Halaka and Aggada and its 
neutralization is reflected in the incident of "the Oven of Aknai" 
related in Baba Mezia where the Halaka was decided according to 
the majority view despite the occurrence of miracles and a 
Heavenly Voice in support of the sole opposing view. The very 
ruling of "We pay no attention to a heavenly voice" and "It is not 
in heaven" because "Thou hast long since written in the Torah of 
Mo S. · ,·Af h · · · 1 . 1 rr120 . l unt 1na1, ter t e maJOrlty must one 1nc 1ne , 1mpe s 
the halakic edict of "after the majority" to confront the aggadic 
categories of "the heavenly voice" and other metaphysical phenomena 
which occurred in support of the opposing view. For it is impera-
tive from a normative standpoint to investigate the reality of 
these categories, and to determine their degree of reliability 
and measure of truth. As Englehard writes: 
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Because the Divine decree stands at the top of the ladder of 
religious norms, and from it the Sages themselves drew their 
authority. On the assumption that the Heavenly Voice is an 
expression of the Will of the Divine Lawgiver, the problem 
is, if the contradictory ruling of the Sages can stand before 
it from a normative position.1Z1 
In other words, it becomes imperative for Halaka to investigate 
Aggada in order to establish the authority and credibility of 
Halaka as a system. For if the purpose of observance of Halaka 
is to perform G-d's Will, and G-d's Will as expressed in the 
Heavenly Voice indicates the exact opposite of the Sages' ruling, 
unless the confrontation is neutralized, then Halaka fails its 
purpose as a system! We will see shortly how this important 
dilemma is resov led. 
To such an extent was Aggada recognized as an integral fabric of 
Halaka that many respondents had great difficulty fathoming the 
above-mentioned dictum until they resolved that Halaka is not 
derived from Aggadot nor Midrashim only in the event that the Aggadot 
or Midrashim contradict the Babylonian or Palestinian Talmuds. 
However,: 
When the Aggadot or Midrashim do not contrapose our Talmud 
or the Palestinian Talmud, but to the contrary, add to them, 
we derive [Halaka] from them, and rely upon them, and many 
of our customs originate in them.122 
R. Zevi Hirsch Olajes went even further in explaining that often 
Aggadot were expounded popularly before the commonfolk not for the 
purpose of instructing Halakot, but rather to penetrate the hearts, 
at times even contravening the law, in order to stress the impor-
tance of certain virtues. However, R. Chajes writes: 
Any matters which do not contrapose the sayings of the Sages 
of the Talmud, and were not spoken homiletically before the 
people, they are all established Halakot.123 
The variance between certain Aggadot and the talmudic rulings of 
the Sages, according to R. Chajes, is no more unusual than the 
contradictions between the Halakot of the Jersualem Talmud and 
the Halakot of the Babylonian ralmud where the accepted ruling 
normally follows the position of the Babylonian Talmud. However, 
when no contradiction exists between the two Talmuds, then the 
Halaka follows, the Jerusalem Talmud or the Midrashim and Aggadot 
which are equally, "halakic rulings by us" (halakot pesukot etzleinu)~24 
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In a similar vein, Saul Liberman justifies his classification of 
the work Hilkot ha-Yerushalmi as a ''book of Law alone" despite 
the inclusion of aggadic material, because the putative author, 
Maimonides, only included Aggadot which were necessary for estab-
lishing Halakot. 125 TWersky as well says of Maimonides' inclusion 
of Aggada in his Code: "Sometimes aggadic material is imperceptively 
transformed into and identifiable with Halaka."126 
In the same article mentioned above, R. Chajes lists several 
imporant Halakot which have their origin in and are derived entirely 
from Aggadot and Midrashim. Menachem Elon in his ha-Mishpat 
ha-Iviri adds several other instances where Halakot are derived 
from Aggadot. 127 We will also show an example of this, in 
iliapter III.4 how the Law of Conformity (lo titgodedu) is based 
upon and stem from Aggada. At times we find the term Halaka 
employed to introduce, authenticate and confirm the reality of 
aggadic s ta temen ts. As for example: 
It is a Halaka, that it is well known that Esau hates Jacob. 128 
And as we find in the Mishna: 
R. Joshua said: I have received a tradition from R. Johanan 
b. Zakkai, who heard it from his teacher, as a Halaka to 
Moses from Sinai, that Elijah will not come to pronounce 
impurity or purity, to put away or to bring near, but to 
put away those brought near by force and to bring near those 
put away by force.129 
The Codification Problem 
Indeed, R. Hayyim Tchernowitz (pseudonym Rav Zair) in his Toledoth 
ha-Posekirn, explains that the generic difference between Halaka 
and Aggada was not recognized by the Tannaimanci Arrmoraim, and that 
the distinction between them was only a much later development of 
h G . 130 Th h f. h . t e eon1m. ey were t e 1rst to separate t ese two categor1es 
and it was they who were responsible for coining the dictum 
"Halaka may not be derived from Midrashim and _Aggadot". 
R. Zair remarks that in fact, the organizers of the Talmud pur-
posely made every effort to mesh the two following in the exact 
style of the Midrash!31 For Scripture itself, the archbasis of 
Midrash, was ~dentically structured, "narrating incidents, reproofs, 
ethics, conmandments and statutes all in the same breath." Hence 
Scripture, and in its path Midrash, and following them in suit, t-.he 
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Talmud, all intentionally mixed Aggada and Halaka until the 
mixture was so thoroughly consolidated and coagulated that only 
the hairsplitingexactitudeand precision of the Geonim was capable 
of distinguishing between the two. The reason for this deliberate 
synthesis is attributable to the conception that only Halaka and 
Aggada unified together as a cohesive unit could project the whole 
picture and teach the correct path of "walking in the ways of G-d." 
Rav Zair questions the peculiarity that in view of the fact that 
Talmud, Midrash and the Bible itself made painstaking efforts 
to purposefully integrate the two, why then did the Geonim subvert 
this pattern and lacerate the viscid bond which existed between 
them previously. Rav Zair emunerates three reasons for the develop-
ment of this phenomenon and the probable Geonic interest in doing 
so : 
1) Firstly, Rav Zair explains that the Geonim were interested in 
fashioning a Code of Law which would present Halaka not from 
the perspective of which practices men ought to follow but rather 
from the vantage point of the enforcement of these practices by 
the Beth Din. Consequently many "aggadic" practices were excluded 
fro~ this codification not because they weren't considered or defined 
e1s Halakot, but rather because of their being uninforceable 
by the judicial authorities. For example, the first of the seven 
thieves enumerated in Midrash, was the one who "steals the mind of 
another man."132 Therefore, the Geonic distinction between Halaka 
and Aggada was not practical versus theoretical, but rather between 
man 's collective communal responsibility versus man's private 
individual responsibility. Any law which pertained to man's 
heart (mitzvot shebalev), though practical from the vantage point 
of man's private concern as an individual, was completely unen-
forceable by judicial authority. 
2) Secondly , R. Zair explains that the meaning behind many 
aggadic sections was so profound that large segments of 
aggadic material remained remote and unfathomable even to the most 
skillfully trained mind. It was impossible then, to institute 
these teachings or enforce their adherence. In order to minimize 
confusion, the same attitude was adopted even towards those 
Aggadot whose meaning were commonly understood. Consequently, 
sanctions were not imposed upon the violation of "aggadic" laws. 
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3) Lastly, R. Zair advances that many of these unfathomable and 
strange Aggadot were utilized by the feebleminded heretics 
as a source of scoffing and ridicule. The Geonim, therefore, 
intentionally categorized Aggadah as different from Halaka in 
order to prevent this perverseness from transferring itself over 
to Halaka whose esteem stood in danger of being exposed to the 
same measure of scoff and ridicule. 
Nevertheless, despite the concerted effort of the Geonim to 
segregate Halaka from Aggada they remained, to a large extent, 
unsuccessful with the result that a plethoric abundance of Halakot 
emerged in the Codes which were completely based, and immersed 
in aggadic vestment as in its original Torah form, even to the 
extent that aggadic practices nullified and cancelled halakic 
ones in certain cases! 133 
Rationalism as a Criterion for admitting Aggadically Based Halakot 
The most reliable criteria fordeterminipg whichAggadot would sift 
their way into the halakic process, as compared to the Aggadot 
which would remain distantly aloof from i~ is the following 
telling dictum: 
You are not to derive anything from it [i.e., Aggada] except 
that which is intellectually understood [ein lecha lilmod 
elah rna sheya'aleh al ha-da'at].134 
This dictum dictates that Halaka will not accept within its con-
fines any conception which is not intelligently understood. This 
is so because the halakic process itself mandates that one actively 
transform communicated beliefs into demonstrative truths. As 
we explained regarding the difference between the "Mitzvah" and 
the "Halaka" of the first commandment. In the same manner, 
those abstract conceptual notions of Aggada which can be trans-
posed into realistic intelligent demonstrative categories are 
accepted by Halaka, as Halaka itself is governed by and defined 
as that same process. Failing this scrutiny, it will be rejected 
by Halaka and remain Aggada. 
For this reason the Sages in the "Oven of Aknai" incident rejected 
the singular position of R. Eleazar despite the occurrence of 
miracles and the heavenly voice phenomenon in support of his view, 
and ruled according to the majority rule. Not because the one 
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position was true and the other position was false. Indeed both 
positions were correct as in, "The utterances of both are the words 
of the lviing G-d" (Elu v'elu divrei Elokim hayyim). 135 However, 
there is a marked difference between aggadic truth and halakic 
truth. Although the occurrence of miracles and the heavenly 
voice were most certainly aggadically true, the Sages on earth 
could only halakically accept those truths which accorded with 
"reason." Hence, the halakic truth was established according 
to the reason of the majority view and the aggadic truth of R. 
Eleazar was ultimately rejected. 136 
In the same view but in an opposite context Maimonides avouches 
that he halakically accepted many of the mathematical and astro-
logical axioms of the Greek scientists and philosophers in calcu-
lating the La~s of Intercalation despite their having been developed 
by Gentiles, because they could be proven by reason and were there-
fore demonstrated universal truths. 137 Since halakic truth is 
determined by reason it takes no notice if in the process of estab-
lishing a truth it accepts the demonstrated postulates advanced 
by Gentile scientists, philosophers and rejects the nondemonstrable 
aggadic postulates of Heaven. 
Indeed, the much discussed question of whether the Pasek (rabbinic 
Decisor) may rely upon a Heavenly voice, prophetic knowledge, or 
heavenly ruling seen in a dream, in order to .decide Halaka all 
revolve around this issue. Namely, whether a Divine interjection 
may influence the halakic decision-making process. On the one hand 
these heavenly phenomena are not apprehended by reason and are 
communicated subsequent to Sinai, yet they are expressions of Divine 
Hill. The majority of discussions confirm that although the 
halakic decision may not be rendered on the basis of these heavenly 
communicants, nonetheless, they may "assist" the Pasek in reaching 
138 a decision which he can arrive at rationally by way of reason. 
The categories of Aggada and Halaka may be regarded as pertaining 
either to the heart or to the brain. While Aggada engenders 
emotions, imagination, and surealism often reaching the super-
natural; Halaka is concerned with the actual and ·· the real, ·carrying 
with it all the mental faculties that manifest themselves in arguing, 
comparing, investigating and developing hermeneutic principles. 
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The 'halakification' of Aggada essentially involves applying one-
self to purely abstract supramundane matters and translating these 
notions into concrete realistic terms by means of demonstrating 
their inherent correctness and truth according to reason. The 
method whereby the abstract imaginary whims of the heart become 
transformed to proven realistic categories of the mind, and the 
extent to which this process influences one's actions in practice, 
manifests the dynamic metaphysical process in Halaka which trans-
lates thought into reality and philosophy into practice. 
The confrontation between Halaka and Aggadah as encountered in 
the "Oven of Aknai" incident exposes the essential need from a 
normative standpoint for Halaka to grapple with Aggada. The 
purpose of the halakic system is realised by resolving to accept 
the most logical expression of G-d's Will which is demonstrably 
correct according to reason. For the supreme expression of G-d's 
Will is manifest in the intellectual internalization and under-
standing of His ways. The decision to treat the oven as pure 
or impure is a further practical and concrete application resulting 
from resolving the above metaphysical dilemma. 
Changeability within Halaka 
Englehard . remarks that although the mystical dimension imparts 
upon R. Nachman's halakic system tremendous cosmic significance, 
nevertheless: 
He [the mystical exponent] does not establish an original 
judicial solution on the basis of his science. Consequently 
the role of this exegesis is very limited. In face of the 
true social needs of judicial solutions, there is little 
likelihood that mv~tics will utilize them to develop ritual 
of a new content.l39 
Although Englehard is correct in appraising that theosophic 
exegesis does not create new ritual since it deals with a given 
text of law, he is mistaken in thinking that it is nothing more 
than a kabbalistic ta'amei ha-mitzvot (ratio praeceptorum), 
providing cosmic embellishment for a pr econstituted code of law. 
He seems to overlook the fact that just as much of Torah Law is 
constant, yet, the situations, conditions, and circumstances for 
arriving at the law are constantly changing. And in the same way 
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as the employment of variant legal factors effect different halakic 
outcomes without creating new Torah laws, so too the employment 
of variant theosophic data and metaphysical considerations can 
similarly lead to different halakic results, without creating a 
new Torah text. · This is the very reason why we find that zoharitic 
conclusions differed from the rulings of the codifiers on so wany 
issues. Precisely because the Zohar's employment of various 
theosophic principles and considerations led to different halakic 
outcomes without changing the original texts of the Law or creating 
a new Juris Mosaici. As R. Joseph Delmedigo of Candia (1591-1655) 
explains concerning the "Oven of Aknai" incident: 
Even though the Din and the Halaka accord with the esoteric 
masters, we do not follow them except in the ways which 
were given to us at Sinai to expound the Torah and to illu-
minate its obscurities. And even if we are mistaken we are 
not punished for this. But one who has been 'favoured' 
by G-d and becomes superior to the other Sages until he knows 
the truth of things from another place, he is not to follow 
the simple way. And for this reason R. Eleazar was so 
adamant and unyielding in the conflict and would not co~~Br 
with R. Joshua's ruling of following the majority rule. 
Although the only halakic outcome was that the oven was either 
pure or impure, and no new halakic category was created nor was 
any new Torah law invented, nevertheless, the employment of diverse 
theological data produced contrary halakic results. R. Delmedigo 
cites this talmudic incident in explanation of certain codifiers, 
who followed the conclusions of R. Simeon b. Yohai in Zohar, many 
of which ran 'contrary to the accepted halakic rulings. 
It is in this practical sense of arriving at variant halakic out-
comes by employing different theosophical considerations and factors 
that one could hardly consider the role of mystical exegesis in 
Halaka as limited. In fact, the scope of its influence on Halaka 
was so vast that it became the excessive preoccupation of a great 
many halakic experts to investigate from a normative standpoint 
how the Sages of the Zohar arrived at diversified and contrary 
conclusions to that of the Codes -expecially considering that 
both were dealing with the same original Torah text. To the extent 
that the zoharitic considerations could be rationally accepted 
according to logic by the majority of codifiers, its view became 
absorbed by the Halaka. That which remained unfathomable according 
to the reasoning of the majority of Sages, although "true" on its 
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own right, could not be proven halakically true and therefore was 
not followed in practice. This being the same criteria employed 
earlier to decide that any aggadic matter whose veracity could be 
demonstrated logically according to majority reasoning, had suffi-
ciently qualified itself for becoming accepted by the halakic 
authorities. Thus a great many practices villose source and origin 
were wholly embedded in Aggada and theosophy entered the Codes. 
The method whereby computation of aggadic and theosophic data 
influences and engenders practical actions, illustrates the meta-
physical dimension operative in halakic process. 
The Responsa Literature 
The rabbinic compilations of aggadic material - whether they be 
essentially theological, metaphysical or philosophical-- which 
function as bases and stimuli for engendering practical laws, 
developed side by side with the emergence of various Codes. 
They can be found deftly diffused throughout the Responsa litera-
ture in scores upon scores of seemingly peculiar cases where exarr,ples 
of such phenomena in halakic process abound. Even long after 
the appearance of the last major universally accredited Code of 
Jewish Law - the Shulchan Arukh- the phenomena of philosophy in 
practice continued unrelentingly to manifest itself in the Responsa 
literature to this date. 
TWo of the examples documented by Rav Zair in evidence of the many 
Halakot which emerged from and were based in Aggada, are taken from 
incidents where the prophet Elijah features. In the first instance, 
it is related in Talmud, Berakoth: 
R. Jose says: I was once traveling on the road, and I 
entered into one of the ruins of Jerusalem in order to pray. 
Elijah appeared ..• Thus I then learned from him three things. 
One must not go into a ruin; one may say the prayer on the 
road; and if one does say one's prayer on the road one 
recites an abbreviated prayer •.. 
In the second instance Rav Zair recalls how tractate Baba Mezia 
1 h 1 . f El .. ah 141 L. k . re ates t ree separate aws stemm~ng rom ~J . ~ ew~se, 
we have elected to demonstrate the relationship of metaphysics 
operative in the derivation of Halaka extant in the Responsa 




There is a two-fold consideration for concentrating our documenta-
tion primarily on the Responsa literature, though our field of 
research also incorporates other l1alakic writings, discourses, 
the various Codes, as well as some purely theoretical works of 
Jewish thought. Both considerations ratify the uniqueness of 
responsa as compared with other writings. In an article examining 
research into Jewish Law, Menachem Elon writes: 
In the responsum the reader finds himself in the midst of 
a living legal situation, facing the facts and listening to 
the claims of the opposing parties while accompanying one of 
the greatest authorities of Halaka in every stage of his 
thinking process. The student and research worker studying 
responsa find themselves in a workshop as partners in the 
experiment of creation, participating in profound and com-
prehensive legal analysis, listening to an incidental descrip-
tion of the current socio-economic background which is inter-
woven with the halakic decision. He may listen in to hidden 
or transparent indications of doubts and differences, and 
follow the halakic scholar in finding a solution and decision 
based on the past but nevertheless SP.rving the diverse needs 
of his own time. (Emphasis added.)142 
Thus, the most fertile soil for observing the relationship between 
metaphysics and Halaka in operation in a dynamic and thoroughlycom-
prehensive manner is \·Jithout parallel, the Responsa literature. 
Secondly, the uniqueness of the responsa is described by R. Jacob 
Moellin of Mainz (Maharil) who rejoins in a responsum of his own: 
As for your statement that one should not rely upon the 
responsa [for the actual decision] the very contrary is true. 
They are decisions concerning actual practice [i.e., not 
merely theoretical discussions] and we may therefore learn 
from them much more than from the words of the posekim 
[i.e., the Godifiers]~43 
According to R. Moellin, the responsa are unique in comparison 
to the Talmud and Codes in that the responsa deal with living 
problems which have arisen in actual situations. Therefore, the 
responsa by their very nature are intensely practical as the respon-
dents were called upon to resolve real existing problems which 
required authoritative rulings. Because of their inherent prac-
tical nature and the circumstances under which they were asked, 
they are more ·authoritative than the Codes or the Talmud. 
It is precisely because of this inherent practical nature of re-
sponsa that one becomes amazed at discovering lengthy aggadic 
discussion peculiarly scattered diffusely throughout the literature. 
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While it is true that many of thesediscussions seem to have no 
apparent practical significance, it certainly does not follow 
that they are categorically theoretical issues thatwere designed 
by respondents to entertain the reader because of the sheer 
pleasure they derived from flirtation with abstractics. On the 
contrary, due to the fact that the respondents were generally 
overburdened with communal responsibilities, who in addition, 
received an enormous volume of correspondence where responding 
to every enquiry was virtually an impossible task, not to mention 
their often state of ill health, the respondents tended to pur-
posely desist from entering into aggadic discussions which did 
not accrue towards any obvious practical end. Time simply did 
not allow them that luxury. Many respondents in fact said so 
expressly when on numerous occasions they apologized for not 
addressing certain aggadic questions. Yet, nevertheless, the same 
respondents who voiced reluctance to devolve into aggadic discussions 
themselves abound in aggadic discourses throughout many cases of 
their own responsa! (As, for example, Rashba.) 
Therefore, considering the inherent pragmatic nature of the responsa 
and the role in which the respondents saw themselves, we must per-
force assume that these discussions were entertained only insofar 
as they functioned as integral elements in the halakic process of 
deriving practical consequences and were relevent in assisting 
therespondent to reach practical decisions. Their apparent non-
practical nature is not conclusive evidence by itself for defining 
and classifying these responsa as non-halakic. A seemingly 
impertinent and apparently inapplicable responsum discussion does 
not absolve the student of the responsa from the scientific 
duty of continually seeking to unearth to what practical end the 
respondent entertained such notions. If a practical purpose cannot 
be ascertained the responsum must be left as considered "difficult," 
for its practical relevance is "difficult" to ascertain. But 
certainly the word "difficult" does not automatically imply "non-
halakic." 
Moreover, we have already shown in this Introduction that the very 
demonstration according to reason of various imaginative aggadic 
categories is itself an active halakic process, even if this 
ratiocination has no obvious practical consequence. As in the 
first commandment, the demonstration of the truth of G-d's existence 
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is itself a halakic process. Therefore, the fact that respo~dents 
in certain instances saw fit to demonstrate rationally the truth of 
various aggadic perplexities to a bewildered enquirer, certainly 
does not lead to the conclusion that such discussions are "non-
halakic." F?r according to Maimonides there exists an entire 
category of comn1andments, such as Love of G-d, the fulfillment 
of which is primarily achieved through intellectual apprehension. 
This salient fact is further born out in a responsum of Maimonides, 
which many redactors of his Code considered relevant to append 
to his Laws of Fundamental Principles of Torah. 
[Question] Concerning that which they said: 'He who knows 
how to calculate the cycles and planetary course but doe3 not, 
of him Scripture says, etc.' And what is the practical differ-
ence if it is Halaka or not? 
[Answer] Indeed, that which you asked what benefit does he 
derive in knowing it? R. Meir already said: 'Look into His 
Acts, because from this you will know the One Who Said and 
the World Came to Be ••• and he will assist us in all His 
commandments and to imitate His Ways, and to understand His 
Unity, Amen.144 
Nevertheless, as far as this study is concerned, we have only 
documented metaphysical issues in the Responsa literature where 
contemplative speculation leads to obvious practical results. 
Other Studies 
To the best of our knowledge no extensive study has previously 
been attempted into our field of research, although its existence 
might have been sensed by some scholars of philosophy and law. 
It's in this sense that our research purports to delve into an 
area of Jewish Law which for the most part has been greatly un-
explored. 
The one work which perhaps comes closest to our study, although it 
falls far short of its mark, is Theology in the Responsa by Louis 
Jacobs. On the existence of theological discussions in the 
Responsa literature Jacobs writes in his preface: 
The fact that theological problems found their way into 
Responsa collections, generally put together either by 
the authors themselves or by their disciples, gives them a 
special significance. It is almost as if these questions 
were treated with the full !recision, seriousness and weight 
demanded when the masters o the law gave their legal decisions. 
A theologian might see no great harm in an occasional flight 
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of fancy, he might feel encouraged to embark on a purely 
speculative exercise, he might be inclined to present some 
of his conclusions only tentatively. But a Rabbi discussing 
theology in a responsum would try to be clear, unambiguous 
and decisive as when he was determining in a legal dispute 
whether A orB were in the right. (Emphasis added)~45 
In other words, according to Jacobs, the difference between the 
existence of theological discussions in the responsa as opposed to 
other theological works and hence their "special significance," 
is that because of the special style of exactitude and precision 
with which the respondents wrote, a theological issue would be 
discussed much more meticulously and accurately in a responsum 
than in another work. For, "it is almost as if these questions 
were treated with the full precision seriousness and weight 
demanded when the masters of the law gave their legal decisions." 
However, it is clear that according to Jacobs, the respondents 
never really considered the theological issues which they were 
treating to be in effect halakic. 
Jacobs reiterates this contention in his summary even more distinctly: 
Although it had long been recognized that the Talmud uses the 
term 'Halaka' only in the sense of a final decision of legal 
questions, the halakic methods of reasoning are employed even 
when theological questions are considered. One might almost 
speak of a Theological Halaka • (Emphasis added.) 
However, it is clear, according 
speak of a theological Halaka. 
and unmistakably: 
to Jacobs, that one cannot really 
He says this most explicitly 
Here it is true that theology did not become Halaka. Digests 
and summaries abound of the legal decisions of the great 
luminaries, but no one has ever thought of providing a 
kind of Shulchan Arukh, a final code of theological beliefs 
binding on all Jews. (Emphasis added.J46 
Jacobs was clearly unaware of the existence of halakic procedures 
whereby theology definitely and unreservedly became Halaka. This 
phenomena can be characterized much better as theonomy ( from the 
Greek theos -i.e., G-d, and nomos -i.e., law) than as theology.147 
R. Jospeh Hayyim Sonnenfield made this fact obvious in a responsum 
to R. Shlomo Sobol: 
[Question] Concerning the matter which Tashbetz [Responsa 
of R.Simeon b. Zemah Duran] wrote in regards to a groom is 
similar to a king'148 etc •.. However, this requires investi-
gation in general, because he [Tashbetz] wrote this in matters 
of Derush Lhomiletics]. And perhaps it is relevant to apply: 
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1 \~e do not draw conclusions from the Midrash?' 
[Answer] What is written in Tashbatz is according to 
rblaka, and it is not judged as a Midrash.149 
Thus R. Sonnenfeld makes it quite clear that derush features in 
the responsa as a hermaneutical device rather than a homiletical 
goal . As far as Jacob's observation that no one ever thought 
of providing a final code of theological beliefs binding on all 
Jews, it is clear that Maimonides intended this very objective in 
formulating his laws of Fundamental Principles of Torah in the style 
of normative Halakot. Precisely because the demonstration of 
the inherent truth of these legislated axioms is a halakic activity 
binding on all Jews. The fact that no one has seriously attempted 
to repeat Maimonides' effort is attributable to many factors, to 
mention only a few: 
1) Rav Zair' s considerati0n that the majority of codifiers 
were primarily interested in compiling their codes from the 
perspective of their enforcement by the Beth Din rather than from 
the perspective of what man ought to do. Their separation of 
deed from creed was due to the logistics of enforcement and not a 
divorcement of creed form .rblaka. 
2) The great difficulty involved in codifying beliefs with the 
same degree of exactitude and precision as legal matters. 
N h . 1 . 1 bl 150 eat sc emes were s1mp y not ava1 a e. 
3) Even with regards to legal matters themselves, the Codes have 
fallen well short of exhaustively covering one's obligation 
to fulfil explicit halakic duties as defined by Din. One cannot 
help feeling painfully aware of the acute paucity of codification 
of legal resources. The emergence of thousands of responsa after 
the Shulchan Arukh which solely deal in legal questions itself 
demonstrates how many issues were omitted by Shulchan Arukh. 
Let alone the complete deficiency and absence of laws of Ethics, 
for example, from Shulchan Arukh. As R. Aaron Lichtenstein correctly 
observed that : "Even the full discharge of one's whole formal 
d d f · d b h D. f 1 bl · ff · · "151 uty e 1ne y t e 1n o ten appears pa pa y 1nsu 1c1ent. 
Nor has anyone attempted to assemble the thousands of collections 
of responsa dealing with contemporary legal matters since the 
Shulchan Arukh which have arisen as a result of changing conditions 
and thus provide a much needed updated authoratative Code of prac-
tical matters which is universally binding on all Jews. 152 This 
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unfortunate fact has given rise to much religious dissension 
and splitting into factions due to the sullen image of halakic 
inflexibility and rigidness which is an ineveitable and unavoid-
able result of failure to revise the Codes. 
Dr. Jacobs claims that his study is particularly valuable in that 
it is, he believes, the first time in any language that such a 
study has been made. If Jacobs is correct in assessing that his 
research is the first time a study has been made of the existence 
of theological discussions in the responsa, then a study which 
divulges the existence of the practical application of theological 
discussions, that is, theology in practice, or theonomy, is 
certainly valuable. 
Methodology 
The methodology of our study differs from Jacob's in that Jacobs 
examines the Responsa collection in the form of a jumbled anthology 
from century to century, chatechistically redacting hundreds of 
unrelated responsa excerpts at random, in which any matter of theo-
logical concern is considered or discussed. Our research examines 
and analyses responsa thematically according to topics rather than 
epochs and reviews only those responsa which contribute towards 
an enhancement and illumination of the central themes under investi-
gation. 
Significance of Thesis 
Jacobs professes his study to reveal that: "matters of belief 
occupied a prominent place in the writings even of those authors 
who won their reputation as distinguished academic lawyers rather 
than as metaphysicians."153 Our study reveals that these distin-
guished academic lawyers were not only also metaphysicians, but 
more exceptionally, often Jewish lawyers had to be metaphysicians, 
for if they were deficient in metaphysical erudition and expertise 
they would not have been able to cogently decide the law in a great 
many cases. As for example, in a responsum which will be discussed 
in detail in Chapter VI.l where the respondent R. Elizer Waldenberg 
incorporated Maimonides' dissertation on the unity of the cosmos 
as well Maimonides' discussion of the significance of biblical 
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anthropomorphisims in order to arrive at a suitable definition 
of personhood so that he could render a cogent decision as to the 
halakic status of a heart transplant patient, or to confirm the 
halakic status of one who undergoes trans-sexual surgery. Or 
else, as will be seen in the same Chapter, both R. Waldenberg and 
R. Hirschler affirm how knowledge and proficiency in ontology and 
in the behavioural sciences are vital for determining the halakic 
status of test tube babies. 
Thus, our investigation not only repudiates the view that Jewish 
theology is un-Jewish and that Halaka concentrates solely on deed 
ignoring belief, but more fundamentally and more profoundly, the 
"deeds" could often not be determined, in many a case, unless the 
beliefs upon which they were contingent underwent , ab initio, 
careful and thorough scrutiny. Thus, not only do respondents 
emerge both as Halakists and metaphysicians, but rather they had 
to be metaphysicians in order to be Halakists which was frequently 
a necessary precondition for becoming the latter. 
Indeed, the noted and highly acclaimed historian, Professor Yitzhak 
Baer in his work Yisrael ba-Ammim, demonstrates that the earliest 
halakic Sages were metaphysicians in nature whom he calls "spiritua-
l . " " 1 . "154 1sts or pneumato og1sts : 
There are two sides to Halaka: On the one hand --the rationa-
listic approach, which in the end did not deduce the final 
conclusions, of the principles of logical thought. And on 
the other hand- the mythical [i.e., metaphysical] approach 
of Halaka and its her~eneutics. These two aspects together 
were the foundations vlhich shaped the image of the Sage and 
the piou? religionist in Israel, the general pattern of Jewish 
thought, and the social structure of our people for many genera-
tions. 
We find Sages of the Hillel type, who was a master of positive 
Halaka, however, in his essential nature he was without doubt 
a mystic and to this fact do his popular religious-moral 
teachings attest. The Sages of the Mishna after the destruc-
tion of the Second Temple continually preserved the equilibrium 
between the master of positive Halaka- and the religious-
pneumatologist-metaphysician. 
Like Rav Zair, Baer maintains the utter inseperability of Aggada 
from Halaka: 
It is clear that one can not separate Halaka from what is 
called 'Aggada,' because they both come together to attest 




Both civil law and ritual law were judged by one common 
method, without distinguishing between the rational and irra-
tional spheres. And similarly regarding hermeneutics themselves: 
Even when our Sages formally followed the rational steps borrowed 
from the West, in the final result they return to the metaphysical 
system of thought from which they stemmed.155 
Baer documents numerous laws which were formulated in the Mishna which 
156 were completely meshed and stemmed from metaphysical concepts. 
Not only does Baer purport that the philosophical orientation of the 
Sages influenced their halakic positions as well as moulded the ideo-
logical and social structure of the people, but in fact, he proves 
that it greatly influenced Christological and stoic philosophies as 
weu.l57 
One of the most significant results of this study is that if it can 
be proven that many practical Halakot are contingent upon and grounded 
in philosophy and metaphysical knowledge, it then follows that, as 
man's understanding of philosophy and metaphysics changes, the Halakot 
which are contingent upon this understanding, of necessity must also 
undergo change. This will become clear in the coming chapters as, 
for example, how the different philosophical perceptions of the after-
effect of Elijah's ascension produced different halakic rulings regar-
ding the marital status of his spouse. This point will become espe-
cially clear in our chapter on Metaphysical Development, where we 
will discuss how many Halakot which were contingent on the scientific 
understanding of various metaphysical phenomena which existed during 
the medieval period underwent considerable modification in practice 
as these phenomena evolved and became differently perceived in the 
modern era. 
Here lies a most important difference between philosophy of practice, 
i.e., ta'amei mitzvot (ratio praeceptorum) and philosophy in practice. 
For in philosophy of practice, or the rationale of law, even when the 
initial rationale changes or ceases to apply, the law still remains 
unchanged. Hence, although philosophy of law certainly enhances one's 
observance and appreciation of the law, it does not materially affect 
the law itself. Philosophy in practice, on the other hand, of 
necessity must affect practice as the philosophy upon which such 
practices are derived themselves undergo change or become differently 
conceived. 158 Thus, in the same way as changing socio-political 
conditions presents problems for practice, so would changing condi-
tions of thought and epistomological perceptions equally present 
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problems for practice, to no less an extent. 
Ultimately, the value of researching metaphysical issues in halakic 
process, could perhaps best be summed up in David Hartman's following 
remark: "Sinai is not a mere stage in man's spiritual development, 
but the ultimate place to which man constantly returns - even when 
he soars to the heights of metaphysical knowledge," and in Baer' s 
statement: "Every Halaka and religious-moral teaching, that from 
its source and origin, is part of a common human reality, returns 
and manifests itself in the end as a mythical [i.e., metaphysical] 
experience, which stems from ~1ount Sinai and Heaven, and it is 
studied and expounded in the process of research, in ways which 
t . 1 b t . h h . 1 . 1 d . n159 seem ra lOna u ln trut are metap yslca , mystlca an pneumatlc. 
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The Sources 
There were nine who entered the Garden of Eden during 
their lifetimes, and they are: Enoch, the son of Yered; 
Elijah, the Messiah; Eliezer, the bondsman of Abraham; 
Hiram, King of Tyre; Ebed-Melech, the Cushite; Jabez, the 
son of Rabbi Judah the Prince; Bithia, the daughter of 
Pharoah; and Serah, the daughter of Asher; and, according 
to others, also Rabbi Joshua ben Levi. 
Derekh Erez Zuta1 
Rabbah bar Abbuha met Elijah standing in a non-Jewish 
cemetery. Said [Rabbah] to him: Are thou not a priest? 
\~y then dost thou stand in a cemetery? He replied: 
Has the master not studied the laws of purity? For it 
has been taught: Rabbi Simeon b. Yohai said: The graves 
of Gentiles do not defile, for it is written, 'And ye my 
flock, the flock of my pastures are men,' only ye are 
designated 'men.' 
Baba Mezia2 
Our Rabbis taught: Twelve questions did the Alexandrians 
address to R. Joshua b. Hananiah. Three were of a 
scientific nature [hokhn1a], three were matters of Aggada, 
three were mere nonsense-and three were matters of conduct. 
'Three were mere nonsense': Does the wife of Lot convey 
impurity? He replied: A corpse conveys impurity, but 
no pillar of salt conveys impurity. Does the son of the 
Shunamite convey impurity? He replied: A coprse conveys 
impurity but no live person conveys impurity. 
Niddah3 
The minor tractate, Derekh Erez relates how nine eminent persons 
entered Paradise alive. A certain enquirer was eager to know 
whether two of them, 4 Elijah and R. Yehoshua b. Levi, were required 
by Jewish Law to divorce their wives or whether the husbands were 
considered dead, in which case it would be permissible for their 
wives to rewed. 
The enquirer observed from Elijah's response to Rabba b. Abbuha in 
the narrative of Baba Mezia that it is clear that Elijah continued 
to heed all the commandments. His appearance in the cemetery 
was justifiable because the graves of Gentiles do not effect 
defilement. Were Elijah considered dead, and thereby unbound by 
Torah Law, his appearance at the cemetery would have been sanctionable, 
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regardless of whether or not the graves of Gentiles would cause 
defilement. Since the effectuation of defilement is a Torah 
precept, it would not apply to Elijah, as the dead are absolved 
of commandments. Therefore, the enquirer deduced that Elijah and 
R. Yehoshua b. Levi must be considered alive, and their wives are 
betrothed womenwhose husbands are alive. Thus he posited to 
R. Israel b. Pethahia Isserlein, the foremost rabbi of Germany in 
the fifteenth century, 5 that it should be forbidden for their 
wives to rewed. 
R. Isserlein's Responsum 
R. Isserlein includedthis responsum in his famous Termumat ha-Deshen 
which reads: 
[Question] Were the spouses of Elijah the prophet of blessed 
memory orR. Yehoshua b. Levi permitted to rewed? There would 
also be a practical difference for future generations if one 
were to merit a similar fate as them. From the narrative of 
Elijah standing in the cemetery one may infer that it i s 
forbidden [to remarry]. 
[Answer] I am greatly astoni'shed that you bothered to pose 
such a query. Did you not know how it is stated that twelve 
questions the Alexandrians addressed to R. Yehoshua b. Hananiah, 
among which were three matters of nonsense:6 Does the wife 
of Lot convey impurity? Does the son of the Shunamite convey 
impurity? And he responded: A corpse conveys impurity but 
no pillar of salt conveys impurity; a corpse conveys impurity 
but no live person conveys impurity. Even though Lot's wife 
was certainly dead, except that she was transmuted to another 
form and likewise the son of the Shunamite was indeed dead and 
was thereupon restored to 7ife, nonetheless he declared that 
the wife of his fellow man is prohibited and not the wives of 
angels who are completely spiritual and not corporeal. 
With regard to what you advanced as proof from Elijah's 
appearance at the cemetery, it is an obvious fact that 
Elijah observed all of Torah Law as it is stated: He even 
complied with the rabbinic enactments concerning the Sabbath 
limits. 8 
A cursory view of the crasis of R. Isserlein's responsum would indi-
cate that one need not search widely to attest Elijah's commitment 
to Mitzvot. Furthermore, he contends that just as R. Yehoshua b. 
Hananiah evinced that the transformation of being, liberates one of 
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edicts relating to his former status, similarly Elijah's becoming an 
angel freed him from edicts relating to his prior status of being 
"thy fellow man." Hence his wife was no longer confined to the 
status of "thy fellow man's wife," and consequently Elijah and R. 
Yehoshua b. Levi must be considered as deceased whose spouses would 
be permit ted to rewed. 
The Difficulties 
Upon closer examination of R. Isserlein's ruling it becomes apparant 
that what is contained in this responsum is by no means simple. 
One of the most arduous tasks of the respondent is not only inventing 
the solution, but also being absolutely certain that his solution 
conforms with the entire talmudic opus. The respondent cannot 
dispute what has been saliently mitigated by the Talmud. 9 His 
ruling attains its cogency only subsequent to such scrutiny. There 
are two talmudic passages which seem to glaringly contradict R. Isser-
lein 's responsum. Being that he was a "Rishon" - one of the fore-
most halakic authorities of his time whose Responsa became the basis 
for the evolvement of an abundance of subsequent Halaka - he was 
undoubtedly aware of these two talmudic passages. 10 In addition, 
there are many internal difficulties within the responsum. 
Adapting R. Isserlein's ruling to the talmudic passages and the 
illumination of its internal difficulties became the plethoric 
occupation of numerous respondents, codifiers, and halakic commen-
tators. To discuss all of the halakic literature dealing with the 
Terumat ha-Deshen passage would be too exhaustive and extremely 
laborious. Therefore, only a few selected portions which are perti-
nent to the subject of the work have been chosen. Only after careful 
analysis of R. Isserlein's ruling, and a proper understanding of its 
profundity may we proceed to deliberate its application and its 
consequences. 
R. Falcon's Analysis 
R. David Falcon, a great talmudist and halakic scholar in Constanti-
nople during the mid-seventeenth century, was exceedingly confounded 
by R. Isserlein's ruling. He proffers in his Responsa Bnei David, 11 
that the ruling seems to contradict the following talmudic passage 
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in Moed Katan: 
Our Rabbis taught: And these are rends that are not [to be] 
sewed up. One who rends [his clothes] for his father or 
morther; or his master who taught him Wisdom;12 for a Nasi, or 
Av Beth Din .•• 
'For his father or mother or for his master who taught him 
Wisdom.' Whence do we derive [these rulings]? - For what is 
it written! And Elisha saw it and he cried: My father my 
father, the chariots of Israel and the horseman thereof.i3 
'My father, my father,' that is, [to rend on the loss of] 
one's father or mother. 'The chariot of Israel and the horse-
man thereof,' that is [for] a Master who taught one Torah. 
Said Resh Lakish toR. Johanan: Elijah [however] is alive!14 
He, [R. Johanan] replied, Since it is written there 'And he saw 
him no more, he was as dead to him [to Elisha].15 
R. Falcon remarked that the Talmud provides proof for the rending 
of one's garment in the event of death from Elisha's own rending 
upon Elijah's heavenly ascension. Resh Lakish promptly objects. 
Since Elijah is still living how can this instance be the source for 
rending in the event of death. R. Johanan's riposte is that since 
Elijah was no longer visible to Elisha, it was as though Elijah was 
dead. R. Falcon inferred from here that according to the Talmud, 
Elijah is considered alive! · Even in the rebuttal, R. Johanan 
maintained that in reality Elijah is considered alive except vis-
a-vis Elisha. For Elisha, Elijah's departure represents his death 
by virtue of his becoming unperceivable. 
In this connection R. Falcon asked: What did R. Isserlein clarify 
by replying to the enquirer that it is an obvious matter that Elijah 
observed all of Torah Law, even to the extent of heeding the rabbi-
nical enactments of the Sabbath limits. Did not the enquirer advance 
as proof from the cemetery incident in Baba Mezia that Elijah's 
obligation to observe Torah Laws of impurity evinces that Elijah is 
alive! There is a contradiction in maintaining on the one hand, 
that Elijah observes Mitzvot and therefore is considered alive, and on 
the other hand that as an angel he is absolved of commandments and 
therefore is considered dead. 
opposed. 
The two positions are diametrically 
In order to fathom these acute difficulties R. Falcon suggested a 
novel interpretation of the above-cited passage in Moed Katan. Resh 
Lakish was not asking how Elisha's rending could be the guiding in-
stance for rending; rather, he was questioning why did Elisha rend 
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altogether. Surely, it would have been preferable to don white 
raiments and rejoice, since Elijah was being spared death and vouch-
safed eternal life. This was not an occasion for mourning but one 
for supreme jubilation. R. Johanan's riposte was that rending was 
not for Elijah per se, but rather it was for the loss of a mentor 
whom Elisha could no longer behold. Indeed, Elijah was sublimated 
to an angel; however, for Elisha it meant his Master had died. No 
longer was there a pedagogue from whom Elisha could receive erudition 
or guidance. It is for the loss of one's master that the Talmud 
stipulates that one must rend. Thus, in the light of R. Falcon's 
novel interpretation, he claims to have resolved the passage in Moed 
Katan with respect to Elijah's status. 
Regarding the internal contradiction contained within the Terumat 
ha-Deshen in maintaining both that Elijah heeds the commandments and 
is an angel, R. Falcon hesitantly suggests that Elijah is not obli-
gated to observe Torah precepts but rather opts to be stringent on 
his own accord. Just as we find that adherence to Torah Law became 
obligatory from Sinai onwards, 16 therefore Abraham's observance of 
Torah prior to .sinai17 could only have been voluntary. Similarly, 
Elijah- though not compelled to observe Mitzvot -nevertheless 
chooses to do so as a result of his own self irrrposed stringency, and, 
not as a mandatory imperative. 
However, R. Falcon cannot account why Elijah's wife should be per-
mitted to remarry. It is entirely possible for Elijah to reappear! 
Certainly, Elisha's disciples, themselves prophets, believed that 
Elijah had never left, and was only cast upon one of the mountains. 18 
Chronicles relates of a letter which Elijah had written after his 
ascension. 19 It is impossible for an angel to write letters. A 
letter can only be written by a living human. 20 Since it is clear 
that Elijah reappears in human form, he is still a married man and 
his wife is still categorically "your fellow man's wife." Since 
her husband is still alive, how then could she be permitted to rewed? 
R. Attiah's Approach 
R. Isaac b. Isaiah Attidh, the renowned eighteenth and early nine-
teenth century rabbinic luminary of Allepo, in his Zera Yizchak 
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severely criticised R. Falcon's analysis of the Terumat ha-Deshen. 21 
R. Attiah's initial objection was toR. Falcon's contention that the 
passage in Moed Katan considers Elijah alive. R. Attiah demurred, 
on the contrary, it is precisely from this talmudic passage that one 
can lend support to R. Isserlein's ruling. Although the Talmud 
maintains that Elijah is in reality alive, as R. Falcon demonstrated, 
nevertheless inasmuch as he was no longer "beholdable," Elisha rent 
his garment as the law requires for one whose master died. There-
fore, concerning the law of "rending," Elijah was afforded the same 
halakic status as a deceased and as one who passes from this world. 
In view of this fact, the same would be true for his spouse. Since 
Elijah is no longer beholdable and therefore, considered dead regar-
ding the laws of rending, so too he is considered dead, vis-a-vis 
his wife. Thence, the wife has full liberty to remarry. 
Furthermore, R. Attiah challenged that the Talmud's q·ualification 
that Elijah "were as dead to Elisha" is not intended to exclude 
other people for whom Elijah is not considered dead. For the same 
reasoning that one must employ in order to consider Elijah dead vis-a-vis 
Elisha applies equally to anyone else as well. Rather, the Talmud's 
intention is that since in the end result Elijah was alive in heaven 
and did notsavour the taste of death, unlike the destiny of his 
counterparts, he is designated alive. However, concerning us, in 
view of that fact that Elijah is visible to no one he were as dead, 
as the Talmud stipulates regarding Elisha, and therefore, he is to 
be considered dead for all purposes. Certainly then this passage 
is an appropriate source that could be utilised in support of R. 
Isserlein's ruling, rather than being a problem for him! 
R. Attiah was also perturbed as to what avail the new exposition 
was to R. Falcon. This reinterpretation only seems further to 
strengthen R. Falcon's original remonstration. Namely, since 
Elisha was not obligated by Law to rend (according to the reinter-
pretation) it follows that Elijah is considered entirely and unequi-
vocally alive; this being diametrically antipodal to R. Isserlein's 
ruling! How then did R. Falcon surmise that this reinterpretation 
would resolveR. Isserlein's ruling to the passage in questionZ 
R. Attiah's final objection refers to the self contradiction that 
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R. Falcon observed within the Terumat ha-Deshen. R. Isserlein, in 
bringing a source stipulating Elijah's observance of Mitzvot 
which mitigates his being alive, contests his own thesis that Elijah 
is purported to.'be dead. R. Attiah denotes that R. Falcon himself 
agrees that his denouement in vindication of R. Isserlein, i.e., 
that Elijah is in actuality considered dead, and absolved of all 
Mitzvot, nevertheless, he voluntarily opts for stringenc~ is forced. 
Moreover, R. Attiah remarks, if this were the servile meaning of 
the Terumat ha-Deshen, certainly R. Isserlein should have stated 
clearly that Elijah was stringent of his own accord as this is the 
main thrust of his response to the enquirer. 
Subsequent to considering all this, R. Attiah ingeniously determined 
that, according to R. Isserlein, Elijah is obligated by Law to 
observe the Mitzvot. Although he transcended to the level of the 
angels, nevertheless, he was never discharged of the sanctity 
contingent on his being a Priest. That is why Elijah was questioned 
for standing in a cemetery. Similarly, his obligation toward the 
other commandments never expired since Elijah in reality never died. 
The dictum, "'Among the dead I am free' - once a man dies he becomes 
free of Torah and Mitzvot," applies in the advent of death, not 
in such a case as ours~2 Accordingly, Elijah did not reply that he 
is absolved of Mitzvot and only voluntarily opts for self stringency. 
Rather he rejoined thatgraves of Gentiles do not defile. The infe-
rence being that, were they graves of Jews they would affect defile-
ment. Thus, in ·regards to his relationship with G-d Elijah is con-
sidered alive and obliged in Mitzvot. However, with regard to us, 
in such cases concerning his spouse, rending and the like, he is 
considered to be dead. The one is not contingent on the other; 
each status (i .'e. , dead or alive) en tails its own consequences . 
This explains why R. Isserlein rejected that which l1is enquirer 
advanced as proof, namely, the fact that Jewish graves effect defile-
ment and would prevent Elijah from appearing in a cemetery. Since 
regarding his relationship to G-d he is alive, it does not contradict 
the fact that concerning us he is considered dead. On this basis 
R. Isserlein ruled that Elijah's spouse is permitted to rewed and 
not as his enquirer surmised that she would be forbidden to remarry. 
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Thus, R. Attiah proposed an illuminative axiom. Although Elijah's 
transcendence divests him of corporeal idiocracies, the sanctity 
contingent on his Priesthood never terminated. This enabled Elijah 
to continue a relationship with G-d corresponding to the living and 
hence obligated him in Mitzvot. However, concerning us he is 
equated with the identical halakic status that is vouchsafed the 
dead. 
The Controversy 
In order not to leave R. Falcon's erudition, uncontested by R. Attiah' s 
polemic, one could argue the following in his defense. R. Attiah's 
major criticism was that according to R. Falcon's novel interpreta-
tion of the passage in Moed Katan, i.e., that since Elisha was not 
obligated by Law to rend for Elijah, it follows that Elijah is 
unequivocally alive. This conclusion is directly opposed to R. 
Isserlein's thesis, which further obscures his ruling rather than 
resolves it. Although in truth R. Falcon contends that Elisha was 
not obligated to rend for Elijah, he explicitly states that he was 
indeed obligated to rend for the loss of his Master. In other words, 
for Elijah's person Elisha was not obligated to rend; however, for 
Elijah's "relation" (yic_!:l~~) of being Elisha's Master he was 
obligated to rend, since it was the relation that was terminated. 
Although Elijah was still Elijah, he was no longer the "Master" of 
Elisha. The novelty in R. Falcon's exposition of the passage is 
that the Talmud is establishing that when one rends for the loss of 
one's master he is in fact rending for the loss of the relation of 
being his master and not for the loss of human life for someone who 
happens to be his master. What concerns us here is not the dissi-
pation of life but rather the severance of this master-pupil rela-
tionship. It was for the severance of this relationship that 
Elisha rent his garments on Elijah's ascension. This also explains 
why R. Falcon felt that this accounts for R. Isserlein's ruling 
that Elijah's spouse is also permitted to rewed. Since being the 
''husband" of his spouse is also a relation, according to Moed Katan, 
any relation emanating from Elijah ceased at the time of transcen-
dence. Although Elijah is very much alive, Elijah's relation of 
being his wife's husband terminated. Although Elijah the angel 
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lives, Elijah the husband ceases to exist. 
Even when R. Falcon challenged why R. Isserlein permitted Elijah's 
wife to rewed it was only because Elijah would reappear, as he was 
known to d~ and at the time of appearance he would immediately 
become the husband of his wife and the master of Elisha. His 
previous relations in each case would be resumed. However, it is 
clear that during Elijah's disappearance he is neither husband nor 
master. That is why in aswering why Elijah continues to perform 
Mitzvot, R. Falcon would not suggest as R. Attiah that Elijah's 
being a Priest obligates him in Mitzvot. Since the status of Priest-
hood is also a relation in the subdivision of the community of Israel, 
according to Moed Katan this is yet another relation emanating from 
Elijah which terminated upon his transcendence. 
It was probably this line of logic that R. Attiah found difficult 
to accept. He thought it implausible to separate Elijah himself 
from relations emanating from him. The two are intricately inter-
twined. If Elijru1 lives, certainly his relations are not dead. 
Elijah's relations terminate only with the termination of Elijah 
himself. It seemed toR. Attiah too great a novelty to say that 
Moed Katan is suggesting an obligation to rend for 
relation and not for the loss of one's person. 23 
inconceivable to R. Attiah that Elijah's relation 
the loss of one's 
It was, therefore, 
of being a Priest 
could possibly have terminated, since this is an intrinsic aspect of 
Elijah's relationship with G-d. Becoming defiled would render 
Elijah impure, an impediment solely significant in impairing his 
relationship with G-d. It is in regards to this relationship and 
laws pertaining thereof that the Talmud in Moed Katan assents that 
Elijah is alive. With regards to laws concerning mankind, however, 
the Talmud considers Elijah dead. 
Ideological Categories of Divorce 
To state the point of contention tersely: While R. Attiah differen-
tiates between laws pertaining to Elijah's 'man-G-d' relationship 
and laws pertaining to Elijah's 'man-man' relationship, R. Falcon 
draws a distinction between Elijah himself and relations which 
emanate from him. 
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Thus far we have evinced that the specific halakic question of 
whether Elijah's spouse requires a divorce in order to rewed must 
be investigated in terms of much broader ideological categories 
of divorce. Namely, whether Elijah's person is divorced of all 
relations which emanate from him and whether commandments based on 
Elijah 's relationship vis-a-vis G-d may be divorced from his rela-
tionship vis-a-vis his fellow man. For this purpose one must first 
ascertain by means of a thorough and assiduous analysis, the essence 
of Elijah 's existential being. 
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1. ELIJAH Is INGRESSION 
In the preceding chapter we have discussed a controversy over the 
nature of Elijah's status subsequent to his disappearance. In 
this chapter we shall demonstrate that this controversy hinges on 
the fact that Elijah's disappearance itself was an utter mystery. 
What exactly transpired during Elijah's miraculous ascent when, 
"it came to pass, when the Lord would take up Elijah by a whirl-
wind into heaven,"1 is a subject of discussion extant in the 
Responsa literature. Before proceeding to deal with the matter of 
Elijah's disappearance, which will be discussed in .the next section, 
we will devote ourselves to a reconnaissance of the matter of Elijah 's 
ffilergence and appearance. Interestingly enough, just as Elijah 's 
disappearance into the whirlwind remains a mystery, so was his debut 
also a mystery. He is first mentioned in Kings I with almost no 
introduction: "And Elijah the Tishbite, who was one of the settlers 
of Gilead , said unto Ahab ..• "2 What is the meaning of the word 
"Tishbite"? Is it the name of a place, or a people, or a family? 
How could Elijah be both a Tishbite and a Gileadite? Who were his 
parents? Certainly, little information concerning Elijah's origin 
can be obtained form this enigmatic introductory verse. 
The Question of Ancestry 
It is probably for this reason that as early as the Geonic period 
(6th-11th centuries) the Geonim were asked to clarify the matter of 
Elijah 's origin, as this question appears in the Responsa of the 
Geonim. A Geon wrote3 that there existed an argument among our 
Sages concerning Elijah's origin found in Seder Eliyahu Rabbah. 
There were those who claimed that he was a descendent of the grand-
children of Rachel, and those who claimed that he was of the offspring 
of Leah. During the course of the argument Elijah appeared before 
the Sages exclaiming: 
Rabbis, why are you so distressed over this matter. 4 
I am descended from none other than the offspring of Rachel. 
Is it not written concerning the progeny of the tribe of 
Benjamin: 'And Jaareshiahf and Elijah, and Zichri were the 
sons of Jehoram.'5 They Lthe Sages] asked him: Are thou 
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not a Priest? Did not thou sayest to the widow: 'But make 
me thereof a little cake first [and bring it unto me 1 and after make for thee and thy son].'6 Said he unto them: That same 
infant was Messiah, the son of Joseph. And I intimated a 
hint to the world that first I will descend to Babylon and 
afterwards the Messiah will arrive. '7 
This account of course, contradicts the passage in Baba Mezia, 
cited in Chapter II, which purports Elijah to be a Priest, a descen-
dent of Levi, the son of Leah, and not a scion of Benjamin, the son 
of Rachel. The Tosafoth resolve this dilemma by positing that 
Elijah's exclamation to the Sages was merely a refutation, to which 
he did not personally subscribe. 8 This was quite ·characteristic 
of Elijah, as Tosafoth point to various other instances where Elijah 
states a position to which he does not personally subscribe. There 
is no need to demonstrate the difficulty which this explanation 
suggests. 9 S~ffice it to say that there exist conflicting sources 
concerning the origin of Elijah and his ancestry. 
Elijah's Prieshood 
In the narrative of Baba Mezia which relates Rabbah bar Abbuba's 
questioning of how Elijah the priest could be so unconcerned and 
indifferenttocontactingimpurity by appearing at a cemetery, Rashi 
comments that this is in accordance with the opinion that Elijah 
and Phinehas (the son of Eleazer, the son of Aaron), the Priest, 
are identica1. 10 Precisely because of the ambiguity and confusion 
among the sources as to whether Elijah and Phinehas were in fact 
selfsame, or of at least a Priestly lineage, R. Ezekiel Zevi ben 
Avraham Hayyim Michaelson was asked to clarify the matter of Elijah's 
identity. R. Michaelson (1863-1942), known as the Rabbi of Plonsk, 
Poland, in his collection of Responsa, Tirosh ve-Yizhar, included a 
response to R. Pesach ha-Cohen Pinter, Dayan in Vilna, in which he 
bibliographs no less than fifteen sources which record and establish 
Phinehas and Elijah as having selfsame identity. Perhaps the most 
explicit source confirming Elijah's Priesthood, cited by R. Michaelson, 
is Elijah's own affirmation in Midrash Proverbs where he divulged: 
"I Pr. t " 11 am a les • 
Thus we have Elijah's testimony cited in the Responsa of the Geonim 
attesting his ancestry to Benjamin, the son of Rachel, conflicting 
with his own testimony in Midrash Mishle attesting to his claim to 
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Priesthood, thereby belonging to a class of direct descendents of 
Levi, the son of Leah. 
The Resurrection Issue 
This latter opinion, alleging Elijah's consanguinity to Phinehas, 
the Priest, mentioned by R. Michaelson, presents with it certain 
difficulties. The Tosafoth already asked that according to this 
opinion how can one explain Elijah's resurrection of the dead son 
of the woman of Zarephath, related in Kings?12 Since Elijah was a 
Priest he was forbidden to defile himself by coming in contact with 
a dead corpse. How then could he be permitted to perform this act 
of resurrection? 
R. David ben Solomon ibn Abi Zimra (1479-1573), known as the Radbaz 
was one of the most prolific writers of the Responsa literature. 
His collection of Responsa, Teshuvot ha-Radbaz, his most important 
work, consists of seven parts, containing well over two thousand 
responsa. Many more are still in manuscript. In one of those 
Responsa, Radba~ was asked the identical question voiced by the 
Tosafoth. The enquirer was either unaware that the question was 
asked of the Tosafoth or dissastisfied with the explanation given by 
them. Radbaz analyzed earlier explanations on the subject and 
offered a few original ones: 
You requested that I clarify how Elijah could defile himself 
for the sake of resurrecting the son of the woman of Zarephath, 
according to the opinion that Elijah and Phinehas are selfsame? 
Various explanations are extant concerning this matter. There 
are those who contend that the child did not actually decease.13 
This seems to be the plain meaning of Scripture. Jonathan ben 
Uziel's transcription seems to suggest that the lad, though 
moribound, had not yet expired. Likewise, one may infer from 
the Talmud's question in Niddah, 'Does the son of the Shunamite 
contact impurity?' It was not asked, 'Does the son of the 
Zarephite contact impurity?'14 This indicates that the child 
had not actually died, and therefore no question could be 
ventured from this incident. 
Indeed this explanation is entirely fallacious. Scripture 
clearly recounts [the woman's reproach] 'to slay my son,' and 
[Elijah's response] 'see thy son liveth.' The transcription 
of Jonathan ben Uziel is inconclusive. The questionner in 
the tractate Niddah did not ask from this incident because of 
his uncertainty.I6 However, narratives which epic Elijah's 
resurrection of the dead are recorded profusely throughout 
talmudic and midrashic litetature. 
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I have already seen R. Bachya's theory that the woman of Zare-
path was a non-Jewess. R. Bachya's theory is equally erro-
neous as our Sages have identified the child of the Zarephite, 
as Jonah, the son of Amittai.17 Could Jonah, the Divine Prophet, 
be of Gentile birth? Even if one were to conjecture Jonah's 
adoption of Jewish faith through conversion, one would still 
have to account for Scripture's relating Jonah to his non-
Jewish progenitor, Ammitai.18 Nor can one speculate that Jonah's 
father co1werted, as Scripture denominates the Zarephite a widow. 
Furthermore , how could Elijah become a resident at the home of 
a non-Jewess? Scripture also recounts the woman's oath, 
' As the Lord the G-d liveth, I have not a cake, only a handful 
of meal. .. '19 Would a non-Jewess know how to utter such an 
oath? Moreover , would a Gentile be deservant of such a miracle? 
Undoubtedly, the woman was a Jewess, as Zarephath,in close 
proximity of Sidon, was under Israel's soverignty. 
The Tosafoth have asseverated that since Elijah was perfectly 
assured beyond all doubt that his undertaking would culminate 
in success , he was permitted to defile himself for the sake of 
saving a life.20 This is a difficult explanation. Firstly 
because of the injunction that one may not rely on miracles.2i 
Furthermore, if Elijah was truly convinced of the success of 
his endeavour, then this instance cannot be regarded as a case 
of saving a life.22 
An explanation has been conduced to the effect that Elijah did 
not in fact defile himself.23 That which Scripture relates, 
'And he stretched himself above the child,' does not mean to 
say directly above the child, but rather adjacently above him. 
Elijah assumed this position in order to muster greater devotion 
while entreating on the child's behalf. This explanation also 
entails some difficulties. If Elijah 's intention was merely 
to muster greater devotion, it would have been sufficient to 
set his countenance upon the child and meditate thereon. 
What point was there in stretching himself over the child? 
Furthermore , Scripture recounts, and he [Elijah] carried him 
[the child] into the upper chamber where he abode.24 Elijah 
was defiled through actual contact with the corpse, as the plain 
meaning of Scripture suggests that Elijah himself carried the 
child to the upper chamber. 
One may espouse that Elijah adjudicated upon himself a special 
dispensation, not to be taken as a precedent for the purpose 
of sanctifying G-d's name, similar to the episode of Elijah 's 
ordering the slaughtering of a consecrated offering outside 
the Temple for the same motive.25 A special dispensation 
[temporarily deferring the laws of impurity] was additionally 
necessary to augment the preventing of an inevitable desecration 
of G-d's name, as Scripture relates how the Zarephite impeached 
Elijah , 'What have I to do with thee, 0 thou man of G-d? Art 
thou come unto me to bring my sin to remembrance and to slay 
my son?' ... and people would claim that you literally came 
upon me \·Jhich caused my son's death. Surely, there can be no 
greater desecration of G-d's name! Consequently, Elijah's 
action procured the sanctification of G-d's name, as Scripture 
records the woman's proclamation, 'Now I know that thou art a 
man of G-d, and the word of the Lord in thy mouth is truth. '26 
- 66 -
1HE NATURE OF ELIJAH' S ESSENCE INGRESSION 
Lastly, one might postulate that the child was a meth mitzvah, 
that is, there arose a religious obligation to bury the dead 
child who was unattended, which overrides the laws of levitical 
defilement.27 According to these two caudal explanations, 
Elijah came in actual contact with the corpse. 
Both these explanations are of my own and it is on the first 
explanation, that Elijah issued a special dispensation, that I 
rely. 
Radbaz concludes his responsum with a most interesting enucleation: 
Alas, I have written down for you all that is known to me 
concerning this question and you are free to choose any expla-
nation you please. However, according to those who are saga-
cious in esoteric knowledge, no question exists whatsoever. 
For those who ascribe that Phinehas and Elijah are selfsame, 
opine that the source of Phinehas's soul embodied Elijah. 
And when Elijah was confronted [by Rabbah bar Abbuha in the 
narrative of Baba Mezia] whether he was a Priest, Elijah did 
not wish to disclose this secret.28 
From this responsum emerges the notion that even the performance of 
a metaphysical act, which by its very nature defies universal law 
embarking upon the orbit of the supernatural, is only sanctionable 
once it conforms within the strict rubric of Halaka. The Halaka 
which encompasses transphysical science, was well capable of endorsing 
Elijah's feat. There is an added practical concern in that the 
responsum ratifies whether a person who temporarily ceases to 
function as alive conveys impurity upon revival. This question 
was considered useful to R. David Bleich in discussing whether to 
continue medical treatment to resuscitate a patient after being 
determined clinically dead. 29 It is noteworthy that in his dis-
cussion of thevarious explanations, Radbaz must provide a running 
commentary to the chapter dealing with the resurrection almost verse 
by verse. The exposition on which he relies is that Halaka was 
temporarily deferred in order to sanctify His name. That is not to 
suggest that an exception arose whereby Halaka was temporarily 
violated in order to allow for the sanctification of His name. But 
rather, that even if that end is acheived by the deferral of the 
details of that system, the deferral itself becomes Halaka. 30 
(To illustrate this axiom allegorically: When the Law Enforcement 
Agency enacted the traffic regulation all vehicles must come to a 
halt at a red traffic light, they also legislated that any ambL'Jance 
in the event of an emergency may continue to pass the red light. 
Furthermore, should the vehicles be congested at a standstill, such 
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that they impede or hinder the ambulance from advancing, they too 
maypass the red light, in order to allow the ambulance to proceed. 
Let us reflect upon what transpired when the ambulance passed the red 
light. Did the ambulance violate a traffic regulation in order 
to save a human life? Certainly not. Rather, since the general 
purpose of the Law Enforcement Agency is to save and protect human 
lives- if the enforcement of its regulation will result in the loss 
of human life, thentheregulation stipulates to pass the red light. 
Thus bywaivingcertain details of that system, the general purpose 
of those regulations is achieved. Furthermore, if other vehicles 
hinder the ambulance in any way from proceeding, they themselves may 
pass the red light, not in violation of a traffic regulation due to 
exceptional circumstances, but rather in strict adherence to the 
initial intent of the regulations legislated by the Law Enforcement 
Agency. Similarly, if the overall purpose of the halakic system 
is achieved bywaivingcertain details of that system then that defer-
ral itself becomes a Halaka.) 
R. Michaelson, in the same responsum in which he bibliographs all 
the relevant sources which identify Elijah with Phinehas, mentions 
the Tosafoth who questioned if Elijah was the selfsame Phinehas the 
Priest, how could he defile himself by coming into contact with the 
dead son of the Zarephite woman? Striving to find an adequate 
solution to the Tosafoth's problem, R. Michaelson immediately turns 
to Radbaz's treatment of the same issue. He supports Radbaz's 
dismissal of the theory that the child was not actually dead, but 
only on the brink of death, by citing eighteen separate sources which 
, clearly indicate that the child was definitely dead. The advocates 
of the former theory, however, found support for their contention 
from the Alexandrian's question in tractate Niddah: 
Does the son of the Shunamite woman contact impurity? It 
was not asked, "Does the son of the Zarephite woman contact 
impurity?' The latter unasked incident of the son of the 
Zarephite would have been a preferable questionl as chronologi-
cally it preceded the incident of the Shunamite s son, yet the 
Alexandrians were absolutely silent on it. This indicated to 
them that the son of Zarephite woman had not actually expired 
and that no question could be ventured from that incident. 
R. Michaelson discounts this support by employing Maharsha's exposition 
of the passage in Niddah and applying it in answer to the advocates 
of this theory: 
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The question of Radbaz from tractate Niddah can be resolved 
according to Maharsha who explained: 
'They [the Alexandrians] mistakenly thought that the body 
[of the resurrected son of the Shunamite] was considered dead, 
and that 'life' which came to him by agency of Elisha's prayers 
was merely incidental, and that the body itself was still dead 
and would effect defilement.' In that case, one may say that 
this is only true of the son of the Shunamite in the case of 
Elisha who prayed [on her behalf] as is stated in Megilla.31 
And for this [reason] they asked if he [the Shunamite's son] 
defiles, as explained by Maharsha, 'that by virtue of Elisha's 
prayer did he live but his body was [still] dead. However, 
in the [case of] the son of the Zarephite by Elijah, where one 
could say that he [Elijah] resurrected him by use of the Divine 
Name and the Book of Creation, they did not ask.32 As surely 
he would not defile, since in reality his body was also alive -
and the Talmud's answer that the living do not defile was [already] 
known [to them]. And ponder this carefully because it is 
correct, with the help of Blessed G-d.33 
R. Michaelson also supports Radbaz's discounting of R. Bahya's 
theory that the son of the Zarephite woman was a Gentile, by citing 
many sources which identify the son of the Zarephite woman as Jonah 
the Prophet, or as Messiah the son of Joseph, who were certainly 
Jewish. R. Michaelson also mentions the original explanations 
offered by Radbaz himself. 
R. Michaelson advances another explanation, not considered by Radbaz, 
which is found in Midrash Elijah, which postulates that the child was 
perfectly righteous. Since the righteous do not defile others, 
Elijah could not contact impurity by coming in contact with the child, 
and therefore his action is sanctionable. 34 Michaelson confirms 
that the child was perfectly righteous, as he already cited opinions 
which identified the child as Jonah the Prophet, or as Messiah the 
son of Joseph. R. Michaelson surveys that from all this material 
one can certainly deduce that Elijah was verily a Priest. R. Michael-
son goes on to bibliograph no less than fifty-six books whose authors 
maintain the same position. 
Although R. Michaelson contends with virtually the identical issue 
as Radbaz, they have different concerns. While Radbaz readily 
accepts the contention that Elijah is a Priest, his concern is, in 
view of this fact, to jus.tify this metaphysical action of resurrection 
in accordance with the laws of defilement. Whereas R. Michaelson's 
concern is to establish the fact that Elijah is indeed a Priest by 
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dispelling any notion which might question his identity as a Priest, 
such as his resuscitating the Zarephite woman's son. 
Various Resurrectional Forms and Their Consequences 
An intriguing disclosure that emerges from R. Michaelson's responsum, 
which he himself verifies as the "correct" exposition, is the notion 
of two types of resurrection. The one kind, which is achieved 
through prayer, is a resurrection whereby the body is actually 
dead yet functions as though it were alive. Something like a 
chicken which continues to strut about after its head has been cut 
off. The state of the body is actually dead, as the life it is 
imbued with is only incidental. 
The other kind, which is achieved by agency of the Divine Name or 
the Book of Creation, is a resurrection whereby the body is also 
restored to life-- the breath of life it possesses is not incidental 
but permanent. This state of existence was confirmed by Elijah 
on the dead son of the Zarephite woman and is obviously considered 
as alive. The former state of existence was bestowed by Elisha on 
the dead son of the Shunamite woman and is not an obvious case of 
being considered alive. The Talmud in tractate Niddah establishes, 
according to R. Michaelson, that even this less obvious form of 
existence, is considered "alive," and therefore the impurity laws 
do not take effect. 
R. Michaelson dismisses the opposition ventured from the Talmud's 
silence in Niddah by disclosing that the Talmud's silence was not 
because of the Zarephite's child's non-death, but rather because of 
his more obvious revival. Whereas the revival in Elisha's case was 
not as complete, and therefore more problematic. It is halakically 
important for R. Michaelson to divulge such a unique metaphysical 
phenomenon of variant forms of resurrectional existence in order to 
prove that despite the impending death of the young child, Elijah 
was halakically justified in defiling himself. 
R. Michaelson's distinction between a resurrection which is achieved 
through prayer to one which is achieved by agency of invoking the 
Divine Name or the Book of Creation is derived from a parallel 
distinction made by Hatam Sofer. R. Moses Sofer refers to R. Johanan 
in tractate Megilla who rules that a synagogue may not be converted 
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to a house of study since a synagogue is of a higher level of 
sanctity and can not be reduced to a lower level of sanctity.
35 
R. Johanan derives his ruling from the verse in Kings which speaks 
of a "Great House." R. Johanan deduces that this great House refers 
to a synagogue because of the "Great Feat" (i.e., resurrection) 
which was accomplished through Elisha's prayer. 36 Whereas a 
house of study is not referred to as a Great House. 
R. Safer questions R. Johanan's assumption that the resurrection 
performed by Elisha was achieved through prayer. Perhaps it was 
achieved through some other means, such as invoking the Divine 
Name or by agency of the Book of Creation, such as are described in 
Talmud, th~ Responsa of Hakham Zevi and other prominent halakic 
37 works. In which case the great House would not refer to a house 
of prayer and R. Johanan would no longer have any basis for his 
ruling that a synagogue may not be converted to a house of study. 
The remainder of R. Safer's responsum is devoted to proving that 
Elijah's resurrection was indeed performed through prayer and not 
by invoking the Divine Name or by agency of the Book of Creation, 
thereby vindicating R. Johanan's ruling. Thus the differentiation 
of two distinct resurrectional processes is halakically significant 
to R. Safer as well, in determing whether a synagogue may be converted 
to a house of study. 
Elijah's Metempsychosis as a Halakic Solution 
Just as R. Michaelson found it necessary to disclose a unique 
phenomenon of variant forms of resurrectional existence in order 
to comprehend Elijah's halakic activity, Radbaz was not without 
philosophical innovations of his own. Toward the close of his 
responsum Radbaz entertains the intriguing notion espoused by the 
Kabbalists that contrary to the popular belief that Phinehas was 
granted longevity of life,in actual fact, Elijah was the reincarnation 
of Phinehas the Priest. 
Before introducing the responsum of Radbaz we mentioned conflicting 
sources regarding Elijah's ancestry. The Responsa of the Geonim, 
which traced his lineage to Benjamin, son of Rachel, seemed to 
conflict with Midrash Mishle and Baba Mezia which attested Elijah's 
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Priesthood thereby descending from Levi, son of Leah. However, 
according to the reincarnation theory of the exponents of the Kabbala 
there is no contradiction whatever. When Elijah averred his kin-
ship to Benjamin, he was merely referring to his biological parents, 
and to which tribe his body belonged. However, when he avouched 
his claim to Priesthood, he was referring to the origin of his soul 
and to which tribe his soul belonged. 
~is explanation of Elijah's metempsychosis, reveals a further 
difficulty contained in the Seder Elijah Rabbah, cited in the afore-
mentioned Geonic responsum. During the midst of an ensuing 
argument among the Sages concerning Elijah's ancestry, Elijah 
himself appears and informs them that his ancestry is traceable to 
none other than Rachel. Thereupon, he was asked: Art thou not a 
Priest? Indeed this question is utterly unfathomable. None of 
the Sages on either side of the debate ever entertained the possi-
bility that Elijah was a Priest. Those Sages that argued that 
Elijah was a descendant of Leah were clearly referring either to 
Gad, son of Zilpha, Leah's maidservant, or to Judah, son of Leah. 
Those Sages who debated that Elijah was a scion of Rachel were 
clearly referring to Benjamin, son of Rache1. 38 How then are we 
to interpret their sequelent question to Elijah: "Art thou a Priest? 
Did thou not say to the widow [of Zarephath], 'But make me thereof 
a little first and bring it unto me, after make for thee and thy son."' 
If Elijah were a Priest, he would be a descendant of Levi, a position 
advocated by neither side. However, if we are to subscribe, as 
Radbaz, to the metempsychosis theory of the Kabbalists, we can 
easily interpret the sequelent question of the Sages. After Elijah 
confirmed the progenatorship of his body, the Sages were now interes-
d . . f . h . . f h" 1 39 te 1n ver1 y1ng t e or1g1n o 1s sou . 
Even Elijah's rebuttal: "That same infant was Messiah, son of 
Joseph, and I intimated a hint to the world that I will descend to 
Babylon and afterwards the Messiah will arrive," was not a refuta-
tion of his being Priest. Elijah was merely explicating to the 
Sages that since he was only the embodiment of a Priest, he was not 
entitled to challah. Therefore, no proof of his Priesthood can be 
advanced from his baking instructions to the widow of Zarepath. 
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Radbaz's adducing of Elijah's metempsychosis elucidates yet a further 
difficulty contained in Elijah's riposte, related in Seder Eliyahu 
Rabbah-- that the child of the widow of Zarephath was Messiah, son 
of Joseph. We shall recall that one of the explanations of the 
resurrection considered by Radbaz was R. Bahya's theory that the 
child and his mother were non-Jewish. Radbaz protested that our 
Sages have already identified the child as Jonah, son of Amittai, 
and certainly Jonah, the Divine Prophet, could not have been of 
Gentile birth. If this same child was Jonah, son of Amittai, whose 
mother was a descendant of Asher, and whose father was a descendant 
of Zebulun, 40 how can Elijah purport him to be Messiah, son of 
Joseph of Jerusalem! However, by operating Radbaz's lucubration 
of metempsychosis to Jonah, we hit upon the solution. Although 
Jonah'sbiological parents were of Asher and Zebulun, Elijah was 
avouching that Jonah's soul originated in Joseph, and that Jonah 
was the embodiment of Messiah, son of Joseph. 41 
Perhaps, then, we have discovered the true secret concealed in the 
words of the Mishna of Rabbi Eliezer: "Jonah was vouchsafed great 
stature in that he was equated to Elijah."42 In which way was 
Jonah equal to Elijah?43 Their equality results from the fact 
that both of them were the embodiments of the heralds of the messianic 
44 era. Elijah who himself realized that he was the embodiment of 
Phinehas, although his biological parents were of other origin, 
was able to attest to the fact that Jonah, his equal, was the 
embodiment of Messiah, son of Joseph, even though Jonah's biological 
parents were of different origin. Thus Elijah was able to intimate 
a great hint to the world that he would descend to Exile before the 
advent of the Messiah. 
By the same token, were it not for this decipherment, how could 
R. Eliezer's statement in Pirkei de-Rabbi Eliezer45 cited in R. 
Michaelson's responsum in which he identifies Elijah as Phinehas, 
the Priest, a descendent of Levi, be reconciled with R. Eliezer's 
own seemingly contradictory statement in Yalkut, 46 (cited shortly) 
where he identifies Elijah as a descendent of Benjamin? Of necessity, 
one is compelled to concede that R. Eliezer maintained both view-
points simultaneously in the aforesaid manner. Thus the theory of 
Elijah's metempsychosis is by no means a daft kabbalistic concoction, 
but rather integral in deciphering the plain and literal meaning 
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(peshat) in Seder Elijah Rabbah and in R. Eliezer himself. 
R. Levi Ibn Habib (1483-1545) known as Maharalbach, devotes a 
responsum to expounding upon whether there is legitimacy in en-
dorsin8 the doctrine of reincarnation: 
With regard to the third question you asked me- whether belief 
in reincarnation is binding on all Jews and whether it is 
permitted to expound the doctrine in public- you should know 
that, for my sins, I have not as yet attained knowledge of 
this science [i.e, Kabbalah]. This is because permission 
has not been granted to any man to understand it or study it 
by his own efforts. As its name implies, the Kabbala is a 
doctrine one must learn from a master who had aquired it 
from a master. But in our land, nowadays, few are found to 
be wholly versed in this knowledge. However, in connection 
with this particular doctrine, I have seen the books and studied 
them and note that there are two groups among our Sages, who 
lived after the close of the Talmud. 
The first group comprises the philosophers who investigate the 
basic principles of faith by the aid of reason alone and who, 
engage too, in the study of natural sciences. These find it 
hard to accept belief in reincarnation since, if reason alone 
is to be the guide, there are many difficulties in the doctrine 
which reason is powerless to resolve. 
However, there is another group, enjoying great authority, 
comprising those Jews who rely on faith. All these write that 
the doctrine is true and is a basic principle of the Torah 
by means of which an answer is given to the problem of why the 
righteous suffer [i.e., because of their sins in a previous 
incarnation]. We are all obliged to hearken to the words of 
these latter Sages; to believe in the doctrine without any 
doubts or reservations. For all that, it seems to me very 
wrong to expound the doctrine in public. We are no better 
than our teachers, on whom be peace. I refer to those who 
wrote on the doctrine in the book they compiled. They never 
spoke of it except by hint ~~d in riddles. And they wrote 
that it is a great mystery. 
Maharalbach explains that a rationalist would find difficulty 
endorsing such a view as reincarnation. However, it is definitly 
legitimate to maintain this view, for although Maharalbach himself 
has a poor knowledge of it, those who are sagacious in it enjoy 
great authority and we are obliged to accept this belief unreservedly. 
Nevertheless, Maharalbach appeals that these views should not be 
expounded publicly. It is through Radbaz's responsum that we 
discover just how enlightning and useful this esoteric view can 
become in resolving complex halakic issues. 
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The Relevance of Establishing Elijah's Origin 
Until now we have seen how various attempts were made by the 
respondents to unravel the logograph of Elijah's provenience. At 
this point one might venture to enquire of what halakic consequence 
wmit to the Sages in Seder Elijah Rabbah that they should have 
d h 1 h f El . "ah' . 48 argue so ve ement y over t e matter o lJ s proven1ence. 
One consequence, which we have already indicated, was that Elijah, 
being a Priest, should have been prohibited from ministering the 
resurrection and that the performance of a metaphysical act was 
sanctionable only upon its conformity to the norms of Halaka. 
However, this consequence is merely an extension of their argument. 
That is, once their argument has been located we can then apply 
the argumentation by extending it to cover the halakic problem of 
the resurrection as well. However, this does not seem to be the 
underlying pinning of contention inherent in their dispute. \~at 
then was the basic fundamental difference dividing the Sages, which 
could have moved them to argue so fervently over the matter of 
Elijah's provenience? For that matter, one might ask furthermore, 
of what halakic consequence was it to R. Michaelson that he was 
moved to devote an entire responsum to establish Elijah's provenience? 
Although the disputation in Seder Elijah Rabbah has been transmitted 
anonymity, simply as, "On one occasion our Rabbis were debating .•. ," 
without the slightest indication as to who these innominate Rabbis 
were, we may ascertain their identities by locating a similar 
disputation elsewhere. Our excerpt from Seder Elijah Rabbah appears 
verbatim in th~ midrashic anthologies of Genesis Rabbah and Yalkut 
Shimoni, along with the following prefatory dispute: 
The Rabbis debated: To which tribe did Elijah belong? 
R. Eliezer [R. Eleazar],49 said: To Benjamin, for it is 
written: 'And Jaarshiah and Elijah and Zichri were sons of 
Jeroboam .•. All these were the sons of Benjamin.' 
R. Nehorai said: To Gad for it says: 50 'And Elijah and Tishbite, who was of the settlers of Gilead ••. ' 
Ostensibly R. Eliezer, (R. Eleazar), and R. Nehorai were debating 
the very issue concerning our Sages in Seder Elijah Rabbah. R. 
Eliezer is, of course, R. Eliezer b. Hyrcanus a teacher and a 
companion of R. Akiba. 51 (The editions which read R. Eleazar, 
refer toR. Eleazar b. Shemoa, the Priest, a disciple of R. Akiba). 
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R. Nehorai was a disciple of R. Joshua and a colleague of R. Akiba, 
who was also a student of R. Joshua. 52 
In order to answer conclusively to what halakic consequence Elijah's 
provenience was toR. Akiba's contemporaries, R. Eliezer and R. 
Nehorai, 53 it is important first to recollect briefly the historical 
conditions prevailing in Palestine during the epoch in which R. Akiba 
and his colleagues were living and the extent of the socio-political 
plight which their generation had encountered. 
"The period of the Hasmonean era intensified the expectations of 
revival and redemption. This is attested to by the coins of the 
epoch, which carried the inscription. 'To the redemption of Zion.' 
The reference, however, was not the redemption of the 'time of end' 
but to redemption from national trouble. 
"With the destruction of the Temple and all that it involved, the 
Messianic consciousness acquired greater strength and actuality. 
The destruction of the Temple was a shattering blow to the Jews 
of that generation. For the Temple service was one of three 
things upon which the world rested. When R. Johanan b. Zakkai 
saw that the Temple was destroyed, and the ~ekhal was burnt, he 
rose and rent his garments, and took off his phylacteries, and sat 
and wept. And his disciples wept with him. The immediate urge 
to attempt to rebuild a sanctuary and to proclaim that the Mess iah 
would come did not cease. R. Johanan b. Zakkai, sensing the approach 
of his death, said: 'Clean the house on account of defilement, and 
set a throne for Hezekiah, King of Judah.' His disciple, R. Eliezer, 
said: 'I have set a throne for R. Johanan b. Zakkai.' R. Johanan 
b. Zakkai sees King Hezekiah, to whom a number of Isaiah's Messianic 
prophecies are applied at the time of his death, as coming to greet 
him; and it is only fitting to prepare a throne for such a Messianic 
king and welcome him. "53 ;': The Talmud in Baba Ba thra relates : 
When the ;emple was destroyed for the second time, large numbers 
in Israel became ascetics, vowing to eschew the consumption of 
meat and wine. R. Ishmael b. Elisha said: Since the day of 
the destruction of the Temple we should by rights bind our-
selves not to eat meat nor drink wine •. and from the day that 
a government [i.e., the Hadrianic persectuions] has come to 
power, which issues cruel decrees and forbids us the observance 
of the Torah and the precepts and does not allow us to enter 
into the 'week of the son' [the rite of circumcision], we 
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ought by rights to bind ourselves not to marry and beget 
children, and the seed of Abraham would come to an end of 
itself. However, let Israel go their way. It is better 
they should err in ignorance than presumptuously [since in 54 any case they would go on marrying and begetting children.] 
To imagine such an onerous and gruesome state of affairs, whereby 
the only deterrent forestalling the Sages from issuing a directive 
forbidding marriage and prescribing celibacy, thereby imposing the 
conscious extinction of the entire Jewish people, was the incapa-
bility of abiding that directive, is practically inconceivable. 
"During the three years in the course of the ignominous downfall 
of Beitar, the Romans destroyed the last vestige of Jewish resistance. 
In fury they drenched the land with blood, slaughtering hundreds of 
thousands of people, selling tens of thousands into slavery, and 
forbidding the few remaining Jews to observe any of their ancestral 
customs. A decree of wholesale extermination could hardly have 
aroused them more than the Emperor's decision to establish his pagan 
sanctuary on Mount Moriah where Hadrian was to be worshipped as 
the personification of Jupiter and the statue of the Emperor was 
placed within it. The city of Jerusalem was called Aelia Capitolina 
and only Gentiles were permitted to live or even approach it. The 
province too was renamed. It was no longer called Judea; it was 
called Philistine Syria, or more briefly Palestine. 
"The fanaticism that had been held in check for decades broke loose. 
A new Antiochus entered the world. Surely now G-d would awaken to 
the needs of His people and reveal Himself through them as He had 
done to the Maccabees three centuries earlier. The first few 
victories of Simeon Bar Cokhba aroused wild enthusiasm among the 
people, who saw in him not only a second Maccabee, but the Messiah. 
It wasnowpossible to entertain hopes that the time had arrived for 
Israel to be redeemed. 
"The criteria that R. Joshua [the disciple of R. Johanan b. Zakkai 
and teacher of R. Akiba] conjoined to the belief in the End, always 
made it possible after failure of attempts at redemption and of 
Messiah to appear, to put the blame on the fact that the generation 
wasnot yet worthy. It may be assumed that R. Akiba adopted his 
teacher's doctrine. He did not abandon the idea of the End, but 
he saw the poss~bility of hastening it in a generation that merited it. 
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R. Akiba held that a generation could be saved by virtue of its 
righteous men alone, and of the redemption of Egypt he declared 
that by the merit of pious women in that generation were the 
Israelites redeemed . 55 This approach made it easier for R. Akiba 
to adopt eventually a positive attitude to Bar Cokhba, as he saw 
the redemption of the nation and the land as an internal practical 
process in the world of history ."56 
It is in the wake of thishistorico-political setting that we arrive 
at the crux of the dispute in Seder Elijah Rabbah. 57 Tractate 
Sanhedrin relates that R. Joshua b . Levi pointed a contradiction 
in the apocalyptic verse of Isaiah, "I, the Lord will hasten it, 
in its time ." He asked : " It is written 'in its time [will the 
Messiah come], ' whilst, it is also written : ' I [the Lord] will 
hasten it, ' and then resolved ' If they are worthy, I will hasten it; 
if no [he will come] at the due time. ' , SS The Talmud refers to 
t\vO possible eras for redemption . If they do not prove worthy, 
the Messiah will come in his due time . However, if they are worthy, 
the redemption will be hastened . R. Eliezer and R. Nehorai were 
in disaccord over which virtuous act, if adopted by the righteous, 
would prove them worthy enough to effect a hastening of Elijah's 
arrival, and concurrently the advent of the Messianic era . When 
the Patriarch, Jacob and the great Teacher, Moses, singled out each 
of the tribes in their blessings, this was because each blessing 
corresponded to a particular attribute of which each tribe \vas 
unique .59 Indeed, the Matriarchs themselves were unique in virtuous 
attributes in which they excelled . The Sages then were at variance 
over which virtuous deed should be accentuated and embrace their 
behavioural patterns such that would be most effective in hastening 
the advent of the Messiah . Perhaps the virtue of benevolence and 
kindness imparted by the Matriarch Rachel would be more effective .60 
Or maybe courage and bravery, exemplified by Gad, could possibly be 
a consideration to join in the Bar Cokhba rebellion against Rome .61 
Jeremiah ' s apocalyptic prophecy , "A voice is heard in Rama •.. Rachel 
shall be rewarded ... And Thy children shall return to thy border, "62 
seems to intimate that Rachel was the preferred Matriarch, and that 
the Messiah would be of her offspring. Consequently, the virtue 
of kindness should be adopted to hasten his arrival . Others, 
however, had a tradition that the Messiah would emerge from the House 
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of David, a descendant of Judah, the son of Leah; and, therefore, 
Leah would seem to them as the preferred Matriarch. Certainly it 
was Leah's prodigious virtue which merited her being the forebearer 
of the greatest number of tribes. 63 
R. Akiba, however, overstepped his colleagues in falling credulous 
to the contagion of Messianism by declaring Bar Cokhba outright as 
the Messianic King. When R. Akiba applied to Bar Cokhba the verse, 
"There shall be a star out of Jacob, and a sceptre shall arise out 
of Israel," --a verse previously expounded and transcribed by Onkelos 
as a reference to the Messiah-- ·R. Johanan b. Torta reacted sharply 
and said: "Akiba, grass will grow out of your jaws and the son of 
David shall not have come. "64 The Tanna' s position might have been 
shared by R. Eliezer, as R. Akiba surprisingly, did not connect the 
restoration of the Ten Tribes and their resettlement in the Land 
with this redemption, nor did he find a role for Elijah, or the 
realisation of the visions concerning the "day of the Lord" on "that 
day. "65 Perhaps R. Ak1.ba d th t h. t · · d sense a 1s genera 1on was p1ous an 
righteous enough to be in rapport with the teaching of R. Joshua b. 
Levi: ''If they are worthy, I will hasten it" --even to the extent 
that Messiah's early arrival would supercede (that of) Elijah's 
and the restoration of the Ten Tribes. 66 
' 
A description of conditions in Palestine by R. Nathan, the Babylonian, 
a contemporary Sage, seemed to be supportive of R. Akiba's appraisal. 
R. Nathan said: "The phrase in the Decalogue, 'Those who love Me 
and observe my commandments' applies to the people of Palestine who 
give their lives for the Law. 'Why art thou being taken to execution?' 
'Because I read the Torah.' 'Why art thou being taken to crucifixtion?' 
'Because I ate unleavened bread.' 'Why art thou being lashed?' 
'Because I performed the ceremony of the lulav [palm branch and the 
other three species].' And it says: Those with which I was wounded 
in the house of my friends,': these wounds caused me to be beloved 
f F h . h ,67 o my at er 1n eaven. 
R. Akiba intuitively discerned that the piety and righteousness 
exemplified by his generation could procure an early advent of the 
Messiah even before the arrival of Elijah. 68 R. Eliezer, who agreed 
in principle with R. Akiba, held the reservation that were their 
generation meritorious in procuring a hastening of Messiah's arrival 
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they should have been equally worthy of revoking the catastrophic 
. h h M . . 69 H R El. events concurrent w1t t e ess1an1c era. ence, . 1ezer 
appraised that historic era corresponding to the latter portion of 
R. Joshua b. Levi's teaching, "If they are not worthy, the Messiah 
will come in due time." Moreover, even if that period were in 
fact the period of "due time," Bar Cokhba could not be proclaimed 
as the Messiah prior to the advent of Elijah . 70 When the Messianic 
King appears in his "due time," his inauguration as the Messiah is 
contingent upon his following the natural sequence of events, that 
is, posthumous to Elijah. 
It is a well-known k.abbalis tic die tum that while the Matriarch 
Rachel is the paradigm of the revealed world pertaining to the 
natural sphere, the Matriarch Leah is the paradigm of the concealed 
71 world appertaining to the sphere of the supernatural. By pre-
facing this simple kabbalistic premise we may presently proceed 
with our analysis of the tannaitic dispute of Seder Elijah Rabbah 
R. Eliezer and R. Nehorai were not debating exclusively which method 
would be most instructive in effecting the advent of the Messianic 
Era. But, more fundamentally, they were confronted with a real 
halakic issue of paramount importance --whether or not to recognize 
a ~·lessiah who had already been proclaimed the Messianic King by 
their close colleague, R. Akiba! ~. Eliezer opined that Elijah 
would emerge from the Matriarch Rachel, who was paradigmatic of the 
natural order of the world. Hence, Bar Cokhba could not be pro-
claimed the Messianic King prior to Elijah 's arrival and the resto-
ration of the Ten Tribes, as this was contrary to the natural pattern 
' 
and sequence concurrent with the Messianic Era . R. Nehorai, however, 
argued that Elijah would emerge from Leah, who was paradigmatic of 
the supernatural order of the world. A miraculous hastening of 
the Messiah would procure a supernatural feat, transcending the 
natural order of the world, thereby enabling the Messianic King to 
supersede Elijah's arrival. Thus R. Nehorai vouched for his col-
league, R. Akiba, to proclaim Bar Cokhba the Messianic King despite 
Elijah's absence. 72 
This presentation of the debate is synchronous with another dispute 
related by the Talmud concerning which month the Israelites are 
destined to be redeemed: "R. Eliezer said, 'In Nisan they were 
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redeemed [from Egypt] and in Tishri they will be redeemed in the 
time to come.' R. Joshua said, ' In Nisan they will be redeemed 
in the time to come."73 R. Joshua likens the last redemption to 
the first , even from the aspect of time. Just as the redemption 
from Egypt in Nisan was characterized by the occurrence of one 
miracle after another (plagues, parting of the Red Sea, etc.), 
likewise the future redemption will be phenomenal of miraculous 
events . According to R. Eliezer, however, the future redemption 
will occur in Tishri, the same month that G-d created the universe 
and patented nature with a set course of activity. 74 
R. Eliezer, who mentioned that the future redemption will occur in 
Tishri, the month during which G-d bestowed upon His world its 
natural course, is congruent with his opinion in Seder Elijah Rabbah 
that the Messianic Era will necessarily evolve according to a set 
historical pattern by following the natural course. 75 Under these 
circumstances restoration of the Ten Tribes and Elijah 's appearance 
must necessarily precede the Messiah. On the other hand, R. Joshua, 
the mentor of R. Nehorai, maintained that just as the first redemp-
tion was wrought by miracles pertaining to a supernatural order, 
the evolvement of the final redemption will also be characterised 
76 by a supernatural order. Under such circumstances the Messiah 
may supersede Elijah's arrival despite the evolving of this sequence, 
contrary to the natural order. 
Possibly still, R. Eliezer concurred with R. Akiba's discernment 
that the righteousness and piety of their generation had proven 
them meritorious of an early redemption. Nevertheless, R. Eliezer 
opined that Elijah will emerge from Rachel; and it is that natural 
order for which she is paradigmatic which dictates that even the 
procuring of Messiah's early arrival must be precedect by Elijah . 77 
Therefore, although the time was conducive for a premature redemption, 
Bar Cokhba could not be proclaimed the Messiah, as his advent did 
not follow the natural sequence of appearing posterior to Elijah. 78 
R. Nehorai, as mentioned was of the opinion that Elijah would emerge 
from Leah -the paradigm of the supernatural sphere . Consequently, 
Bar Cokhba could be proclaimed the hastened Messiah despite Elijah 's 
absence. 79 
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Lastly , even excepting the aforementioned kabbalistic dictum, it 
is entirely plausible that R. Akiba himself appraised that historic 
era corrmensurate to the "due time" in R. Joshua b . Levi ' s maxim . 
Close consideration of the prevailing conditions in Palestine depicted 
above impelled R. Akiba to the credulity that the calculated end 
had at long last arrived .80 R. Akiba was of the persuasion that 
Bar Cokhba, was none other than the much awaited Messiah, the son 
of Joseph . 81 R. Eliezer contended that since Elijah would emerge 
from Joseph ' s mother, Rachel, he will of necessity herald Messiah, 
the son of Joseph . Bar Cokhba could, therefore, not be proclaimed 
~~ssiah, (son of Joseph) prior to Elijah ' s arrival . R. Nehorai 
challenged that Elijah would emerge from Leah, the mother of Judah, 
the primogenitor of the House of David . Hence, Elijah \vill solely 
herald Messiah, son of David, and not his predescessor, Messiah, 
son of Joseph~2 Therefore, R. Nehorai accorded with R. Akiba ' s 
conception in proclaiming Bar Col<hba as Messiah (son of Joseph) 
despite Elijah ' s absence . 
To recapitualate our analysis of the dispute in Seder Elijah Rabbah, 
we considered four possibilities of interpretation in view of the 
prevailing hisorico.-poli tical conditions in Pales tine. At first, 
\ve considered their dispute over which virtue, if adopted, would 
prove most effective in eliciting the impendence of Messiah. From 
there we proceeded to identify their dispute as the famed controversy 
concerning the affirmation of Bar Cokhba as the Messianic King, 
revolving on the maxim of R. Joshua b . Levi . R. Nehorai envisioned 
that historic period as the realisation of the hastening of Messiah ' s 
advent , whereas R. Eliezer appraised that era commensurate with 
the calculated "due time ." Thirdly, we considered the possibility 
that both R. Eliezer and R. Nehorai were in consonance that their 
generation was mcri torious in precipitating Messiah ' s advent; however, 
they were dissonant whether even the hastened Messiah could be pro-
claimed in the absence of Elijah . Finally, we considered that both 
Tannaim agreed that their generation was witness to a rectification 
of the long awaited calculated end . However, they disagreed on 
whether Bar Cokhba could be proclaimed as Messiah, son of Joseph, 
in absenteeism of Elijah . 
In vie\v of the tremendous halakic significance of establishing 
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Elijah's progentiorship, in order to determine the appointment of 
the Messiah, it is our contention that for this reason the author 
of our Geonic Responsum, Tosafoth, Radbaz, and R. Michaelson, all 
undertook so assiduously to clarify the question of Elijah's ancestry. 
This was undoubtedly the intention of the Geonic Responsum who 
quoted Seder Elijah Rabbah verbatim --the issue of which we have 
now explained. We suspect that this is subtly discernable in 
Radbaz and R. Michaelson, as they both cite opinions that the dead 
child of the Zarephite woman whom Elijah resurrected was none other 
than Messiah, son of Joseph. 
Finally, in view of the aforeseen substantial evidence argued by 
R. Akiba's opponents against the plausibility of Bar Cokhba's pro-
pinquity with the Messiah, the question arises how could R. Akiba-
the greatest Tanna of his generation, whose erudition surpassed 
even that of his masters- and so many of his colleagues have been 
so mistaken in proclaiming Bar Cokhba as the Messiah?83 
Messianic Qualifications 
R. Moses Safer, also known as the Hatam Safer (1762-1839), was an 
undisputed leader of Orthodox Jewry and an outstanding halakic 
authority, in fact, one of the most authoritative respondents of 
all time. Among his voluminous writings he wrote seven books of 
responsa. In one of these responsa R. So fer deals with the mani-
festation of Messiah: 
And lo! in the matter concerning the son of David, I am 
obliged to make one suggestion and that is -just as Moses, 
our Master, peace be on him, who was the First Redeemer, agedfor 
eighty years without knowing or intuitively sensing that he 
would become the Redeemer of Israel; even when G-d charged 
him imploring, 'Go for I am sending you unto Pharoah,' 84 nonetheless he refused, unwilling to undertake [such a mission]. 
So too will it be, please G-d, with the Last Redeemer. For 
immediately following the day of the destruction of the Temple 
someone was born whose piety would deem him worthy of becoming 
the Redeemer, and when the Lappropriate] time will arrive, G-d 
will reveal Himself unto him and will send him out. Then 
will the spirit of the Messiah which is hidden on high and 
preserved for his coming, flow unto him. Just as we find 
by Saul, that consequent to his annointment the spirit of 
rulership and Divine inspiration descended upon him, which 
hitherto was undistinguishable to Saul.8) As it was true of 
the First Redeemer so will be it be with the Last Redeemer. 
For it is a matter of ignorance even to this pious one [the 
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prospective Messiah] himself. But because of our iniquities, 
which are numerous, many of them [prospective Messiahsj have 
already perished, since we did not merit that the Messianic 
spirit should flow unto them. For although they were \,·orthy 
of it, their generation was not. However, eventually, \vi tcn 
he does arrive, please G-d, G-d will reveal Himself unto him 
as He did unto Moses at the bush and will send him either to 
Israel alone) or to a King such as Pharaoh saying, 'Send out 
my people! ' 8b 
Hatam Safer's depiction of Messiah's manifestation is clear, 
requiring little elaboration. Just as prior to his accession 
Saul was oblivious of his destiny and only subsequent to his 
accession "G-d gave him another heart,"87 so too will the potential 
~1essiah remain incognito even to himself until such time when Israel 
proves itself worthy of meriting the manifestation of Messiah. 
Whereupon G-d, through divine inspiration, will then commission 
Messiah to redeem Israel. 
The Talmud affirms that Bar Cokhba reigned as King of Israel for 
a duration of two and half years. 88 What was it that led to the 
downfall of this tragic hero? 
In the same place where the Jerusalem Talmud relates that R. Akiba 
applied the verse, "There shall come forth a star out of Jacob", to 
Bar Cokhba, exclaiming: "This is King Messiah," the Jerusalem 
Talmud continues to narrate the chronological events immediately 
prior to Bar Cokhba's death. 89 It is related (there) that an 
enraged Bar Cokhba killed the Tanna, R. Eleazar of Modiim whom he 
suspected of wishing to surrender the city of Bethar to Hadrian. 
Thereupon, there issued forth a Divine Voice (bat kol) saying: 
"Woe to the worthless shepherd that looseth his flock: the sword 
90 shall be upon his arm and his right eye utterly darkened. Thou 
hast slain R. Eleazar of Modiim, the arm of all Israel and their 
right eye. Therefore the arm of his murderer shall be clean dried 
up and his right eye utterly darkened." Immediately Bethar was 
taken and Bar Cokhba was slain. His head was taken to Hadrian 
who enquired, "Who killed him?" A Cuthean said, "I killed him." 
"Bring his body to me," he ordered. When the body was found 
encircled by a snake, Hadrian exclaimed: "If his G-d had not slain 
him, no one could have done so."91 
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We recall Hatam Sofer's referral to Saul as the prototype of whom 
we learn that G-d may inspire the redeemer at a given moment as 
"G-d gave Saul another heart." Perhaps by extending Hatam Sofer's 
thesis one step further we may adduce that just as G-d may suddenly 
inspire the redeemer, equally so he may abruptly rescind and ter-
minate that inspiration as well. Indeed we find of the same Saul, 
that as a result of his bitter jealousy towards David, upon David's 
glorious victory over Golliath, and the Philistine Army, and his 
having captured the hearts of Israel, "it came to pass on the morrow, 
that an evil spirit came mightily upon Saul and he raved in the 
midst of his house."92 Thus not only did G-d rescind his inspira-
tion, but he inspired Saul with madness. Saul, therefore, is 
not only the prototype of the emergence of the redeemer, but through 
his sin he is the prototype of G-d's termination of the redeemer as 
well. 
By application of this principle learned from Hatam Sofer to Bar 
Cokhba, an illumination of the entire enigmatic affair is obtained. 
Bar Cokhba's Messianic reign was abruptly terminated by G-d upon 
his murder of the Tanna, R. Eleazar of Modiim. This is conclusive 
of the bat kol's pronouncement of Bar Cokhba's death in retribution 
for committing his fatal sin, the immediate fall of Bethar resulting 
in Bar Cokhba's death, and confirmed by Hadrian's averment, "If 
his G-d has not slain him, no one could have done so." If Bar 
Cokhba were not the Messianic King, why could only G-d have slain 
him? R. Akiba was not mistaken in proclaiming Bar Cokhba the 
Messianic King. This was no phantasmal vision or hallucinatory 
illusion. Indeed Bar Cokhba was the Messianic King whose reign 
terminated solely when he committed his fatal error. 93 This seems 
to be intimated implicitly in the words of Maimonides meticulously 
codified in the Laws of Kings: 
For R. Akiba was a great Sage, one of the Sages of the Mishna. 
And he carried the armour of Bar Cokhba, the King, and declared 
him the Messianic King. And he [R. Akiba] and all the Sages 
of his generation opined that he [Bar Cokhba] was the Messianic 
King until he was killed in his iniquity--
only subsequent to his death did Bar Cokhba cease from being the 
Messianic King. 94 
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This exposition of the appraisal of R. Akiba and the Sages of 
his generation regarding the Messiah raises a very perplexing 
question which requires serious investigation, and verily is beyond 
the confinements of this work. Specifically- is it possible for 
the Messiah, whoever he might be, to be capable of committing sin? 
Will the Divine overflow, mentioned by Hatam Sofer, once conferred 
upon him, preclude his propensity to sin? It seems not. 95 As 
both Moses and Saul were cited by Hatam Sofer as examples of Redeemers 
who were bestowed with Divine overflow, yet nonetheless they were 
b
. . 96 a Ject to s~n. 
Perhaps this is the simple meaning of R. Hillel's extremely difficult 
statement, recorded in tractate Sanhedrin: "There is no Messiah 
for Israel"- to the extent that many accused Hillel of heresy, 
indicative in R. Joseph's retort: "May G-d forgive him for saying 
so."97 Rashi thereon comments that Hillel was not denying or 
e nouncing his belief in a Messiah for Israel, but rather espoused 
that the Almighty Himself will redeem Israel and reign over them. 98 
What can explain Hillel's demurral and aversion towards a human 
Messiah? Perhaps his objection was precisely because of the 
vexing problem we raised. Hillel's conception of the Messiah 
could not tolerate a human being. The notion of a human being 
was a blatant sophism to his conception of the Messiah as the 
ultimate being. Were he to be human his inclination to sin would 
subject him to human misgivings. Hillel conceived the ultimate 
redeemer as a perfect being who possesses no propensity to sin. 
Needless to say, such a person does not exist in human form. 
Consequently, Hillel espoused, the Messianic role could only be 
assumed by G-d himself. 
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2. ELIJAH'S EGRESSION 
R. Safer's Analysis 
In the same responsum that R. Moses Safer discusses the manifestation 
of Messiah, he also deals with the entire phenomenon of Elijah's 
mysterious transcendence. The Talmud in Erubin, seeks to determine 
whether the prohibition of traversing the Sabbath limits apply above 
a level of ten handbreadths, assuming that should this law apply, 
Elijah would thereby be prevented from appearing on the Sabbath. 99 
From this assumption, it is obvious that Elijah adheres to the com-
mandments. This being so, Hatam Safer poses the following question. 
If the laws of Sabbath limits prevent Elijah from appearing on the 
Sabbath, why then do we summon Elijah to be present at every 
circumcision, ~ven when the circumcision rite falls on the Sabbath. 
Isn't his appearance on the Sabbath forbidden? R. Safer dissertates: 
It is the Jewish custom to proclaim during the circumc~s~on 
rite, 'This is the seat of Elijah, may he be remembered for 
good.' 100 Even the circumcisor implores, 'Elijah, angel of the 
Covenant, here is yours before you, stand at my right and uphold 
me. ' These invocations are beseeched even on the occasion 
of a circumcision which falls on the Sabbath. However, 
according to the Talmud in Erubin, it is impossible for Elijah 
to visit us on the Sabbath, perchance there exist Sabbath limits 
above ten handbreadths. Moreover, it is this reason for which 
the Tur and Shulchan Arukh explain the custom of chanting hymns 
invoking Elijah on the outgoing of the Sabbath: that is, 
Elijah could neither come on the Sabbath eve nor on the Sabbath 
day on account of the Sabbath limits.lOl How can this be 
reconciled in the light of our circumcision practice on the 
Sabbath and Festivals? 
Howbeit the Truth manifest itself as although Elijah never 
ascended beyond ten handbreadths [beneath the uppermost heavens] 
in his physical body, at this point, however, his soul separated 
from his body enabling his soul to continue its ascent and assume 
its place among the Ministering Angels. His body, on the 
otherhand undergoes rarefaction and respites in the lower Garden 
of Eden of this world. And soon, in our time on the Day of the 
Tidings [announcing the redemption], Elijah's soul will enclothe 
itself in this sacred body and become as anyone of Israel's 
Sages and Prophets. In addition, he is ordained by his master, 
Ahiyah the Shilonite, or by Moses, our Master, if he is Phinehas, 
and he will ordain the Sages of Israel, and will share the same 
law as all of Israel.102 In this way, each time Elijah reveals 
himself, and makes himself seen in this world, he is enclothed 
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by his sacred body. However, when he reveals himself in spirit 
alone, such as on the day of circumcision, he is not obliRated 
in Mitzvot, as it is written, "Among the dead I am free' [i.e., 
once a man dies, he becomes free of Torah and Mitzvot].103 
Furthermore, when Elijah descends, the Sabbath limits do not 
apply to him.104 When he appears in this [spirit] form he is 
an angel, and although he lucubrates Torah and reveals laws~ it 
is forbidden to establish laws according to his teachings,lvS 
for it were only as a dream or a prophetic trance to which we 
enjoined106 to pay no attention to the authority of a Heavenly 
Voice.107 However, when he reveals himself enclothed by his 
body, he is one of the great wise men of Israel of whom it is 
said, "The Tishbite will resolve quandries and mysteries" 
and unto whom we are entreated to hearken.108 For which teacher 
is there who can be likened unto him.109 . 
And when Rabba b. Abbuha met Elijah in a Gentile cemetery and 
asked him whether he were not a priest, Elijah had then appeared 
enclothed by his body, for one can hardly ask a soul devoid of 
body, "Art though a Priest." If those seven traditional rulings 
were delivered by Elijah, of necessity he iterated them enclothed 
by his body, as is his custom in clarifying and elucidating the 
Halaka.llO 
Precisely at the point where Scripture abruptly stops short, relating 
nothing more than a cryptic account of an appearance of a fiery 
chariot with horses of fire, and that Elijah was taken up by a whirl-
wind bound to the heavens, Hatam Sofer continues to expound, vividly 
describing exactly what transpired beyond the whirlwind. 111 
At a place of a distance of ten handbreadths beneath the uppermost 
heavens (in accordance with the Talmud in Sukkah) a schism occurred, 
whereby Elijah's body detached itself from his soul freeing Elijah's 
soul to continue its ascent to the uppermost heaven and commune among 
the Ministering Angels . His body descended to Paradise, where it is 
preserved. That same place where the schism transpired was in effect 
the place of Elijah's death, as at that moment Elijal1's soul departed 
from his body, thereby signifying death. 
From that time onwards Elijah reveals himself to mankind in two ways: 
either in "man" form, enclothed in his body, or in the form of "spirit" 
alone. When Elijah appears in spirit form he is unbound by Torah 
Law, both because the deadare£xempted from commandments, and also 
in his newly acquired status of Angel, for the Torah was not given to 
the Ministering Angels. 112 This explains why we summon him to be 
present at the event of a circumcision rite which falls on the 
Sabbath. Since he attends the circumcision as an angel, in spirit 
form alone, the laws of Sabbath limits do not prevent his appearing. 
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As an angel he is unbound by Torah Law. When Elijah appears in "man" 
form, enclothed in body, he adheres to Torah Law as all men. This 
explains his apprehension of contacting impurity in the Baba Mezia 
narrative, as he appeared to Rabba bar Abbuha in "man" form, and was 
thereby bound by the commandments. 
R. Kluger's Approach 
R. Solomon Kluger (1785-1869), known as Maharshak after the initials 
of his name (Morenu ha-Rav Shlomo Kluger), and as maggid of Brody in 
Galicia was a contemporary of Hatam Sofer. He was a prolific writer 
and wrote hundreds of responsa. He is said to have written 375 books, 
the numerical equivalent of his name. In one of his many books of 
responsa, entitled Tuv Tam ve-Da'at, R. Kluger descants the almost 
identical issue as Hatam Sofer. However, neither R. Kluger nor 
R. Sofer seem to take any notice of the fact that each dealt with the 
same issues and arrived at very similar conclusions. Perhaps their 
similarity of views is attributable toR. Isserlein's earlier treat-
ment of this subject, which was probably well known to them. 113 
If a corpse lies in the women's gallery, should the circumcision 
rite be performed irregardless, or perhaps one should be pre- 114 cautious of what was said of Elijah, 'Art thou not a ·Priest?' 
~~ile delving into the matter, I pondered of what significance 
was the question, 'Art thou a Priest?' Doesn't the Talmud in 
Niddah affirm that once a person has deceased he is free of 
Torah and its commandments?115 Do not answer that Elijah's 
case is different since Elijah never deceased. Were that so, 
Elijah's wife would be forbidden to rewed [without a prior 
divorce]. However, R. Isserleinll6 has already put in writing 
that the spouses of Elijah and R. Joshua b. Levi are permitted, 
since they are not betrothed to men but to angels who are not 
commanded to observe Torah.117 
Regarding the question, "Art thou a Priest?" it seems a dis-
tinction can be drawn that Elijah's case is different. Since 
he appeared enclothed in body, it was incubment upon him to 
adhere to Torah, as he appeared in this world in the likeness 
of one who were alive, he is obligated to adhere to Torah as 
all men. And it follows conversely, when he does not resemble 
one who is really alive, he is nQt obligated as all men, since 
the "dead are free of Torah."11~ Therefore, it follwos that 
the circumcision may be performed, since in our case Elijah 
arrives without his bodily vestment, as an angel only, for 
whom adherence to Mitzvot is inapposite. 
Moreover, it seems, and in my opinion this is in the main, the 
certain intention is that granted he is exempted, [nevetheless] 
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it behoves him to undertake the commandments out of zeal, as 
one who is not enjoined yet fulfills willfully. For although 
he is not termed 'ish' [person], nonetheless, since he is also 
not termed 'dead, ' it behoves him to fulfill the commandments 
out of zeal, as one who is not enjoined, yet fulfills willfully . 
However, for one who is in reality dead there is no [practice of] 
zeal, not even willfully without being enjoined . 
In any event, according to this, Elijah must be precautious of 
defilement merely as one who is not entreated, yet fulfills the 
commandments willfully . And if this is so, we have a principle 
that he who is enga7ed in one religious duty is free from any 
other. [Elijah s duty at being present at the circumcision 
rite frees him from the prohibition of defilement] .119Therefore, 
the circumci sion may be performed without any apprehension or 
hesitation, and the harbinger will come soon in our time and the 
horn of the pious shall be exalted . 120 
The similarity between R. Kluger ' s initial analysis of the problem 
and R. Safer's responsum is readily apparent . Like R. Sofer, 
R. Kluger differentiates between Elijah ' s dual form of existence . 
When Elijah appears in "man" form, enclothed in body, he follows the 
laws of all men and is obligated in observing the commandments. And, 
conversely, when he appears in angel form alone, as at the circumcision, 
since he does not resemble man, he is not bound by the laws of man, 
and is, therefore, exempted from Torah obligations . 
Ho\vever, R. Kluger prefers to explain that although Elijah is exempted 
from Torah obligations, which is why his spouse is permitted to rewed 
without prior divorce, it nevertheless behoves him to observe voli-
tionally out of zeal, as those who are not entreated, yet fulfill the 
commandments willfully . The presence of the corpse should theore-
tically prevent Elijah from attending the circumcision, since Elijah 
must volitionally be precautious of defilement, but because of the 
principle that engagement in one religious duty frees one from another, 
Elijah may foregotheprohibition of defilement to attend the circum-
cision . 
The main difference between this exposition toR . Kluger ' s initial 
analysis is that in the "preferred explanation," Elijah volitionally 
fulfills the commandments even when he appears in spirit form alone . 
This represents a departure from R. Safer ' s dichotomy, whereby he 
propounds that when Elijah assumes his spirit form he fulfills no 
commandments whatsoever, not even volitionally, as Torah obligations 
are entirely irrelevant to angels . However, when Elijah assumes his 
' 'human" form, Elijah does not merely fulfill conrnandments volitionally, 
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but rather because he is obligated in effect, and it is incumbent 
upon him to observe Torah as a Divine imperative. 
The Main Positions Reviewed 
The debate is reminiscent of the R. Falcon - R. Attiah controversy of 
Chapter II, in which R. Falcon, like R. Kluger, purports that Elijah 
volitionally undertakes the commandments out of zeal. R. Falcon was 
sharply criticized by R. Attiah, who like R. Sofer, posits a dichotomy 
whereby Elijah is either enjoined to observe the commandments in 
effect , or not at all. The R. Attiah - R. Sofer viewpoints are 
similar, to the extent that they agree in areas where Elijah is 
obligated to observe the commandments, he is enjoined to fulfill them 
as a Divine imperative and not volitionally out of zeal. In areas 
where Elijah is not enjoined in effect he does not fulfill them at 
all. However, they disagree on where these areas of obligations 
and absolvement from obligations exist. According to R. Attiah, 
Elijah's area of obligation lS only insofar as his 'man-G-d' relation-
ship is concerned. As far as his 'man-man' relationship is concerned 
he is completely absolved of all obligations. According to R. Sofer , 
however, Elijah's area of obligation is dependent on his mode of 
appearance. When Elijah appears in his "man" form he is obligated 
in commandments concerning both his 'man-man' and his 'man-G-d' 
relationships. However, when he appears in his "spirit" form he is 
not obligated either in commandments concerning his 'man-man' nor 
his 'man-G-d' relationship. More specifically, although R. Sofer 
and R. Attiah agree that there is an 'obligating factor,' i.e., 
something which produces an obligation in effect to observe command-
ments (in the absence of which no obligation exists at all), they 
disagree over what the obligating factor is. For R. Attiah, the 
obligating element is the particular relationship Elijah pursues. 
For R. Sofer, the obligating element is not Elijah's respective 
relationship, but rather his form of appearance. 
TI1e R. Kluger ,- R. Falcon positions are remarkably similar, in that 
they agree that Elijah is not enjoined in effect to observe the 
commandments, and merely does so volitionally out of zeal. However, 
they disagree on why this absence of obligation exists. According 
to R. Falcon, since all of Elijah's relations have become severed 
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upon his transcendance, Elijah assumes no relation for which there 
can be a corresponding commandment. According toR. Kluger, however, 
this absence is due to his existence as an angel and not as an 
ordinary man. More specifically, for R. Falcon the absence of an 
obligating element is due to the severance of Elijah's relations, 
whereas for R. Kluger it is due to Elijah's unique form of existence . 
The Obligating Factor in Commandment Observance 
If we were to align these four positions, not from the point of view 
of whether Elijah's performance of commandments is volitional or 
obligatory, but rather from the point of view of why an obligation 
to perform commandments or absence of one exists altogether. Or, 
stated differently, what produces an obligation to fulfill command-
ments, we would find R. Kluger's position much more closely aligned 
with R. Sofer than with R. Falcon, and that R. Attiah's position is 
much more closely aligned with R. Falcon than with R. Kluger. 
For what produces an obligation or an absence of one for R. Kluger 
and R. Sofer depends on Elijah's form of existence and mode of 
appearance. Whether or not such obligation exists according to 
R. Sofer depends on whether Elijah chooses to reveal himself in 
"spirit" form, devoid of human vestment, or in his "man" form, 
enclothed in his bodily garment. For R. Kluger, Elijah's mere status 
of being an "angel" divests him of any obligation, since "obligation" 
itself is a term applicable only to men. For R. Falcon and R. Attiah, 
however, that which produces an obligation to observe does not depend 
on Elijah 's form of existence or mode ofappearance but rather is 
contingent on his relations and relationships vis-a-vis G-d and his 
fellowmen. 
This new representation of the controversy leads us to a most intriguing 
question, which will be discussed in a later chapter: What is it 
that produces an obligation to adhere to Torah Law? Is it man's mere 
existence and status of being a Jew, or is it his relations or rela-
tionships with G-d and his fellowmen? 
What will concern us throughout the coming sections is to analyze 
how these four bastions of Halaka arrived at such diversified conclu-
sions. As we have stated at the onset of this section, it is our 
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contention that these differences of opinion regarding Elijah's 
status and the nature of his obligation in.Mitzvot, have emerged due 
to the fact that what exactly transpired to Elijah after his being 
taken up in a ~irlwind is an utter mystery. The resolution of 
this enigmatic event produced diversified opinions in halaka. 
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3. BEYOND THE ASCENSION 
Bible Exegetes 
The most conceivable locale to find a deciphering of the after-effect 
of Elijah 's ascension would be to consult the opinions of the classical 
Bible exegeteswhodealt specifically with the verses on the ascension. 
Gersonides, the scientist-philosopher (1288-1344), in his commentary 
to Kings writes: 
In addition we find that he [Elijah] did not die at the time he 
was taken up from above Elisha's head, and this [is so] because 
after [his ascent] Elijah's letter came to JehoLam, as is 
mentioned in Chronicles ... , and this [letter] proves that Elijah 
was alive afterwards.121 
The appearance of Elijah's epistle to Jehoram subsequent to his 
ascension was sufficient proof for Gersonides that Elijah remained 
alive after ascending the whirlwind. 122 Nahmanides, a talmudist-
philosopher-Kabbalist-physician (1194-1270), in his commentary to 
Leviticus states unmistakably: 
But those who abandon altogether the concerns of this world 
and pay no attention to it, acting as if they themselves were 
not creatures of physical being, and all their thoughts and 
intentions are directed only to their Creator, just as the case 
with Elijah, [these people] on account of their soul cleaving 
to the Glorious Name will live forever in body and their soul, 
as is evidenced in Scripture concerning Elijah, and is knmm in 
tradition.123 
Even more resolutely, Nahmanides writes in his Gate of Reward: 
In his [Elijah's] living ascent to [heaven] he did not ca1~ 
off his [physical] body and was not separated form soul.1 
It is self-evident from Nahmanides and the clear intention of Gersonides 
that no schism of body and soul ever transpired at any point during 
Elijah 's ascent. The after effect of Elijah 's ascension left him 
unchanged, exactly as he was prior to his ascension. 
Entirely different is the approach of the rationalist, R. David Kimchi, 
Radak (1160-1235), in his commentary to Kings: 
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[Upon his ascent] his clothing became devoured by fire, save 
his mantle, and his flesh and himself were consumed, while his 
spirit returned to the Almighty who had given it to him. 
And he continued in a subsequent verse: 
Elijah became spiritual and his body became consumed in heavenly 
fire and each element returned to its origin. 
Again, in his commentary to Malachi, Radak expounds: 
Behold I wil_l send you Elijah, the prophet. .. , meaning [the 
Almighty] will return Elijah's soul which ascended to heaven, 
to a created body like that of the first body, since his first 
body returned to earth during the ascent, as each element returned 
to its origin. And then, when the Almighty will bring him back 
to life in body, He will send him to Israel.~ 
Radak delineates clearly that Elijah's ascent did not merely 'repre-
sent' Elijah 's death, but in actual fact was his death; that his 
body becamed consumed in fire. And before Elijah will be sent to 
herald the Day of Judgement, 126 he will have to be brought back to 
life. In his rationalistic approach Radak substantiates his opinion 
by endorsing the theory of generation and corruption. This theory 
postulates that all matter at some stage will eventually decompose 
and revert to its prime origin. This thought is expressed unequi-
vocally in the phrase, "and each element returns to its origin." 
Radak is not alone in his view and his opinion is shared by several 
other rationalists. Most notably is the opinion of the greatfourteenth 
century halakist and liturgical commentator, David ben Jospeh 
Abudarham, who writes categorically: "And there his [Elijah's] 
body perished, and each element returned to its origin, and his spirit 
d Hi h • .. 127 b d h I 1• • returne to m t at gave 1t. Au ar am s exp 1cat1on seems 
virtually a transcription from Radak. 
Although from a rationalist standpoint Radak's view seems well taken, 
it is difficult for Gersonides to accept this view for a simple 
reason, to which he calls attention: the surprising appearance of 
an epistle written by Elijah to Jehoram seven years after his 
ascension, implicitly recorded in the Bible.
128 
This is absolutely 
unaccountable, unless one posits, as Gersonides, that Elijah never 
died and his body remained intact and unscathed by the heavenly 
fire during the ascent. Radak was quite aware of this difficulty and 
in his commentary to Chronicles he defends his earlier view: 
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'And a letter came from Elijah': This occurred after the 
ascent, this matter is [to be understood] that Elijah revealed 
himself in prophesy to one of the prophets and placed in his 
mouth the content of the letter. He [Elijah] instructed 
him to write it down in a letter and tell him [Jehoram] that 
this letter is sent by Elijah, in order that Jehoram should 
think this letter came to him from heaven, so that he would 
surrender his heart and realise the abomination he had commit-
ted.129 
Explaining the appearance of the epistle from Elijah in this way, 
Radak is able to maintain his earlier view that Elijah in fact died, 
since the epistle was only inspired by Elijah, but not actually 
. b h. 130 wrltten y lm. 
Thus, the classical exegetes were divided over the after effect of 
Elijah's ascension. Gersonides and Nahmanides oppose any notion 
of a schism between body and soul; while, according to Radak, 
something more drastic than a schism occurred - an actual death, 
whereby Elijah's body was completely consumed by fire and devoured 
in flame. Whether or not Elijah actually perished during his ascent, 
as espoused by Radak and R. Abudarham, or was simply relocated to 
another abode, as advocated by Nahmanides et al., is traceable to 
a dissonance which emerged much earlier, from the sources of the 
talmudic period. 
Earlier Sources 
The first source to throw light upon the discussion is a source 
we are already ·familiar, from our treatment of R. Isserlein's 
responsum in Chapter II. Derekh Erez Zuta, states that nine 
eminent persons entered Paradise during their lifetimes, Elijah 
among them. R. Isserlein was asked what obligation these persons 
have r~garding the performance of Mitzvot. The fact, however, 
that these persons are in reality alive and existing was never 
questioned. It is explicitly stated in the minor tractate itself. 
R. Isaac Arama, the philosopher-exegete, a follower of Maimonidean 
philosophy, in his commentary to Deuteronomy writes: 
We have already found men of distinction who were saved from 
it [death] because of their great merit as was exemplified by 
Elijah when he was taken up in a whirlwind, and hinted by Enoch 
in what was said, 'And he was not, for G-d took him.' And 
our Sages maintained this and attributed to him existence as 
Serah b. Asher and R. Joshua b. Levi and the others who 
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merited to enter, in body and soul, the life of the next world. 131 
R. Arama clearly understood Derekh Erez Zuta as referring to the 
continual existence in body and soul of Elijah and his counterparts 
who merited Paradise in their lifetime. It would therefore appear 
that the minor tractate is substantially supportive of the espousals 
of Gersonides and Nahmanides. We are also aware of a similar 
source of wider repute form the tractate Sukkah, which R. Sofer 
cites in his responsum dealing with Elijah: 
R. Jose stated: Neither did the Divine presence ever descend 
to earth nor did Moses or Elijah ever ascend to heaven, as 
it is written: 'The heavens are the heavens of the Lord, but 
the earth was given to the scns of men •.• '132 




to Elijah's ascension to heaven is consistent with his 
Seder Olam Rabbah, to which R. Jose is ascribed putative 
"And El' 'ah · [ l' ] d · t' "133 R. Jose ~J ~s a ~ve an ex~s ~ng. 
posited that Elijah could only continue to subsist as "alive and 
existing" so long as he did not ascend heaven, since "the heavens 
are the heavens of the Lord, and the earth was given to the sons 
of men." The heavens are the exclusive domain of the Almighty and 
His Holy Retinue. Man's subsistence in the form of "alive and 
existing" is confined and restricted to the periphery of earth. 
These additional sources seem to bolster further the opinions of 
Gersonides and Nahmanides. 
On the other hand, we have already seen Hatam Safer's treatment of 
the said passage in tractate Sukkah. Albeit, R. Sofer concedes, 
Elijah never ascended heaven in bodily form, however, he did indeed 
ascend in his soul form. In fact, R. Jose himself seems to allude 
to this view in a further chapter of Seder Olam Rabbah, where he 
states: "In the second year of Ahaziah's reign, Elijah was ensconced 
[nignaz] and is not to be seen [again] until the advent of the 
M 'ah ,,134 ess~ ... 
Meir Friedmann correctly evinces that the term nignaz is only applied 
when referring to the respite of souls and not of bodies. This 
observation leads Friedmann to conclude that, in R. Jose's opinion, 
it was only Elijah's soul which was esconced in heaven, since Elijah 's 
bod t d h h . . . ll 135 y mus return to ust, t e state t at ~twas or~g~na y. 
Friedmann's conclusion is plainly reminiscent of Radak's rationalis-
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tic interpretation. 
Other sources which seem to contest R. Jose's thesis in Sukkah 
that Moses and Elijah never ascended heaven are: R. Joshua b. Levi 's 
statement in Shabbat: 
When Moses ascended on high, the ministering angels spoke 
before the Holy One, blessed be He, 'Sovereign of the Universe! 
What business has one born of woman amongst us? 
And Tanhum b. Hanilai's statement in Baba Mezia: 
One should never break away from cust~~6 For behold, Moses ascended on high and ate no bread ... '' 
However, these sources can be resolved to both renditions of R. Jose. 
According to the literalist view that R. Jose maintained that 
neither Elijah nor Moses ever ascended the heavens in any form, 
these two sources are to be understood as referring to a distance 
of ten handbreadths below heavens--an elevation to which even R. 
J d h . d 137 A d. h 1 . ose conce es to ave transp~re . ccor ~ng to t e atter v~ew , 
that R. Jose's statement in Sukkah was only said in reference to 
the bodies of Moses and Elijah, these other sources can be under-
stood as referring to Moses' sou1. 138 
Thus we have located the controversy over the aftermath of Elijah's 
ascension to antedate long before the period of the classical Bible 
exegetes, and, in fact, dates back to as early as the talmudic 
sources themselves. The minor tractate, Derekh Erez Zuta, seems 
to bear out overwhelmingly in evidence of the Gersonides-Nahmanides 
position, which points out that Elijah remained unchanged by his 
ascension and continued a uniform existence of body and soul in 
his new habitat, "Paradise." Radak, himself, concedes that Derekh 
Er Z d . . . h. . 139 R J I ez uta stan s ~n oppos~t~on to ~s own v~ews. . ose s 
opinion, on the other hand, as stated in Sukkah , Seder Olam Rabbah, 
and Baba Bathra, seems to be a matter of interpretation and can be 
regarded as supportive of either Gersonides-Nahmanides or supportive 
of the Radak-Abudarham views. 140 
Although we have traced the origin of the controversy over the after-
effect of Elijah 's ascension to the talmudic sources, there is no 
mention in those sources of any sort of reasoning underlying the 
controversy, which might have led each source to its respective 
position . The emergence of an explicit and clearly stated rationale 
only appears in the later writings of the classical Bible exegetes. 
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Philosophical Debates 
Although we cannot be sure that this same rationale lay in the 
foreground as the basis of the respective talmudic positions, 
we can be quite certain that it was this ratiocination which led 
the latter respondents to their respective conlcusions. We have 
already quoted Radak's clearly stated reasoning as to why he 
believes Elijah's body necessarily perished before his soul could 
continue its upward ascent to heaven. "Elijah became spiritual and 
his body became consumed in heavenly fire and each element returned 
to its origin. 141 Radak's alluding to and endorsement of the 
theory of generation and corruption as the embodying rationale for 
his depiction of the after-effect of Elijah's ascension, is indica-
tive of pure philosophical consideration guiding Radak's thinking 
and exegesis . 
We noted that Gersonides contests Radak's view for the simple 
reason that Chronicles implicitly records the appearance of an 
epistle to Jehoram written by Elijah quite some time after his 
ascension. Even if one were to endorse philosophically the theory 
of generation and corruption in general, from the appearance of 
the epistle it would seem that Elijah was immune to its rules. 
Gersonides' objection to Radak is not in principle, but rather to 
a specific incident in the case of Elijah. Nahmanides, however, 
disputes Radak on grounds of pure philosophical differences in 
reasoning . 
Nahmanides refutes the Aristotelean allegation that the operability 
of the theory of generation and corruption may necessarily preclude 
the outcome of the world's matter. Since G-d's Will is always 
operative, and is in perpetual interaction with nature, G-d's Will 
may easily circumvent the outcome of all matter which might have 
been determined otherwise by nature. Therefore, by virtue of the 
theory of generation and corruption alone, there is no reason to 
to presume thqt Elijah 's body returned to dust, since G-d's Will 
could easily have altered that outcome. In fact, it is essential 
to Nahmanides that Elijah's body did not disjoin itself from the 
soul, in order to subvert and dismiss the contention of the philo-
h wh . . T h 142 sop ers ose v1ews run contrarw1se to ora . 
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The Aristotelean philosophers rejected the entire notion of G-d's 
Will, claiming that, although G-d is the Cause of the world, the 
world was not created in His Will and nothing can change as far as 
its nature is concerned. Rather the world is primordial and eternal. 
Just as the candle is the cause of its shadow, neither one preceding 
the other, nor is the shadow cast by the "will" of the candle, but 
rather every place the candle moves, the shadow follows it in time 
and in space - so it is with the Cause(i.e., G-d) and the effect 
(i.e., the world). 143 They further developed this axiom by 
endorsing the theory of generation and corruption. They postulated 
that the composition of matter is not renewed, but rather automati-
cally renews itself as a natural process. 
Nahmanides counters this view by bringing a Midrash. The Midrash, 
although being a much earlier source, in Nahmanides' view is con-
fronted with the same issue. The Midrash instructs: 
If one were to say to you, is it possible that had Adam not 
sinned he would have lived on forever? Answer him, is there 
not Elijah who has not sinned and he is living and in existence 
forever!144 




Namely, how was Adam punishable by death, since he was 
to corruption and decomposition even before his sin? The 
exemplifies Elijah in evidence of the ludicrousness of such 
a contention. For, were it true, that all men were subject to 
generation and corruption, irregardless of whether men sin or not, 
how could one explain Elijah's continued existence? Shouldn't 
Elijah himself be subject to corruption and decomposition. Rather, 
one must conclude that it is G-d's Will which allows for man's 
continued existence, and circumvents the operability of generation 
and corruption. 
Hence it is vital to Nahmanides that Elijah continues to live 
aggregately in body and soul, since Elijah's continued existence is 
absolute proof of G-d's Will in creation, and that the world has 
not proceeded from creation by virtue of necessity. Had Elijah's 
body disjoined itself from his soul, then Elijah would have become 
subject to generation and corruption, and there would be no proof 
of G-d's Will being able to suspend the operability of the theory 
of generation and corruption, and hence no proof of G-d's Will in 
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Creation. 
It is quite obvious that the problem of whether Elijah exists in 
form of body or soul _is hardly trite, and for Nahmanides the issue 
is of paramount significance. For it is Elijah's continual aggre-
gate existence of body and soul which dispels the Aristotelean 
doctrine of an eternal world independent of G-d' s Will. Elijah is 
1. · f h G d' w·11 1 · · · 145 ~v~ng proo t at - s ~ a one ma~nta~ns creat~on. 
The issue was of such major import to Nahmanides that his philosophic 
position quite uncharacteristically influenced him to dispute the 
opinion of the Zohar. Nahmanides had a foremost reputation of 
being a keen Kabbalist . In fact, his kabbalistic approach general ly 
guided his philosophic thinking. Yet, in a surprising deviation, 
Nahmanides' philosophic stand concerning Elijah's existential status 
caused him to disagree with the Zohar -- which even more surprisingly 
seems to be supportive of the rationalistic approach of Radak. 
The Zohar is not concerned with Elijah's body returning to earth 
as dictated by the theory of generation and corruption, but rather 
the flip side of the issue. Namely, the problem of corporeality 
in heavens. Elijah's body, being that it is corporeal, has no 
place in heavens -not because it must return to dust, but rather 
because in a cor~oreal state, it can have no existence in heavens. 
The Zohar states: 
'Who hath ascended up unto heaven?' Behold, we have established 
that this refers to Moses, as it is written: 'And to Moses He 
said, Come up unto the Eternal.' Another interpolation, 
'Who hath ascended up unto heaven?' This refers to Elijah, 
as it is written: 'And Elijah went up by a whirlwind into 
heaven.' And how could Elijah have ascended unto heaven? 
Behold, all the heavens could not tolerate even the size of a 
mustard seed of the substance of this world, and you say, 
'And Elijah went up by a whirlwind unto heaven!' 
Rather, as you say, 'And the Eternal descended upon Mt. Sinai, ' 
and it is written: 'And Moses came into the midst of the 
cloud, and went up into the mountain.' And was not the Holy 
One, Blessed be He, on the mountain, and it is written, 'And 
the sight of the glory of the Eternal was like devouring fire 
on top of the mountain.' How could Moses go up unto Him? 
Rather, by Moses it is written, 'And Moses came into the midst 
of the cloud as one dresses oneself in clothing. Here too 
he clothed himself in the cloud and entered into it. And in 
the cloud he approached the fire, and he could draw near to it. 
So too with Elijah it is written: 'And he went up by a whirl-
wind into heaven.' He entered that whirlwind and he clothed 
himself in that whirlwind and ascended upwards.146 
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It is clear to the Zohar, from its remark, "the heavens could not 
tolerate even the size of a mustard seed of the substance of this 
world," that Elijah's terrestrial body could not have entered heavens. 
This leads the Zohar to conclude that Elijah necessarily entered 
tteaven in a different form, and only after he was suitably garbed 
in special celestial clothing was ne enabled to continue his heavenly 
147 acsent. 
The Zohar's problem of corporeality in heavens is reminiscent of R. 
Jose's statement in Sukkah that Elijah and Moses never ascended 
heavens. However, the difference between these two lies in the 
resolution of those verses which seem to imply that Moses and Elijah 
did indeed ascend the heavens. R. Jose resolves these verses propo-
sing that Moses and Elijah ascended until a point below heavens, 
whereas the Zohar resolves these verses by submitting that Elijah and 
Moses ascended heaven in a different form. The format of the Zohar's 
resolution is virtually identical to that of Hatam Sofer. They both 
agree that Elijah's ascent was made possible because of his ascending 
in a new form. The difference being that R. Sofer suggests that this 
was in the form of soul, whereas the Zohar submits that this was in 
the form of a new garb of celestial clothing. 148 
However, for Nahmanides, from a philosophical standpoint, the necessary 
vitalness of Elijah's continued aggregate existence in body and soul, 
as proof of G-d's Will being abound in creation, caused him to un-
characteristically controvert the opinion of the Zohar. 149 
One might postulate, by extending Nahmanides' principle a step 
further, that just as the omnificience of G-d's Will will render 
Elijah's aggregate existence of body and soul immune to the rubric 
of generation and corruption, similarly the omnificience of His 
Will may enable Elijah's body to enter heaven without necessitating 
a prior change of form. This reasoning, however, is inconclusive. 
For Nahmanides explicitly states that G-d's Will maintains His 
created objects in eternal existence, immune to the effect of gene-
ration and corruption, provided this was G-d's original intent at 
th t • f h • • • 150 • d I • • 1 • e 1me o t e1r 1ncept1on. S1nce G- s or1g1na 1ntent at 
the time of the inception of man's soul was that the soul should 
give eternal sustenance to man's body, G-d's mere willing the 
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preservation of his created objects would have rendered Adam immune 
to generation and corruption had he not sinned, as in the case of 
Elijah . However, since we are unaware of an original intent that 
man 's soul should give eternal sustenance to man's body even in 
heavens, there is no reason to assume thatG-d's Will should be so. 
Consequently, there is no reason that any created being, including 
Elijah , should be able to ascend heaven in form of body, since we 
have no knowledge of such an original intent. Therefore, it is 
possible that Nahmanides might have endorsed the opinion of the 
Zohar, provided that Elijah's changed form in celestial clothing 
in heavens would not affect his ability to resort to his prior 
form in terrestrial clothing on earth. This is plausible, conside-
ring that Moses' changed form, donned in celestial garments, during 
his ascension did not seem to impair his ability to resort to his 
prior form during his descent. 
In much the same way we find that there are two distinct traditions 
concerning the astral body in Neoplatonism, 151 the one representing 
it as permanently attached to the soul; 152 the other, as acquired 
in the course of the soul's descent and discarded in the reascent. 153 
Similarly, we can't be certain if according to Nahmanides, Elijah 's 
terrestrial body remained permanently attached to his soul even 
during ascent, or is only acquired during the course of his descent. 
It is not overly surprising in this instance to find the opinion 
of the Zohar more closely in semblance to Radak than Nahmanides. 
For R. Simeon unequivocally stated in the following zoharitic passage : 
From here R. Simeon said: A decree was issued upon Adam 
beforehand that he should die, since he was taken from [the 
dust of the] earth. This may be inferred from Scripture : 
' For in the day that thou eatest thereof [thou shalt surely die.'] 
This teaches, that had he not sinned he would have lived a 
long life. But, as he sinned, this was his punishment-- his 
life would become shortened and he would die on the sart~e day. 
Upon his repentance, he was given a day of G-d, which is a 
thousand years. 
And this is evidence that the decree [of death] was [decreed] 
prior to his [punishment of] death. For were it not so, 
upon his repentance the decree would have been repealed. 
Rather, R. Simeon said: he repented and annulled the decree 
that was decreed upon him: 'For in the day that thou eatest 
thereof [thou shalt surely die]' and [G-d] prolonged his days, 
giving him [Adam] His day.154 
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R. Simeon's view is ostensibly antithetic to Nahmanides. R. Simeon 
unquestionably reflects Radak's reasoning that the law of generation 
and corruption was operative even prior to Adam's sin. Nonetheless, 
one may not divorce Nahmanides from the Zohar on this matter, as 
R. Simeon's opinion is a contentious issue in the Zohar itself. 
The Zohar in another place states: 
Behold, had Adam not sinned, he would not have savoured the 
taste of death in this world ... 155 
This excerpt is remarkably similar to the Midrash that Nahmanides 
quotes in support of his thesis, that it is G-d's Will which allows 
for man's continued existence, and may easily circumvent the opera-
bility of the law of generation and corruption. 
One might have surmised that Zohar's proposal of celestial clothing 
(in solution to the problem of corporeality in heaven) is contingent 
upon R. Simeon's rationalistic statement that death was decreed on 
Adam even prior to his sin. Only if man's body must return to dust, 
is it faced with a problem of its being corporeal upon its ascent. 
It then follows that once Nahmanides dismisses R. Simeon, he would 
automatically dismiss the notion of celestial clothing regarding 
Elijah as well. However, we have already evinced that even if 
Adam had merited eternal life, he might only have done so in this 
World alone. 156 Co tl th . t nsequen y, ere ~s no reason o assume a 
contingency between R. Simeon and the notion of clestial clothing 
in Elijah's case. Therefore, although Nahmanides unequivocally 
disputes the zoharitic opinion of R. Simeon, he did not necessarily 
i gnore the Zohar's dilemma of Elijah's corporeality in heavens. 
The resolution of this dilemma could just as easily be commensurate 
with the other zoharitic view which accords with Nahmanides, as with 
R. Simeon whom he disputes. 
At this point it should be ostensibly clear that the decisive 
factor in determining the aftermath of Elijah's ascension and con-
firming the existential status of Elijah, lies at the heart in the 
resolution of such fundamental philosophic issues, such as the 
eternality of the world versus the omnificience of G-d's Will, 
the theory of generation and corruption as against the notion of 
G-d's Will, and the problem of corporeality in heavens. One cannot 
confirm any form of existence upon Elijah without firstly resolving 
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or committing oneself to a philosophic position. 
We remarked earlier that despite the fact that we have effectively 
located the controversy over Elijah's destiny to antedate as early 
as the talmudic period- long before Aristotelean metaphysics 
became predominant- we have no evidence that it was these philoso-
phic issues which account for divergence in the sources. Although 
this is true, nevertheless from Nahmanides' usage of the early 
midrashic source of Leviticus Rabbah157 dating back to the classical 
Ammoraic Midrashim of the early period (400-500 CE), and which 
cites Elijah as evidence that had Adamn not sinned he would not 
have been subject to decomposition, and from what emerges as the 
clear problem in Zohar, it is seemingly apparent that the resolution 
of these philosophic issues were basic for the determining of 
Elijah's destiny even in the earliest period. 
However, after these opinions were propounded prominently by Nah-
manides, Radak and other~ and found expression even in Zohar, 
their opinions and positions devolved and became well known to the 
respondents. There can be no doubt that confirming of Elijah's 
halakic status by the respondents necessitated their prior conten-
ding with the same philosophic issues which were well known to them. 
Indeed, we find these opinions expressedly mentioned in another 
responsum of Radbaz, who explicitly emphasizes how well known the 
view of the Rishonim (i.e., Nahmanides, Radak, et al. ,) were to 
the respondents and all who took interest in this issue. 158 
The fact that the respondents were confronted with the philosophic 
premise of generation and corruption, and dealt with it, is also 
evident from the same responsum. Radbaz was asked to explain Adam's 
ethical behaviour. How such a venerable person could disobey a 
simple commandment of G-d: 
You have enquired of me, my friend of my soul, that I impart 
knowledge to you concerning the sin of First Man according to 
thesimplemeaning [peshat], since you have no dealings in 
esoterics. For you questioned; the creation of His hands, 
and after all the glory that he [Adam] had, as our Sages have 
mentioned, how could he be seduced by the advice of his wife 
and transgress a simple commandment that his Blessed Creator 
corrmanded him? 
It is true that in the book of Zohar and in Tikkunim, profound 
and tremendous things were related concerning this matter of 
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which we are not entitled to speak. And you as well, my 
friend, did not ask of it. And, therefore, I saw fit to 
set down to you my opinion so that it rests well with the 
heart and with the simple meaning of Scripture. 
Know that it is an intelligible thing that all existing things un-
dergo corruption and in the final result all things return 
to their prime origin from whence they were taken. All the 
more so, man, who is composed of the four elements. And 
this thing was known to Adam beyond all doubt. And that 
which the Lord said to him: 'For in the day that thou eatest 
thereof thou shalt surely die,' [this refers to] incidental 
death, because from the natural death there is no escaping. 
And the Rishonim have already spoken about this, so I will not 
expatiate on it. And even according to those who say that 
he [AdamJ could have attained eternal existence by way 
of a miracle, nevertheless, First Man did not know this. 
Rather, he estimated in his mind that the heavenly creatures 
have eternal existence, and that which is composed of matter 
is subject to death. Would that he were to live a thousand 
years. If so, it was clear to him that he would not exist 
in perpetuity as a man. 
Nevertheless, First Man had a good intention. He yearned 
to become like on of His angels who stand before Him always. 
And certainly Adam did not know his fate and he thought his 
days would be short.159 
Radbaz devoted an entire responsum to discussion of an issue 
pertinent to ethics. Since rror.al and ethical behaviour is an 
integral constituent of Torah Law, which exacts moral fidelity, 
any discussion of rroral conduct is a lawful concern and of inherent 
halakic relevance. 160 The philosophic premise of the theory of 
generation and corruption is axiomatic to Radbaz for an accounting 
of Adam's moralistic behaviour. Radbaz notes Zohar's contention 
with the same ' issue and clearly emphasizes that the entire philo-
sophical debate concerning the theory of generation and corruption 
was already discussed by the Rishonim. In fact, he considered their 
deliberation on the matter so well known, and presumably readily 
available, that he felt no need to discuss the issue further. 
By the Rishonim he undoubtedly is referring to Radak and other 
rationalists who maintained that the theory of generation and 
corruption is unrelated to Adam's sin. Radbaz' mentioning "even 
according to those who say that Adam could have attained eternal 
existence by way of a miracle," is an obvious allusion to Nahmanides, 
who maintained that G-d's Will could have suspended the effect of 
generation and corruption. From Radbaz's observation that the 
philosophic concept of generation and corruption was so well known 
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that he found it unnecessary to discuss the matter any further, 
we can easily assume that the other respondents were not only 
equally familiar with the existing opinions, but in fact utilised 
these opinions in their halakic discourse, as Radbaz did himself. 
Application of Philosophy as Basis for Main Halakic Positions 
We recall aligning the respective positions of the respondents 
from the point of view of the factor which produces an obligation 
for Elijah to fulfill the commandments. And we observed that 
according to the R. Sofer-R.Kluger school, this factor depends on 
Elijah's form of existence or mode of appearance. According to 
the R. Falcon-R.Attiah school, this obligation is produced by his 
relations and relationships vis-a-vis G-d and his fellowmen. 
On the surface it would seem that the representation of R. Sofer 
and R. Kluger is far simpler than that of R. Attiah and R. Falcon. 
It is much simpler to posit a schism theory whereby Elijah assumes 
various modes of apeparance, than to complicate matters by involving 
oneself in an arduous diagnosis and analysis of Elijah's relations 
and relationships vis-a-vis man and G-d. 
Ostensibly, R. Attiah and R. Falcon rejected the simpler notion, 
because they viewed disparaginglyon the whole concept of a schism. 
They obviously sided with the philosophic position of Nahmanides, 
based on the Midrash in Leviticus Rabbah, R. Jose in Seder Olam 
Rabbah and Sukkah, and Derekh Erez Zuta, all of which attest the 
fact that Elijah continued to live an aggregate existence in body 
and soul. On the contrary, it is R. Kluger and R. Sofer who re-
interpret those sources and complicate them by removing them from 
their plain meaning by construing them to refer only to Elijah's 
bod 161 R s f I • • f . . h y. • ' o er s mot1vat1on or re1nterpret1ng t e sources 
was undoubtedly promoted by the same philosophic considerations 
expressed by Radak and the Zohar. 
Therefore, it would seem correct to interject at this stage that 
R. Attiah-R. Falcon school sought to define the extent of Elijah's 
involvement in commandments from the vantage point of his relations 
and relationships vis-a-vis man and G-d, rather than in terms of 
Elijah's dualistic existence, because they were opposed to a solution 
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of a schism. We have evinced the philosophic rationale which 
pursuaded Nahmanides to maintain that Elijah continues his aggregate 
existence in body and soul. These very considerations influenced 
this school to reject the solution of Elijah's dualistic form of 
existence. According to this view, although Elijah attained the 
status of "angel," in reality he continued to exist in the form of 
162 man. 
On the other hand, the R. Sofer-R. Kluger school had no difficulty 
in defining Elijah's involvement in commandments in terms of Elijah's 
dualistic existence. They saw no contradiction in maintaining that 
G-d's Will is operable within creation simultaneous with the philo-
sophic notion of generation and corruption even prior to Adam's 
sin, whereby Elijah himself is subject to its laws. Indeed we find 
this view extant in Radak, Zohar, and Radbaz and none seem to be 
troubled by the reservation of Nahmanides. According to this view, 
Elijah exists in reality in the form of spirit, yet he may reappear 
. 11 . f f 163 occas~ona y ~n orm o man. 
The Synthesis of Avnei Nezer 
Having demonstrated the respondents' rendering of certain halakic 
decisions based upon extensive philosophic deliberation, it is 
important to divulge a third philosophic position, extant in the 
Responsa literature, concerning the discussion of Elijah's existen-
tial status subsequent to his ascension. R. Avraham ben Ze'ev 
Nahum Bornstein of Sochaczew (1839-1910), head of the Beth Din of 
Sochaczew, was one of the greatest halakic authorities of his 
generation. R. Bornstein's most notable halakic work was Avnei 
Nezer, a remarkable collection of responsa on the four parts of 
Shulchan Arukh after which he himself became known. In one of these 
responsa, Avnei Nezer relates to a contention of Maharal that the 
righteous, do not possess impurity upon death by virtue of their 
pertaining to the Upper World: 
These th1ngs can be explained further. It is written in 
the holy Zohar in Shelach that if not for the sin of First 
Man the body would have ascended with the soul to the Upper 
World.164 And because of the sin, the body remains in this 
word. And here! The sin is incidental and in essence the 
body is worthy to ascend the Upper World at the time of death. 
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Necessarily, it [the body] pertains to the Upper World and one 
who touches it becomes impure. And here! Maharal would not 
dispute the holy Zohar that there is impurity to the dead itself, 
as the externals cling to the holy garment. 
And here! When he [Elijah] was burying R. Akiba and Elijah 
was asked 'Art thou not a Priest? 'loS According to the reason 
of Ma~aral,noprohibition or impurity exists for Elijah as 
Elijah himself 1s from the Upper World, he ascended above and 
descended below! And what place is there to say to Elijah 
that touching something from the Upper World [i.e., R. Akiba's 
corpse] should bring impurity upon him? This is only pertinent 
to men of this world, not to Elijah who himself belongs to the 
Upper World! Except however, according to the reason of Zohar 
and Nahmanides, that impurity is intrinsic to the dead itself. 
And do not ask, is it not known that Elijah at the time of 
ascension was stripped of his body and placed it on the planet 
Sun? And if so, his body did 'not ascend to the Upper World 
and it was well said that Elijah's body which enclothes him 
in this world should not touch that which pertains to the Upper 
World. This is not so, for I have already written, that which 
a dead body pertains to the Upper World is because if not for 
the sin, the body would have also ascended. And Ohr ha-Hayyim 
[in his commentary] to Hukkat on the verse 'And from Bamoth to 
Gay,' wrote: 'If not for the sin, at the time of death man's 
body and soul would ascend. And man would place his body on 
the planet sun as Elijah.'166 
From this we may conclude that the dead body, even if not for 
the 'sin' does not pertain to the Upper World any more than 
Elijah's body that enclothes him in this World. And it is 
impossible that Elijah should become impure upon touching a 
corpse according to the reason of Maharal.167 
Avnei Nezer maintains that even if First Man had not sinned, his 
body would not have ascended further than Elijah's body which is 
stationed on planet sun. As the sin is merely incidental, the body 
of every man is worthy of pertaining to the Upper World. Avnei Nezer 
utilizes this premise to disprove Maharal's contention that the 
righteous do not have intrinsic impurity of their own by virtue 
of their pertaining to the Upper World, as every man has this 
inherent quality of pertaining to the Upper World, yet nevertheless 
has intrinsic impurity of his own. 
Avnei Nezer, similar to Radaz, maintains that even without sin 
First Man would never have attained bodily existence in the Upper 
World beyond the planet sun. It is interesting to note that in 
contrast to Nahmanides who cites Elijah as absolute evidence that 
had First Man not sinned he would have obtained eternal aggregate 
existence of body and soul, Avnei Nezer cites Elijah as proof of 
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exactly the reverse. Just as Elijah never attained eternal aggre-
gate existence of body and soul neither would First Man have attained 
such an existence, even prior to corrrnitting the "sin." 
Once again we see how it was crucial for a halakic giant as Avnei 
Nezer to contend with the entire gamut of philosophical considerations 
cited in our discussion in order to render a halakic decision. That 
decision being that all men, even the righteous must have intrinsic 
impurity of themselves if they are to cause impurity to others. 
Avnei Nezer seems to suggest a new philosophical position, somewhere 
midway between Radaz and Nahmanides. While Radbaz considers all 
men to be permanently subject to decomposition and Adam's punishment 
of death merely incidental, Avnei Nezer considers all men to be per-
manently eternal and Adam's sin and consequent death merely incidental. 
However, Avnei Nezer qualifies his position stating that the highest 
state of man's permanent level of eternality of body cannot extend 
further than the planet sun. Although Avnei Nezer concurs with the 
R. Sofer-R. Kluger school in maintaining that Elijah's body severed 
itself from soul at planet sun, this severance does not represent 
the death of Elijah's body as expressed by the R. Sofer-R. Kluger 
school. It rather represents the highest level of eternality that 
Elijah's body could possibly attain. In this sense Avnei Nezer is 
similar to Nahmanides and the R. Falcon-R. Attiah school who maintain 
that the aggregate existential status of Elijah's body and soul is 
one of being eternally alive. 
Impurity Upon Revival as a Consequence for Surgery 
There are significant practical halakic consequences emanating from 
Avnei Nezer's responsum concerning whether the dead corpse possesses 
intrinsic impurity. One example of this can be found in a responsum 
by R. Waldenberg in Tzitz Eliezer to Dr. Abraham-Safer Abraham where he 
discusses whether a priest is permitted to have a finger which was 
accidentically torn asunder rejoined in place through plastic surgery. 168 
Dr. Abraham reasoned that since the torn finger conveys impurity to 
the priest, possibly the priest would not be permitted to undergo 
surgery. R. Waldenberg considers the possibility that since the 
finger is restored to life in the same place that it was imbued with 
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However, R. Waldenberg recalls the talmudic discussion in Niddah 
which clearly delineates that even if a person's whole being was 
restored to life, although he no longer conveys impurity whilst he 
is alive, he certainly conveyed impurity while he was dead. R. 
Waldenberg bolsters his contention that the finger continues to 
convey impurity despite its becoming restored to life, by quoting 
a responsum of Hatam Sofer in which R. Sofer explains that the son 
of the Shunamite woman certainly required ritual sprinkling subse-
quent to his resurrection as he came in contact with himself during 
his resurrection and consequently he conveyed his intrinsic impurity 
to himself. 169 
According to Maharal however, who espouses that a corpse does not 
convey intrinsic impurity to itself, 170 R. Waldenberg would no longer 
find support for his contention from the Talmud in Niddah, and 
consequently the priest might well be permitted to undergo the 
171 surgery. The application of the Talmud's discussion in Niddah 
is another instance where resurrection discussions bear practical 
consequences for ordinary surgical procedure . 
t 
l;i - 111 -
l~~~~===========:======~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--~~--~-~~.---~-~-~~~~~·~·· 
III. 1HE NATURE OF ELIJAH Is ESSENCE 
4. DESCENSION 
We have discussed two main schools which described the aftereffect 
of Elijah 's ascension and have shown that each school derived its 
views based on the most profound philosophical considerations. 
\~ile one school maintained that the aftereffect of Elijah ' s ascen-
sion resulted in Elijah's continued existence in the form of man 
whose evasion of death attained his angel status, the second school 
maintained that Elijah transcended in reality to an angel \vho reap-
pears occasionally in the form of man. 
Exactly how one is to define an angel would involve us in a 
rather tedious and complicated study of Angeology. Suffice it to 
say that according to all opinions, an angel is an entity somewhere 
in between the sphere of man and the sphere of G-d. ~ether angels 
more closely resemble men or G-d is a study for angeologists. Not-
withstanding, it would seem that R. Falcon and R. Attiah regarded 
angels, or at least the angel Elijah, as more closely resembling 
the sphere of man. ~ereas R. Sofer and R. Kluger seem to have 
related the angel Elijah more closely to the sphere of G-d. 
Did Elijah Originate as a Man or an Angel? 
It is most intriguing to note that this distinction of whether 
Elijah is in reality a man who attained the status of angel, or in 
reality an actual angel, is a dilemma which has bearing on Elijah 
already prior to his ascension. A controversy emerged in the rab-
binic literature already at the onset of Elijah's ingression: Was 
Elijah originally in reality an angel, even before he began his 
earthly career, who subsequently descended in the form of man to 
take up his career, and upbn ascension he resumed his angel reality? 
Or, did he originate as a man to take up his career as related in 
Kings, and only upon his ascension did he rise to the level of angel? 
Indeed we find this very topic raised by R. Michaelson in the same 
responsum where he clarifies the matter of Elijah 's identity. 
Toward the conclusion of his responsum, R. Michaelson divulges a 
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most remarkable opinion, which he discovered: 
I found in the name of R. Moses de Leon: 'I saw a most marvelous 
secret. You will not find [of Elijah] in all of Torah a father 
and a mother. And it was not written of him [Elijah, that 
he was] the son of so and so except for Elijah the Tishbite. 
And it is said that beforehand he descended from heaven, and 
his name is known [to those savant] in esoteric wisdom.' He 
[R. de Leon] is recorded in the book Zikkukin de-Nura [commentary] 
to Seder Elijah Zuta. See thereon the marvels of his holy 
words .172 
R. Michaelson imparts the opinion of R. Moses de Leon who made a 
most remarkable observation. Nowhere does Scrtpture allude to 
Elijah's parents or even identify him as the son of so and so, as 
is customary of Scripture whenever introducing its characters. This 
obvious omission leads to the conclusion that Elijah in fact had no 
natural parents and that in reality Elijah originated as an angel 
before he began his earthly career. Subsequently he descended in 
the form of m~n to take up his career, and he is recorded in Kings 
simply as Elijah. 
R. Michaelson quotes Zohar, Ruth, as a source for his opinion. 
However, this source rather than deriving Elijah's origination as 
an angel from Scripture's omission of Elijah's parentage, derives 
this from Elijah's apparent celibacy. The fact that Scripture 
neglected to record Elijah's children is an equally curious omission 
as well: 
R. Nathan asked R. Jose b. R. Hanina one day. He said to him: 
'Did Elijah have a son or not?' He answered: 'He had another 
thing.' [i.e., He is unlike other people.] And it is written: 
'Touch not my appointed ones and do my prophets no harm.' 
What is: 'Do no harm [al tareiu]?' Do not make loved ones 
[reim] and friends to my prophets. For the Holy One, Blessed 
be He, chose them and separated them from Israel for His 
service and brought them into His Palace. It is a fortiori 
for someone who is an angel in heaven [i.e., Elijah]. Need 
you ask of him? 
R. Johanan said he belonged to the tribe of Gad. R. Nehorai 
said Elijah had another thing. And it is written: ·~~o 
ascended up into heaven and descended2' '\Vho ascended up into 
heaven.' R. Eleazer said in, the name of R. Simeon. This 
refers to Elijah. 'And-descended.' Beforehand.173 
The Zohar explicitly interpreted the proverbial verse: "Who ascen-
ded up into heaven and descended" as referring to Elijah the angel 
who descended beforehand, that is, before he "ascended up into heaven." 
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The Zohar is not the only source for this oplnlon. R. Hayyim Joseph 
David Azulai (1724-1806, known as the Hida), the halakist-kabalist, 
who combined a religious and mystical ardour with an insatiable 
intellectual curiosity, recounted in his compendium, Midbar Kedemoth 
the following : 
Elijah, may he be remembered for good, was originally an 
angel. And at the time when G-d desired to create the world, 
He said to Elijah and the other angels, 'Let us make man.' 
He [Elijah] answered: 'If it is good before You, before me, 
is it not all the more so? If it be pleasing in Thine eyes, 
I will descend on earth and make myself serviceable to him.' 
[Then G-d changed his angel name.] And later [under Ahab] 
he descended and converted the world to the belief that 'The 
Lord is G-d.' A few days after he converted the world to this 
belief, G-d took him again into heaven and said to him: 'Be 
thou the guardian spirit of my children forever [and spread 
the belief in Me abroad in the whole world].174 
And in Midrash Talpiyyot: 
Elijah was at the beginning of creation from the sect of 
angels who brought indictment against creation of the world. 
And the Holy One Blessed be He cast him down to earth from 
his residing place. As it is written: 'And truth was cast 
down to the ground.' This refers to Elijah.175 
It is quite obyious from the above citations that it can clearly 
be established that there is a definite opinion within rabbinic 
literature that the prophet Elijah was originally an angel who 
existed already during the time of creation. He was commissioned 
by G-d to descend and he appeared in the form of man. When Elijah ' s 
mission was completed he ascended, returning to his original angel 
state. 
In fact, his angel name is known to be Sandalphon, 176 whereas Elijah 
is his terrestrial name. Sandalphon is the angel name that Hida 
relates was changed by G-d to Elijah and is the same name that R. 
Michaelson refers to in his responsum, in which he quotes R. Moses 
de Leon: "And they said that beforehand he descended from heaven 
and his name is known to the savant in esoteric wisdom." 
Nevertheless, despite the evidence, there exists strong opposition 
to this view. Among the most distinguished of the opposers to this 
view is Rashi in his talmudic commentary. The Talmud in Kiddushin 
relates that every marriage is recorded in writing by Elijah and 
G-d fixes his seal to the marriage record. He who marries a wife 
who is not fit for him, will be bound in stocks on the pole by Elijah 
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and flogged by G-d. 177 Rashi, in commenting thereon, explains: 
This Elijah [i.e., the one who is related in Kiddushin] 
is not the same Elijah who is written in Scripture. For if 
so, before he arrived, who did the binding. Rather this 
[Elijah] is the name of an angel who is a scribe above. 
Rashi claims that the Elijah related in Kiddushin who inscribes all 
marriages and binds those who take wives unfit for them cannot 
be the selfsame Elijah recorded in Scripture. For were this the 
same Elijah of Scripture, who then was responsible for the inscrip-
tion of marriages and flogging of husbands who took unfit women for 
wives prior to Elijah's ingression? Rather, the Elijah related to 
in Kiddushin is a different Elijah who is an angel and a scribe in 
the heavens above. 
It is more than apparent that Rashi did not espouse the view 
divulged by R. Michaelson. Were Rashi to espouse this view, there 
would be no question as to who was responsible for inscribing and 
flogging prior to Elijah's arrival. It would obviously be the same 
Elijah. Rashi's rejection of this simple solution is a clear indi-
cation that he is opposed to the notion that the Elijah of Scripture 
originated long before as an angel during the time of creation. 
The view of R. Moses de Leon, imparted by R. Michaelson, is quoted 
from a book entitled Pardes, whose author is R. Moses Cordevero. 
R. Cordevero, in fact, cites R. de Leon in order to dispute him 
thereafter, saying: 
This opinion [R. de Leon's] nullifies itself before the words 
of R. Simeon b. Yohai, who opined that Elijah was a human being, 
and so is the opinion of all the Sages. For they [the Sages] 
only disagreed upon which tribe he belonged. But to say that 
he was an angel who materialised [in person], there is not a 
one who would agree.178 
R. Cordevero's assertion that none of the Sages would agree with 
R. de Leon's opinion is dubious. We have shown that R. de Leon's 
179 opinion is amply reflected in the sources. Although it is true 
that R. de Leon's conception is not explicitly stated in the older 
sources, many of the old 
. 180 A l conceptlon. c ear 
by R. de Leon himself: 
sources were interpreted according to his 
instance is the Talmud in Berakoth quoted 
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A Tanna taught: Michael [reaches his goal] in one [flight], 
Gabriel in two, Elijah in four, and the Angel of Death in eight.181 
The Tanna compares the angel Elijah to the archangels Michael and 
Gabriel, who has less power than them, but more than the Angel of 
Death. 182 The Tanna must have presumed that Elijah both originated 
and is an angel in essence. Otherwise Elijah could not be compared 
to the archangels Michael and Gabriel and· the Angel of Death who are 
angels in essence and originated as such. 
Moreover, Hida himself seems to personally endorse the view that 
Elijah originated as an angel which he quoted in Midbar Kedemoth. 
This is evident in another work, Petah Einayim, where Hida \VTites: 
Recently, I found an introduction in the books of the Kabba-
lists that Elijah, may he be remembered for good, was from the 
class of Heavenly Angels. He spoke out concerning man's 
creation and G-d decreed upon him to descend below and abide 
among the sons of men. And later he ascended in a whirhvind 
to heaven. 
And, thereon [in regarding the above], I said that with this 
[opinion] it is solved; for the Elijah who binds, [who is] 
related in Talmud, is forever the same Elijah the Prophet, 
may he be remembered for good, recorded in Scripture. And 
until he came to this world he himself would bind \ihen he was 
an angel. And similarly, [he continued to so] after his advent 
and after he ascended heaven.183 
Not only does Hida endorse the opinion of R. de Leon, Hida believes 
that the Talmud in Kiddushin could only be resolved in the light of 
this opinion. It would, therefore, seem that R. Cordevero's 
assessment that none of the Sages would agree with R. de Leon is 
doubtful. The Talmud, both in Kiddushin and in Berakoth are sup-
portive of R. de Leon. 
Rashi's solution in Kiddushin of two different Elijahs is certainly 
difficult. Indeed, Hida's solution is far simpler. The only expla-
nation possible for Rashi's discounting Hida's solution is that Rashi 
strongly opposed the notion of Elijah's origination as an angel 
prior to his descending to take on his earthly career. 
In fact, this is precisely the point of contention with which 
Zikkukin de-Nura explains the disputation of the Rabbis in Seder 
Elijah Rabbah over Elijah's genealogy. We are already familiar with the 
argument which was discussed in detail at the onset of this chapter. 
R. Michaelson lauds Zikkukin de Nura in his responsum for his marvelous 
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exposition of the disputation. Zikkukin de-Nura writes: 
..• This was the disputation in the academy among our Sages 
recorded in Seder Elijah Rabbah. For there are those who 
said that Elijah was not a human but an angel. Since we do not 
find that he was born unto father or mother. And there are 
those who said that Elijah was a human, only we have not found 
to whom h~ was born. Therefore, they argued from whom was 
Elijah.184 
Again, it would seem that R. Cordovero's allegation that R. de Leon's 
opinion is absent from the sources is groundless. As according to 
Zikkukin de-Nura, the contention of R. de Leon is exactly the subject 
of dispute among the Sages of Seder Elijah Rabbah. This is endorsed 
by R. Michaelson who bibliographs him authoritatively. 
In the Respansa of the Geonim, the question was raised that in 
view of the talmudic injunction: "One should never petition his 
needs in Aramaic; and R. Johanan said, when one petitions for one's 
needs in Aramaic, the ministering angels do not heed one, for they 
do not understand Aramaic."185 Why then is so much of our liturgy 
in Aramaic? In response, a distinction is drawn between areas 
where angels have jurisdiction to act on their own, and areas where 
they require approval from a higher authority. In areas where 
angels have jurisdiction to act on their own, supplication can be 
made in Aramaic, as angels understand Aramaic. An example is cited 
from the Selihot, (penitential) liturgy, where supplication is 
made to Elijah in Aramaic: "I beg of you, light runner who traverses 
the world in four strides." (A reference to Talmud in Berakoth, 
cited earlier.) This proves that angels understand Aramaic. 
Albert Harkavy, in his notes on the Geonic Respansa queries what 
sort of proof did the Geon produce from Elijah that angels understand 
Aramaic. Elijah is different for he is a man who became an angel, 
and, therefore, needs to be petitioned in Aramaic. Rather, Harkavy 
concludes, the proof is not from Elijah, but from other angels who 
are mentioned in the same Selihot •186 
Obviously, Harkavy did not consider the possibility that Elijah 
originated as an angel who only assumed the appearance of a man. 
Otherwise, his question would be unwarranted and he would not need 
to conclude that the Geon was referring to other angels, excluding 
Elijah. The Geon explicitly cites a petition to Elijah, who is 
stipulated in Berakoth as the one who traverses the world in four 
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strides. If the Geon was referring to other angels, excluding 
Elijah, he would not have cited a petition to Elijah. Rather, 
the Geon maintained, as R. Michaelson, R. de Leon, Hida, and Zikkukin 
de-Nura, that Elijah was an angel from his inception, and continues 
to retain that reality. Therefore, he could cite Elijah as proof 
that angels understand Aramaic. It is significant to note that the 
Geonic Responsa understood the talmudic source in Berakoth as 
asserting Elijah's reality of angel in the same way as R. Moses de 
Leon. 
In view of the stated controversy, let us now turn to reflect on 
why Rashi, and in R. Cordovero's estimation, all of the Sages of 
the Talmu4 discounted the notion of Elijah's origination as an 
angel. We recall our earlier discussion dealing with the after-
effect of Elijah's ascension, how we related R. Falcon and R. Attiah 
to Nahmanides, who maintain that Elijah continues to exist aggregately, 
in the form of man. Ostensibly, it would seem that if Elijah in 
reality continues to exist as a human, attaining only the status 
of angel, but not the reality of one, it would be difficult to 
embrace Elijah's origination as an angel. As clearly, only if 
one maintains that Elijah transcended to the reality of angel, is 
there room to entertain the thought of his origination as an angel. 
Since the simple meaning of the Talmud in Sukkah is that Moses and 
187 Elijah never attained the reality of angel, it is most probable 
that Rashi, and in R. Cordovero's opinion, all the Sages followed 
this literal interpretation and therefore, maintained that Elijah 
continued h.is human existence -- which precludes the possibility of 
his origination as an angel. Moreover, the Talmud compares the 
ascension of Elijah to that of Moses, stating that neither ascended 
the uppermost heavens. By the same token, one must assume that just 
as Moses did not originate as an angel (his genealogy being well 
known), neither did Elijah. Otherwise the Talmud could not compare 
the two ascensions, as Elijah would have resumed his original angel 
state, while Moses remained a human. 188 
Moses' Assumtpion and the Law of Conformity 
The striking resemblance between Moses' mission and existential 
nature to Elijah is particularly accentuated in Pesikta Rabbati and 
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Yalkut Shimoni: 
You find that Moses and Elijah are identical in every respect. 
Moses was a prophet and Elijah was a prophet. Moses was called 
Ish Elokim [Man of G-d], and Elijah was called Ish Elokim. 
Moses went up to heaven and Elijah went up to heaven as i t is 
written, 'And it came to pass when the Lord took Elijah up 
into heaven.' •.. Moses: 'And the cloud covered him six days' 
[and on the seventh He called unto Moses out of the midst of 
the cloud.] Elijah went up in a \vhirlwind: 'And it came 
to pass, when the Lord would take Elijah by a whirlwind.' 
•.• Moses spent forty days and forty nights during which he did 
not eat nor drink; so too, Elijah went on the strength of 
that meal forty days.' Etc.189 
Their being alike in every respect precludes Elijah's origination 
as an angel -as Moses originated as a human, so must have Elijah. 
Moreover, Peskita Rabbati compares Moses to Elijah in that they both 
miraculously lasted without food for forty days. Were Elijah 
originally an angel who merely disguised himself as a human, his 
fasting forty days would have been most natural for one who in reality 
is an angel. In fact, were Elijah in reality an angel even before 
his ascension, his abstinence from food would be permanent and not 
only forty days. If so, Elijah's fasting for forty days would be 
an incorrect comparison to Moses', as their abstinence from food was 
not alike. 
Indeed, the very issue of Moses' abstinence from food for forty 
days is a subject whichcrept its way into the Responsa literature. 
R. Jacob b. Joseph Reischer, also known as R. Jacob Backofen 
(1670-1733), was appointed Av Beth Din of Ansbach, Worms, and Metz. 
He was accepted by contemporary Rabbis as a final halakic authority, 
and queries were addressed to him from the whole of the Diaspora. 
The following question is the third of three questions addressed 
to him by R. Ben Zion Wengoff, in the name of his father, R. Moses 
Wengoff, which R. Reisher included in his responsa: 
[Question] There is found in Midrash Yalkut, [on the verse]: 
'And Moses was there on the mountain forty days and forty nights,' 
as follows: And is it possible for a one born unto a woman to 
remain forty days without eating or drinking! Rather, [the 
saying goes], 'When one goes to a town, behave as its inhabitants 
do.' . 
And this needs be affixed by a young carpenter [i.e., this 
requires explanation]. For how was the question, 'is it 
possible, etc.' answered? Since it [i.e., the abstinence 
from food] is impossible~ For do we deduce the impossible from 
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the possible? As certainly, whenever it is possible one must 
behave as the inhabitants do, but not so, in a place where it 
is impossible! 
[Answer] According to its plain sense it would seem that this 
is the meaning of the Midrash: 'Is it possible for one born 
of a woman to remain forty days and nights without eating or 
drinking? And one cannot say that this transpired by way of 
a miracle for naught? Since he [Moses] could have taken along 
food and drink with him. Or he could have eaten 'bread from 
heaven.' To this comes the answer: 'When one goes to a town, 
behave as . its inhabitants do.' And it is simple to understand. 
And in a witty way, it can be said that this is the intention 
of the Midrash: 'Is it possible for one born unto woman to 
be without food or drink? Rather, one must say, that Moses 
truly attained the level of angel in reality who is called 
'Ish Elokim', as it is written. And so it is difficult [to 
understand] why he did eat below [i.e., subsequent to his des-
cent from the mountain]? To this the Midrash nicely answers 
that for this reason he ate below, because 'when one goes to 
a town behave as its inhabitants do.' So it seems to me.190 
In answer to how Moses could be expected to behave as angels by 
abstaining from food even when it is impossible for him to do so, 
R. Reischer offers two explanations. The first explanation, which 
he considers literally, can be understood in line with Rashi's 
reasoning, that both Moses and Elijah were inherently men. R. 
Reischer responds that this is not a case of deducing the impossible 
from the possible, as Moses' abstinence from food forfortydays was 
not impossible. He could have brought food along with him, or 
eaten food from heaven. There was, therefore, no reason for G-d 
to work a miracle, whereby man could exist without food for forty 
days. Rather, the Midrash submits, the reason it was necessary 
for G-d to work such a miracle was so that Moses could conform to 
191 the practice of angels. 
R. Reischer's second explanation can be understood in line with Hida 
et al. who viewed Elijah inherently as an angel. In that case how 
was Moses likened to Elijah in every respect? To this R. Reischer 
says in a witty way that Moses himself became an angel. 192 The 
question of the Midrash is: in view of the fact that Moses in reality 
became an angel, why did he continue to eat upon his return from 
the mountain? To this the Midrash answers that since Moses returned 
to the place of humans, he must conform to the practice of humans. 
R. Reischer's responsum significantly contributes to our discussion 
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in that the statement "Moses and Elijah were alike in every respect" 
can now be understood both according to the conception that Elijah 
was inherently a man and according to the conception that Elijah 
was inherently an angel, since R. Reischer describes Moses' ascen-
sion in accordance with each view. Moses' ascension can no longer 
serve to disprove Elijah's transcendence to angel, as according to 
R. Reischer's second explanation Moses himself transcended to an 
angel. 
Louis Jacobs in his book, Theology in the Repsonsa, introduces R. 
193 Reischer's responsum as an aggadic question of a non-legal nature. 
Although R. Reischer himself prefaces his responsum, saying that 
he was asked a number of aggadic questions, he did not intend to say 
that these questions were "non-legal." In fact, R. Reischer begins 
his responsum saying: "I was asked three things of Aggada and 
hokhma," paraphrasing the Talmud in Niddah: "Twelve questions 
did the Alexandrians address to R. Joshua b. Hananiah. Three were 
f h khm h f Agg d 11194 matters o o a. t ree were matters o a a, etc. 
Rashi in his commentary to Niddah explains that the word hokhma 
denotes Halaka. Rashi clearly saw the "three questions of hokhma" 
as halakic and of a legal nature. There is no reason to doubt that 
R. Reischer used the word hokhma in this same legalistic sense as 
there is every indication to substantiate that R. Reischer para-
phrased the above passage in classifying the nature of the questions 
he was asked: Firstly, by the fact that in each instance groups 
of exactly three questions were asked. Secondly, the identical 
terminology of hokhma and Aggada were used in each case to classify 
the nature of the questions asked. And thirdly, the content of 
the questions which R. Reischer was asked bears an uncanny resemblance 
and similarity to the content of the questions asked by the Alexan-
drians. Moreover, it is clear that the canon "When one goes to 
a town, one must behave as its inhabitants do" is an ethical 
principle which is legally binding. 195 
R. Joseph ben Ephraim Caro (1488-1575) codified this principle 
in his legaldigest, Shulchan Arukh, as a legal canon, in relation 
to the performance of work on the eve of Passover. 196 Our Midrash 
is dealing with exactly the same type of legal premise as is pre-
scribed by Shulchan Arukh concerning the Passover laws, namely the 
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La f Co f . . f . 1 1 197 w o n ormlty, l.e., con ormlng to oca custom. 
Let us see how our Midrash served as a halakic basis in demonstra-
ting the Law of Conformity. On the surface it would seem that the 
Law of Conformity as codified in the Shulchan Arukh is a simple law 
one must conform in order to prevent quarrels. As R. Caro writes: 
"One must never break away [from the local custom] on account of 
quarrels."198 
This is in accordance with the Torah concept "Lo tithgodedu- you 
shall not form separate sects."199 Why then was it necessary and 
for what halakic significance did the Midrash demonstrate the Law 
of Conformity by citing the incidents of Moses' ascension as well 
as the descension of the angels to Abraham? In other words, what 
legal precept emerges from the Midrash that is not already encom-
passed by the Pentateuchal injunction "thou shalt not form separate 
sects?" 
In response, one could simply differentiate between the negative 
aspect and the positive aspect of the law. That is to say, that 
were one to observe the injunction merely from its negative aspect, 
namely, to conform in order to prevent quarrels, then it follows 
that upon entering a town one must behave as it inhabitants do 
publicly. However, in private, when no quarrel would ensure, one 
would be permi~ted to exercise one's own custom, even if it did not 
conform with the local custom. Whereas, were one to observe the 
injunction from its positive aspect, there would then be an inherent 
positive value in conforming to the local custom in itself. Namely, 
the value of training the stranger to become a part of the local 
society. Consequently, even in private one would not dissociate from 
local custom, since one's private behaviour is an important element 
in one's training. From the Torah injunction one merely derives 
the negative aspect of the Law of Conformity, i.e., the prevention 
of quarrels. The Midrash accentuates the positive aspect of the 
law, i.e., the inherent value of conformity. R. Jacob Hayyim Sofer 
stipulates in his halakic commentary to the Shulchan Arukh, Kaf 
ha-I-Iayyim, the positive value of conformity as a legal principle: 
'One must never break away,' etc; And it is so regarding all 
other actions [i.e., not only concerning the performance of 
work on Passover eve], one should conduct oneself in accordance 
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with the ways of the land and one should not deviate from this 
custom. And even if no one should see him, in order that one 
accustom oneself to all the ways of the land.200 
R. Sofer brings other reknown halakic authorities, such as R. Mordecai 
J ff I Le h . f h' 1' 201 Ou M'd h b a e s vus , ~n support o ~s ru ~ng. r ~ ras ecomes 
vitally important not only in serving as a source for teaching the 
positive side of the Law of Conformity, but also in its illustration 
of the inherent value of conformity. That illustration can be 
understood as follows: Assuming that Moses observed the Law of 
Conformity to its ultimate end, he would have had to associate so 
completely with the angels, until Moses himself would have learned 
the ways of the angels and become like them. Consequently, he no 
longer would require food. Once his association was complete, his 
abstention from food would be as natural as the angels. Similarly, 
one could say the same of the angels' partaking in Abraham's repast. 
S • th 1 t II " 202 • d f h f lf '11 ~nee e ange s were sen as men, ~n or er or t em to u ~ 
their mission of appearing as men, they would have had to associate 
so completely with men that they themselves would require food. 
Only by observing the Law of Conformity to its fullest extent could 
they fulfill their mission completely. Thus the Midrash augments 
an added dimension to Halaka, which an ordinary talmudic dictum is 
incapable of achieving. Rather than just postulating the dictum, 
by the very nature of its being a Midrash, it is also able to 
illustrate the inherent value of the Halaka it is describing. 
By the same token one could further say that the halakic significance 
of the Midrash concerning the Law of Conformity is also to instruct 
the extent that this law can be fulfilled. Namely, that there is 
an inherent value in accustoming oneself so thoroughly with the 
practice of the new society even to the extent of negating one's 
own essence to achieve that end. In order for Moses to conform 
successfully to the practice of angels he had to forego his own 
essence of being human by abstaining from food, to achieve the 
ultimate end of conformity in becoming angel-like and thus independent 
of food. Similarly, if the angels had to achieve the _ultimate end 
of their mission in successfully conforming to human society and 
becoming man-like, they had to forego their own essence of being 
angels who are independent of food. 203 
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R. Reischer 's responsum and discussion of Moses, the man, in his 
conforming to the practice of angels upon ascension on the one hand, 
and Moses the angel in conforming to the practice of men upon his 
subsequent descension on the other hand, has enormous practical value 
in tackling the principal question of our study . Namely, whether 
Elijah, upon his transcendance to angel became absolved or continued 
to be obligated in Mitzvot, both when communing among angels and 
whenever he reappeared among men. 
Even if one could theoretically prove that Elijah continued to be 
obligated in commandments upon his transcendance to angel, according 
to the Law of Conformit~ Elijah would be constrained not to break 
away or deviate from the practice of angels who are absolved of 
204 commandments. Consequently, he would be constrained not to 
adhere to the commandments in order to conform to the angels, even 
though theoretically he could in fact be obligated. And conversly, 
even if one could theoretically prove that Elijah became absolved 
of commandments upon transcendance to angel, even when subsequently 
appearing among men, according to the Law of Conformity, Elijah would 
be admonished not to break away from the practice of men who are 
obligated in Mitzvot, whenever he reappeared amongst them. Conse-
quently, he would be admonished to adhere to the commandments in 
order to conform to the practice of men, even though theoretically 
he could in fact be absolved of commandments. Unless, of course, 
one argues that were Elijah absolved of commandments he would also 
be absolved of adhering to the Law of Conformity itself, in \vhich 
case he would not be constrained to observe the commandments in 
conformity with man. However this rebuttal is most unlikely as 
Moses the angel, as well as the angels who visited Abraham, although 
absolved of commandments, nevertheless conformed to the practice of 
man, while abiding among them. 
Thus it would appear that R. Reischer's responsum is of immense 
practical value, in that it exposes the Law of Conformity as a 
super-commandment, as it obligates those who are absolved of command-
ments (i .e., angels) to abide its precepts, as well as absolving 
those who are obligated to adhere to commandments (i.e., men). 
The tremendous ethical value of the Law of Conformity is furthermore 
manifest in its complete absolvement of commandments, even where an 
obligation to adhere to them theoretically exists, in order to 
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preserve the "ethic" of not deviating from the behaviour and customs 
of the new society. Thus we find an instance where the halakic 
ethic of conformity even overrides the basic Halaka of adhering 
205 to commandments in general . In view of the many halakic impli-
cations and ramifications of R. Reischer's responsum discussed here, 
it would certainly seem that Jacob's assertion that R. Reischer's 
responsum is of a non-legal nature is entirely baseless. 
In any event, from R. Reischer's responsum emerges the notion that 
Elijah 's similarity to Moses in every respect does not preclude 
Elijah 's origination as an angel. Moses himself, by observing the 
Law of Conformity to its ultimate end, attained the level of angel . 
Indeed, it would be unerudite to overlook the sufficiently ample 
sources which -relate the opinion that Moses never died. 206 Whether, 
in this opinion, Moses attained eternal aggregate existence of body 
and soul, or merely of soul, would depend to no small extent on the 
resolution of the philosophic differences revolving on ascertaining 
Elijah ' s existential status subsequent to his ascension. Espe-
cially considering the aforementioned Pesikta Rabbati, where Elijah 
resembled Moses in every respect. 
R. Reischer himself, in his commentary to tractate Sotah, which 
records the opinion, "Moses never died," deals with the obvious 
difficulty which arises from this opinion. Doesn't the Torah 
explicitly state "And Moses died there," and "And He buried him 
[Moses]?" R. Reischer answers that the Torah stated that Moses 
died and was buried in order to prevent people from discrediting 
the earlier righteous men who did not merit the same fate of eternal 
l .f 207 1 e. 
Philosophical Motif 
Thus far we have endeavoured to show that there are two clearly 
established views concerning whether Elijah was in reality originally 
an angel who descended in the form of man, or whether he was origin-
ally a man who attained the status of angel only upon ascension. 
In view of the striking similarity between the nature of these two 
views to the two views concerning the aftereffect of Elijah's ascen-
sion, it is our contention that the identical philosophical consi-
derations led each school to derive their respective positions. As 
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clearly, the philosophical considerations which led the R. Falcon-
R. Attiah school to deduce that the aftereffect of Elijah's ascension 
resulted in his continued existence in the form of man, could not 
possibly have allowed them to entertain the notion of Elijah's 
origination as ·an angel. Consequently, they maintained that 
Elijah originated as a man, born unto human parents, and upon ascension 
continued to exist aggregately in body and in spirit in the form of 
man, attaining angel status by virtue of being immortal, but never 
attaining the reality of angel. Similarly, the school which main-
tained Elijah's origination as an angel, temporarily descending to 
earth in the form of man, could not possibly entertain the notion 
that the aftereffect of Elijah's ascension resulted in his continued 
existence in the form of man, as he would invariably have returned 
to his original angel state. Consequently, the same philosophic 
considerations which caused the R. Sofer-R. Kluger school to oppose 
the notion of Elijah's continued aggregate existence subsequent to 
ascension enabled this school to endorse the view that Elijah ori-
ginated as an angel and upon ascension attained the reality of 
angel he initially was, leaving behind his body in the whirlwind. 
Theological Debate Concerning Melchizedekites and Jesus 
Aside from the philosophical considerations over which the schools 
were divided, one could attribute their respective positions to a 
further theological motif over which the schools were at variance. 
We have seen that one of the main reasons for espousing that Elijah 
originated as an angel was the fact that we have found no mention 
of his parents. It was this same consideration which induced some 
of the Church Fathers such as Ambrosius to believe that Melchizedek 
was an angel. In the Epistle To the Hebrews Melchizedek is described 
as eternal, ''having neither beginning of days nor end of life," 
because ''he is without father, without mother, without genealogy." 
Melchizedek is also assigned eschatological and soteriological 
functions in the Qumram scrolls and is, in all likelihood, to be 
identified with the Angel of Light, who figures in the dualistic 
doctrine of the Qumram sect. 
208 . 
The Church Father, Epiphanus, who opposed this view, deemed it 
necessary to prove, in opposition to the Melchizedekites, that 
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209 Elijah was not an angel sent from heaven. Ambrosius assigned 
a Jewish origin to the doctrine of the Melchizedekites. It is possible 
that the doctrine of Melchizedekites was extant among Jewish circles 
and therefore it was thought theologically vital to disprove the 
doctrine of the Melchizedekites by establishing that Elijah, despite 
the omission of his parentage, was and originated as a human. 
In fact, Louis Ginzburg atributes the talmudic statement in Nedarim 
that Melchizedek was deposed by G-d from his priestly dignity which 
was passed to Abraham's descendants, in punishment for blessing 
Abraham first and then G-d, as directed against the Christians who 
took Melchizedek to be a type of Jesus, the everlasting priest. 210 
The absence of ,Melchizedek's genealogy was resolved in many Jewish 
sources, which identify Melchizedek with Shem, the son of Noah. 
Epiphanus, who opposed the doctrine of the Melchizedekites, also 
. d . f. d h. . h Sh 211 1 ent1 1e 1m w1t em. 
The second school, which espoused that Elijah was in reality an 
angel and not human, did not find it necessary to project Elijah 
as a human in order to counteract the doctrine of the Melchizedekites, 
as indeed the Talmud itself in Sukkah includes Melchizedek among 
the eschatological and soteriological Messiahs allegorically implied 
by the "four craftsmen" in Zechariah: "'And the Lord showed me four 
craftsmen,' Who are these four craftsmen? R. Hanina b. Bizna, 
citing R. Simeon Hasida, replied: The Messiah, son of David; the 
Messiah, son of Joseph; Elijah; and Melchizedek. "212 
The philosophical considerations and theological motifs which divided 
the schools over ascertaining Elijah's essence were so crucial in 
vindicating the fundamental credo of Judaism in its defiance of other 
philosophies and other religious dogma, that we find these same 
schools consistently divided over at least two more of the most 
important biblical characters. 
Enoch 
The following encounter between R. Abbahu and the "heretics" is 
related in Genesis Rabbah: 
The heretics asked R. Abbahu, they told him: 
death with regard to Enoch. He asked them: 
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told him: Scripture says 'taking' here [regarding Enoch], 
and Scripture states further on 'today the Lord will take thy 
master from above thy head.' He said to them: If it is 
taking that you interpret, Scripture states 'taking' here and 
Scripture states further on [regarding Ezekial's wife]: 
'Behold I take from thee the desire of thine eyes with a stroke.' 
R. Tanhuma said: R. Abbahu answered them well.213 
The heretics sought to affirm that Enoch evaded death, interpreting 
G-d's taking of Enoch in the same way as Elijah. R. Abbahu disclaimed 
them, shmving "taking" to connote an untimely death caused by a 
sudden stroke, as in the case of Ezekiel's wife. The Lord's taking 
of Enoch, therefore, does not refer to his evasion of death, as 
claimed by the heretics, but rather to his premature death due to a 
sudden stroke. 
The source of the rabbinic views ascribing Enoch's fate of death is 
to be found in the Onkelos transcription of Genesis, "And he [Enoch] 
was no more, for the Lord slew him."214 Not only do we find the 
rabbinic view whiCh negated the ''heretical" allegation that Enoch 
evaded death, 215 but in fact the Rabbis attributed his premature 
death as a result of his evil character, or at least possessing an 
intense latent capacity for becoming evil: 
R. Hama b. Hoshaya said: He [Enoch] is not inscribed in the 
ledger of the righteous, but rather in the ledger of the 
wicked. ~- Aibo said: Enoch was a hypocrite, at times he 
was righteous and at times wicked. The Lord said, while he 
is still righteous I will take him away.216 
From the fact that no mention is made of Enoch in the entire tannaitic 
literature and in both Talmuds, 217 as well as the rabbinic view 
here cited which affirms Enoch's death and, moreover, associated 
him with an evil character, there can be no doubt that the talmudic 
view of Enoch is that he was a mortal who died a mortal death. That 
the term "taken" is employed by Scripture in lieu of the usual "and 
he died," is attributable to Enoch's premature death. 
On the other hand there exists a very definite positive attitude 
taken towards Enoch within the mainstream of the rabbinic view, 
notwithstanding the largely negative attitude taken towards him 
generally. Midrash ha-Godol relates: 
A Tanna taught: three ascended and served in heaven. And 
these are they: Enoch, Moses and Elijah. Enoch, for it is 
written: 'for the Lord took him.' Moses, as it is written: 
- 123 -
THE NATURE OF ELIJAH'S ESSENCE DESCENSION 
'And Moses went up from the plains of Moab.' Elijah, as it 218 is writt~n: 'And Elijah went up in a whirlwind towards heaven.' 
We are familiar with our quotation from Derech Erez Zuta, cited at 
the commencement of Chapter II, where Enoch is enumerated among the 
nine prominent persons who merited entering Paradise during their 
lifetime. Among the oldest sources for the view which lauds Enoch 
are the translations of Jonathan b. Uziel and the Jerusalem Trans-
cription to Genesis. Jonathan b. Uziel's translation reads: 
And Enoch served in truth before the Lord and he was not among 
the d\vellers on earth because he was carried away and taken 
to heaven before the Lord, and He called his name Metatron, 
the Great Scribe.219 
Not only did this view attribute Enoch's premature departure from 
earth due to his righteousness, in fact he transcended to an angel 
and is identified as Metatron, the highest ranking angel of the 
220 heavenly host. This controversy of contrary rabbinic viewpoints 
concerning Enoch was discussed by many of the talmudic commentators. 221 
In fact, in Midrash Aggada, the two viewpoints appear together in 
h 
. . 222 t e same c1tat1on. 
The most obvious objection to the view which purports that Enoch 
merited eternal life is pointed out by Maimonides who remarks that 
Genesis records the exact number of years that Enoch lived. 223 
This objection was reconciled by modifying the ascension of Enoch 
as referring to the ascension of his soul subsequent to his death; 
only subsequent to his death did Enoch transcend to an ange1. 224 
However, just as we find it axiomatic that certain philosophical 
principles render the reconciliation of a schism, whereby the body 
dies releasing the soul to ascend, unacceptable in the case of Elijah, 
the same objection applies concerning Enoch. Inevitably, the opinion 
that Enoch attained eternal life in body and in soul emerged as 
we11 . 225 The latter view based itself largely on a literal inter-
pretation of Derekh Erez Zuta, which identifies Enoch as one of the 
nine who entered Paradise during their lifetime. Taken literally, 
entering alive, precludes the possibility of death of any sort, 
body or soul. 
The opposition to this view was so vehement that R. Solomon Judah 
Rapoport, in Iggeroth Shir identifies Derekh Erez Zuta as an "externa1u 
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Baraita which was altogether not accepted by the Rabbis . 226 That 
the rabbinic view which opposed ascension, regarded the view which 
upheld Enoch ' s ascension , as a major departure from Jewish belief, 
is evident from the fact that Genesis Rabbah denominates the espou-
sers of Enoch ' s ascension as ''heretics ." These heretics are identi-
f . d b I..o · c· be Ch · · J · h Ch · · 227 E 1e y u1s 1nz rg as r1st1ans, or ew1s - r1st1ans. ~en 
pre-Christian authors not only denied Enoch's transcendence, but even 
d h En h . . ll . 228 H h reporte t at oc was or1g1na y a s1nner. owever, we ave 
already evinced that Enoch ' s ascension was not only maintained by 
Christians and Jewish-Christians, but was in fact the belief of many 
prominent Rabbis as well . 229 
Not only do we find the rabbinic view which maintains that Enoch 
transcended to an angel, who subsequently became Metatron, but in 
fact there is a rabbinic vie\v whichasserts that Enoch originated 
in Metatron. This view contends that Enoch existed already as an 
angel before taking up his earthly career, when he descended in the 
form of man, and upon ascension, he returned to his original angel 
state. Much in the same way as we find an identical opinion con-
cerning Elijah . This latter view was arrived at in light of a 
particular difficulty raised by the Tosafists. They questioned 
how Enoch could be identified with Metatron. 230 Doesn't the Talmud 
in Hullin relate that Metatron existed already at the time of Creation, 
\vhilst Enoch only figures many generations subsequent to Creation? 
This difficulty gave rise to the solution that Enoch originated 
initially in Metatron, who subsequently figures in the human form 
of Enoch. 231 
In addition, R. Kasher subnits, the ''heretics" intended evil in 
attempting to confirm Enoch ' s ascension. 232 Consequently the Sages 
maintained that Enoch died a mortal death. Moreover, R. Kasher 
claims, for this reason the Sages expressed Enoch's derogatory be-
' 
haviour in that he vascillated between piety and evil, specifically 
in order to refute the opinion of the heretics . This is reminiscent 
of the same kind of theological motif which downgraded the ascensions 




even the school which maintained that Elijah originated as 
might have been reluctant to maintain the same regarding 
As one of the main factors which served to evidence Elijah ' s 
-130 -
Tl{E NATURE OF ELIJAH'S ESSENCE DESCENSION 
origination as an angel is untenable in Enoch's case. Namely, 
Scripture 's glaring omission of Elijah's parentage and children. 
Enoch's parents, lifespan, and children are all explicitly recounted 
. G . 233 ln enesls. 
Nevertheless, the view that Enoch originated as an angel emerged 
still the same. We have seen that Elijah's angel name is Sandalphon. 
The meaning of Sandalphon 
)_/ I 
and a..ue~rpos- "brother." 
is explained as a compound of crli19- "with" 
Elijah is the brother of Enoch-Metatron, 
both of whom in their transcended states are angels. 234 
Exactly in the same way as Avnei Nezer merged the school which 
advocated the death of Elijah's body with the school which maintained 
Elijah's aggregate existential status of body and soul as being 
eternally alive, by expressing Elijah's death in terms of the highest 
level of eternality that his body could have possibly attained. 
We find the identical middle viewpoint expressed by R. Isaac b. Judah 
Abrabanel (1437-1508), who merged the two views concerning Enoch long 
before Avnei Ezer wrote his responsum on Elijah. 
to Genesis, R. Abrabanel writes: 
In his commentary 
Since Enoch's death was a result of his cleavage toG-d ... 
therefore, Scripture writes of him, 'And he was not.' That is 
to say, his soul cleaved to the 'supreme ones' and separated 
from the body •.• Therefore, Scripture does not write of him 
'And he died,' as it is stated of his predecessors. Namely, 
in order to make known that the separation o~ §is soul from 
body was not death, but rather eternal life. 3 
Although Avnei Nezer did not quote R. Abrabanel, he was undoubtedly 
familiar with the commentary, which quite possibly might have induced 
Avnei Nezer to arrive at a virtually identical conclusion regarding 
Elijah . 
This dilemma of whether Elijah and Enoch are in reality men who 
have angel status, or whether in fact they are actually angels who 
may have originated as such is apposite to a third personality among 
the nine enumerated in Derekh Erez Zuta. Namely, the Messiah, 
Messiah 
\mo is this mysterious Messiah who is reported to have entered Paradise 
during his lifetime? The Talmud in Sanhedrin recounts an interview 
between R. Joshua b. Levi and the Messiah, whom the former found 
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among the crowd of the afflicted poor gathered near the city ga tes 
of Rome, bandaging his sores. 236 No further mention is made in 
either Talmuds as to the correct identity of this Messiah. However, 
in Midrash Bereshit Rabbati we find a list of thirteen who "never 
tasted the taste of death," and a corresponding reason is given for 
each one. Of Messiah, who is enumerated among the thirteen, it is 
said: 
Messiah, why [did he not taste death]? Because he lived 
among a generation of wicked men. And he saw his forefathers, 
the kings of the House of David, worshipping idols. And he 
detested them and chose the Holy One, Blessed Be He, and 
entreated for His compassion for Israel, fasting and praying 
for them. As it is written: 'Because he was wounded because 
of our transgressions, he was crushed because of our iniquities. 
The chastisement of our welfare was upon him, and with his 
stripes we were healed. ' Therefore, he was esconsed, in order 
to redeem Israel in the gathering of exiles and to rejoice in 
them during the resurrection of the dead.237 
The description of the Messiah related in Midrash Bereshit Rabbati 
closely resembles the Messiah whom R. Joshua b. Levi encountered 
in Sanhedrin and for want of any other existing talmudic or midrashic 
source we must assume it is the same Messiah who is reported in 
Derekh Erez Zuta as having entered Paradise during his lifetime and 
. . 238 is being preserved for the future redempt1on. The following 
mention of Messiah in Paradise is found in Zohar: 
In that time [of redemption] the King Messiah will be awakened 
to go out from Paradise .•• and he will appear in the Land of 
Galilee.239 
R. Hayyim Vital (1542-1620) in his commentary to Zohar asked: 
Behold, it is a great astonishment if we were to say that 
there will be [such] a change that Messiah \vill not be born of 
man and woman, but that in that time he will go out from Paradi14o 
Behold, we find in Scripture: 'This day I have begotten thee.' 
R. Vital questioned the zoharitic notion of a pre-existing Messiah 
who abides in Paradise, in view of the scripbJral references which 
indicate that Messiah will be born unto human parents. After 
considering a few explanations, R. Vital resolves: 
It is possible that just as there are nine who entered Paradise 
during their lifetime, so was the Messiah born on the ninth 
day of Ab, as mentioned in Midrash Lamentations, and he was 
taken up by a whirlwind which brought him to ~aradise, as it 
happened to Elijah. And from there he will go out in the 
future. This Lexplanation] seems true.241 
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R. Vital reconciled the notion of a pre-existing Messiah suggested 
in Zohar by identifying Messiah as one born of human parents on the 
ninth day of Ab, who met a similar fate as Elijah . He was taken 
up by a whirlwind to Paradise and there he awaits the redemption, 
when he will be sent out from his abode in Paradise . This evidence 
of a pre-existing Messiah who already abides in Paradise greatly 
conflicts with the thesis of Hatam Sofer, where he depicts the mani-
festation of Messiah in a responsun1 discussed earlier in this Chapter . 
We recall R. Safer's thesis: 
Immediately following the Day of the Destruction, there was 
born a one whose piety would deem him worthy of becoming the 
Redeemer . And when the [appropriate] time will arrive, G-d 
will reveal Himself unto him and send him forth ••. But because 
of our inquities, which are nun1erous, many of them [prospective 
Messiahs] have already perished, since we did not merit the 
Messianic spirit should flow unto them. 
Although R. Sofer makes mention of a prospective Messiah born on the 
ninth of Ab, this Messiah never materialised as his generation did 
not merit him. Consequently, this Messiah perished, and it is not 
this Messiah who will be sent out during the Redemption. Messiah 
will be born during the time of the redemption, and he will receive 
the "Spirit of the Messiah" when the people of his generation merit 
it. Even if R. Sofer saw Messiah mentioned in Derekh Erez Zuta 
among the nine who entered Paradise during their lifetimes, it \vould 
seem that he disagreed with Midrash Bereshit Rabbati and R. Hayyim 
Vital that this same Messiah will be the redeemer. 242 
However, when one bears in mind R. Vital's procurement that ~1essiah 
met the same fate as Elijah, and recalling that according to R. 
Sofer the aftereffect of Elijah's ascension resulted in a schism, 
whereby Elijah's body severed itself from soul, it is entirely possible 
that l1atam Sofer maintained the same aftereffect regarding Messiah . 
That is, upon Messiah's ascension, his body severed itself from soul, 
and it is Messiah 's spirit which resides in Paradise. And it is 
this Messianic spirit which G-d will cause to descend upon the even-
tual redeemer who will be born during the time of the Redemption. 243 
We have now hit upon one of the most practical differences of whether 
Enoch, Elijah, and Messiah attained eternal aggregate existence and 
reside in Paradise in body and soul. Or whether it is their souls 
alone \IDich attained eternal existence that reside in Paradise. For 
13.:3-
THE NATURE OF ELIJAH'S ESSENCE DESCENSION 
if one maintains as R. Safer, that their souls severed from body, 
then although Messiah's soul resides in Paradise, Messiah himself 
is still unborn and will not eventuate until Redemption. If, on 
the other hand, Elijah, Enoch, and Messiah attained aggregate 
eternal existence of body and soul then Messiah clearly exists, 
and it is this pre-existing Messiah who will be sent out of Paradise 
to the Day of Redemption. 
Furthermore, the reality of Messiah's manifestation and his existen-
tial status upon his eventuation depends on this controversy. If 
Messiah attained eternal aggregate existence of body and soul then 
Messiah in reality is a human person of angel status. Whereas, 
if his body is severed from soul, the Messiah is in reality an 
angel who will appear in human form. 
We have clearly shown in our earlier discussion on Bar Cokhba that 
rigid halakic principles must be employed in order to enable one 
to assess the credibility of Messiah, or whether he is just a pre-
tentious impostor. Whether Messiah is in reality a human being 
endowed with "Messianic spirit," or whether he is in reality an 
angel in human form would have great halakic bearing on the process 
of determining and proclaiming the "true" Messiah and his being 
identified, recognized, and accepted by the people. 244 
Finally, one must consider the school which maintained that Elijah 
originally existed as an angel before commencing his earthly career. 
This was derived from the fact that we find no mention of Elijah's 
parents in any of the sources. The sources which describe Messiah's 
earthly career are all silent of his parentage. 245 
From this obvious omission there is room to espouse that Messiah was 
not a human who transcended to an angel, but rather he originated 
as an angel before descending to assume his earthly career. Even 
the verse, "This day I have begotten thee," which served as indication 
to R. Vital that Messiah must originate as a human being born to 
human parents, and consequently caused R. Vital to oppose the 
zoharitic notion of a pre-existing Messiah is an inconclusive 
reference . Most of the classical Bible exegetes interpreted this 
verse figuratively. Quite possibly these schools found support 
for each contention in the description of Messiah 's advent related 
in Sanhedrin: 
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R. Alexandri said: R. Joshua reconciled two opposing verses. 
It is written: 'And behold, one like the son of man came 
with the clouds of heaven,' whilst elsewhere it is written, 
['Behold, thy King cometh unto thee •.• ] lowly, and riding upon 
an ass.' If they are meritorious, [Messiah will come] with246 the clouds of heaven, if not, lowly and riding upon an ass. 
Although the talmudic corrmentators understood "the clouds of heaven" 
to symbolize swiftness, and "lowly and riding upon an ass" to be 
symbolic of slowne?s, it is possible that the symbols themselves 
· h h · d. d. · bo h M · h 247 His m1g t ave 1n 1cate a certa1n nature a ut t e ess1a • 
advent from "clouds of heaven" might have represented his angel 
type nature, as indeed Messiah is identified elsewhere as the "one 
from the clouds."248 Whereas his being "lowly and riding upon an 
ass," might have suggested Messiah's being of a more lowly nature 
than angel and that he will appear as a human. 249 
Ultimately, however, what induced each school to maintain whether 
~1essiah was in fact an angel in human form or in reality a man of 
' 
angel status, depends on the resolution of theological and philoso-
phic axioms, which enabled each school to maintain their respective 
positions concerning the existential realities of Elijah, Enoch, 
and Messiah. 250 In view of the extraordinary similarity of the 
nature of existential being between Elijah and the Messiah, as con-
tended by the various schools, it is not surprising then to find the 
emergence of a view which identified Elijah himself as the promised 
Me .ah 251 SSl • 
We have already emphasized in our discussion on Bar Cokhba the dire 
halakic difficulties which present themselves in the process of 
proclaiming the Messiah in the absence of Elijah. We considered 
various circumstances where one might be halakically justified in 
proclaiming the Messiah despite Elijah's absence. If, however, 
according to this opinion, Elijah is in fact the selfsame Messiah, 
then ostensively Messiah could not be proclaimed in the absence of 
Elijah under any circumstances. 
Derekh Erez Zuta 
The principal source for the school which derived their position 
that Elij~ Enoch and Messiah attained eternal aggregate existence 
in form of men, is our very first citation in this work, Derekh 
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Erez Zuta, which enumerates "nine who entered Paradise during their 
l 'f • II Th' ba • • Y lku Sh' • 
252 1 et1mes. 1s source appears ver t1m 1n a t 1mon1. 
We have already mentioned R. Issac Arama and others who maintained 
that the literal meaning of "during their lifetimes" is that they 
entered Paradise while they were still very much alive in every 
respect, both in body and in sou1. 253 In fact, in Alphabet of 
Ben Sira there exists a parallel rendition which reads: 
Eleven people of the sons of men [i.e., of the human race] 
entered Paradise during their lifetimes. He asked him, '\~o 
are they?' He replied: 'Enoch, Elijah, Messiah, Serah, the 
daughter of Asher, Bitia, the daughter of Pharoah, Hiram, the 
King of Tyre, Eliezer, Abraham's servant, Ebedmele~g4 the Cushite, R. Judah ha-Nasi's slave, R. Joshua b. Levi, etc.' 
Although this expanded list of immortals concurs with the immortals 
listed in Derekh Erez Zuta, the expression "people of the sons of 
men," suggests that these immortals retained their existential 
nature as men and abode in Paradise in the form of men. However, 
many of the editions omitted the names of Elijah and Messiah. 
This omission is probably attributable either to an objection of 
classifying Elijah and Messiah as "people of the sons of men," as 
. l' h l 256 h . t . 1n rea 1ty t ey are ange s, or to t e oppos1te ex reme, opposl-
tion was directed against the notion of Elijah's and Messiah's 
ascension in general, as they are mortals who died a mortal death. 
Indeed, we have already seen R. Rapoport's objection to the entire 
passage in Derekh Erez Zuta, who claims that this source was never 
accredited by the Rabbis. In fact, many editions of Derekh Erez 
Zuta itself re,ad: "Seven entered Paradise during their lifetimes," 
. tt' th f En h M . h d El'. h 257 Ag · om1 1ng e names o oc , ess1a , an lJa • a1n we 
may attribute the omission of these three either to an intentional 
dissociation of the aftereffect of the three from the other seven, 
as they were of a different nature, or because of the theological 
objection to ascension. R. Kasher attributes Enoch's absence from 
the list of immortals in Pirkei Rabbenu ha-Kadosh, as concurring 
with the opinion of R. Abbahu in Genesis Rabbah, who rebuked the 
''heretics" for espousing Enoch's ascension. 258 
However, even if we are to attribute the omission of these three 
from the various sources to an intentional dissociation of those 
who exist in reality as angels from the other immortals who exist 
in reality as men, we must not forget that the same philosophical 
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considerations which caused this school to maintain their position 
pertain to all immortals listed in Derekh Erez Zuta equally. A 
resolution for any one of them would hold true for the others. 
Therefore, no distinction can be drawn between the existential 
reality of these three to the existential realities of the other 
seven . 
Perhaps then we can now comprehend the existence of yet a third 
parallel rendition to Derekh Erez Zuta which reads: "Thirteen 
never tasted the taste of death. They are Enoch, Eliezer, ... 
Elijah, and Messiah."259 Although this expanded list of immortals 
includes all the immortals enumerated in Derekh Erez Zuta, who are 
reported to have entered Paradise during their lifetimes, the 
expression "never tasted the taste of death," seems to suggest 
another meaning. · The expression is not merely stating that these 
immortals are alive in negative phraseology. A careful exacting 
of the closest literal interpretation of this expression would 
suggest that these persons in fact died; however, while they were 
dying, they never tasted the taste of death. 
What exactly this phenonmenon of "the taste of death" is, and how 
one dies without tasting death, can best be understood by the fol-
lowing descriptions of the aftereffect of those persons; Of Elijah, 
R. Abraham Hirsch of Zloczow (Zolochev) writes: "And he ascended 
in a whirlwind to heaven and did not die b~ the angel of death. 
. 1 d f bod . h t . 112 0 s1mp y separate rom y w1t ou pa1n. 
He 
The escaping of death by the hands of the angel of death is explicitly 
mentioned in Alphabet of Ben Sira. 261 That the escaping of death 
by the hand of the angel implies a painless death is also evident 
from R. Kimchi's descritpion of Enoch's end. "And he was no more: 
[i.e. ,]As he had no sickness or pain while he died."262 Thus it 
would seem that "not tasting the taste of death" simply means a 
painless ~paration of soul from body at the time of death. 
A further illumination on the phrase is found in R. Judah Leib 
Krinsky's commentary to Ibn Ezra in discussing the "taking'of Enoch: 
"G-d will not 'take' the soul of. the wicked but rather it goes 
down to Sheol."263 In other words, not tasting death doesn't 
necessarily refer only to painless death, but may also refer to the 
evasion of punishment of the soul after death. The souls of the 
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righteous immediately ascend Paradise without prior judgement and 
. h d . . hm 264 w1t out un ergo1ng pun1s ent. 
Thus, it would appear that the first school, which for various 
philosophical reasons was unable to envision the ascension of the 
irrmortals in body and soul, preferred the expression "never tasted 
the taste of death," as this expression signifies an actual death, 
whereby the soul is released to Paradise. Consequently, we find 
this terminology extant in the sources. In fact, certain irrmortals 
who are absent form the list of those who merited Paradise during 
their lifetimes, appear mentioned among the list of those who "never 
tasted the taste of death," probably for this very reason. 
We recall aligning Abrabanel with Avnei Nezer's synthesis of the 
schools, which claimed that while the body dies during its separation 
from soul, this phenonmenon could not be classified as 'death,' 
since it represents the highest level of eternal 'life' which is 
possible for man to attain. Avnei Nezer might well have derived 
this notion from the expression "never tasted the taste of death." 
One might even venture to say that the difference between these 
schools may account for two slightly variant renditions of Derek 
Erez Zuta itself. One rendition reads: "Nine entered Paradise 
during their lifetimes" (be-hayyeihem), while the variant rendition 
reads:"Nine entered Paradise alive" (be-hayyim). 265 
The first rendition, which states that they entered during their 
lifetimes, seems to imply that they entered Paradise exactly as 
they were during their lifetime, i.e., in body and in soul. 
hlhereas, the second rendition simply relates that they were "alive, " 
but does not specify in which way they were "alive." Being alive 
might merely refer to the soul alone, i.e., that their souls were 
alive . Or, alternatively, one could say exactly the reverse. The 
first rendition of entering Paradise during their lifetimes describes 
the time as to when they entered Paradise, but does not relate which 
way or in which form they entered and continued to exist in Paradise . 
They might exist there merely in the form of soul. \~ile the second 
rendition does not relate to the time element of when they entered 
Paradise, but rather emphasizes that they remained "alive ," in body 
' 
and soul throughout their duration in Paradise. 
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In any event, it is quite evident that the major schools, which were 
divided over the aftereffect of the immortals, were able to find 
ample support in the various renditions of Derekh Erez Zuta and its 
parallel equivalents, which were the very sources of these schools. 266 
It is our contention that the major philosophical positions, which 
divided the schools over the aftereffect of the ascension of Elijah 
and his colleagues, and their different ascertainments of their 
existential realities, were prevalent and existed already as early 
as Derekh Erez Zuta itself. 267 And, in fact, it is these consi-
derations which are responsible for the various renditions of Derekh 
Erez Zuta and its parallel equivalents. 
The various philosophic views which emerged from the respondents 
are only an echo of the same views which were already prevalent and 
intricately concealed and contained in the exactness of wording of 
the same sources on which the Halakists based their views. The 
contribution of the respondents, aside from illuminating intricacies 
which were embedded at the root of these sources , is that they 
examined these otherwise recondite metaphysical passages and placed 
them in a halakic framework, which gave the passages added dimension 
and infinite value. 
In explaining the phenomenon of the emergence of the major schools 
concerning the fate of the immortals, we focused on the philosophic 
axioms over which these schools were divided, as well as the back-
ground of theological-political overtones of those who attempted 
either to deny or ignore any relation between the ascension of the 
immortals and Jesus. 
Metaphysical Motif 
Finally, it would seem that still a third consideration would warrant 
close examination in explaining the polarization between the two 
schools. It is quite clear that the Rabbis of all schools wished 
to attribute these pious persons the greatest possible level of 
spiritual attainment that one could merit. Whether it be by the 
way of their becoming transformed to angels or by way of attaining 
eternal life as men. The question which presents itself following 
this consideration, is which form of being represents a higher level 
of spiritual attainment: Eternal life as men, or transformation to 
angel. 
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Professor Ephraim Urbach, in his work, The Sages, remarks that: 
''the question whether the angels were higher than men was a rna t ter 
of dispute."268 The Midrashim speak of how at the time of man's 
creation, G-d refuted the arguments of the angels who opposed the 
creation of man by alleging that man would possess more wisdom than 
the angels themselves. Man displayed this greater wisdom in his 
269 capacity to name all of G-d's creatures. Furthermore, Louis 
Ginzberg relates, although man is a terrestrial being inferior to 
angels, he surpasses them by overcoming the evil inclination which 
the angels do not possess. The superiority of man to angels is 
270 in his free will. If man follows good, he is superior to an angel. 
For this reason we find the Talmud in Sanhedrin expresses the motif: 
"The righteous .are greater than the angels." Maharsha in explaining 
this motif comments: 
Furthermore, we find the wise men are called 'Elokim,' as it is 
written: 'The word of both shall come before ~1IT,'[i.e., the 
judges] whereas the angel is called the 'son of EloKim,' since 
he Lthe angel] is less important than the righteous who are 
called Elokim.271 
The author of Epistle to the Hebrews also made use of the motif, 
"the righteous are greater than angels," with regards to Jesus, 
. 11 f wh t 'd f M . ~ . 1 · 1 d' · 272 espec1a y o a was sa1 o oses, 1n a utrlsto og1ca 1rect1on. 
Nevertheless, because of man's corporeal nature, and his similarity 
to the animals in this respect, by virtue of being terrestrial, man 
was also regarded as somewhat inferior to angels. However, were 
man to attain eternal life, this similarity to animals would auto-
matically dissipate, as man would attain a new reality of his own. 
Considering this new reality, whereby man surges exceedingly close 
to G-d and drifts far apart from the animals, no longer resembling 
them at all, the question which arises is: Does this new reality 
represent a higher form of spiritual attainment than even the angels? 
Those who espoused that "the pious are greater than angels," main-
tained that the immortals merited eternal life, as this new found 
reality of man dissociated him completely from the terrestrials, and 
allowed the immortals to draw far nearer to the proximity of G-d 
than angels. To become transformed to angels would have been a 
regression, for these pious individuals were already greater than 
the angels prior to their ascension. Others argued that man's 
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existence in form of man still conencted him with the terrestrials 
who are inferior to angels, and they therefore maintained that the 
immortals became completely transformed to angels, thereby trans-
cending man. 
It is indeed possible that the R. Falcon-R. Attiah school depicted 
Elijah as more closely resembling man because they considered "the 
pious superior to angels." Therefore, the highest level of spiri-
tual attainment that could be assigned to Elijah would be to consider 
him still a man, since becoming an angel would be a regressive 
development. R. Safer and R. Kluger, on the other hand, depicted 
Elijah as an angel because they possibly sided with all the other 
facets in which angels display a superiority over men. Therefore, 
they felt that only if Elijah were defined as an angel wo~ld he be 
ascribed the highest possible level of spiritual attainment. 
The question of whether angels are superior to man has further 
significant bearing on R. Isserlein's responsum and in determining 
Elijah 's obligation in commandments. This is evident from R. 
Israel Jonah b. Joseph landau, Ab Beth Din of lubomil, and after 
of Kemper (d. 1824), who discusses this concept in illuminating the 
biblical verse when G-d appeared to Abimelech, King of Gerar, in 
a dream, charging him to return Abraham's wife, whom Abimelech had 
taken to himself: 
I will preface my interpretation of the verse, 'restore the 
man [Abraham] his wife, for he is a prophet.' Both according 
to its plain meaning and its homiletical in terpre ta tion, it 
[the verse] is bewildering. And it appears to me, [that the 
verse is to be understoodJ in accordance with what the Rishonim 
wrote in Tur, Eben ha-Ezer, No. 17, by way of a question: 
'Are the spouses of Elijah and R. Joshua b. Levi permitted to 
[rewed] others, being that their husbands did not die.' And 
they [the Rishonim] wrote that they are permitted, as the Torah 
forbade the wife of one's fellow man and not the wife of an 
angel. And so did Beit Yosef write on this, and it is brought 
down in Bei t Shernuel. Now no source is known to evidence 
their contention. See thereon that no source is quoted. 
And in our opinion one can say, that there is explicit evidence 
for the contention in the Pentateuch. And following Hovot 
ha-Levavoth, who writes that the angel surpasses the erophet, 
oecause the prophet is only an Ish Elokim Lman of G-dJ. And 
for this [reason] Joshua, who was chief of all prophets, with 
the exception of Moses, when Joshua beheld the angel he fell 
upon his face. See thereon [Hovot ha-Levavoth] in full. And 
accordingly, according to the meager comprehension of that 
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generation they called Abraham our Patriarch, Nesi Elokim 
LPrince of G-d], that is, they considered him an angel. As 
is related in Midrash. And in truth he could only be defined 
as a prophet. And the root of the matter is that man does 
not relinquish his definition of ish [man] to become classified 
as a 'standing angel' until after he disappears, as it i s 
written: 'And I give thee access among those that stand by.' 
And so it is of Enoch, Elijah, and R. Joshua b. Levi, after 
they were taken from the world they became transformed to angels. 
However, all the while they existed during their lifetimes in 
the world they were called anshei nevi'im [men of prophec¥]· 
And understand this. Now the verse is to be understood Las 
follows]: 'Restore the man [ish] his wife'; simply from ' for 
he is a prophet' -- and not aniangel. And he is still defined 
as an ish [man] and his wife is the wife of an Ish [another 
man's wife] who is forbidden [to rewed]. And it can be implied 
that the wife of an angel is permitted, that is only after his 
disappearance form the world -- even if he is alive and trans-
formed to a standing angel, his wife is permitted. 
And this is a support to their [the Rishomim and later codifiers] 
holy words. And it is explained, in any case, according to 
the words ·of Hovot ha-Levavoth, that an angel is far greater 
than a prophet.273 
R. Landau's keen halakic expertise drew his attention to the respon-
sum of R. Isserlein concerning the matter of Elijah's wife. R. 
Landau notes that R. Isserlein's ruling was widely accepted among 
the major codifiers, who incorporated this responsum in their own 
codices of law. He remarks that although the ruling that only a 
fellowman's wife is forbidden to remarry and not the wife of an 
angel, is readily accepted by the codifiers, none of them bring any 
evidence to support this contention. 
R. Landau believes that scriptural support for this view may be found 
in the verse, "restore the man's wife, for he is a prophet." 
R. Landau interprets "for he is a prophet" as if to say, "for he is 
only a prophet," and not greater than a prophet, which is the reason 
for "restore the man's wife." Since he is only a prophet and no 
more, his wife is still considered "the man's wife," who is forbidden 
to others. Were he greater than a prophet, i.e., had he transcended 
to becoming an angel, then his wife would no longer be the man's wife 
(wife of an ish), and she would be permitted to Abimelech, who need 
not restore her to Abraham. Abimelech, and the men of his generation, 
according to R. Landau had erred in assuming that Abraham had actually 
attained the level of angels whose wife should be permitted, not 
realising that this state is only attainable after the pious depart 
from this world. 
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Implication for Halaka 
R. Landau's entire approach 1s based upon the premise of Hovot ha-
Levavoth that angels are superior to the prophets. Although Hovot 
ha-Levavoth gives good reason for maintaining this gradation, we 
have already seen that the question of whether angels are in fact 
superior to man is a matter of dispute . Various facets were men-
274 tioned in which man is considered far superior to angels. 
If the pious are regarded superior to the angels, one could then 
interpret the very verse that R. Landau saw as supportive to R. Is-
erlein, not only not supportive but in fact resists R. Isserlein . 
The verse, "for he is a prophet," would now be understood to mean 
"for he is even a prophet" (rather than only a prophet) who exceeds 
even the angels . Nevertheless, Abimelech must still "restore the 
man ' s wife," who is forbidden to remarry. In other words, according 
toR . Landau , R. Isserlein's ruling is valid only so long as angels 
are to be considered superior to man. However, were man to surpass 
the angels, R. Isserlein ' s entire responsum and ruling would be 
effectively invalid, as Scripture would then state that even the 
wives of angels are forbidden to rewed . 
In view of th~ implications concerning the dispute over the question 
of superiority of man over angel, specifically with regards to 
determining the halakic status of the immortals one can well understand 
the evolution of two schools among the halakic authorities . As the 
issue of whether Elijah is in fact man or angel was especially per-
tinent to them. 
The devious question which presents itself to the school that main-
tained that Elijah and other immortals were transformed to angels 
is that if "the pious are superior to angels, " then Elijah's trans -
formation to angel would represent a regressive change in level 
rather than a higher spiritual attainment . R. Reuben Margaliot, 
in an interesting approach, divulges that the motif, "the pious are 
superior to angels," refers only the low categories of angels . 
However, there are higher categories of angels which are superior 
to man. 275 This approach would enable that school to resolve the 
difficulty by establishing that immortals belong to the higher cate-
gory of angels, whereas the pious surpass only those angels belonging 
to the lower category. However, this complicates matters more than 
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facilitating them, as one would have to identify positively which 
category of angels all the immortals enumerated in Derekh Erez Zuta 
belonged, a most laborious undertaking. 
case this would be quite a simple task. 
Nevertheless, in Elijah's 
The Talmud in Berakoth, as observed earlier by R. de Leon, associates 
276 Elijah with Michael and Gabriel, among the highest ranking angels. 
Elijah was completely unlike the other pious mentioned in Derekh 
Erez Zuta 1n that he attained a level of angel which allowed him 
to appear to certain eclectic individuals who merited his appearance, 
a quality which none of the other pious persons possessed. 277 
Although it is clear that Elijah ranked among the higher category 
of angels, it is quite possible that the other immortals belonged 
to the lower .category of angels, given Elijah's known superiority 
over them. Consequently, the motif, "the pious are superior to 
angels," would not represent a regression in Elijah's case, as he 
verily belonged to the higher category of angels. However, it 
might well represent a regression in the case of Elijah's colleagues. 
Furthermore, according to R. Landau 1 only if angels are superior to 
man are the wives of angels permitted to rewed. If as R. Magaliot 
claims, only certain categories of angels are superior to man, then 
only the wives of angels belonging to this category are permitted 
to rewed. Consequently, were R. Joshua b. Levi to belong to the 
lower category of angels inferior to man, his wife would not be 
permit ted to rewed' wh.ereas Elijah Is wife would be permit ted to 
rewed as Elijah belongs to the category of angels superior to man. 
The distinction of R. Margaliot, seen in this context, now becomes 
imminently significant from a halakic standpoint. Although R. 
Isserlein used the same ruling concerning the wives of both Elijah 
and R. Joshua b. Levi, according to this distinction it would be in-
appropriate to render one ruling which concerns the wives of all 
angels, as R. Isserlein did, since one would first have to establish 
to which category of angels the immortals belonged. The halakic 
implication of R. Landau's approach, according to the distinction 
of R. Margaliot, is that eligibility for remarriage of wives of 
angels would depend upon which rank of angels their angel-(ex-)hus-
bands attained. 
R. Moses Cordovero discusses the dilemma that Elijah's and Enoch's 
- 144 -
THE NATURE OF ELIJAH'S ESSENCE DESCENSION 
transformation to angels represents a regression given the motif 
that the pious are superior to angels. 278 R. Cordovero divulges 
that the Paradise which the pious entered during their lifetimes 
refers merely to the Paradise of the Lower World. The pious are 
constrained in that only their souls can ascend Paradise of the 
Upper Horld . Elijah and Enoch, by becoming transformed to angels, 
were able to ascend Paradise of the Upper World in form of body as 
well, as they received special celestial clothing, which enabled 
their bodies to enter Paradise of the Upper World , clothed in 
special attire. In this sense, by becoming transformed to angels, 
Elijah and Enoch were in fact superior to the pious . 
The entire dilemma is effectively sidestepped by the school \vhich 
maintained that the pious individuals attained eternal life in form 
of man, thereby being considered angels only in status and not in 
reality. By retaining their inherent characteristic of men, their 
angel status would not represent a regression in any manner, as 
they are still pious "men, " who are greater than those who in 
reality are angels. Consequently, this school sought to attribute 
to immortals the highest level of spiritual attainment possible, 
ascribed to the position that Elijah and his colleagues enumerated 
in Derekh Erez Zuta attained eternal life as men who abode Paradise 
forever as men . This fate, being uncommon to the fate of all men 
who "return to the dust from whence they came," earned them recog-
nition as men of angel status. This existential state of being 
represented to this school a far greater level of spiritual attain-
ment than were they to have become transformed in reality to angels . 
Thus, the consideration of which existential state of being represents 
a higher statET of spiritual attainment is certainly significant in 
view of its direct bearing on the responsum of Terumat ha-Deshen. 
We concluded Chapter II by submitting that in order to render a 
halakic ruling concerning Elijah and his wife, we must first ascer-
tain his existential reality. According to this last consideration, 
aside from determining his existential reality, we must also arrange 
the various existential forms into a systematic hierarchy, in order 
to establish whether Elijah is of sufficient stature to exempt him 
from adhering to the precepts of Torah Law. 
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IV. PARAMETERS OF LIFE AND DFAlli 
A Comparative Analysis of Methods of Computing Metaphysical Data 
in Halakic Process 
The modus operandi of practically all of the respondents who endea-
voured to verify whether Elijah is obligated to adhere to Torah 
Law subsequent to his ascension is virtually the same. All are 
in agreement that the method of resolving this enigma entails a 
three step process: Firstly, one must ascertain the true nature 
of Elijah's existential being. Secondly, one must classify this 
existential nature as either alive or dead. And thirdly, once this 
is determined one may proceed to verify his obligation in command-
ments by implementing the talmudic die tum, '''Among the dead I am 
free' [Psalms 88:6]; once a man dies he becomes free of Torah and 
Mi tzvot. "1 The respondents differed widely, however, as to how 
the dictum is to be implemented in Elijah's case. By comparing 
the way in which the various respondents applied the said dictum 
to Elijah, one begins to perceive a working definition of life and 
death itself, which the respondents assumed in their treatment of 
the issue. Moreover, one discovers by means of this comparison, 
what exactly it is that causes one to become obligated in the com-
mandments in general. 
The respondents all faced the same dilemma. Whichever way one 
applies the dictum to Elijah one encounters difficulties If Elijah 
is considered dead and therefore "free of Torah and Mitzvot," how 
does one explain the numerous talmudic references, cited by Terumat 
ha-Deshen himself, which confirm that Elijah adheres to the comman-
ments? If, on the other hand, Elijah is alive and therefore not 
"free of Torah and Mitzvot," why doesn't his wife require a divorce. 
Let us review how R. Sofer employed the dictum in his responsum where 
he discusses whether Elijah may attend a circumcision which falls 
on the Sabbath: 
In this way, each time Elijah reveals himself and makes him-
self seen in this world, he is enclothed in his sacred body. 
However, when he reveals himself in sp:i..1.:i t alone, such as on 
the day of the circumcision, he is not obli?ated in Mitzvot 
as it is written, 'Among the dead I am free [once a man dies 
he becomes free of Torah and Mitzvot] •.• When he appears in 
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spirit form he is an angel.2 
R. Sofer resolved the dilemma by applying the dictum to Elijah's 
spirit form. When Elijah appears in spirit (i.e., at circumcision) 
he is devoid of body and consequently considered as the dead who 
are "free of Torah and Mitzvot." Only "when Elijah appears in this 
[spirit] form he is an angel"; however, when he appears enclothed 
in body he is an ordinary human who is obligated in Torah and Nitzvot 
as all men. 
In R. Kluger's responsum, where he discusses whether Elijah could 
attend a circumcision which is performed in the same room as a 
corpse, R. Kluger challenges that when one considers the dictum 
it is difficult to understand why anyone (i.e., Rabbah b. Abbuha) 
should be concerned about Elijah's contacting impurity: 
\.Jhat significance is the question, 'Art thou a Priest?' 
Doesn 't the Talmud affirm that once a person is deceased he 
is free of Torah and Mitzvot? Do not answer that Elijah ' s 
case is different since Elijah never deceased. Were that so, 
Elijah 's wife would be forbidden to rewed . 3 
In his initial explanation , R. Kluger adduces the identical solution 
as R. Sofer; a dualistic existence whereby the dictum is applicable 
only to his spirit form, but not to his human form. However, in 
his preferred explanation, R. Kluger expands the dictum slightly, 
and applies it even to Elijah's human state. 
Elijah 's case is different, being that he did not die. 
For although he is not termed 'ish' [person], nonetheless, 
since he is also not termed 'deaGT it behoves him to fulfill 
the commandments out of zeal, as one who is not enjoined yet 
fulfills willfully.4 
R. Kluger expanded the dictum to encompass a third category. The 
dictum obligates living persons and frees the dead. Those who 
are living but are not persons are not obligated. Yet, since they 
are not dead, they are not entirely freed. In this way, comprised 
within the dictum is an interim state of those who are both not 
obligated and not freed. Namely, those who observe voluntarily despite 
their not being obligated. 
Although R. Falcon obtained the same result as R. Kluger, he 
differed in his considerations. He does not explicitly refer to 
the dictum. Nonetheless, he considers Elijah dead, since his 
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r elations have all terminated. However, as Elijah himself did not 
die, he continues to observe commandments willfully. 5 Most out-
' 
standing among the halakists is R. Attiah in his treatment of the 
dictum regarding Elijah: 
For although he [Elijah] did rise up in stature until he became 
like one of the angels, nevetheless, he was not discharged of 
the sanctity contingent upon his being a priest. Hence, he 
[Rabbah b. Abbuha] questioned him as to why he was standing 
in a cemetery. And likewise, he was also not discharged of 
his obligation to adhere to the rest of the commandments since 
ultimately he did not die an actual death of this world. 
And it was not said except for 'once a man dies, he is free of 
Torah and Mitzvot.' And not in such a case as ours.6 
While R. Sofer applied the dictum to Elijah's spirtt form and R. 
Kluger in his preferred explanation extended the dictum to incorporate 
a medium state, R. Attiah is outstanding in that he explicitly 
denounces any application of the dictum to Elijah whatsoever, empha-
sizing that the dictum refers only to "men" who have "died" and not 
to angels who are living. R. Attiah did riot consider the prospect 
of relating the dictum even to Elijah's spirit form because he 
opposed the schism theory and maintained that Elijah continues to 
exist aggregately in body and soul, as seen in the previous chapter. 
As an individual he is still very much alive. Regarding his rela-
tionships however, whilst Elijah continues to pursue intensely his 
'man-G-d' relationship, his 'man-man' relationship terminated upon 
ascension. Elijah is not required to divorce his wife, not because 
he is considered dead, but rather because his 'husband-wife' 
relationship has terminated. 
It is indeed remarkable to note that although the modus operandi of 
all the Halakists is virtually identical, in that they all agreed 
that the dictum must be related to Elijah, in order to resolve his 
'partial' observance of the commandments, R. Isserlein himself, 
from whom the entire problem originates, doesn't mention a word of 
the dictum, neither explicitly nor implicitly! Neither does R. 
Isserlein mention the schism theory, espoused by R. Sofer and R. 
Kluger. 
The diverse positions regarding the implementation of the dictum 
is due primarily to the outcome of step two. Namely, the definition 
of Elijah's existential status as alive or dead. R. Isserlein, 
who considered Elijah alive and a devout adherent of commanrnnents 
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(with the exception of divorce) saw no connection between Elijah and 
the dictum which absolves the dead of Torah and Mitzvot. l-Ienee his 
silence . On the other hand, R. Kluger intially and R. Safer applied 
the dictum to Elijah ' s spirit form since they considered him then 
an angel, who like the dead are "free of Torah and Mitzvot." 
It would appear that the principal obstacle preventing R. Kluger 
intially and R. Safer from concurring with R. Isserlein is the obvious 
contradiction contained in the latter ' s thesis. It is senseless 
to maintain that Elijah is obligated in all commandments, with the 
exception of divorce . The two go hand in hand . If Elijah is obli-
gated in commandments because he is considered alive, then his wife 
also requires divorce . If his wife does not require divorce because 
he is considered dead, then his is absolved of all other commandments 
as well. Elijah cannot be simultaneously alive and dead. One must 
decide one way or anotehr . Consequently, R. Safer and initially 
R. Kluger conceived of a schism whereby Elijah qualifies separately 
for each category . In spirit form he is an angel who is considered 
as the dead who are free of Torah and Mitzvot, whilst wherever he 
assumes his human form he is considered alive and hence obligated in 
commandments. 
R. Isserlein, as mentioned , does not seem to have considered anything 
of the kind, as he makes not even the slightest reference to a schism. 
What probably prevented R. Isserlein from endorsing the schism theory, 
aside from the philosophic perplexities concurrent with the theory, 
is a fundamental problem regarding the dictum itself . That is, once 
one applies the dictum to Elijah, he is immediately free of Torah 
and Mitzvot , and there is no reason for that obligation to return . 
G1ce his transcendence to angel discharges him of obligation in 
commandments, that obligation is forever forfeited and irretrievable . 
The fact that Elijah also assumes a human appearance makes no diffe-
rence as far as his obligation in commandments is concerned. Even in 
human form , Elijah is still an "angel" who is absolved of commandments . 
His human ' attire ' is no reason for a resumption of obligation. 
To obviate this difficulty R. Isserlein maintained that Elijah was 
never discharged of obligation and that the dictum does not apply 
to Elijah in any form . 7 R. Sofer and intially R. Kluger were not 
perturbed by R. Isserlein ' s difficulty because they believed Elijah ' s 
- 149 -
PARAMEI'ERS OF LIFE AND DEAlll 
transcendence to angel was neither total nor complete. He continu-
ally vascillates between angelhood and manhood. When Elijah appears 
in human form he is not an angel in human guise as purported by R. 
Isserlein. Rather, he is entirely human, with human obligations 
regarding commandments and not an angel at all. As a human he 
does not resume a defunct obligation, but continues an obligation he 
never relinquished. R. Isserlein, however, believed Elijah's trans-
formation to angel was a complete one. Therefore when he appears 
in human form he is nothing more than an angel in human guise, who 
once considered dead relinquishes an irrevocable obligation. 
Essentially we have reversed the original question of this entire 
study. Initially we posed the query which state of life may be 
conferred upon a man who ascends to become an angel? Now we must 
enquire which state of life may be conferred upon an angel who 
descendsto become a man?8 
For R. Isserlein, the two questions are utterly intertwined. The 
state of life which is to be conferred upon Elijah the man who became 
an angel utterly depends on which state of life would be conferred 
upon him were he subsequently to reappear as a man. If one were to 
confer upon him a state of death, freeing him of Torah and Mitzvot, 
it would be forever irrevocable. Therefore, R. Isserlein conferred 
upon Elijah the angel a general state of life, since he continues to 
adhere to the commandments. 
For R. Sofer, however, the two questions are completely unrelated. 
Since Elijah's transcendence to an angel was incomplete, continually 
vascillating between angelhood and manhood, the state of life that 
may be conferred upon Elijah when he ascended to become an angel 
is in no way influenced by the state conferred upon him were he to 
appear subsequently as a man. Elijah may well be conferred a state 
of the dead when appearing in spirit, as well as a state of the living 
when appearing in human form. In person, he does not revitalize a 
bygone obligation, but simply reverts to an original obligation which 
he never relinquished. 
The obvious drawback of R. Safer's and R. Kluger's initial positions 
is that were Elijah to reappear as a human he would then be defined 
as a man who is obligated in commandments and his wife would promptly 
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require divorce in order to remarry. According toR. Isserlein, 
however, even if Elijah were to appear in human form he would still 
be defined as an angel whose wife does not require divorce. 
It is probably for this reason that R. Kluger reneged his initial 
explanation in favour of his preferred explanation. Consequently, 
R. Kluger explained Elijah's commandment adherence in terms of a 
purely voluntary nature. 
R. Kluger's second explanation is similar toR. Falcon's approach. 
It is clear that R. Falcon considered Elijah dead. The fact that 
Elijah himself is in reality alive is immaterial and of no consequence. 
Since Elijah's ·obligation in commandments is contingent upon the re-
lations which he commands and not upon his form of existence, and 
since Elijah's relations have all terminated (possibly even his relation 
of being a Jew?) his being alive in reality is absolutely irrelevant. 
Therefore, his adherence to commandments may be attributed only to a 
self-imposed stringency of a voluntary nature. 
R. Attiah, in contrast toR. Safer, R. Kluger, and R. Falcon, cate-
gorically establishes that Elijah could definitely not be equated 
the same status vouchsafed the dead since his 'man-G-d' relationship 
continued as impassioned, after ascension as before. R. Attiah's 
position seems to be consistent with the approach of R. Isserlein 
since the former position unmitigatedly opposed any relation of the 
dictum to Elijah as Elijah is very much alive and vigorously pursues 
his 'man-G-d' relationship, which he never relinquished. 
Criteria for Defining Parameters of Life and Death 
Our comparative analysis of the diverse treatments of the operation 
of the dictum in halakic process by the various respondents confirms 
that in order to apply the die tum one needs establish a prior,i halakic 
criteria for defining life and death, as well as defining the para-
meters of each state. Our comparison reveals two major differences 
for consideration in establishing criteria which outline the precincts 
of life and death. 
for. R. Safer and R. Kluger intially, the criteria for establishing 
life and death is determined by the existential form which one assumes. 
One who exists in human form is automatically considered halakically 
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alive. One who exists in spirit form is considered halakically 
dead. For R. Falcon and R. Attiah, however, it matters not which 
existential form a person assumes. The determining factor is their 
prospective relations and relationships vis-a-vis G-d and their fellow 
man. As long as those relations and relationships continue to per-
sist unhindered, one is considered halakically alive. Once these 
relations or relationships are impaired and desist, one is considered 
halakically dead. 
We have already demonstrated in the previous chapter that it was 
the differences in philosophic reasoning regarding the aftereffect 
of Elijah 's ascension among the various schools which was chiefly 
responsible for the diversified conclusions in applying their definitions 
of the parameters of life and death to the case of Elijah. Because 
R. Falcon and R. Attiah rejected the notion of Elijah's dualistic 
existence on philosophical grounds, they could not possibly consider 
applying any criteria of life and death based on existential form. 
Hence they submitted that the existential condition one assumes is 
entirely irrelevant. Rather, the relevant criteria for establishing 
life and death is determined by the relations and relationships one 
pursues and not by existential form. 
Parenthetically speaking, the criteria for defining life and death 
maintained by R. Falcon and R. Attiah, may well explain the talmudic 
edict, "The righteous in their death are called living and the wicked 
in their lifetime are called dead. "9 If life and death are to be 
determined not by form of existence., but rather by relations and rela-
tionships one pursues, then clearly, if during one's lifetime, one 
does not maintain those Divinely ordained relations and relationships 
(i.e., as the wicked), then one is to be classified as dead despite 
that in reality one might well be alive. Whereas, if one continues 
to pursue those relations and relationships even after death, then 
clearly one is to be classified as alive. 
It is, therefore, essential at the onset to establish precise and 
definite halakic parameters for life and death before proceeding to 
discern under which category Elijah is subsumed. Ultimately then, 
the determining factor in deciphering whether R. Isserlein employed 
the dictum necessarily depends on procuring a foreknowledge of the 
criteria for establishing the parameters of life and death which 
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R. Isserlein operated upon. 
Value of R. Isserlein's Responsum 
Great indeed, is the utilitarian value which emerges from R. Isserlein's 
responsum which, aside from the specific question that R. Isserlein 
deals with, it serves as a basis for exacting an accurate halakic 
procurement of the very confines and parameters of life and death 
itself. The way in which these parameters v1ere practically utilized 
and applied by other Halakists in resolving various other halakic 
issues shall be discussed in further chapters. 
We have already determined in Chapter II that Elijah's obligation 
in commandments is entirely dependant on whether Elijah is considered 
alive or dead. Bearing in mind that these criteria are themselves 
subject to various considerations, it follows then that whatever the 
considerations for establishing the criteria for life and death may 
be, they directly affect one's obligation or absolvement of command-
ments. Thus, the identical considerations for determining the para-
meters of life and death will ultimately determine one's general 
obligation or absolvement in commandments. 
Parameters of Commandment Activity 
The question of Elijah's obligation in commandments can now be posed 
in a slightly more philosophical perspective. Namely, what is it 
that "frees" or binds man to Torah Law? Is obligation produced or 
absolved by the mere existential form which man assumes: i.e., if 
man exists as a person and assumes a human existential form then he 
is defined as "alive" and hence obligated in Mitzvot. And conversely, 
if man assumes an existential form of spirit then he is defined as 
"dead" and hence absolved of Mitzvot. Or, is it man's respective 
relations and relationships with G-d and his fellow man which pro-
duce an obligation: i.e., as long as man's relations and relationships 
persist man is defined as "alive" and hence obligated in commandments, 
and once these relations and relationships cease man is defined as 
dead and hence absolved of commandments. 
Whereas R. Safer and intially R. Kluger adopted the former considera-
tion, R. Attiah and R. Falcon embraced the latter. R. Isserlein, 
as we have seen, can be explained either way, depending on the criteria 
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he employed in defining life and death. We shall now see tha t 
various other factors were considered by the respondents in developing 
a formula for determining what produces commandment obligation, as 
well as their consequences. 
- 15L~ -
V. Tl-IE RELATIONSHIP BEIWEEN Tl!E FUTURE 
WORLDS AND Tl1IS WORLD 
The question of Commandments in Paradise 
A vast quantity of rabbinic literature has been apportioned to the 
depiction of life in Paradise. This literature has conventionally 
been regarded as eschatological speculation of a purely theoretical 
nature. To the Halakist, however, even such a seemingly remote 
eschatological discussion as 'Life in Paradise' can often have signi-
ficant halakic relevance to life in this world. To this effect, such 
discussion is by no means theoretical. For the respondent, R. Solomon 
Zevi Goldbaum it was essential to know, for instance, whether the 
commandments are observed in Paradise, in order to determine whether 
Elijah's wife requires divorce. Thus Elijah's observance of command-
ments in Paradise directly affects the status of his wife in this 
world. R. Goldbaum saw immeasurable value in R. Isserlein's responsum 
in determining this question: 
I wondered about those who entered Paradise during their life-
times, such as Enoch and Elijah and others of their rank who 
are enumerated in tractate Derekh Erez Zuta. If they still 
stand commanded to observe the Mitzvot, specifically the posi-
tive commandments such as donning the phylacteries and the fringed 
garment and the like. Since the ne&ative commandments are 
certainly irrelevant there [ParadiseJ, only positive command-
ments [are relevant]. Do we say that death alone causes absolve-
ment of obligation in commandments, that the obligation of the 
activity of Mitzvot is not continued or necessitated, except 
for when he is a manZ That is, when joined in body and soul, 
but when they are separated [body and soul] from one another, he 
is not a man. N1d the verse stipulates [concerning commandments] 
'which if a man do he shall live in them.' For the reason that 
he is a man who is alive, it is his life which caused his [rela-
tion to] commandments. And, therefore, once he dies he is free 
of Torah and Mitzvot. And if so, those who entered Paradise 
during their lifetimes are enjoined there as well to keep and 
to observe G-d's commandments since their bodies are alive. 
Or perhaps, if it is the ldace which causes it [relation to 
Mitzvot]. , Only this wor is a place which is suited for ob-
serving G-d's commandments, ordinances, and laws, and not Para-
dise. And if so, even those who entered Paradise during their 
lifetime are absolved from observing commandments. 
After some research I deliberated upon it and resolved it from 
that which I saw in [the work] of one of the earlier scholars, 
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the ordained genius, Maharai [R. Isserlein], author of Terumat 
ha-Deshen, who wrote in his Rulings [Pesakim], number 102, that 
the wife of Elijah, the prophet, and the wife of R. Joshua b. 
Levi are permitted since [only] a fellowman's wife is forbidden · 
[to others] and not the wife of an angel who is completely 
spiritual and not corporeal. And the pratical difference would 
apply in case a man were to merit a similar fate as they. And 
his words [Maharai's] are recorded in Darkhei Moshe and in Beit 
Shemu'el, and in other works of the Acharonim [the latter commen-
tators]. 
And according to this we can resovle our question. As certainly 
those who entered Paradise during their lifetimes are absolved 
of fulfilling the commandments. For were we to say that they 
are obligated to fulfill them, and that Paradise is a suitable 
place for observing commandments, then they would be bound to 
the ordinances of matrimony and divorce and their wives would 
be prohibited unless given a bill of divorce. Rather, of 
necessity, Paradise is nota place which is suited for performing 
Mitzvot; even for those who entered alive. If so, they are ex-
cluded in general from commandments and are considered dead. 
And they do not cause their wives to be forbidden [to others] 
because the ordinances of matrimony and divorce are irrelevant 
to them. And therefore, it is well proven from here that those 
who entered Paradise during their lifetime are absolved of 
observing commandments. So it seems one could say, as I was 
writing with haste.1 
R. Goldbaum 's methodology and rationale are fairly simple and straight-
forward. Since Elijah did not die, death never absolved him from 
observing the commandments. If he, nonetheless, is not required to 
divorce his wife to enable her to rewed, this is only accountable 
if one concludes that the commandments are not relevant in Paradise. 
R. Goldbaum believes that he has proven that it is not "life" 
which causes obligation, nor does "death" cause its absolvement, but 
rather the "place" where man abides. R. Goldbaum cites R. Isserlein's 
responsum as proof that the commandments are pertinent only to men 
in this world, but do not apply to men living in Paradise. 
In view of the various schools which we are familiar from our prior 
discussion, it is clear that R. Goldbaum's rationale is subject to 
severe criticism. R. Goldbaum's entire proof hinges on the fact 
that death does not absolve Elijah of obligation in commandments 
since he never died, and hence only if Paradise itself absolves one 
of obligation can Elijah's absolvement from commandments be explained. 
According to the R. Sofer-R. Kluger school, which maintains that the 
death of Elijah's body caused his absolvement from commandments, 
R. Goldbaum's entire proof crumbles. Similarly , according to the 
R. Attiah-R. Falcon school, which maintains that Elijah 's 'man-man' 
relationship terminated upon his ascension, one cannot adduce proof 
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from Elijah's exemption of divorce that there are no commandments 
in Paradise. Elijah's exemption from divorce is merely one aspect 
of his 'man-~n' relationship, which automatically terminated upon 
ascension. However, Elijah may well pursue the commandments pertain-
ing to his 'man-G-d' relationship in Paradise. Certainly, R. Gold-
baum does not prove the contrary. 
R. Hayyim Hezekiah b. Raphael Elijah Medini (1832-1904), a most 
brilliant scholar and master of Halaka, in his halakic encyclopedia, 
Sedei Hemed, explicitly states that no proof of absolvement of com-
mandments in Paradise may be advanced from R. Isserlein's responsum. 2 
R. Medini draws an analogy between Elijah's exemption from divorce 
to those who live in the diaspora and are exempted from those command-
ments which may be performed only in the land of Israel. Since the 
laws of matrimony and divorce are contingent to this world, as they 
concern the relationships of those who abide this world. An "angel" 
of Paradise may be compared to one who lives in the diaspora and is 
exempted from those laws which only concern Israel. However, in 
Paradise there are many other laws which are not contingent on the 
world of men and they may well be perfomred there. 
R. Medini's criticism is very similar to the R.Falcon-R. Attiah school. 
Elijah's exemption from divorce is contingent upon the automatic 
termination of his 'man-man' relationship. However, many other 
commandments which are not contingent on this relationship may well 
apply in Paradise also. R. Medini, in fact, goes on to dispute the 
contention that commandments are irrelevant in Paradise, proving 
that Paradise is indeed a suitable place for performing commandments. 
This he adduces from Sefer Hasidim which relates: 
And our holy Rabbi would appear [enrobed] in precious garments 
which he wore on the Sabbath, and not in shrouds, to impart 
that he retained his vigour and [could] exempt others in their 
obligation of reciting kiddush and [that he was] unlike the 
dead who are freed of commandments. But rather like the living 
in clothes as he wore during his lifetime. And the righteous 
are called living even after death, and he could exempt his 
household in kiddush.3 
Sedei Hemed records the view of Hida, who in his commentary to Sefer 
Hasidim cites this passage as proof that the righteous continue to 
perform commandments even after their death. They interpret the 
talmudic dictum, "once a man dies he is free of Torah and Mitzvot," 
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as applying only to man. However, the righteous, who are not ordinary 
men, continue to perform the commandments even after death. 4 
Sedei Hemed points out that the implication is tremendous, for it 
indicates that not only the righteous who entered Paradise during 
their lifetimes practice the commandments, but even the righteous who 
have died also observe the commandments, since they are not ordinary 
men and death only exempts ordinary men and not the righteous. 5 
Not only are the righteous obligated, they can even exempt live men 
from obligation, as Rabbi exempted his family from their obligation 
to recite kiddush. This shows that the righteous who are dead 
assume the same obligation as men, as unless they are of equal obli-
gation, the one could not exempt the other. 6 
R. Joseph Hayyim b. Elijah al-Hakham of Baghdad (1835-1909), in a 
responsum which we will address shortly, also documents Sefer Hasidim 
and Hida's coomentary thereon as evidence that the dictLUTI, "once 
a man dies he becomes free of Torah and Mitzvot," is inapplicable to 
the righteous since they are considered "alive" after death. The 
position of Sedei Hemed and R. Joseph Hayyim is not only contrary 
to the school of the respondents mentioned in Chapter IV, who declared 
Elijah in reality alive yet nevertheless applied the said dictum to 
him. According to Sedei Hemed and R. Joseph Hayyim, even if Elijah 
and all other righteous men are to encounter death, being that they 
are not ordinary men the dictum is entirely irrelevant to them. 
R. Medini's proof of the observance of commandments in Paradise, as 
well as his support from other schools, has far reaching consequences 
concerning R. Goldbaum's responsum. If it can be proven, as indeed 
Sedei Hemed does prove that the commandments are observed in Paradise, 
then according toR. Goldbaum 's rationale Elijah's wife would not be 
permitted to rewed unless she received a prior bill of divorce. The 
same would be true for the wives of any of the immortals listed 1n 
Derekh Erez Zuta, or anyone else who would merit a similar fate. 
Furthermore, Sedei Hemed contends that all pious persons pursue the 
commandments, not only those who entered Paradise alive. According 
toR. Goldbaum's rationale, the wives of any pious Jew should be 
forbidden to remarry unless theyreceivedprior divorce! Sedei 
Hemed himself, as well as the other schools, who do not accept R. 
Goldbaum's rationale, would obviously dismiss this conclusion. Yet 
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the fact remains that were one able to prove that commandments are 
observed in Paradise, not only by the righteous who entered alive, 
but even by the righteous who died, according to R. Goldbaun their 
wives require divorce, and were they to marry without divorce their 
children would be branded as Mamzerim (bastards), and they themselves 
as well as their new mates would be liable to capital punishment! 7 
The question of whether the commandments are observed in Paradise 
is therefore by no means a remote exchatological question for theo-
retical speculation, as its resolution has grave consequences con-
cerning life in this world. Even for those who opposed R. Goldbaum 's 
rationale, the question of commandments in Paradise has important 
consequences as well. For if Elijah continues to pursue the command-
ments, even if' the specific law of divorce does not apply to him, 
be it because of the termination of his man-wife relationship or for 
any other reason, as soon as Elijah were to return and reappear on 
earth he would revert to his original marital status and his wife 
would still be forbidden. However, if the place of Paradise itself 
exempts him completely from commandments, then even if he were to 
reappear, he would be considered dead. He would not revert to his 
original marital status and his wife would still be considered a 
widow who is permitted to rewed others. This might represent a 
specific problem for Elijah should he reappear and subsequently wish 
to remarry his wife. Since if he bears the rank of High Priest, he 
is forbidden to marry his own widow. 8 
Furthermore, if as R. Goldbaum and others contend9 that it is not 
death which absolves men from commandments, but rather the place 
which he abides - then if he were to transfer his habitat from earth 
to the moon or some other planetary place, would he be obligated to 
10 adhere the commandments in those places? Are the planets and 
other places more closely related to Paradise or to earth? Were the 
commandments given solely for the purpose of man on earth and do not 
pertain in other places2 If man living on a planet other than earth 
is equally obligated as man on earth, in which way does the place of 
Paradise differ such that it alone should absolve man from commandments7 11 
The resolution of all these questions revolvesaround one central 
theological question. That is, are the comnandments a function 
of man's existence in this world alone? According to R. Goldbaum , 
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the commandments are solely a function of man's existence as a human 
on earth and are temporal in nature, terminating upon death. 
According to Sedei Hemed and othe~s, the commandments are an eternal 
function of man's relationship with G-d, which transcends time and 
place, as well as the particular existential form which man assumes. 12 
There even seems to be a medium position. We recall that R. Kluger 
proved that ordinary men do not observe commandments after death 
even willfully out of zeal. In this sense R. Kluger conforms with 
R. Goldbaum who maintains that the commandmentsare temporal and solely 
a function of man's human existence upon earth. However, R. Kluger 
also posits that Elijah and his colleagues in Derekh Erez Zuta are 
different. Having escaped death, they continue to observe the com-
mandments willfully out of zeal. For them the commandments are 
a function of their relationship with G-d which transcends time, 
place and existential form. Yet to a lesser degree than advocated 
by Sedei Hemed·. As according to Sedei Hemed they are enjoined by 
law to obey commandments in Paradise, whereas according to R. 
Kluger .they are not enjoined by law, nevetheless they choose to 
observe them willfully out of zea1. 13 
In fact, we are given a glimpse to this issue by R. Goldbaum himself, 
who alludes to it by questioning whether commandments are observed 
in Paradise solely in terms of the positive commandments of donning 
phylacteries, the fringed garments, and the like. In his words: 
"the negative commandments are certainly irrelevant there." In 
this subtle distinciton of R. Goldbaum we perceive that even among 
the commandments themselves there are vast differences. Some are 
clearly a function of this world alone, i.e., the negative command-
ments, whilst others, i.e., the positive ones, can be regarded as 
serving a greater purpose and thereby having relevance in Paradise 
as well. R. Goldbaum concludes, however, that even the more sublime 
commandments are a function of this world alone. 
In fact, R. Rahamim Isaac Palache (Palaggi), in his novellae to 
Shulchan Arukh deliberates this very point. He cites the Zohar which 
states that in Paradise, Adam-First Man, was given both positive 
and negative commandments, such as the injunction not to eat from 
the Tree of Knowledge. Based on this, R. Palache contends that the 
negative commandments are relevant in Paradise. Sedei Hemed, however, 
- 160 -
11!E RELATIONSHIP 13fo.1:W'EEN Tl!E FUTURE WORLDS AND 'l'lliS WORLD 
contests R. Palache, claiming that the pre-Sinaitic injunction not 
to eat from the Tree of lZnowledge was a separate injunction having 
nothing to do with the 613 commandments given at Sinai. 14 There-
fore, the negative commandments of Sinai may not be relevant in 
Paradise . Nevertheless, Sedei Hemed posits that there are still 
many negative commandments which concern man's reflective capacity 
which could well apply in Paradise, even if the conditions for per-
petrating an actual violation of Torah in Paradise are remote. 
Thus, the question of whether the commandments are observed in 
Paradise is fundamental to the understanding of the nature and sig-
nificance of commandments in general and the nature of man's involve-
ment with them. If there is a distinciton among the commandments, 
then those commandments which apply only to this world may be regarded 
as temporal agents whose primary purpose is to refine corporeal man. 
In Paradise, where man is already refined, they are no longer neces-
sary . Nevertheless, those commandments which have a more sublime 
purpose and greater worth are continuously pursued with an even greater 
vigour and intensity in Paradise. 
Time as a Factor Responsible for Commandment Observance 
Apart from the considerations of man's existential form, his relation-
ships vis-a-vis G-d and his fellowman, and the place where man abides, 
there is a fourth element which must be considered in determining 
what causes man's involvement and absolvement from commandments. 
And that is, the element of time. 
The simplest understanding of the op1n1on accorded in tractate Niddah 
(which incidently and significantly is the accepted opinion in Halaka) 
"the commandments will be abolished in the time to come,"15 is that 
"the time to come" itself is the factor which is directly responsible 
for the future abolishment of commandments. That is to say, that 
according to this opinion one can envision a future period, i.e., the 
Time to Come, in which the commandments are no longer applicable to 
that particular period, as they will automatically become obsolete 
and hence abolished. Therefore, time itself is an important element 
which must be taken into consideration in determining the causes of 
absolvement from commandments. 
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R. Elhanan Bunim Wasserman (1875-1941) in Kovetz Shiurim, denounced 
the opinion which held the time element responsible for the future 
abolishment of commandments. Rather, R. Wasserman claims: 
It is a fiat which is scripturally ordained: 'Among the dead 
I am free' [Psalms 88:6]; Once a man dies he becomes free 
of Torah and Mitzvot -forever, even after he is resurrected. 
And this law applies even in the present time. For if a 
miracle were to occur [today], such as the dead whom Ezekiel 
restored to life, they would be exempted form all the command-
ments. And in the time to come there will not be any novelty 
in the Laws of the Torah. And those people who will remain 
alive during that era, who will not live as a result of resur-
rection·, they ~ill verily be obligated to observe all the 
corrmandments.1 
R. Wasserman objected to the contention that it is the element of 
time '~ich is responsible for the future absolvement of commandments, 
for were this so, it would show that the Laws of the Torah are subject 
to change and that they change in accordance with existing conditions 
in time. R. Wasserman considers this opinion heretical, as one of 
the fundamental principles of faith is that the Torah will never be 
b . t h . . 17 H h f 1 . h h su Jec to c ange at any t~me. e, t ere ore, exp a~ns t at t e 
future absolvement of commandments is due to a fiat ordained by 
Scripture itself. This does not indicate that the Torah is subject 
to change, since Scripture has decreed this change from the onset . 
It is, therefore, the result of a scriptural decree, rather than 
their becoming automatically obsolete due to prevailing conditions 
in time. 
R. Wasserman proves his contention that Scripture decreed that 
death should absolve man from commandments rather than time, by 
demonstrating that man can become absolved of commandments upon death 
at all times and not only in the future. For if man were to be 
miraculously restored to life at any time he would immediately be 
absolved of commandments and would not wait until the future. 
R. Wasserman's thesis certainly does not accord with Sedei Hemed and 
Hida, who claim that death does not exempt the righteous from command-
18 ments . Furthermore, R. Wasserman's contention that were a man 
miraculously restored to life at any time he would be immediately 
absolved of commandments, is also suspect. For Hida in his gloss to 
Shulchan Arukh, entitled Birkei Yosef, deals with this very situation 
in an altogether different manner: 
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It i s stated in Aggada of first chapter in Megillah, ['Rabbah 
and R. Zeira joined together in a Purim feast. They became 
mellow] and Rabbah arose and cut R. Zeira's throat. On the 
next day he prayed on his behalf and revived him.' And there 
is to deliberate [on] the wife of R. Zeira, once her husband 
was slaughtered and died, certainly her marriage [to him] 
became dissolved and she is permitted to anyone in marriage. 
And when R. Zeira came to life on the morrow he was required 
to betroth his wife anew for she is a spinster. And this may 
be compared to returning one's own divorcee which requires a 
new betrothal as the former marriage has fallen away and a new 
person has appeared. And similarly, this one whose husband 
died, behold his death permits [her] and even dissolves his 
marriage, and once he comes back to life this is a new thing. 
Or perhaps, a woman acquires her independence upon the death 
of her husband only when he dies and remains dead. However, 
when he is not buried and is restored to life by a prophet 
or a Hasid, it becomes apparent that his death is dissimilar 
to the death of all men and that the first marriage was never 
dissolved. And hence she is a married woman whose marriage 
to another man would not take effect. And her husband, once 
he returns to life is immediately permitted to her as he was 
prior to his death.l9 
Hida proceeds to cite proof from the Jerusalem Talmud that if a 
person was miraculously restored to life he would remain attached 
to his wife and would not be required to remarry her anew. Thus 
Hida demonstrates that even once a person has actually died, since 
his death is dissimilar to the death of all men in that he is soon 
revived after death, he is not considered halakically dead regarding 
his wife, and consequently he is permitted to remain with his wife 
as if nothing had occurred. 
From Hida's discussion it is quite evident that he contends that 
were a man presently to be restored to life he would immediately 
be obligated in commandments and the laws of marriage are at once 
binding upon him. Otherwise there will be no room for his entire 
discussion. 2° Furthermore, both Ritba (R. Yom Tov b. Avraham Ishbili) 
and Rashba (R. Solomon b. Abraham Ibn Adret) have remarked that the 
Talmud implies that the dead who were resurrected by Ezekiel imme-
d . t l d h . bl. . . dm 21 la e y resume t elr o lgatlon ln comman ents . 
Thus R. Wasserman's contention that were a dead person restored to 
life at any time he would immediately be absolved of Mitzvot is 
altogether inconclusive. His thesis that absolvement of command-
ments is not a function of time remains unproven. lhis is a signi-
ficant observation, as it gives rise to the conviction that there 
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will conceivably be a time during which the commandments will become 
h l . bl h . d 22 outmoded because t ey are not app 1ca e to t at per1o . 
Marital Status upon Resurrection 
R. Joseph Hayyim b. Elijah al-1-lakhamof Baghdad was renowned as a 
great halakic authority to whom questions were addressed by Sephardic 
communities throughout the world. At the end of each section of his 
collection of responsa, Rav Pe'alim, he devoted a separate section 
to a discussion of questions concerning theological and kabbalistic 
issues, entitled Sod Yesharim. 
In one of these responsa R. Joseph Hayyim discusses Hida's ruling 
as well as the abolishment of commandments in the time to come . 
R. Joseph Hayyim found it necessary to devolve into this discussion 
in order to answer another intriguing question to which he addressed . 
That is the fascinating question of whether a widow who subsequently 
remarries will be reunited with her first husband during the time 
of the resurrection or whether she will return to her second husband. 
According to the laws of Torah, once a woman has remarried she may 
not return to her former husband. 23 R. Joseph Hayyim also points 
out a corollary question. If a man married the sister of his deceased 
wife by levirate marriage how will he retain both sisters as wives 
during the resurrection (as the Torah forbids the marriage of two 
sisters to the same husband). 
R. Joseph Hayyim then proceeds to resolve these questions by stipu-
lating that marriage is a physical bond created in the union of two 
bodies and dissolves upon the death of these bodies. Furthermore, 
the body in which one is restored to life during the resurrection is 
a new body of changed configuration and looks. For all that remains 
of the original body is bones, and especially when even the bones 
have returned to dust and all that remains of the original body is 
a tiny bone called niskoi. 24 Thus, even according to the opinion 
that the commandments will not be absolved in the time to come, a 
widow may be reunited with her first husband since the original body 
of her first husband is dead forever and the new body in which he 
is restored is not related to his former body. And likewise, a 
man may retain two sisters whom he acquired through levirate marriage 
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since these sisters will be resurrected in new bodies. They will, 
therefore, become unrelated and considered as two strangers. 
Nonetheless, the spiritual bond which was created between the souls 
in marriage is not severed by death, and hence these souls will 
return to their original partners during the resurrection. And 
there is no lawful impediment against this reunion since the bodies 
to which these souls are to be released will be newly-created bodies 
which were never previously united in marriage. 
Degrees of Death 
R. Joseph Hayyim regarded Hida's ruling concerning R. Zeira's wife 
as a challenge to his own thesis. For Hida ruled that subsequent 
toR. Zeira's resurrection by Rabbah he was not required to rewed 
his former wife as the marriage bond is automatically resumed once 
a deceased is restored to life. This seems to contradict blatantly 
R. Joseph r~yyim's thesis who rules that the physical marriage bond 
dissolves forever with death. He resolves this apparent contra-
diction by distinguishing between two types of death. One is in 
which the original body does not undergo any change after death and 
comes to life in exactly the same state as before death. The other, 
whereby the original body is reduced to dust and a new body is fashioned 
for it to which it comes to life. In the first instance the physical 
marriage bond does not dissolve with death. This was the case of 
R. Zeira, who did not undergo any physical change after death, 
and consequently his original marriage bond resumed immediately upon 
being restored to life. The latter instance is the case of R. Joseph 
~yyim, which deals with resurrection in the time to come when the 
bodies of all men will undergo complete change, becoming reduced to 
dust. Consequently, their marriage bond dissipates with death and 
will not resume upon resurrection, 
25 created. 
Rather, a fresh bond will be 
R. Joseph Hayyim's distinction in two kinds of death is similar to 
Hida, who, we recall, also distinguished between two kinds of death. 
The first is the "death of all men," in which the deceased remains 
dead. In this case, the marriage bond dissipates permanently. The 
secondisthe death of R. Zeira, where the deceased is restored to 
life soon after death, even before burial. In this case, the marriage 
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bond remains intact as he is regarded as if he had never died , 
being that his death was dissimilar to the death of all men. 
Thus, in considering the parameters of life and death in Chapter IV, 
we have to deal with two more determinants. According to Hida 
death is not only defined as the cessation of life, but also 1n 
remaining in a continual state of death, as similar to death of all 
men. This is a valuable principle regarding the much discussed 
field of medical ethics. For according to this criterion death 
ld "l be d . f l"f 26 wou not necessar1 y pronounce upon cessat1on o 1 e. 
According to R. Joseph Hayyim even after the deceased has remained 
dead for some time he is still not technically defined as dead until 
his return to dust. Therefore, were he restored prior to returning 
to dust he would be obligated in commandments, being that he is not 
technically defined as the "dead who are freed of Mitzvot. "27 
Although Hida differentiates between the "time span" of death, that 
is, the duration of time that the deceased has remained dead, R. 
Joseph Hayyim differentiates in the biological nature of death, 
that is, the degree of organic decomposition the deceased has under-
gone . 28 When G-d proclaimed to Adam, "for dust thou art and unto 
dust thou shalt return," He was conveying to man a definition of 
29 death short of which he is not technically considered as dead. 
According to Hida, who is not so much concerned with the biological 
state of death as much as with the permanency of death, should a 
man comply with the biological definition of death and then become 
returned to life soon afterwards, he would not be defined as dead, 
since his return to life is not analogous to the death of all men. 30 
Consequently, he would still be obligated in commandments. Hence, 
in the view of Hida it is the time element of remaining dead over 
a prolonged period of time which is a vital factor in determining 
death and its concurrent exemption from Mitzvot. We recall R. 
Wasserman 's protestation that it is not "time" which absolved man 
of commandments but rather it is death. According to Hida, however, 
"time" is the more vital of the two elements since time itself is 
the essential criterion in defining death. 
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Future Marital Status as a Consequence for Current Marriage Laws 
The renown respondent, R. Hayyim Eliezer Waks was greatly perturbed 
by Hida's proof that were a person miraculously restored to life 
he would automatically revert to the same marital status prior to 
his death. R. Waks challenges that were this so, every widow in 
the world would be forbidden to remarry, perchance her hushand would 
miraculously be restored to life! 31 
While, Hida in Birkei Yosef claimed that if the deceased did not 
remain dead he is retroactively considered alive from the time of 
restoration, R. {,Jaks denies this, stating that he is pronounced 
dead immediately upon death, regardless of whether or not he might 
later on be restored to life. Should he later return to life, his 
wife would only become forbidden from that moment onwards. R. 
Waks claims that for this reason we are not worried in the case of 
every widow, perchance her dead husband will come to life. Since 
until that time he is considered dead, and we do not suspect that 
perchance he may live. 32 
R. Waks ' responsum is of no little halakic significance. For he . 
reveals that the seemingly recondite problem of whether one reverts 
to one's former marriage status once miraculously restored to life, 
as discussed by Birkei Yosef, has practical bearing on every widow 
in the world! R. Waks' responsum is also extremely valuable in 
challenging Birkei Yosef 's definition of death. For Birkei Yosef 
maintained that death is not confirmed upon cessation of life but 
rather only once the deceased has remained dead over a prolonged 
period of time. R. Waks challenges that were this so every \vidow 
would be forbidden to remarry, since immediately upon death, the 
husbands might theoretically still be considered alive. Since he 
has not remained dead for any length of time, she is consequently 
still attached to him. R. Waks re-establishes that death is 
completely confirmed upon cessation of life. If, by some miracle, 
her husband were restored to life, only then would she revert to 
her original married status. In the meanwhile, they are entirely 
unattached to one another, as the marriage bond dissolves with the 
cessation of life. Consequently, every widow is free to remarry . 
R. /\braham furnstein of Sochaczew, in an earlier responsum in /\vnei 
Nezer takes issue with R. Waks. Avnei Nezer attacks R. Waks ' thesis 
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that the marriage bond would immediately become restored upon the 
husband's revival, even though that bond was completely severed 
upon his dea th. Avnei Nezer recalls the principle, "keivan shepaska 
paska, " once (life has) teminated, it remains terminated. 33 This 
principle would not pose a difficulty to Hida's thesis in Birkei 
Yosef as according to him the marriage bond never terminated. Since 
the husband's revival is retrospective proof that he never died, 
the marriage bond remains intact throughout. R. Avraham Teomim 
in Responsa Hesed Avraham, challenges the principle that once the 
deceased is restored to life the marriage bond is immediately resumed. 
R. Teomim demurs that in the time to come all the dead will become 
restored to life. Were the bond automatically resumed upon restora-
tion of the marriage partner every widow in the world should be 
forbidden to remarry. Although R. Waks originally posed this same 
question in contesting Birkei Yosef, the identical question can 
still be posed to R. Waks. For although R. Waks pronounces the 
deceased partner dead upon cessation of life, he nevertheless 
concedes that upon his revival the marriage bond is resumed. R. 
Teomim challenges this point, since it would have bearing upon every 
widow. Thus according to R. Teomim the question of whether marriage 
partners will be restored to their original spouses in the time to 
come is halakically significant in understanding why widows are 
permitted to remarry today. 
R. Joseph Hayyim ' s specification of biological death would resolve 
R. Teomim 's demurral. No objection could be raised from the 
future resurrection, since by that time all the dead would have 
returned to dust, and their marriage bonds would have been long 
disbanded. However, we shall see that not all the I-hlakists 
support R. Joseph l-layyim's theory that the dissolution of the marriage 
bond depends on the thoroughness of one's death and it seems that 
R. Teomim would be amongs t them. 
Relation to Terumat ha-Deshcn 
R. llayyim b . Israel 11cnveniste (1603-1673), was renown as one of 
the greatest Jewish codifiers. His principal work, Keneset ha-Gedolah, 
was accepted hy hath Ashkenazic and Sephardic Rabbis as an authora-
. k f . l l 35 Th h d" h ta t1ve wor o- great pract1ca va ue. ere , e 1scusses t e 
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same question addressed by Birkei Yosef, R. Hayyim, R. Waks, and 
R. Teomim; and, in fact, views this problem as directly related 
to the original query in our discussion from Terumat ha-Deshen: 
Is the wife of Elijah or R. Joshua b. Levi permitted to rewed 
etc., Pesakim and Ketavim, no.102. The compiler said: 
The Rabbi [Isserlein] already wrote that the practical diffe-
rence [of this query] is, if someone were to merit [a similar 
fate] as them. And I say that there is a further practical 
difference when the dead will be resurrected. When the wife 
of Elijah or R. Joshua b. Levi will become resurrected, will 
she be permitted to remarry? For as long as her husband is 
living she may not [rewed], [or], since she has died her tie 
to her husband has become severed. And I am of the opinion 
that if a woman died an absolute death while under her husband 
and was again restored to life by a prophet, such as in the 
case of Elijah to the Zarephite's son, or Elisha to the Shuna-
mite's son, that the attachment of her husband has not severed 
from her, and she is not permitted to marry another man.36 
R. Benveniste claims that R. Isserlein's responsum has halakic 
significance not only in terms of the status of Elijah's wife in 
this world, but in the world to come as well. R. Benveniste rules 
that the marriage bond is not severed forever upon the death of 
one partner. And, therefore, as long as one of the partners remains 
alive, when the second partner is restored to life, the original 
marriage bond is automatically resumed again. Consequently, the 
r es tored partner is not permitted to rewed. However, this would 
not be so in the case of Elijah. Since R. Isserlein ruled that 
Elijah 's transformation to angel severed the marriage bond, thereby 
permitting his wife to remarry despite Elijah's still being alive , 
then in the world to come as well, once his wife 1s restored to life 
she is permitted to remarry. As Elijah's being in reality alive 
neither affects the status of his wife in this world nor in the world 
37 to come. 
We recall R. Joseph Hayyim's responsum, in which he ruled that the 
physical marriage bond is completely severed upon death and will 
not resume in the world to come, but rather will begin afresh. 
In the same responsum, R. Joseph Hayyim dispels any contradiction 
to his ruling which might stem from R. Benveniste. For R. Joseph 
Hayyim claims that even R. Benvensite concedes that once both part-
ners have died, the marriage bond is forever released, thus concurring 
with R. Joseph Hayyim. It is only if one of the partners remains 
,'11 i vc thn t R. 11cnvcni.s tc insists that the ori ginal marriage hond is 
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resumed upon restoration of the dead partner. It is the latter 
point of R. Benveniste which causes R. Joseph Hayyim considerable 
consternation: 
After deep forgiveness, I fail to see any reason or logic 
[in R. Benveniste ' s ruling] . Since the woman ' s body is obli-
terated and its identity undergoes complete change, what sort 
of attachment and relation does there remain for the husband 
to this body after it is resurrected. Isn ' t this woman ' s body , 
which comes to life after total death, a new countenance which 
has arrived hither? And how does the husband ' s body, which 
still lives, enhance or detract from the attachment which he 
had with that body?38 
It would appear that R. Benveniste took no notice of R. Joseph 
Hayyim ' s criticism because he did not accept the premise upon which 
R. Joseph Hayyim ' s criticism is based . That is, he did not distin-
guish between a biological death in which the corpse decomposes 
and returns to dust, to a death in which the corpse remains intact. 
Nor does R. Beneniste distinguish, as Hida, in the duration of time 
the deceased remains dead . For there is no difference to R. 
Benveniste whether the deceased was resurrected shortly after 
death or at the resurrection of all men in the time to come . 39 
It would appear that R. Benveniste did not consider ' death' per se 
as the major factor responsible for severing the marriage bond , 
neither in thoroughness of biological disintegration of the deceased , 
nor in the time span which elapses after death. Rather, it is 
tne relationship between the two which, for as long as one of the 
partners is alive , continues even after the death of the deceased partner 
The death of one partner only serves temporarily to ' freeze' the 
active manifestation of the relationship. However, upon restoration, 
the relationship automatically resumes. 40 
It is possible that R. Benveniste derived this perspective from 
the same Terumat ha-Deshen with which he deals . For R. Isserlein, 
in Terumat ha- Deshen, ruled that Elijah ' s marital relationship 
terminated upon his transcendence to an angel despite the fact 
Elijah never tasted death. From R. Isserlein's responsum, R. Ben-
veniste learned that it is not ' death ' per se which is fundamental 
to the severance of the marriage bond, but rather the ' relationship ' 
which is ultimately terminated only upon the death of both partners . 
The very query to which R. Benveniste addresses himself, namely, which 
- 170 -
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FUTURE WORLDS AND THIS WORLD 
factor is primarily responsible for the dissolution of the marriage 
bond, the death of thedeceased·partner or the discontinued relation-
ship of the live partner with the deceased, is identical to the 
original problem we posed at the onset of this work. Namely, what 
is it that ultimately liberates man from the obligation to adhere to 
the commandments in general, and of the obligation to divorce one 's 
wife to allow her to remarry in particular? Is it man's death, or 
the discontinuation of man's relationship with G-d and his fellow-
men which incur upon death? We have seen all through the work that 
the respondents were widely divided over this matter and that this 
question has abundant ramifications regarding a host of physical and 
metaphysical issues. 
We noted that R. Teomim, as well, was not concerned to what extent 
of biological decomposition the deceased undergoes. Probably R. 
Teomim accords with R. Benveniste who maintains that it is the dis-
continued relationship which incurs upon death which terminates the 
marriage bond rather than death per se. However, R. Teomim rejects 
R. Benveniste's claim that the marriage relationship automatically 
resumes upon the restoration of the deceased partner. 41 
The Darkhei Noam Principle 
R. Teomim is not alone in expressing reservation on R. Benveniste's 
ruling. R. Isaac Zevi Lebovic in his halakic opus, Shulchan ha-
Ezer, quotes R. Nathan Landau, who poses a number of halakic compli-
cations which arise from R. Benveniste 's ruling. For example, 
suppose a man marries the sister of his deceased wife, and subsequently 
his deceased wife is resurrected, either miraculously by a prophet 
or in the time of resurrection. Would he still be permitted to the 
sister? Or, for instance, there is a Torah penalty that a man who 
rapes a virgin must remain married to her all the years of his life 
and he can never divorce her. Suppose this woman, whom he raped 
and married, had died and was subsequently restored to life. Would 
he still be required to remain married to her all the years of his 
life?42 Because of thes~ complexities and the more common complica-
tion of the live partner having remarried subsequent to the other 
partner ' s death and being faced with two marriage partners upon the 
former ' s revival, H. Teomim ruled that the Torah ethic of Darkei 
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Noam implores us to avoid these halakic complexities and unpleasant-
nesses which are concurrent with them. Therefore, we must regard the 
deceased spouse as permanently dead even in the event of a subsequent 
revival. 
However, it is uncertain whether the Torah ethic of Darkei Noam will 
be operative during the time of the resurrection. For the principle 
of Darkei Noam in this context is only applied to avoid unpleasantnesses 
1n the present arising from unforseen circumstances in the future. 43 
However, in the time to come, when the circumstances concurrent with 
the resurrection become normative rather than hypothetical, we will 
have no choice but to reckon with the massive onslaught of halakic 
complexities and entaglements , unpleasant as they may seem, which will 
inevitably ensue. 
In this sense it is certainly significant to contend with halakic 
issues that will arise in the time to come. For if that time is a 
period real to life, which will become faced with real halakic 
issues similar to our own, nay more, is a period which, as a funda-
mental principle of faith we daily strive towards, and in fact what we 
have to look forward to at the same time is a period engulfed in an 
endless chain of convolut~d halakic enmeshments and befuddlements 
f h h . h d h. 11 f . . . 44 o t e 1g est or er - t 1s ca s or ser1ous 1ntrospect1on. 
Furthermore, if Halaka is the flawless eternal system it claims to be, 
these questions must be reconciled, if for no other reason than to 
\vithstand the test of its own integrity and infallibility. Perhaps 
these problems were some of the factors which motivated many of the 
Rabbis to conclude that "the Mitzvot will become abolished in the 
time to come. " 
Eschatology as a Halakic Basis for Resolving Present Issues 
~~ereas R. Benveniste regarded his discussion as a further outcome 
of R. Isserlein's responsum, R. Judah b. Israel Aszod (1794-1896) 
regarded this issue as fundamental in understanding the whole basis of 
R. Jsserlein ' s responsum . Among the collection of responsa, Teshuvot 
Maharei (morenu ha-Rav Judah Aszod), also called Yehudah Ya ' aleh, is a 
responsum which deals in its entirety with Terumat ha-Deshen. R. Aszod 
begins his responsum by questioning the source upon which R. Isserlein 
- 172 -
TI IE RELATIONSI liP BETWEEN THE FUTURE WORlDS AND TI-IIS \\IORLD 
based his ruling that Elijah's wife is permitted to remarry. For 
the Mishna in Kiddushin lists only two ways in which a woman acquires 
her freedom from her husband: either through death or by divorce. 
\~ereas in Elijah 's case neither occurred. To this difficulty R. 
Aszod responds: 
And it seems to me that the wife of R. Joshua b. l~vi is in-
cluded among the women who acquire their freedom through the 
death of a husband, for she has acquired her freedom from the 
heavens. And the philology of death connotes vanishment from 
this world. And to the contrary, it seems to me there is proof 
to his [R. Isserlein's] ruling from the initial position of 
Kiddushin which maintains that one need not derive from Scripture 
that a woman acquires her freedom through her husband's death, 
for it is logical- 'he [the husband] bound her, hence he frees 
her.' [i.e.,] since he is not in the world and will not return 
again until the Resurrection. If so, for this reason the wife 
of R. Joshua b. Levi is certainly free as well, for it makes 
no difference whether his body ascended to be buried in the 
heavens or to be buried in the ground. And this [the case of 
R. Joshua b. Levi 's wife] is also preferable to it [the standard 
case in Kiddushin]. For even during the resurrection when the 
dwellers of dust will awake and sing, it is written, 'when I 
have opened your graves and caused you to come out of your 
graves .' But certainly Enoch and Elijah and R. Joshua b. Levi, 
then too during the time of the Resurrection, will not return to 
the corporeal states they were originally. But rather, their 
bodies will remain spiritual, because [of the rule], 'we may rise 
only to a higher level of sanctity, but may not degrade to a lower 
level.' And it is more logical to free his [R
4 
Joshua b. Levi's] 
wife, since 'he bound her, hence he frees her.' 5 
R. Aszod explains tht R. Isserlein based his ruling on the premise 
that just as a woman acquires her freedom through the death of her 
husband, so did the wives of R. Joshua b. Levi and Elijah acquire 
their freeclor:1 up<)n the death of their husbands. For death connotes 
disappearance from this world and it makes no difference whether their 
bodies are buried in heaven or on earth. And since the Gemara assumes 
that it is logical that a woman should be freed upon her husband's 
death, even though her husband will return to life during the resurrec-
tion, then it is even more logicalthat the wives of R. Joshua b. Levi 
and Elijah should acquire their freedom upon their husbands' disappearance, 
for they are gone forever and will not return in bodily form during 
the resurrection. Since Elijah and R. Joshua b. Levi attained a high 
level of sanctity by becoming spiritual , they will not be reduced to 
a lower level of scantity by returning to their corporeal status during 
resurrection . 
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R. Aszod continues that all this is well according to the initial 
position of Kiddushin. Ilowever, according to the conclusion of the 
Gemara, it is not sufficient to deduce through logic that a woman 
acquires her freedom upon her husband's death. Rather, this must be 
derived by means of applying the hermeneutic principle of Hekesh 
(juxtaposition). R. Aszod questions that since the Gemara in its 
conclusion requires a Hekesh, of necessity the wife of an angel is 
still forbidden to remarry. In a final attempt to rectify Terumat 
ha-Dehsen, R. Aszod writes: 
And one must answer that only the wife of an angel is excluded 
from the [prohibition of taking the] wife of one's fellowman, 
because he will no longer return to his corporeal state. That 
is not so in the case of death, for she is still designated the 
wife of one's fellowman, both because of the past, in that she 
already was his wife, and because of the future during the resur-
rection when the bodies will return to life. And one who is due 
to come to life is likened to the living, and she will become 
the wife of one ' s fellowman . And, therefore, it is necessary 
to learn that she is permitted. So it seems to me. 
R. Aszod explains that because in the time to come the bodies are due 
to become restored to life, one would regard the deceased husband as 
if he were still living and his widow would still be considered the 
wife of one's fellowman, which she was beforehand and still indeed 
becomes once more. TI1erefore, the Hekesh is necessary to teach that 
she is no longer considered the wife of one's fellowman subsequent to 
her husband's death and hence she is permitted to re-marry. However, 
since R. Joshua b. Levi and Elijah are not due to become resurrected, 
there is no reason to continue regarding their wives as married women 
and, therefore, one does not need the Hekesh to teach that they are 
permitted. 
From R. Aszod's responsum one sees clearly that eschatological notions 
such as the resurrection in the time to come are not only outcomes of 
R. Isserlein 's responsum, but are ftndamental as a halakic basis for 
deriving the validity of his ruling. For according to R. Aszod it is 
only because Elijah and R. Joshua b. Levi will not be resurrected in 
the future that their spouses are permitted to rewed in the present . 
Were they subject to resurrection their wives would not be permitted 
to remarry since they would not be included under the Hekesh, and, 
there would be no other source or basis for R. Isserlein's ruling. 46 
R. Aszod is unique in his espousing that Elijah and R. Joshua b. Levi 
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will not become resurrected or return in a corporeal form. Although 
the respondents debated whether or not Elijah's body 'died' upon his 
ascension, none seem to doubt that he will eventwally return during 
the resurrection in bodily form, either his own or another. Nor do 
any seem to relate the dictum, "we may only be elevated in levels of 
sanctity and may not be degraded in levels," to Elijah's returning in 
corporeal form, as indeed they speak of such a return quite resolutely. 
Had R. Aszod imagined that these angels would return during the resur-
rection in corporeal form, he would have considered R. Isserlein's 
ruling without basis, if not erroneous. Once again we evince an 
instance where serious contemplation of the reality and the events 
which are to transpire in the world to come, are important components 
of halakic decision-making, which directly affect laws related speci-
fically to this world. 47 
This very question which medieval Jewish philosophers debated exten-
sively, whether the Resurrection in the time to come will be one of 
souls alone or both soul and body has practical bearing upon R. Isser-
lein's responsum. 48 For according toR. Aszod, R. Isserlein's ruling 
is only valid if Elijah and R. Joshua b. Levi will be resurrected in 
soul alone. Otherwise, there is no source which permits their spouses 
to rewed men in this world without prior divorce. According to the 
other respondents Elijah and R. Joshua b. Levi will be resurrected 
in body as well. Nevertheless, R. Isserlein's ruling was accepted 
by these respondents as being halakically bona fide. 
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1. CONTEMPOlWW CONSEQUENCES 
Thus far we have devoted our discussion primarily to an in-depth 
analysis of the ex is ten tial reality of transcendental man. We have 
endeavoured to delineate how the determining of his existential reality 
and his affiliation with the extraterrestrial worlds insofar as they 
c 1 m:-Hy his position in this world, are necessary in order to fa thorn 
the n~ny intricate difficulties contained within and contingent upon 
the ruling of Terumat ha-Deshen. In this chapter we shall focus 
our attention upon what practical halakic valueR. Isserlein's ruling 
was able to contribute in resolving various halakic issues, while 
this section will concentrate on contemporary issues in particular. 
\.Je have already seen in the previous chapter that R. Benveniste con-
sidered the question of whether Elijah will be reunited with his 
spouse in the hereafter, a practical outcome of R~ Isserlein's ruling. 
Although we discussed how this outcome is beneficial in understanding 
the logical basis of R. Isserlein 's ruling, there are a considerable 
number of much more direct practical consequences of far-reaching 
benefit for which R. Isserlein's responsum served to contribute immense 
halakic import. 
Test Tube Babies 
R. Moshe Hirschler, in his contemporary work, Halaka and Medicine, 
found R. Isserlein's ruling eruditely instructive in resolving the 
issue on test tube babies. 1 R. Hirschler points out that although 
medical science has leaped forward great strides in enabling harren 
women to realize motherhood by successfully developing test tube 
fertilization and its subsequent implantation in the mother's womb, 
medical science has not yet achieved its ultimate aspiration of bringing 
a fetus to full development in a laboratory outside the mother's womb. 
Nevertheless, the day is soon approaching when such test tube creations 
will be promenading the face of the earth and Halakists will soon 
h<1vc to prepare thcmse 1 vcs to con ten<'l with the nui.·,arous hn l<1 kj c r:-tmi-
fications concerning these test tube babies. 
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R. llirschler begins his halakic analysis by discussing the existen-
ti<'tl reality of a test tube baby. He questions whether this entity 
which possesses human characteristics and idiosyncrasies, ye t was 
produced by genetic science without fertilization, without a womb, 
and without childbirth- if this entity is considered a 'man, ' like 
all men. In which case, 'he' would incur all of the responsibilities 
contingent with society and family life. R. Hirschler considers the 
ramifications concerning the obligations associated with the laws of 
society which govern human life, morality, and jurisdiction. He 
states that without a doubt one would initially require the assistance 
of psychological and neurological research and all other fields of 
scientific research concerning human behaviour, in order to obtain 
an existential identity for mankind in all matters concerning intelli-
gence, cognitive skills, emotion, and perception. We should accu-
rately ascertain man's existential reality: Is it an utterly humanis-
tic phenomenon to include test tube creations who by definition would 
be deemed worthy of belonging to the human race despite the genetic 
constitutent? Are his personality, his nature, his character, and 
his mannerisms all expressed in the definition of his status as a 
man? On the other hand, R. Hirschler continues, one might regard 
this phenomenon from another angle. That is, to regard test tube 
creations as mere semblances of men, in the sense of lifelike automa-
tions, or highly intelligent and developed ' plants, ' or perhaps the 
shadows of ' angels' \~10 are not born unto women. That despite all 
their humanistic qualities and characteristics, nevertheless they 
stand apart from the existential laws which pertain to those born 
unto women and they therefore do not belong to the human race. 
R. 1-lirschler goes even one step further, claiming that it might be 
possible to obtain a definition whereby one could exclude them com-
pletely from human society to the extent that it might even be 
permissible to destroy them without equating such an abhorrent act 
with murder. Such a problem would arise during the initial stages 
of experimentation. If, for some reason, scientists envision un-
expected complications to arise from a particular test tube experiment . 
Would they be permitted to throw these creations to waste? Would 
this constitute murder? All these considerations, though they seem 
incredible, are nevertheless legitimate and they require further 
halakic verification. 
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Golem (Homunculus) 
R. Hirschler reveals that, although there do not exist, to his know-
ledge , any halakic sources which deal directly with this problem, 
there are two discussions which deal with very similar issues to the 
one at hand. The first discussion deals Hith the unnatural creation 
and is found among the Responsa of R. Zevi Hirsch ben Jacob Ashkenazi 
(1660-1718) , known as Hakham Zevi. Hakham Zevi was asked whether a 
golem (automated homunculus), which was produced by agency of the 
Book of Creation, such as the one reported to have been produced by 
his grandfather, R. Elijah of Chelm, could be counted for a minyan 
(a religious quorum). R. Ashkenazi responded that R. Zeira would 
not have ordered the golem automation conjured up by Rabbah to return 
to dust , as is related in the Talmud, if Rabbah's automation was of 
sufficient worth to count for a minyan. In addition, there exists 
no question of manslaughter, for the verse stipulates: "Who so 
sheddeth the blood of a man in [by] a man, his blood shall be shed ," 
implying, only for a man who is formed "within a man." That is, 
only for a fetus who developed in his mother's womb can one be cul-
pable for manslaughter, but not for destroying Rabbah's automation, 
which had not originated within the womb of a woman. 2 
R. llirschler suggests that perhaps one can derive a general definition 
of 'man ' from R. Ashkenazi's responsum. Namely, that one who is 
not formed "within a man" is not consider ed to belong to the human 
race for all matters, including murder. However; on closer scrutiny , 
R. llirschler suggests that the two cases are dissi1nilar. l•'or llakham 
Zevi 's case deals with one who was produced by agency of the Book of 
Crea tion as a supernatural creation which has no relevance to the 
natural order of the world. Of such a creation it is proper to ask 
whether it belongs to the human race. However, a test tube creation 
is a natural phenomenon, produced through sperm-egg fertilization with 
its O\m placenta, and develops according to natural laws. 
On the other hand, R. Hirschler points out that R. Ashkenazi ruled 
that one is not culpable for shedding the blood of one who was not 
formed within a woman's womb. Consequently, even if one were to 
delennine thn t a Lcs l Lube creation be longs to the hurn<Jn C;"~cc, one 
mi ght s t i ll be permitted to 'wash out' the contents of an undesicable 
tes t tube, and possibly it would he forbic1den to violate Jewi sh ]nws, 
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such as the Sabbath, in order to save the life of a test tube creation. 
If that were the case, R. Ilirschler provocatively surmises, that had 
First Man been murdered, the murderer might not have been culpable 
for the crime. For although Adam belonged to the human race, he 
did not develop within a woman's womb, but rather was formed by the 
'hands ' of G-d Himself. 
The second case which R. Ilirschler believes pertinent to the discus-
sion is our responsum of Terumat ha-Deshen. R. Hirschler notes how 
R. Tsserlein resolved the question of Elijah's halakic status by 
drawing an analogy from the Talmud in Niddah. R. Hirschler explains 
the analogy saying that just as the Shunamite's son was "dead, " in 
every sense of the word, yet because of his transformation to life 
he could no longer be considered dead. Similarly Elijah, despite 
the fact that he is alive in every respect, because of his transforma-
tion to an angel, can no longer be regarded as a fellow man. He 
has completely eclipsed the normal framework of creation, \mich has 
clearly defined parameters regarding mankind and creation. Likewise, 
R. llirschler claims, it is possible to regard a test tube creation 
as either a non-person or dead, despite its being imbued \vith life. 
Since it does not fall within the natural framework of creation nor 
does it correspond to the conventional definitions of man. 3 
R. Ilirschler remarks that R. Isserlein's responsum seems very removed 
from reality. Yet, nevertheless, fhlakis ts deal \vith this very issue . 
R. Hirschler musefully suggests that perhaps these Halakists envisioned 
a future epoch which would witness living and thinking creatures and 
people who belong to another plane, yet they propagate themselves in 
the incubators and hotbeds of mankind. 
According to R. Hirschler, R. Isserlein's responsum is of enormous 
practical halakic value in that it establishes the existential reality 
of a person belonging to another plane, which is vital in order to 
determine the existential reality of the world's future test tube 
babies. It is intriguing to note as well, that Hakham Zevi's respon-
sum concerning the existential status of a golem , a responsum which 
was conventionally considered purely theoretical, according to R. 
~lirschler is of immeasurable practical significance. It is construc-
tive in determining the existential reality of test tube babies. 
~Je have already seen in Chapter III.2 how R. Sofer employed llakham 
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Zevi ' s rcsponsum in determining whether a synagogue may be converted 
to a house of study . 
Most fascinating is R. 1-!irschler's cofllTlent that R. Isserlein and other 
halakic colleagues who dealt with R. Isserlein's responsum possibly 
envisioned a future period of test tube creations not yet conceived 
by men living in their generation . If R. 1-!irschler's theory is 
correct, this shows that discussions in Responsa literature Hhich 
appear to our limited lmowledge as purely theoretical and specula-
tory, having no practical relevance to reality whatsoever, could 
well have been written with such prophetic foresight by the authors 
of these ancient responsa, that they envisioned periods of ulterior 
forms of existence, which are unknown even to the most imaginative 
and ingenuitive minds found among modern scientists. 4 
Ovarian and Embryonic Transplants 
Indeed Maimonides attested to that fact that the prophets themselves 
depicted various phenomena which we will not comprehend their meaning 
until they occur . Today, for example, we know that the prophetic 
verse, "Sing, 0 barren woman who could not give birth ..• for many 
shall be the children of the desolate," could well have been intended 
to include barren mothers who are now able to conceive as a result 
of test tube fertilization. 5 This verse, which was a complete 
enigma in former times and could only be understood metaphorically, 
or if intended literally, as sheer miracle, can now be understood 
simply in terms of ordinary scientific technique. It is in this 
novel field of fertilization aided by ovarian and embryonic surgery 
that once again we find precendent in the rabbinic literature of old. 
Rabbi Dr. Jonathan Sacks, in an articleon test tube babies, discusses 
the question of determining maternity where an ovum was taken from 
one woman and after fertilization was implanted in another . Whose 
child is it? The genetic mother's, or the host mother's? R. Sacks 
remarks that although this question arose earlier in the century regard-
ing ovarian transplants, it is generally agreed that a transplanted 
organ takes on the identity of the recipient. The question, however, 
remains whether the same is true for an embryo . In resolving 
this issue R. Sacks writes: 
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Strangely enough , it is here , in relation to a startling new 
development in medical techniques , that we find a precise pre-
cedent in ancient rabbinic literature . A tradition is recorded 
about Leah, wife of Jacob . She had six sons--and Jacob ' s two 
handmaids had two sons each . When she became pregnant for 
the seventh time she had known by prophetic foresight that Jacob 
would have twelve sons . 1nus had she given birth to a boy, 
that would have left only one son to be born ot Rachel . And 
her sister would then have had the humiliation to have given 
birth to fewer sors than the handmaids do . The child in Leah ' s 
womb was in fact a boy . She prayeu for it to be a girl . And 
so, by a miracle, the fetus was transferred to Rachel, who even-
tually gave birth to it and called him Joseph . Joseph, in 
other words , had Leah as his genetic mother and Rachel as his 
host mother . And he was of course, Rachel ' s son . 6 
Although R. Sacks concedes that this proof is not conclusive, as 
there are several legal passages in the Talmud that have bearing 
upon whether a child ' s relationship to its mother is determined by 
the moment of conception or of birth . Nevertheless, R. Sacks has 
demonstrated a clear instance where even the most advanced scientific technique 
can find its parallel equivalentin ancient rabbinic literature. 
Scientists are presently referring to parenthood by resorting to 
formulas because biology is now creating concepts of parenthood faster 
than society can define them . The reproductive possibilities remain 
so novel that terms are lacking to describe the relationships they 
create . These new techniques have raised all sorts of politically 
explosive moral questions . Professor A. Capron, professor of law 
at Georgetown University explains that there are no federal laws in 
the United States to guard against the dangers of exploitation and 
manipulation . The state and local laws ' ~ave sprouted into thickets 
of illogicality and contradiction ." Dr. Freed, the head of American 
Bar Association's family law section committee on research opines, 
"It ' s going to take years of debate, legislation, trial and error to 
figure out how to deal with these problems ." While 3 . Gorovitz, 
professor of philosophy at the Unviersity of Maryland at a House 
subcommittee chaired by Congressman A. Gore Jr. described : "He have 
a patchwork of laws and gaps, stigmas and deprivations, confusions 
and fears. "7 
It is comforting to note that while legalists are groping in the dark 
to unravel these perplexities which science has now produced , Jewish 
tradition long ago equipped contemporary r~lakists with precedents 
in the ancient rabbinic writings with which to effectively resolve 
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these novel issues . 8 
Like R. Hirschler, R. Sacks states that the possibility of a fetus 
being brought to full development without having matured in the womb , 
and moreover the cloning technique , will call for reconsideration of 
our definitions of personhood as well as parenthood . In the same 
manner as R. Ilirschler, R. Sacks recalls the responsum of Hakham Zevi , 
who discussed the status of artificallycreated life, over three hundred 
years ago . R. Sacks takes note of the responsum ' s obiter dictum that 
taking a life applies only to "something formed as a foetus in a 
mother ' s womb ." Accordingly, R. Sacks questions whether a foetus 
brought to full maturity in a laboratory would thus be no more than 
a mere golem? 
We have already discussed R. Hirschler ' s differentiation between 
J~kham Zevi ' s responsum and test tube creations . Nonetheless, both 
from R. Hirschler and R. Sacks we can readily discern how responsa, 
which superficially seem highly remote and theoretical, can be immea-
surably valuable in resolving halakic issues which pertain even to 
the most advanced techniques of scientific experimentation. Just 
because science and technology had not yet sufficiently advanced to 
the level of those questions dealt with in the Responsa literature , 
does not mean that in the minds of the respondents these were not 
practical questions. Whether the extraterrestrial creation is engen-
dered via prayer, the Book of Creation, or sheer scientific technique 
is highly irrelevant . In each case the desired result is the same 
and must be halakically defined and recknoned with. 
Heart Transplants 
The question of establishing maternity in the case of an ovary trans -
plant , mentioned by R. Sacks , is taken up by R. Eliezer Waldenberg 
(b. 1917) , a Jerusalem Rabbi of note, in his responsa collection, 
Tzitz Eliezer . 9 Ile arrives at this question in discussing a related 
issue of establishing the identity of the recipient of a heart trans -
plant. R. Waldenberg remarks that the heart is the "ruling king" 
of all the organs, and the living being lives entirely according to 
the movements of his heart .10 TI1e heart transmits strength to the 
two main organs , which are the brain and the liver . 11 As a result, 
all the forces of Jlfe which vitalize this heart recipient are now 
- 182 -
TilE RELEVANCE OF TO'S RESPONSUM: CONTeMPORARY CONSEQUENCES 
derived from the strength of another man from whom his heart was 
taken. Whether he (the donor) be male or female, Jew or Gentile, 
fit or unfit (i.e., bastard, etc .), the essence of the one person is 
now channeled through the oody of another man. 
The question facing R. Waldenberg was how to determine the identity 
and kinship relations of the recipient from now on. Whether new 
laws would pertain to him concerning unfit family relations, etc ., 
since the essence of his life , which is the heart, originates from 
another man. As it states in Proverbs 4:23, "Aoove all that thou 
guardes t keep they heart, for out of it are the issues of life." 
R. Waldenberg writes that he himself has read and is aware of existen-
tialist writings concerning the psychological and spiritual effects 
upon heart transplant patients. He submits that the recipient does 
not in any manner relate or take on the identity of the donor for 
a number of reasons. Just as one could not call an artifical (mecha-
nical) heart implanted by mortal man in the oody of another, "the 
king of organs," for aoout such a heart was it said, "and of it are 
the issues of life," similarly, the same would be true in our case . 
Rather, one must say that transplants enable life already stored up 
within the recipient Is oody to flow freely throughout the oody. As 
similar to those living creations which have no hearts, such as snakes 
and scorpions. 12 Consequently, this heart becomes completely sub-
servient to the body of the recipient . 
1{. \.Jaldenberg reinforces his thesis by citing the Zohar, which states 
that G-d stored man's vitality and strength in the centre of man's 
body .13 It is only because the heart is situated in that same 
area that it became the core of the body's strength. However, this 
relationship between the heart and the centre force of the body, which 
Zohar describes, only exists when it is specifically designed as 
such by the Creator of man from the beginning of his creation. Only 
then does there exist a natural symbiotic relation between the centre 
of the hody nnd the henrt. 1l1e comm<md over strength and r.u 1 ership 
over life is transferred to the heart as a natural process. However, 
this is not the case when the heart is severed from its natural source 
o[ life in one body and is then artificially attacl:ed to the centre of 
:mothc>r m:m ' s hocly. Conscqt Jently, 1~. Wc1ldenherg de fines th0 r 0cipi ent 
ns a treif<1, the same status accorded to those who are living corpses, 
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\vhcre <'lec1 th i s j nmi nen t. 
R. \Jal<'lenberg further bolsters his argument by questioning whether 
the · ~eart and lung machine" from which the patient lives and breathes 
during the course of the operation , could this contraption be consid-
ered the "king of all organs?" Furthermore, what status should be 
given to plastic hearts and the like , which are now being designed? 
He would digress to an absurd situation of those "~mo say to a stick, 
I 1 f h I d I I b f I " 14 '1 ou art my at er, an to a stone, t1ou hast rought us -orth . 
~breover, R. Waldenberg explains, the moment the heart is extracted 
from the donor there is at once a brief jnstant of a heart without 
a body . At that moment all identification and association with the 
donor ' s body is severed from it . For a heart without a body cannot 
even be called a heart at all , as at that moment it is comparable to 
a dangling limb or a random piece of flesh . Consequently, \~len i t 
is replanted and adjoined to another body it is considered a new 
organ and can only now be called a heart again , because of the new 
body to which it has been attached . Therefore , all of the new hear-t ' s 
associations aLe only with regards to the new b0dy to which it becomes 
adjoined. R. Waldenberg proves his contention that a heart which 
is severed from a body cannot be ·. considered a heart, by citing Maimo-
ni<'les ' Cui<'le, in his discussion of the unity of the cosmos, which 
~~imonides compares to the anatomy of a man: 
For just as it is impossible that the limbs of a man should 
exist separately; while being truly the part of a man, I mean 
to say that the liver should exist separately or the heart should 
exist separately or the flesh should exist separately, so it is 
impossible that the parts of the world should exist in this per-
manent existence without one another in such a way that light 
should exist without the earth or the earth without heaven or 
the heaven without earth .15 
R. \Jaldenberg utilizes this Maimonidean premise to resolve the issue 
of determining maternity in the case of an ovary . transplant as mentioned 
16 by R. Sacks , and discussed by a number of respondents . R. Walden-
berg asserts that according to Maimonides it is clear that once the 
ovaries are extrapulated from the female donor, the entire association 
between the ovaries and the donor ' s body is completely severed as the 
ovaries are considered dead flesh . Once these ovaries are implanted 
in ~IIJoLheL- living body, Lhey bec.olnc new ocgans , and all Lhe i 1~ [uLtwe 
rel:1tions anci c1ssoci<1tions are to this li_vi_ng body alone . 
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Finally, R. Waldenberg explains , that man's existential identity 
and relations are not determined independently by the various parts 
of the body, no matter how important the organ is. Rather, it is 
determined by his spirit and soul, which comprise his essence. As 
R. Sofer correctly writes in his biblical corrrnentary that a hociy 
is not a man but rather a sheath made of dust. 17 In this material 
sheath lies man who is the "inner intellect," whose knowledge and 
reasoning is his principal character. R. Waldenberg continues: 
It is the force which governs man that is man's essence, and 
all the limbs without exception, which are governed by this 
force are servile to this essence . And so did Maimonides write 
in his Guide: 'In this human individual there is a force 
that connects the parts of his body with the other, that governs 
them, provides every part of the body with what is needed for 
the safeguarci of its well being, [1110 WDrcls off fcom it LhDt 
which harms, namely, the force of which the physicians have 
clearly spoken anci whi.ch they have cies ignated as the force 
governing the body of living beings .' And furthermore, we 
have found in Maimonides ' Guide, written that the term 'heart' 
is an 'equivocal term,' which designates thought, advice, will, 
and intellect. 
And because this ~s so, it is clear that the heart as well sub-
mits before the identity and relation of the independent force 
within the organic body which governs it [the heart] as well, 
and thcough it [the focce], it [the heact] receivel
8
its (onn 
according to thedegree of its activity within him. 
In conclusion, R. Waldenberg recounts a midrashic disputation between 
the Sages , R. Eliezer and R. Joshua over which place in the body 
cioes wisdom reside .19 R. Eliezer maintains that wisdom resides in 
the head, while R. Joshua maintains that wisdom resides in the heart. 
It is stated there that King David agreed with R. ·Eliezer and King 
Solon1on wiLh R. Joshua. l{. Waldenberg infers that all are in agree-
ment that the residing place of the soul is in the mind. lie cites 
R. llayyim Volozhiner in his Nefesh ha-Hayyim who writes : 
The residing place of the spirit is the heart ••• , however, 
the rational faculty is on the level of the soul, which teaches 
men knowledge and understanding of the holy Torah . Its princi-
pal residing place is in the 2~ind, the vessel of thought . lt is highest level among them. 
Therefore, R. Waldenberg explains, even if we wish to associate man ' s 
existential reality with the "King" which governs him, we must asso-
ciate this King more with the mind. /\s for the mind, there is verily 
no possibility of transplanting a mind to another body, as is the 
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consensus of many physicians. 
R. Waldenberg's responsum is invaluable to our discussion for a num-
ber of reasons. Firstly, because he deals with a real and practical 
problem of establishing the identity of the recipient of a heart 
transplant. This is an important halakic question, as it has tremen-
dous ramifications in determining his religious denomination as 
Jew or Gentile, the family and ethnic group to which he belongs, his 
classification within the community of Israel as Priest, Levite, 
or Israelite , fit or unfit, the people to which he is eligible for 
marriage, establishing paternity and maternity in the case of off-
spring, and a host of other classifications and categories upon 
~1ich a plethora of permissible and forbidden halakic activity is 
contingent . Secondly, because R. \~aldenberg clearly shows that in 
order to resolve this issue, one must involve oneself a priori in 
one of the most complex and potent philosophical puzzles in the his-
tory of mankind. That is, the problem of how to arrive at an onto-
logical definition which accurately describes man's existential reality. 
W.1at is it ultimately which defines man as 'man '? Only a keen 
philosopher with keen expertise and knowledge in the field of ontology 
could be competent enough to tackle the issue cogently. TI1irdly, 
he bases his ruling upon Maimonides' Guide, which is a philosophical 
treatise. Yet, R. Waldenberg utilizes and incorboratesthese philo-
sophical data as halakic source material for resolving issues of 
determining identities of persons, establishing maternity, etc. 
It is most fascinating indeed to note how a brilliant l-lalakist of 
R. \Jaldenberg' s calibre incorporates Maimonides' discussion on the 
unity of the cosmos and his expounding of anthropomorphisms, as 
source material for which to render a halakic decision. 
Trans-Sexual Surgery 
In this same responsum, R. Waldenberg discusses another cognate issue 
and once again brings Terumat ha-Deshen to the fore; 
It is a great endeavour , however, to research the phenomenon 
of a qualitative organic change in a man's body , such as the 
transformation of one's sex from male to female or vice versa. 
And according to what I have heard and has been published in 
various articles, operations of this sort are performed even 
todny under srcci <ll cj rcums tctnCCS. Tn f\ (jlla 1 i tct tive chrmge 
such AS this, mAny problems verily develop concerning determin-
ing Lhc identity :md cx-istC'nt·i:ll distinctiveness ofsttch :t p0rson. 
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The entire halakic discussion of ascertaining the identity of a heart 
transplant patient is pertinent to resolving a very related halakic 
jssue. Namely, to establish the identity of one who has undergone 
a complete hormonal transition from male to female. 
R. Waldenberg cites the work of another respondent, R. 1-Iayyim Abraham 
b. Samuel Miranda, who saw in the writings of a saintly Jerusalem 
sage, an illustration of similar occurrences of male-female trans-
mutations.21 He also describes the matter how we do not find any 
differences between the characteristics of the male organs and female 
organs, except that the one's organs are internal and the other's 
orgnns are external ("for the female has internally a foreskin and 
testicles, although they are unlike the testicles of a male, etc. ") 
Because this is so, the author questions whether this woman is obli-
gated to undergo circumcision or not. 
R. Waldenberg writes that he saw a similar question in the work of 
22 R. Joseph Palache concerning the divorce proceedings in such a case. 
lie discusses the case of a man who married a virgin daughter of Israel 
and lived with her as husband and wife. After a few years it happened 
th<1t she became completely transformed to a man. What is the law con-
cerning this female, the wife of one's fellow man who became a male? 
Is her husband required to divorce her with a bill of divorce since 
his wife was "the wife of one's fellow man" (eshet ish), or perhaps 
it is not necessary, since she is no longer a woman but a man? 
In this regard R. Palache also discusses whether a woman who udner-
goes such a change can recite the daily morning prayer designated for 
a man : "Blessed art Thou, Oh Lord our G-d, King of the Universe, 
who has not made me a woman."23 
R. Waldenberg poses this question of whether a woman who becomes 
transformed to a man requires a bill of divorce is equally valid 
in the reverse case as well. When a man becomes transformed to a 
woman does his wife require a bill of divorce from him? And what 
if he becomes transformed to a man once again? R. Waldenberg 
divulges that R. Isserlein's responsum is eminently useful in resol-
ving this issue. Drawing an analogy toR. Isserlein's responsum, 
R. Waldenberg explains that, just as R. Isserlein ruled only the "wife 
of one's fellowman" is forbidden to rewed, but not the wife of an 
"angel ," similarly, only the "wife of one's fellowman" is forbidden 
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and not the wife of a "woman" (i.e., a man who became transformed 
to a woman). 
R. Waldenberg further, bolsters his analogy theTerumat ha-Deshen by 
quoting R. Joseph Rabad ' s Minhat Hinnukh, where he explains R. Tsser-
lein' s ruling by saying that because matrimony could never take ef feet 
between a woman and an angel to begin with, therefore even an already 
existing 111atcilllony would i11mediately become abrogated upon the man's 
trcmsformation to ange1 . 24 Similarly, R. Waldenberg claims, just 
as matrimony would never take effect between two women to begin with, 
so is an already existing matrimony immediatley dissolved upon the 
husband's transformation to woman. 
R. Haldcnberg ' s cesponsum clearly confirms that Terumat ha-Ocshen is 
of no small practical halakic significance. Indeed, the ruling of 
Terumat ha-Deshen is a fundamental basis for resolving any issue in 
which a person undergoes transformation of any kind. for R. Isser-
lein establishes that once a person undergoes transformation, he 
no longer relates to his prior person whatsoever. Indeed all those 
respondents whom we have quoted in this work, who maintained that 
H. Isscclcin's responsu111 only concerns Elijah ' s wife and docs not 
rertai.n to other relations or relEitionships which F.lijah pursues , would 
h~ve to investiga te thoroughly the identity of a heart trnnsplant 
recipient, the identity of a person who undergoes a complete sex 
change, the identity of test tube babies , and the identity of all 
people who undergo various transformation of sorts, in accordance 
with their interpretation of Terumat ha-Deshen. 
Similarly , we find many respondents who disagreed with R. Rahad 's 
inlerpretation of Terumat ha-Deshen upon which R. Waldenberg ' s ruling 
is based, as we shall see in the following section and understood 
Terumat ha-Deshen as saying exactly the reverse. Namely, that Elijah 
relates to his original status for all matters, which explains his 
observance of corrrnandments. llowever, certain adjustments must be 
incorporated to include his new reality which explains , for example, 
why he is no longer required to divorce his wife. Thus, hEtseci on 
Lhis in terpre ta tion, we find the exact opposite ruling of R. \.Jalden-
berg in Practical Medical Halakcl stating : 
Tf, in violation of Tornh l.Eiw, such a sex change oper Ation 
wEts performed, the individual maintains his pre-surgicet l sex 
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with all its halakic ramifications.25 
TI1e value of the respondents ' discussion of the future marital status 
upon resurrection, reviewed in the last chapter, is similar to the 
value of what is learned fcorn Tecumat ha-Deshen . for in tha t question 
the respondents examine whether one ' s newly transformed existential 
state (i.e . , life after death) reverts to the original marital status, 
or whether one is regarded as an entirely new entity from the moment 
of resurrection onward. Indeed, the very question and value of 
de termining whether one who undergoes existential change r el a tes to 
one 's ori ginal or newly acquirecl status, originates in the T.1lmucl . 
The same talmudic passage which R. Isserlein ingeniously cites in 
support of his ruling . Namely, the questions of "nonsense" which 
the Alexandrians addressed to R. Joshua b. llananiah in tractate Niddah:. 
"J)oes the wife of Lot convey impurity? Does the son of the Shunamite 
convey impurity?" According to R. Isserlein, the question of ''non-
sense" which the Talmud is essentially asking is:Does a person who 
undergoes transformation of being relate to his original existential 
status, or is he regarded as a new existential entity? It j s here 
tha t we see that even questions which the Talmud classifies as "non-
sense, " contain vital halakic material. Possibly a more appropriate 
term for nonsense would be "metaphysical," or " transcendental" in 
nature . 
'lhe term "nonsense" was merely employed to describe a situation which 
i s out of the orclinary amhit ancl na tur<tl course of events. Thi.s 
1s clear, as the Talmud is not in the habit of entertaining nonsensible 
cliscussions upon . its own admission . Rather, it is significantly 
beneficial for the Talmud and the respondents to pursue metaphysical 
discussions, as they are of practical halakic value in resolving trans-
cendental issues, such as the many issues which involve a trans formation 
of being from ones tate to another . 26 
Def inition of Widowhood 
R. Joseph Bordjel (spelled also Burgel, 1791-1857), in his work, Va-
Yikken Yosef, cliscusses a further practical consequence of Terumat 
ha-Deshen . R. Bordjel begins his discussion by questioning whether 
Lh0 wive's of f.lijnh nnd H • . loshtt.'l h. l.c'Vi mny l10. c lnssi fi 0d .1s "widows." 
More specifically, is a woman defined as a widow only in the event 
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o[ her husband's death? However, if her husband does not die but 
rather continues to live on another plane of existence, perhaps 
such a woman would not be classified as a widow? Or is a widow not 
only defined as a woman whose husband has actually died but also a 
woman whose husband no longer exists in this world? 
The resolution of this question has many consequences. For ·example, 
a High Priest is forbidden to marry a widow. Would the High Priest 
be forbidden to marry such a woman as well? Another example, the 
widow of a king is forbidden to remarry. Were a king to merit 
the same fate as Elijah and R. Joshua b. Levi, would his wife also 
be forbidden to remarry?27 In another example, if a man uttered 
a vow not to derive benefit from widows, would he be forbidden to 
derive benefit from these quasi-widows as well? 
R. Bordjel resolves this dilemma by employing Terumat ha-Deshen and 
various talmudic passages to prove that a woman is no longer consi-
dered the "wife of another man" upon her husband's transcendence. 
Therefore, at the point in time of transcendence, not only does 
she not require divorce, she is not considered a widow either since 
there is no "matrimony" for her to become widowed from. Consequently 
R. Bordjel concludes these women are not widows and therefore, a 
High Priest may marry such a woman. However, regarding a king, the 
prohibition or marrying a widow or taking a king's widow is because 
this woman is "a vessel which was used by another man," and, there-
fore, it makes no difference whether the man who "used" her died or 
met some other fate. With regards to one who vowed not to derive 
benefit from a widow, the vow would only apply to a woman whose 
husband died and not to these women. 
R. Bordjel's treatment of Terumat ha-Deshen raises an extremely im-
portant consideration concerning our work. If R. Bordjel is correct 
in concluding that a widow is not defined as a woman whose husband 
disappeared from earth and continues to live on another plane, but 
only as a woman whose husband died. · Then, if she isn't a widow, 
why isn't such a woman whose husband disappeared from earth considered 
an Aguna (an abandoned wife, whose husband disappeared without di-
vorcing her), who may not remarry any man, let alone a High Priest! 
Until now, most of the discussion, which we have seen concerning the 
difficulties contained in 'l'erumat ha-Deshen revolved around one main 
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problem. Namely, that the Talmud only specifies two methods in which 
a marriage can become terminated, either by divorce, or through the 
death of either spouse. 28 So on what basis did R. Isserlein rule 
that ~n's transcendence to angel terminates the marriage, thereby 
introducing a third factor which is nowhere considered? To which 
most of the respondents seem to concur that Elijah's transcendence 
was equivalent to death, as his wife was affected by his transcen-
dence as she would have been by his death. However, were that so, 
his wife should clearly be considered of equal status to a widow. 
Yet, according to R. Bordjel, none of the laws of widowhood applies 
to her! Therefore, the question remains, that if R. Bordjel doesn't 
consider Elijah's wife a widow, then her marriage did not become 
terminated by one of the two specified ways. Then why is she not 
considered an Aguna as any woman whose husband did not die but only 
disappeared who is forbidden to remarry any man? 
It would seem that R. Bordjel understood that there is a third way 
in which a marriage can become terminated. And that is along the 
lines of R. Joseph Babad in Minhat Hinukh and cited in R. Waldenberg's 
responsum,whopurports that once a marriage partner becomes trans-
formed to an entity to which marriage to such an entity could not 
take effect, that marriage is automatically annulled and retro-
actively considered as if no marriage had ever taken place. There-
fore, neither divorce, nor death, are necessary to terminate the 
marriage, as the marriage is regarded as if it never existed from the 
start. Possibly, R. Bordjel concurred with this view. However, 
there are many respondents who disagreed with Minchat Hinnukh' s expo-
sition, as we shall see in the next section. In which case we return 
to our problem that if a woman, whose husband disappeared from off 
the earth is not considered a "widow," then why isn't she automatically 
defined as an Aguna? 
It seems that R. Aszod, in his responsum, in which he endeavours to 
find a source to justify R. Isserlein's ruling, was very much aware 
of this problem. For he shows that the talmudic source in Kiddushin, 
which permits a v10man whose husband died to remarry, includes the case 
29 of a woman whose husband becomes an angel as well. He does so by 
drawing·a parallel between two types of widows: a widow whose husband 
died a natural death, and one whose husband became an angel. He 
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explains: "For the name 'widow' means solitary without husband." 
And, as we recall in the previous chapter, R. Aszod remarked earlier 
in the same responsum: "For it is the same whether his [Elijah's] 
body ascends and is concealed in the heavens, as when it is concealed 
in the ground.'' 
In fact, R. Aszod's son, in his notes to his father's responsum 
thereon, researches and locates the source from where it is derived, 
that a widow of an angel is included in the general category of 
widows. Apparently, both R. Aszod and his son extended the denomi-
nation of "widow" to include a woman who is husbandless, even in 
the event that her husband did not die a mortal death, because other-
wise she would certainly be. defined as an Aguna woman. 
is also a husbandless woman, who would certainly suit 
of being "solitary without husband. "30 
For an Aguna, 
the description 
In view of the fact that R. Aszod disagrees with R. Bordjel and extends 
the denomination of widows to include women who are husbandless though 
their husbands have not died,he would undoubtedly disagree with most 
of R. Bordjel's conclusions. Indeed, R. Aszod explicitly forbade 
a High Priest to marry even such a woman, in blatant contradistinction 
to R. Bordjel. The question which remains obscure is, although a 
certain parallelism exists between a woman whose husband died and 
a woman whose husband transcended to become an angel, an even greater 
parallel seems to exist between an Aguna, whose husband deserted 
her going off to a distant country beyond the sea, to a woman whose 
husband abandoned her, in transcending to live in Eden. Certainly 
each woman equally suits the description of being solitary without 
husband? 
Scientific Location of Paradise 
Possibly for this reason we find that R. Teomim in the same responsum 
cited in the previous chapter, states that a married woman is pro-
hibited to other men only as long as her husband resides in this world. 
That is to say, that even if her husband disappears, she is only 
defined as an Aguna if her husband resides somewhere in this world. 
llowever, if her husband resides in another world, despite the dis-
appearance, his wife is not defined as an Aguna. This exegesis, 
however would obviously find difficulty with the theological school 
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which maintains that Paradise is located somewhere in this world. 31 
for if it is so, the wives of all these prominent persons enumerated 
in Der ekh Erez Zuta, who merited Paradise during their life times, 
should be prohibited in marriage to any man as they are all defined 
as Agunot. Possibly, herein lies still a further consideration which 
might have induced one of the nmjor Elijah schools to maintain that 
the bodies of Elijah and his colleagues actually died and it was only 
their souls which merited Paradise. As otherwise their wives would 
be classified as Agunot rather than as widows. 
1he uncertainty of the exact location and fate of those meriting 
Paradi se should itself place these womenin the category of Agunot 
since an Aguna is by definition a woman whose husband's latter end 
is uncertain. For this reason alone it becomes halakically impera-
tive to resolve the theosophical notion of Paradise, to ascertain 
its exact location and de t ermine the mode of life pursued by its 
inhabitants, as it throws light on the whole question of who is 
defined as an Aguna woman. 
The question of verifying the exact location of Paradise is especially 
significant today wher e science has sufficiently progressed to have 
enabled man to r each and map every spot on earth, each place with 
its own dis tinct line of latitude and longitucic . In the process man 
has discovered and scientifically verified that there is no place on 
c.:~r th corres pondi ng to Par adise . This discovery ·presented n severe 
challenge to the rabbinic tradition, which maintained that Par adise 
occupies a place in this world. In light of this discovery R. Joseph 
Hayyim was asked to impart his views on the matter. In a most 
brilliant responsum he describes the limitations of "scientific 
certainty" and outlines the differences between scientific and rabbinic 
truth, explaining how Paradise may well exist on this earth despite 
. "f" "d h 32 sc~ent~ ~c ev~ ence to t e contrary. 
In s Lmnr~ary, we have demons tra ted in this section how the Elij ah i ssue 
has enormous practical ramifications in r esolving a good number of 
r enl halakic problems. In spite of this, most of the cases which 
we have seen pertain to a highly sophisticated scientific age , where 
because of the advancement of science, ques tions which deal Hith 
changing exis t ential s ta tus , such as the r ecipients of hear t trans-
pl ants, t es t tuhe babies, transsexual surgery and the like ar e tociEty 
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practical and relevant. However, during the time of the Shulchan 
Arukh (16th century) these questions were far from practical, as it 
is doubtful whether such a specialised period of scientific advance-
ment was even conceived of. Yet, strangely enough, we find that 
this responsum of Terumat ha-Deshen appears in the 
and its appended glosses, even though the Shulchan 
only those issues which he felt were practical and 
Shu lchan Aru kh 
Arukh discusses 
relevant. As 
we have shown in Chapter I, the Shulchan Arukh was not in the habit 
of entertaining theoretical abstract notions, since this was not his 
purpose in compiling a much needed synthesis of practical Jewish Law. 
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2. TERUMAT HA-DESHEN AND THE SHULCHAN ARUI<H 
The Aguna Problem 
In seeking to resolve the question of what practical value was Terumat 
ha-Deshen's responsum to the Shulchan Arukh and his colleagues, we 
can possibly gather a clue by paying close attention to the section 
of the Shulchan Arukh where the responsum is redacted. We find that 
it is cited several times in the section which deals with the laws 
of the Aguna woman. 33 The first instance where the responsum is 
mentioned is in Darkhei Moshe, the glosses prepared by R. Moses Is-
serles to Tur/Beit Yosef, the text upon which R. Joseph Caro based 
his Shulchan Arukh. R. Jacob b. Asher writes in his Tur: 
A woman whose husband went off to a province of the sea and 
testimony was given that he died, even if by one witness, even 
if the witness is a slavem~, or a slavewoman, or a relative, 
she is permitted to rewed. 
In an appendage to the words, "province of the sea," R. Isserles 
glosses in Darkhei Moshe: 
Mahari [R. Isserlein], wrote in his Rulings, number 102, 'The 
spouse of Elijah, the prophet, or R. Joshua b. Levi is permitted, 
for she is not calle<i eshet ish [the wife of one's fellowman] 
but rather the wife of an angel. And she is permitted to rewed. 
And the difference is, if a man were to merit La similar fate] 
as them.' Until here are his words.35 
The mere fact that R. Isserles redacted R. Isserlein's responsum in 
juxtaposition to the words "province of the sea" indicates that R. 
Tsserles saw some connection between the case of Elijah's wife to the 
case of a woman whose husband went off to a province of the sea and 
was reported to have died. Feasibly, one could say, that R. Isserles 
is perturbed by why the Halaka is so lenient in establishing the hus-
band 's death, in the event of his disappearance that it accepts even 
poor evidence of a single witness, such as a slave or a relative? 
R. Isserles alleviates this dilemma by resolving that Elijah's 
<iisappearance to Paradise is similar to a disappearance to an unknown 
province of the sea. Not only has Elijah ' s deatlt not been established ,but 
the re is even evid0nce thnt he continues to live, c<md yet, 1< . Tsserlein 
permitted his wife to rewed. Certainly then, where there are grounds 
TI-IE RELEVANCE OF TO'S RESPONSUM: TO AND THE SHULCHAN ARUKH 
to establish his death, albeit poor- as the evidence may seem - i.e., 
the testjmony of a relAtive or a slave - surely there is room to 
be lenient in establishing the husband's death. l{ad R. Isserlein 
considered Elijah 's wife an Aguna we possibly would have been more 
stringent in establishing the husband's death in the event of his 
disappearance. 
This seems to be the approach of R. Samuel ben Uri Shraga Phoebus, 
(second half of the 17th century) in the second instance where 
Ter-uamt ha-Deshen is cited. 
in Shulchan Arukh; 
Quoting Tur verbatim, R. Caro codifies 
A woman whose husband went off to a province of the sea and 
testimony was given that he died, even if by one witness, even 
if a slaveman or a slavewoman, even if a .witness [heard his 
testimony] from another witness •.• 36 
R. Samuel ben Uri Shraga Phoebus enters in his gloss , Beit Shemu 'el 
to Shulchan /\rukh, beginning with the words "even if a witness from 
another witness .•• ": 
And so it is in the strict sense, a witness can bring testimony 
from another witness to establish that he is alive. So it is 
written in the Responsa of Maharashdam [R. Samuel ben Moses de 
Medina, 1506-1589], number 49. The wife of Elijah, the prophet, 
or the wife of R. Joshua b. Levi is permitted for she is not 
called an eshet ish [the wife of a fellowmanj, but rather the 
wife of an angel . And the difference is, if a man would merit 
[a similar fatel as him. Maharai. And this is redacted in 
Darkhei Moshe.37 
At first glance there seems to be no connection between the two re-
spondents, Maharashdam and Maharai, whom Beit Shemu'el cites under 
the same subscript. One wonders why Beit Shemu'el cites Maharai at 
all in this context. But at closer inspection one discerns an im-
portant principle which emerges from Maharashdam's responsum, namely, 
while the ll.alaka is unconmonly lenient in establishing the husband's 
death by relying even upon the poor evidence of a witness who heard 
his testimony from another witness, at the same time the Halaka is 
also quite strict in establishing that the husband is still alive by 
relying upon the same kind of poor evidence! In that case, Beit 
Shemu ' el wondered, if there is even the slighte~evidence, be it 
poor as it may seem, that the husband is still alive, i.e., the mere 
possibility that he may have merited a similar fate as Elijah, his 











THE RELEVANCE OF TO'S RESPONSUM: TD AND THE SHULCHAN ARUKH 
evidence always exists whenever a husband disappears, as Maharai 
himself writes, that the difference that his ruling makes is if an-
other man were to merit a similar fate. Perhaps then the existence 
of this very possibility is reason enough to be strict and establish 
that the husband is alive, unless we can positively confirm the con-
trilry. Therefore, Beit Shemu'el rejoins hy citing Terumat ha-Oeshen 
who rules that even were the husband to merit such a fate, his wife 
would still be permitted to remarry. 
It is in this vein that Beit Shemu'el and Darkhei Moshe seem to have 
the same interest in redacting Terumat ha-Deshen. They both regarded 
Terumat ha-Deshen as extremely useful in understanding the permissive 
nature of the Halaka in the case of an Aguna woman whose husband 
suddenly disappeared. In fact it is entirely possible that Scripture 
itself already intimated that Elisha and the sons of the prophets 
had argued over this very issue; As it is related in II Kings 16: 
And they [the sons of the prophets] said unto him [Elisha]: 
'Behold now, there are with thy servants fifty strong men; let 
them go we pray thee, and seek thy master [Elijah]; lest 
pecndventure the spirit of the Lord has taken him up, and cast 
him upon some high mountain, or unto some valley. ' And he 
[Elisha] said, 1 Ye shall not send. 1 
The sons of the prophets claimed that before relating to Elijah as 
if he were no more, and before dismissing Elijah's wife from being 
considered a possible Aguna, maybe a greater degree of evidence is 
required in order to establish positively that Elijah is nowhere to 
be found -"lest peradventure etc." Elisha responds that the laws 
of evidence concerning the Aguna are not so stringent to warrant 
such a degree of positive identification and testimony. Therefore, 
"You shall not send."38 l-ienee the codifiers find R. Isserlein 1 s 
responsum useful in assessing the type of evidence neccessary to 
confirm that a woman has changed her status from an Aguna to an Almana. 
Doubtful Marriages 
The next instance where we find Terumat ha-Deshen redacted by a number 
of codifiers is in connection with the first law with which Shulchan 
Arukh begins this section of jurisdiction. 
women in general are perrnitted to remarry: 
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A married woman is included with women who are forbidden on 
account of consanguinity and no [other] marriage is valid with 
her . When i s this said? Concerning a woman who i s certainly 
married . However, when she is doubtfully married or doubtfully 
divorced, then [ .:mother] llklrriage i s valid with her because of 
a doubt and she requires a b~~l of divorcement from both of 
them [i. e . , bo th husbands . ] 
Shulchan Arukh establishes that when a woman is certainly married, 
no other marriage is valid with her . However , when a woman is doubt-
fully married or doubtfully divorced, another marriage can become 
valid because of the dubious nature of her fi~st marriage . In 
other words, one of the ways of permitting a married woman to r emarry 
is to prove the dubious nature of her first marriage . This i s an 
important criterion for dealing with the problem of an Aguna, who 
would like to remarry in the absence of her husband. For if we 
can attack the very foundation of the first marriage and dispute 
whether in fact she had contracted a valid marriage from the first , 
then there is already grounds to possibly permit another marriage. 
It is in this context that the codifiers see R. Isserlein's responsum 
of value to Shulchan Arukh ' s law. For R. Isserlein establishes the 
type of doubt on which basis we can attack the validity of the first 
marriage. That is, a doubt which arises from the contracting of 
the marriage (ishut), or the granting of the divorce . However, a 
doubt which Bnana tes from the personhood (enoshut) of either partner 
of the marriage, does not constitute the type of uncertainty that 
would define the marriage or divorce as a doubtful one . For when 
the personhood is in doubt to the extent tha t the marriage partner 
is no longer considered a ' man, ' the entire gamut of the lega l as-
pects of matrimony are no longer applicable , since the matrimonial 
laws are binding solely between a man and a woman . Thus R. Isserlein 
proves from Elijah tha t in order to permit a woman to remarry on the 
grounds of the dubious nature of her first marriage, we would first 
have to establish that the uncertainty lies in the contracting of 
her marriage rather than in the personhood of her spouse. 
Changes in Marital Status 
Another reason why the codifiers redact R. Isserlein ' s ruling in 
connection with this first law of Shulchan Arukh is because of an 
illlj >O J-t:ml pr:inc iple whi ch e1ne t:'ges ft:'olll here : Namely, tha t whct:'c ~1 
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·woman's marriage to another party does not take effect, the other 
party is not required to grant a bill of divorce. 1his principle 
is operable in R. Isserlein's responsum. For one way to determine 
whether a person is required to divorce his wife is to establish a 
priori whether a marriage to that person is valid from the first. 
Just as Shulchan i\rukh's principle establishes that there is no need 
for divorce if the marriage itself is invalid. Similarly, in Elijah 's 
case, since marriage to an angel is invalid, therefore, there is no 
need for divorce. 1hus, R. Isserlein's responsum is an illustration 
of Shulchan Arukh's principle, using a different model. 'I11us R. 
Isserlein's responsum illustrates that in determining any question 
regarding whether a woman requires a divorce, it is useful to employ 
Shulchan Arukh's principle to establish whether a marriage can become 
effective in the first place. 
When one considers the homology between Terumat ha-Deshen and Shulchan 
Arukh's law more deeply, one sees even a greater connection. 
Shulchan Arukh boldly affirms that where a valid marriage was con-
tracted between Mr. and Mrs. X, should Mr. Y come along and propose marriage 
to Mrs X, the new marriage would be invalid and Mr. Y would not be 
required to divorce Mrs. X/Y. However, Shulchan Arukh does not 
establish what the Halaka would be in the event that Mr. X himself 
experienced an existential transition so that he became Mr. Y, i .e ., 
a person with whom a valid marriage could not be entered into, had 
he been Mr. Y from the start. Would Mr. X/Y now be required to 
grant his wife a divorce? 1he resolvement of this issue is the 
very ruling of Terumat ha-Dcshcn. For R. Isserlein establishes that 
once Mr. X becomes transformed to Mr. Y (i.e., "a person with whom 
etc ."), the marriage is retroactively invalidated and considered as 
if no marriage was ever contracted between Mrs. X and Mr. X/Y. 
R. 1sserlein's responsum is, therefore irrrninently relevant to the 
Shulchan Arukh in that it accepts Shulchan Arukh's principle and 
extends it one step further. R. Isserlein's responsum concerning 
Elijah ' s wife is, in this regard, paradigmatic for resolving any 
issueconcerning a change in marital status, where marriage to the 
same party can no longer take effect even in the event where marriage 
had been effectuated beforehand. 
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Apostasy 
R. Joseph b. Moses Babad (1800-74) in his Minhat Hinnukh illustrates 
mrmy rel ewmt j nst<mces where changes in marital status are likely 
to occur and how R. Isserlein's responsum is instructive in resolving 
them. In one instance R. Babad recounts the opinion of the rabbinic 
authorities who maintain that an apostate is not eligible for marriage. 40 
R. Babad avers that according to this opinion, if a man became an 
apostate he would not be required to divorce his wife. For, although 
their marriage was originally valid before the apostasy, since 
marriage to an apostate cannot take effect, the marriage is irrrnediately 
dissolved upon his apostasy. 
R. Babad's averment is confirmed by R. Meshullam b. Samson Igra (1752-
1802), in his Responsa, Igra Rama. Moreover, R. Igra claims, a 
man who apostatizes subsequent to his marriage would not even be 
permitted to act as an agent for contracting a marriage under such 
circumstances, since a person can only act as an agent for marriage 
so long as he himself is eligible for marriage. 41 
Sotcth 
R. Babad claims that the correctness of R. Isserlein's ruling is cor-
roborated by Rashi, who utilizes the same principle to explain a 
similar instance in · tractate Yebamoth concerning the Sotah woman (a 
faithless wife). 42 Rashi proves that the Sotah's betrothal is valid 
from the fact that her betrothal did not become automatically annulled 
upon her becoming a Sotah. Rashi establishes that the only reason 
a Sotah's marriage is valid is because the Torah requires her husband 
to grant a divorce in order to terminate the marriage. Had the 
Torah not stipulated that a Sotah requires a divorce her marriage 
would have terminated automatically upon her becoming a Sotah. Hence, 
Rashi corroborates R. Isserlein's thesis. 
Consanguineous Relatives 
R. i\ryeh Leib b. Joseph ha-Kohen Heller of Stry, in his halakic com-
mentary to Shulchan Arukh entitled Avnei Millu'im applies Rashi's 
principle concerning the Sotah, to all women who initially hctd valid 
llk1r:Tiages, and during the course of their marriage became prohibited 
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to their husbands on account of a negative precept (isur lav) .43 
R. Akiba considers all women who are subject to the penalty of nega-
tive precepts on a par with those who are subject to the penalty of 
karet . 44 Accordingly , their marriages would automatically terminate 
upon the woman becoming prohibited to her husband by a negative pre-
cept, despite the prior validity of such a marriage . Avnei Milluim 
utilizes this principle to explain a question advanced by the Tosafoth 
as to why, in R. Akiba ' s view, women who are considered consanguineous 
relatives on account of a negative precept are not eligible for 
halizah and levirate marriage .45 
R. Babad himself applies R. Isserlein ' s thesis to explain another 
important aspect of Jewish Law concerning consanguineous relatives . 
Shulchan Arukh codifies in Eben ha-Ezer : 
The daughter of a man ' s wife, and her [i . e . , the wife's] 
daughter ' s daughter and her son ' s daughter, are forbidden to 
him from the Torah . And [this law concerns] only the daughter 
of his wife. However, the daughter of a woman whom he raped 
is permitted to him after her death .46 · 
R. Babad discusses the conditions under which the prohibition as 
well as the Torah penalty of burning may be incurred. 47 R. &bad 
utilizes R. Isserlein ' s principle to demonstrate that in certain 
instances, if marriage to one of these women would not take effect 
while marriage to the other could , then even if the valid marriage 
becomes automatically invalidated, the man could not incur the 
prohibition of having intercourse with a woman and her daughter. For , 
according toR. Isserlein, a marriage can becomemvalidated despite 
its earlier validity. Therefore, the same principle applies here . 
Eligibility for Marriage 
Thus the halakic relevance of Terumat ha-Deshen to Shulchan Arukh, 
according to R. Babad, is twofold: Firstly in establishing that 
Shulchan Arukh ' s law, which absolves one from penalty where a valid 
marriage was not contracted, also applies in the case Where a valid 
marriage becomes automatically invalidated . Secondly, since Shulchan 
J\rukh establishes, that in the event that the former marriage is 
invalid these other relatives would be eligible to the same man in 
me1rriage. Then, according to Terumat ha-Deshen, the relatives of 
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eligible to her former husband in marriage. Therefore, R. Isserlein's 
responsum is considerably valuable in establishing which women are 
eligiqle for marriage as well as which relations are to be considered 
illicit. 
Thus, it is evident, that R. Isserlein's principle, that a marriage 
~1ich was previously valid can become automatically invalidated, 
has far-reaching consequences in Jewish Law. For this principle 
concerns the Sotah, the apostate, exemption from levirate marriages 
and halizah, consanguineous relatives , and eligibility for marriage. 
llowcver, it is important to emphasize that R. Isserlein does not .for-
mulate such a principle in his responsum and this principle is 
solely R. 13abad ' s interpretation of R. Isserlein's responsum. 
According to R. Babad ' s interpretation of R. Isserlein, we regard any 
marriage during which one of the partners reached a stage to which 
a new marriage to that party cannot be effective, as if the existing 
marriage were being entered into at that moment . Therefore, the 
exis ting marriage becomes invalid just as a new marriage would be . 
Other Opinions 
However, many of the respondents differ with R. Babad's interpretation 
of R. lsserlein's responsum. In fact, R. Babad's own grandfather, 
R. Joshua Heschel b. Isaac Babad seems to have differed with his 
grandson in his compendium of responsa entitled Sefer Yehoshua. 
one of these responsa, R. Joshua Heschel Babad writes: 
In 
And the wife of an angel is different, for there is no marriage 
altogether. For if an angel betrothed a woman, certainly we 
do not regard the marriage [valid] at all. Which is not the 
case of Elijah who married when he was a m~n, and there is no 
death to permit her. Who permitted her?4 
R. Joshua Heschel Babad clearly establishes, in opposition to his 
grandson, that there is a vast difference between an angel about to 
enter a marriage for the first time, to a man who had already 
contracted a valid marriage, and subsequently became an angel. 
For, in the first case, there is no marriage at all. But in the 
second case there is an existing marriage. Consequently, according 
to R. Joshua Heschel Babad, one cannot regard an existing marriage 
as if it were being entered into at that point. 
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It is probably because of the reservation that R. Joshua Heschel Babad 
expresses that many of the r espondents did not interpret R. Tsserlein's 
ruling along the lines of ~1inchat Hinnukh . Thus it stands to reason 
that all the respondents who disagree with R. Joseph Babad's inter-
pretation of Terumat ha-Deshen would disagree with all the halakic 
consequences contingent on the application of this principle. Since 
a marriage which was previously valid would, accordingly, not become 
automatically terminated in the event of a change in marital status , 
then , all the halakic conclusionswhichwere based on the former 
principle would be reversed. 49 
As we recall in the previous section, R. Waldenberg ruled that if 
one of the marriage partners underwent trans-sexual surgery, no 
divorce is required since the lilarriage is regarded as if it were being 
entered into at the time of the change, when it cannot be effected. 
'lhis ruling was completely based upon R. Babad ' s interpretation of 
Terumat ha-Deshen. According to the opposers of this view, however, 
R. \~alden berg ' s ruling would be incorrect. As according to their 
opinion we do not regard the marriage from the moment of change in 
marita l status, but rather we consider the marriage from the time of 
its inception . Consequently this view would also regard any change 
in existential status not according to the new status but rather 
according to the original one. This position obviously affects 
all the other halakic consequences discussed in that section . For 
this reason we find, as mentioned earlier , the following ruling which 
appears in Practical Medical Halaka: 
If, in violation of Torah Law, such a sex operation was 
performed, the individual maintains his pre-surgical sex, with 
all its halakic implications .SO 
TI1is ruling is in blatant contradistinction to all the respondents 
who, based on R. Joseph Babad ' s interpretation of Terumat ha-Deshen, 
ruled that any person who had undergone any existential change could 
be regarded according to hisnewexistential status and not according 
to his pre-transitional status. R. Tendler's ruling in Practical 
Medical Halaka was obviously based upon R. Joseph Babad ' s grandfa ther, 
R. Joshua lleschel 13ahaci, and all other respondents who disagreed with 
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with Minchat Hinnukh's interpretation of Terillnat ha-Deshen. 51 
At this point it should be quite obvious that R. Isserlein's responsum 
concerning Elijah 's wife and the proper und~rstanding of thls ruling 
W8S immensely significant in determining a wide range of practical 
halakic problems from the medieval days of Shulchan Arukh until the 
most advanced days of an ultra-supersonic era which will bring to 
e[fcct exl s tcntialchanges which even today have not yet been concerned 
The Katlanit Woman 
Rcfore concluding this seciton , it is worthwhile mentioning yet another 
law in Shulchan Arukh in which Terwnat ha-Deshen is of substanLlal 
significance and which has a direct bearing upon the main sul-,ject of 
this work. Shulchan Arukh codifies in Eben ha-Ezer: 
A woman who was married to two [successive] men who [both] 
died , may not remarry a third time. For she has already es-
tablished herself as a woman whose husbands die.52 
R. Isaac Zevi Lebovic in his work Shulchan ha-Ezer discusses this law 
in regards to Terumat ha-Ocshen: 
And in the matter of a Katlanit [a woman whose husbands died] 
she [i.e., Elijah's wife] is not considered a I<atlanit in this 
case. Since it is explained in Eben ha-Ezer that even in death 
itself, [it is] only if they died by natural causes. But if 
[they died] by some other means, the law is lenient. ~pecially 
here in our case being that he did not die altogether.S 
R. T~bovic discusses the law concerning a woman whose first husband 
dlcd and whose second husband transcended to become an angel . Is 
such C~Woman accorded the status of a Katlanit who is not permitted 
to marry a third time, or is this case different? On the one hand, 
according to R. Isserlein's responsum Elijah's transcendence is 
halakically considered as if he had died and his wife is considered 
a widow. For this reason such a woman should be accorded the status 
of Katlanit. On the other hand, as we have seen among the various 
analyses of the respondents in dealing with R. Isserlein's responsum , 
there exist many laws for which Elijah is still considered halakically 
alive . Especially in our case where the Halaka affords a special 
leniency for women whose husbands died other than by natural means, 
such a woman would certainly be permitted to remarry a thi.rd time . 
\vhen conslclering Shulc.han Arukh' s law in light of Tennmt h:1-Deshen 
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we find thaL Ter.u111at ha-Deshen is intportant in verifying the genernl 
status of the f(atlanit woman. Since as a result of Terumat ha-Deshen 
we must now verify whether a Katlanit is a woman who has estnblished 
herself as the cause of her husbands ' deaths or whether she is a 
woman who has established herself as the cause of an unprecedented 
termination of the marriage relationship . If a Katlanit is a woman 
who has established herself as the cause of the death of her husbands 
then certainly a woman whose second husband transcended to an angel 
\vould not be considered a Katlanit. llowever, if a Katlan] t is a 
woman who has established herself as the cause of a premature termin-
ation of the marital relationship, then a woman whose seconci husband 
became an angel would also be considered a Katlanit and she would be 
forhi dden to remarry fl third tj me . 
the central problem of our thesis . 
rfl-tis problem is very si mi_lar to 
In particular , whether a widow 
is considered a woman whose husband died or whether she is a woman 
whose marriage relaLionshij) te'J:.-titltla t ecl through her husbands ' dcpnrture 
from this world . And i_n general , whether the commandments c:tre a 
function of one ' s existential state , i.e ., of either being alive or 
dead, or whether they are a function ofone ' s relationships vis-a-vis 
f.-cl <tnd hi.s fellowm<tn . 
Tn the c:1se of thr l<t1tl:lni t womnn, R. T.chovic divulges th:1t Shulchnn 
Arukh has determined that a Katlanit is only defined as a woman who 
HAS responsible for her husband ' s death through natural causes . In 
no other im;tance is she considered a l<atlanit . Certainly not in 
the .::ase of her husband ' s transcendence, whereby he continues to live . 
Thus the Halaka has determined that a Katlanit is defined as such 
solely in the event of the death of her husbands , and not when the 
nn1~ i tal re] <t tionsh] ps become tennlna ted prematurely. 
1l1e npplicntion of Tenumt hn-Deshen in thecnseof n Kntlunit is of 
considerable utility in verifying our earlier problem of whether an 
Almana (widow) is a woman whose marital relationship became abruptly 
terminated through her husband ' s departure, or whether she is neces-
sarily defined as"' woman whose husband died . Fpr if a Ke1tlnnit is 
to be cicfincd as a woman whose husbands died, it stands to reason 
that the same would be true of a widow . For every Katlanit is at 
I c:ts t <1 \.Y i dow . 
Possibly then, Terumut ha-Deshen could uclclitionally be extended to 
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verify our general question and resolve that obligation in Mitzvot 
is contingent upon one ' s existential status and not upon the rela-
tionships which one pursues . On the other hand, it is possible 
th.'lt the I<atlanit may well be regarded as an isolated instance which 
h.:1s no bc.:1ring whatsoever upon the general problem of our thesis .:1nd 
in particular to the case of a widow . For a Katlanit is not simply 
.:1 woman who was widowed twice . As a widow might verily be rlcfined 
as one whose marriage relationship became abruptly terminated . 
llowever, .:1 Katlanit is .:1 much more specific classific.:1tion .:1nd is 
only appropriate for a woman who lost her husbands specifically 
through natural death. 
Thus R. Tsscrl ein ' s rcsponsum is of gre.'lt pr.1cticRl si.gnifi.c.1ncc not 
only in verifying the exact status of the Katlanit woman as cod i fied 
in Shulchan Arukh, hut also in illuminating the general question of 
whe ther the co~nanrunents are contingent upon man ' s existential reality 
or upon the various relationships which man pursues, wherever the 
resolution of this question has consequences in Jewish Law . 
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3 . DECODIFYING TERUMAT HA- DESHEN 
Elijah ' s Wife : A theoretical or Practical Problem? 
\Je have seen how the responsum of Terumat ha-Deshen was of immense 
practical relevance on various levels. However, these levels of 
rel evance nre essentinlly outgrowths of the responsum. In other 
words, these are areas where the application of Terumat ha-Deshen ' s 
ruling cFtn he useful i.n resolving various halakic problems. Jlowever , 
we have not as yet seen whether Terumat ha-Oeshen himself was con-
fronted with a real practical issue or whether he was merely enter-
taining theoretical speculations . 
On the one hand, the very fact that Terumat ha-Deshen considers this 
problem in the second part of his work , which consists of actual 
cnses as compared to the first portion of his work, in which quer-ies 
\vere posed by the au thor himself, would seem to indicate the1 t R. 
Tsserlein is dealing with a real practical issue . 54 Yet, the 
issue itself concerning Elijah ' s and R. Joshua b . Levi ' s marital 
s tntus subsequent to their transcendence seems to lend itself to 
pure abstraction . 
Perhaps one way of ascertaining whether Terumat ha- Deshen 1s dealing 
\vi.th a practical or theoretical problem is to investigate whether or 
not Elijah in fact had a wife at all . If it can be proven that Elijah 
remained unmarried then we can reasonably conclude that although this 
question has practical halakic consequences, the quesiton itself is 
hypothetical . The questions which would then require investigation 
would be why Tenum t ha-Des hen concerns himself with theoretics and 
\vhy does he enter this question in the practical section of his work . 
\.Jas Elijah Celibate? 
On the one hand, it would seem logical to assume that the reason 
th;Jt there i_s ;1hsolutcly no mention of Elijah ' s fe1miJy i_n the f\ihle 
j s because Elijah never married. Certainly, if Elijah had no wife, 
then he woulcl have no fElmily . Tncleed, this is the opini.on of l.oui.s 
C.inzl>erg who conc.luucs thuL l~l.ijuh was c.cl.il>utc :s On Lhe oLheL- ll<.u1u, 
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the absence of biblical reference to Elijah's family is not in itself 
sufficient proof to establish his celibacy. As we recalled in the 
eadier chapters of this work, there are many respondents who endea-
voured to identify positively Elijah's genealogy despi.te the fe1ct 
that there is no biblical reference to Elijah's parentage. The lack 
of reference to human parentage is not enough evidence for these 
respondents to conclude that Elijah originated as an angel. TI1e 
nihle onJyrecords detflils which <=~re si.gnific<=~nt. Tf certain det<=~ils 
arc not recorded it is because these details are not important to 
the biblical narrative, and not necessarily because the detai -ls do 
not exist. 
1\s we called upon the Geonic Responsa in 01apter ITI.l to establish 
Elijah 's genealogy in the absence of biblical evidence, so must we 
cnll upon the Geonic Responsa either to confirm Elijah's marri::tge or 
verify his celibacy. In a responsum of R. Yehudai Geon we find 
tho fo 11 owing exposi.ti on: 
'And who is their father?' [I Samuel 10:11]: What is [the 
meaning of] who is their father? He said tci them, And is there 
a father for words of Torah? Is is not already written: 
'What is his name, and what is his son's name, if thou knmves t? '[ Prov. 30:4] 
- Hence, Torah is not an jnheritance. That is what he said : 
See how great Moses was that he ascended to heaven; Aaron, 
that he gAthered the wind; F.J i_ j ah, that he found the wr1 ters; 
Messiah, that he established all the ends of the earth. Did 
they have children who were as great as them, that could do 
the same? 'What is his name and what is his son's name if 
56 thou knowest?' Know here that Torah is not an inheritnnce. 
From R. Yehudai's interpretation of the proverbial verse it is clear 
that Elijah was not celibate, as according to the Geon, the verse 
establishes that prophecy is not inheritable by recording that among 
others, ElijFih ' .s chj ] dren as well never reached the same spiritual 
grea tness as their father. Clearly, if Elijah had no children, 
no proof could be mounted from Elijah to support that prophecy is 
not transmittable from father to son . 
the following passage in Zohar~ 
On the other hand, we find 
R. Nathan enquired of R. Jose b. R. Hananiah one day: lle 
said to him: Did Elijah have offspring or not? lle said to him: 
lie r 1·: 1 iiah "I hCid rmother thing. t\nd it is writ ten' Touch not 
my annointed ones, And to my prophets do no harm Lal tareiyuJ. 
\v'ha t is [the meaning ofl al tareiyu? Do not make yourse l.ves 
loved ones LreiyimJ and friends to my prophets. For the Holy 
One blessed he lle , has chosen them and has separated them from 
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Israel to serve Him and He brought them into His palace. A 
minori ad majus for someone who is an angel in heaven, do you 
ask of him?S 
Zohar explains that because of the nature of the special relationship 
which exists between the prophets and G-d, the people must separate 
themselves from the prophets. 58 All the more so is this true of 
I 
Elijah who is not only a prophet, but also an angel . Thus Zohar 
establishes that Elijah was most certainly celibate because of the 
very special relationship which he enjoyed with G-d contingent on 
his being an angel. In fact, R. Joseph Bordjel, whereupon being 
asked to verify whether the wives of Elijah and R. Joshua b. Levi 
are considered widows, begins his discussion by quoting this very 
passage from Zohar. R. f~rdjelquestions why the enquirer sought to 
verify whether Elijah's wife is considered a widow in view of the 
fact that Zohar clearly establishes that Elijah had no wife and was 
i.ndeed celihate! 59 
Notwithstanding theahove, certain Halakists seem to side with R. 
Yehudai Geon and consider it conceivable that Elijah could have 
taken a wife and bega t children. R. Isaac Lebov:ic writes in his 
halakic codex Shulchan ha-Ezer that one of the consequences of R. 
Isserlein's ruling is that Elijah's wife would be obligated to wait 
the three month period that women must tarry before marrying to ascer-
tain paternity of any offspring. R. Leibovic states that all the 
r easons ~1ich the Talmud specifies for a woman waiting the three 
h . d bef . l 11 El .. hI . f 60 mont per1o ore remarr1age, app y equa y to lJa s w1 e. 
Similarly, the controversy between R. Joseph Babad and his grand-
father R. Joshua Heschel Babad, earlier reviewed, who argue whether 
there exists any difference between an angel who wished to enter a 
marriage with a human for the first time and a person who already 
contracted a valid marriage and subsequently became an angel. In 
either case, the very fact that both R. Joseph and R. Joshua Heschel 
Babad discuss the matter of marriage between transcended humans to 
ordinary humans seems to suggest that each considers at least the 
possibility of such a marriage as conceivable. 
Thus we have uncovered two schools, one which considers the possibility 
of Elijah having a wife and children entirely conceivable and another 
school which .!uliK'nt -ic;ltcs th:1l :1ngcls m~c cclih:1to .1nd th0n' fon' it 
is impossible to maintain that Elijah had a family. It would seem 
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Lhal Lhis difference of O(Jinion over whether it is possible for 
<mge ls or trcmscended m<m to have a wife or children depends upon 
the resolution of a more general question. Namely, does an ungel 
or a man who transcended to become an angel require a wife to ful-
Lill his needs and to be partner to him? 
'Jhe following encounter is related in Talmud: 
1\. Jose met Elijah and asked him: It is written, 'I will make 
a helpmeet for him. I How does a woman help a man? lie rnijah] 
responded: If a man brings wheat, does he chew the wheat? If 
fbx, cloes he put on the flax? Does she not bring light into 
his eyes, and put him on his feet?61 
H. 11.1nokh 7.unde 1 h. Joseph (d. 18() 7), in his mi dr::~shic commen tnry 
Anaf Yosef was greatly disturbed, about the simplicity of Elijah 's 
G2 reply. Why were none of the Sages in the academy capable of offering 
such a simple reply? Was it necessary to engage Elijah? Therefore, 
Anaf Yosef explains that R. Jose was inquiring as to whether a \voman 
is a helpmeet in heavenly matters as well as in earthly matters. 
Elijah responded that a woman is only a helpmeet in earthly matters, 
i.e. , converting his wheat into bread and spinning his flax into 
clothing, but not in heavenly matters. 
According to Anaf Yosef we can well understand why none of the Sages 
were capable of responding toR. Jose's question and why Elijah alone 
was able to reply. For only Elijah was in a position to evaluate 
whether a woman could he of any help to a heavenly entity and to 
assist him in heavenly matters. From Elijah's response it would 
seem that as an angel he remained secluded from his wife as she could 
be of no help to him in attending to his heavenly affairs. for 
the woman was only created as a helpmeet for man to assist him in 
earthly matters, for which Elijah is no longer needful. 
t.Je recall how Zohar proved that angels are celibate from the fact 
that even the prophets were separated from Israel for G-d's service . 
Indeed the question of whether heavenly figures are in need of a wife 
concerns the prophets as well. For we find a fervent debate launched 
by Miriam and J\aron against Moses over this matter, recountecl by the 
Tosafoth . Miriam and Aaron rebuked Moses for separating from his 
\vi lC~ . /\s they c l:Jilll( 'd thnt tlwy too WC'n' rrophC'tS rind llC'V('J"tllC'lC'SS 
h:1d no need to separate themselves from their spouses. Yet the Talmud 
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clearly affirms that Moses was perfectly justified in separating 
himself from his wife, since the separation was necessary for Moses 
to maintain his level of prophecy. 63 When one considers that both 
Miriam and Aaron actively continued their marital relationships 
while simultaneously pursuing prophetic careers, the question which 
then arises is, when does a prophet reach a level of prophecy that 
he no longer reClui.res a he]prneet and IT\Jst separate himself from her? 
Or conversely, what is it about a woman which does not enable her 
to function as a helpmeet once her husband has attained such a level 
of prophecy? And more, what is it about a wife which seemsto hinder 
her husband from maintaining or attaining higher levels of prophecy? 
f'specially when considering that Miriam herself was a prophetess? 
Yalkut Reuveni states that if it was necessary for Moses to separate 
from his wife so that Moses could unite himself with Shekinah that 
' she ' may descend upon the earth for his sake . On the other hand, 
we find that Yalkut Reuveni speaks disparagingly of Moses' separation 
from his wife, faulting Moses for failing to fulfill his conjugal 
duties. Yalku t Reuveni claims that Moses was "almost per feet" and 
that he would have heen "entirely perfect" had he fulfilled his 
. l d . 64 COnJUga UtleS . 
It is in this matter of the prophet performing conjugal duties that 
we find a difference of opinion concerning Elijah himself. Yalkut 
Shimoni interprets the verse, "/\nd she said to Elijah: hihat have I 
to do \vi th thee, 0 thou man of G-d? Art thou come unto me to bring 
my sin to remembrance, and to slay my son?" to mean that the Zare-
phite woman had rebuked Elijah , claiming that her son had died as 
• h f T:'l' • hI • • h h 65 Mo f h • d h . pums ment or t'. lJa s co1tus w1t er . st o t e m1. ras J.c 
conrnentaries dismiss her accusation as preposterous, explaining that 
the woman was ranting and raving.irrationally because she was over-
come by the grief of ha-son's death. However, R. Abraham Abele b . 
Hayyim ha-Levi Combiner , author of Magen Avraham ~loss to Shulchan 
Arukh),\Vrites in his midrashic commentary Z3yit Ra'anan that the 
Talmud records an archaic practice that, when Rabbis would travel 
to- d0 1-i v0r their di scourses in s trnnge towns-_ women were set nsi de 
[oL- them to meet in private, because of the injunction that a mon 
may not reside alone without a wife. These women would have to 
waiL a seven-day I?Criou in case their excitelllent would cause Lhclll to 
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1ncns trun tc. 66 R. Combiner suggests that possibly the Zarcphi te 
woman was set aside for Elijah to wait seven days. Therefore, she 
uttered her accusation. Ostensibly, if there was need for a I:Jt:"OI:Jhet 
such as Elijah to separate himself from women, there would be no 
place for R. Combiner's explanation . For Elijah would have distanced 
himself from the wife of his native town, much less would there have 
hc 'C' Il :lily nC'ed Lo Sc'L :lside :lllolhc l- wotn:1n rOI- him in tl SLl-:lllgc' Lown. 
AppArentLy, R. Combiner did not regard woman companionship as a 
clctcrrcmt to F.li.jnh ' s prophetic career. On the other hancl, the other 
conmentators considered the very thought of Elijah's cohabita tion 
Hi. th any woman as totally ludicrous. Perhaps it is in regnnls to 
F.lijah ' s ambivalent relationship with women in addition to Elijah ' s 
other similarities to Moses, that he is designated "the disciple of 
Moses" as well. h7 
/\1 Lhough, as we 111en tioned earlier, the absence of any biblical refe-
rence to Elijah ' s wife and children is not sufficient evidence of 
Elijah 's celibacy, Elijah figures as a symbol of celibacy and chas-
tity in the apostolic pseudepigraphie. 
Ti tus 1\p is t 1 e : 
Thus we find in the Pseudo-
Why t<1kest thou, 0 m,1n, <1 womnn as C1 servnnt? C'.onsi.der the 
conduct of [our] holy ancestors. Thus Elias, a noble man who 
lives in hody, took a young man as a servant, to \Vhom <1lso he 
lett his. mantle as a holy keepsake when he was taken up into 
Paradise in a chariot of fire .68 
'TI1e epistle considers even the keeping of connections with women 
· 69 Th . l . . h ll . G . servants as s1n. e ep1st e cont1nues w1t an a us1on to enes1s 
which slates: "And Lhe sons o[ Eloki111 saw Lhe daughters o[ 111en Lhat 
they were fair ancl they took them wives of all whom they chose ," 
claiming that the sons of Elokim abandoned their heavenly abode, 
enticed by lust in pursuit of the daughers of men, which caused them 
to forfeit their angelic character. 70 
T t seems e1l mast too pArndoxi.c<~l to observe how Elijah, whose own 
marriage seems to be a source of contentions deliberation, should be 
charged with the sacred task of recording every marriage in the heavenly 
. . 71 marr1age reg1ster. 
Once again we must reiterate that the real question pertinent to 
rrsolving the issur of Eli_i::~h's colihclcy or non-ce>lih1cy, is wh0thC'r 
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or not heavenly figures such as angels and high ranking prophets have 
any need whatsoever for a wife or female companionship. In Genesis 
we ;'Ire tolci of the raUonale behind G-el's creating woman anci the 
manner in which she is valuable to man: 
And the Eternal G-el said, It is not good that the man should 
be alone , I will make a helpmeet for him.72 
lillshi, in his comnentary to the Pentateuch, expounds the verse as 
fo 11 ows: 
It is not good, etc . In order thn.t people may not say there 
are two Deities, the lloly One Blessed be lie, among the heavenly 
beings [who is] alone and without a mate, and this one [Adam] 
among the terrestrial beings without a mate.73 
Although Rashi renders the above exposition within the literal inter-
pretation of the verse, he ~s ~n fact referring to a midrashic view 
which is found in Pirkei de-Rabbi Eliezer with a slight variation: 
The Holy One Rlessed be He said: 'I am alone in my world, and 
this one f!\ci<'tml i.s Alone in his world. Tam without repro-
duction before Me and he is without reproduction before him.' 74 Tater on creatures would say : 'That one [Adam], created us.' 
Both Rashi and Pirkei de-Rabbi Eliezer explain the problem ("it is 
not good") of Adam's loneness in that he would have been mistaken 
for a deity. However, Rashi attributes Adam's l?neness to the 
f:1cL thnt he was without n rnttte, while Pirkei dc-Tbhbi f.1iC'zct-
emphasizes Adam's loneness more as a result of his being without 
rqxoduction . Verily the two are interrelated, as without a mate 
there can be no reproduction. 'lhe reason that being without a 
mate and without the ability to reproduce is considered an attribute 
of deity is explained in Genesis Rabbah, on the verse, "These are the 
generations of heaven and earth when they were created": 
It has been taught, everyone who has generations [offspring] 
dies and withers, and is created and does not create. And 
everyone who is without offspring does not die, does not wither, 
creates and is not created. R. Azaria in the name of Rabbi 
said: Concerning the Above, this matter was said.75 
The Midrash asserts that deities do not propagate. For that which 
propagates is subject to cieath and decay. Not so C-ci, who i.s eternct1 rtnd 
not subject to death and decay. fi'urtherrnore , everything which pro-
p<'lgfltes must have itself been created. G-el is different- He creates 
anu is not created . 'lhe ntiurashic comnen ta tors ex~Jlain Lha L Lhis 
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Midrash was stated in opposition to the philosophic school which 
maintained that the wocld is eternal and was not cceated by C-d 
but rnther generCited (tolclnh) from llim. 76 Since thAt which gene-
rates must itself have been created, G-d Himself must also have been 
created. Therefore, the Midrash counters, the world did not gene-
rate from G-d, as G-d does not have generations. Rather, the world 
hAs generated from heAven and earth ("These are the generations of 
heaven and earth .•. "). Heaven and earth however, were created (not 
generated) by G-d (" •.. when they were created!"). 
Genesis Rabbah clearly establishes that G-d does not propagate. 
Otherwise, lie would not be Eternal since that which propagates is 
itself subject to death and decomposition. Although this is most 
certainly true concerning G-d, the question exists whether the same 
is true concerning angels . Some of the midcash:lc co1nmenLatocs claim 
thr1t the nbove is true only of C:-cl llimself, whereAs angels ar.e often 
ephemeral, perishing immediately after their mission is completed. 77 
On the other hand, we must remember that there are angels who are 
eternal, such as the angel Elijah who lives forever, and who certainly 
do not propagate. Since, as the Midrash explains, that which pro-
pagates is itself subject to death. Moreover, the general concept 
of angels begetting offspring is completely foreign both to Jewish 
<md 01dstian sources and :Ls extant only in pagan writings. 78 
What's more, we do not find sex differentiation among angels that 
enable them to propagate with one another. Although angels are 
classified according to attributes or functions which they are 
responsible for, and they can also be divided into groups of higher 
or lower ranks. Nevertheless, in all the classificatioloand cate-
gorizations of angels and their duties, there never appears a distinc-
tion among angels according to sex . for even a union between angels 
and earthly women would require that angels lose their transcendental 
qualitites which are invested in sublunary bodies, so that a union 
with the daughters of men could be possible. 79 
To understand this phenomenon - why we do not find sex differentiation 
nmong ange] s, or why e1 me1l e <mge 1 should not possess a fem<1 l e rflrtner. -
we must return to Rashi's interpretation of the verse, "lt is not good 
for man to be alone, I shall make a helpmeet for him." According 
to Rashi, wece man to have cemained alone he would have been mistaken 
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for a deity. For only the Deity is capable of being alone, self 
sufficient, without requiring the assistance of any counterpart to 
''help" Him. In this sense the creation of Eve as a helpmeet for 
Arl<'lm represents <'I deficiency or shortcoming in man as he cannot exist 
without co-existence, and he cannot attain his own wholeness without 
Eve . The fact that there does not exist sex differentiation among 
angels would seem to indicate that angels are self contained units 
and do not require the ''help" of counterparts for 'their own completion. 
Nevertheless, one must bear in mind, that even angels themselves 
are only "subunits," as they altogether comprise the general category 
of Unity - an attribute of G-el alone. 
The various philosophka l schools which we reviewed earlier concerning 
whether Elijah is in reality a human with angel status, or in reality 
an angel; whether Elijah 's body actually died or whether he continues 
to exist aggregately in body and soul ; whe ther Elijah originated 
as an angel or only later transcended to become one - all these 
questions have tremendous bearing upon the resolution of whether Elijah 
was celibate or not. 
For if Elijah originated as an angel , certainly there is no room to 
espouse that it Hns necessary for him to take a wife. As being 
essentially an angel, he would have no need for a counterpart. If, 
on the other hand, Elijah originated as a human whose body actually 
died upon his ascension , he could even have begotten children, as 
there is no problem if his popagating subjected Elijah to decomposition 
and death. However, if Elijah is eternal then he cannot have children 
as according to Genesis Rabbah, his ability to propagate would subject 
hi111 to decomrosi tion and den th. 
An interesting halakic corollary to this last opinion is manifes t 
in the controversy concerning whether Elijah's spouse requires Levi-
rate marriage (yibum). According to this opinion, even if one were 
to maintain that she requires yibum, in this case Elijah's wife would 
be exempted . Since reproduciton is completely irrelevant to Elijah, 
there would be no obliga tion for Elijah's brother to replace Elijah 
in this capacity. 
Based on this premise, some of the midrashic commentators surmised 
Lha t the Midcash wns spccificnlly sUited jn rcfutC'Iti.on of the theo-
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logical school which propounded the belief that Jesus was the "son" 
of G-d .80 i"or according to this Midrash, it is philosophically 
imposs ibl e to mr~int[li.n that C:-d has a "son ." For wer e th is true , 
by incurring generation, G-d would Himself be subject to death and 
rlecomposition and woul d forfeit His quality of being Eternal. 
furthermore, since G-d i s Unity, G-d does not reproduce Himself. 
Neither does He have any need for a partner for his comple tion. 
Tn fAc t, j n A r esponsum Arlrlressed to R. Joseph llayyim of l\1ghrlad, 
the enquirer related an incident of an atheist who taunted the Jews 
saying : "You Jews say G-d has a wife called Shekinah ." The enquirer 
asked R. Joseph llayyim how to counter this challenge . In Sod Yesharim, 
R. Joseph l-layyim writes that he is astonished that they did not r e tort 
that it is sheer canard to claim that Jews believe that G-d has a 
wi fe . Any Jew who believes such a perverse theory is a compelete 
unbeliever, no hc ttcr thr~n an idolater. R. Joseph Hayyim continues 
to ex~lain the kabbalistic notion of Shekinah and then concludes re-
iterating that the atheist should have appreciated that a Jew who 
believes tha t G-d has a wife is a gross unbeliever , his sin too 
gr ea t to bear . The truth, as everyone knows, is that no people 
is more staunchly corrrnitted to a pure monotheism than the Jews . 81 
Transcendentalism and Ilalaka 
\.-.he ther it is possible that Elijah had a wife, and if he did whe ther 
she needs to be divorced in order to remarry, can now be understood 
both according to the philosophic schoohvhich maintained that Elijah 
was in actuality a human who att<..tiuLCl angel status , and according 
to the scconrl school whi ch purporterl thr~t F.lijAh attainerl the rm l ity 
of an angel. According to the former view which espoused that Elijah 
was actually a human of angel status , Terumat ha- Deshen ' s question 
can be understood as follows : Llow close did Elijah come to a ttaining 
G-dliness, and how much of his human characteristics did he still 
r e tain? Was he like G-d in that he was now an independent unit 
no longer requiring the assistance of a female helpmeet? If so , 
he would not need a divorce, since he no longer has a functional 
a ttachmert to a human wife, which no longer requires severing . Or 
rloes he still partly retain some of his human characteristics that 
disassocia te him from G-d and s till cause him to be in need of a 
- 2l6 -
TilE RELEVANCE OF ID'S RESPONSUM: DECODIFYING TERUMAT HA-DESHEN 
helpmeet? If so, the only way to termiante such a relationship 
wo11ld he through divorce. 
According to the latter vjew which maintains that F.lijah hecc1me in 
reality an angel we can understand Terumat ha-Deshen in the iden-
tical manner which we explained R. Waldenberg' s responsum in which 
he discusses whether a person who undergoes trans-sexual surgery 
relates to his former or latter gender . For exactly the same problem 
exists here. As Elijah underwent a total transmutation that changed 
him from a male to an entity for which there is no distinction in 
sex whatsoever. What's more, he progressed from the level of a 
human who is in need of a female counterpart for attaining complete-
ness, to a self-contained, self-sufficient unit. And exactly the 
same question advanced by R. Waldenberg applies here. To which 
stDtus does Elijah halakically correspond? His former human status , 
much in need of a helpmeet and, therefore, would require a divorce, 
or according to his latter angel status, for whom there is no female 
counterl?art , and therefore, would not need divorce? It is precisely 
hecause the issues were identical in nature that R. Waldenberg (and 
other respondents who dealt in transmutation of one's existential 
state) relied so heavily upon Terumat ha-Deshen for their rulings . 
Thus, the real issue with which Terumat ha-Deshen was dealing is 
whether a human who transcends to become an angel, comple t ely Clbfln-
dons his human characteristics, or whether he still retains some of 
his human features. The consideration of Elijah ' s (relationship 
with his) wife serves as an excellent method in gauging the state 
tmmrcls \vhich he was most closely polarizecl. 82 
We now arrive at the crux of the matter. Specifically, was Terumat 
ha-Deshen dealing with a real practical halakic issue? Did he 
consider the question of whether transcendental man is halakically 
regarded according to his former human status or subsequent angel 
status, a real issue or not. If not, why then did Terumat ha-Deshen 
bother to deal with it and include this responsum in the practical 
section of this work? 
In order to solve this extremely vexing and challenging dilerrma accu-
rately, it is crucial to consider the social and 'political conditions 
wh ·ich rrcvnilcd upon C:crmnn Jewry during the end of the fourtl'onth IFlti.l. 
the middle of the fifteenth centuries - the period and place in \vhich 
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Teruma t ha-Deshen lived; the ideas and religious philosophies which 
were currently upheld and exchanged during that period to which the 
enquirer and Terumat ha-Deshen were undoubtedly exposed; and the 
personage of R. Isserlein himself. 83 
"The devastating effects of the Black Death epidemic on European 
Jewry were still felt strongly in the aftermath of that plague in 
the late fourteenth century. The much believed libel that the Jews 
were the cause for the spread of the epidemic by poisoning the wells 
in an outrageous plot against Christianity and that the Jews were 
to be blamed for all evils , was still high in the consciousness of 
the Centile \vorlci. J\n article was entered into the new German Con-
stitution known as the Golden 13ull, which allowed cities to ' retain ' 
Jews for the purpose of raising revenue . J\s long as a Jew possessed 
money, he was tolerated, but when he lost his money even his right 
to live was no longer recognized. 
"In the year 1390, the same year when R. Isserlein was born, King 
Wenceslau, the successor of Charles IV, decreed in wide areas of 
Germany that all debts owing to the Jews were null and void. Instead 
they were payable to the states and cities, upon the condition that one-
fourth went into the KiPg's own pocket. Expulsions were indeed 
the mark of the fifteenth century as burnings had been in the four-
teenth. During the disorders under the reign of Wenceslaus, the 
guilds in some cities overthrew the patrician rulers and shed much 
Jewish blood in many German cities. 
"A time of turmoil set in once again in Germany during the early 
years of R. Isserlein's manhood under King Sigismund (1411-1437), 
whose reign witnessed conflict with the Reform movement led by John 
Huss and accompanied by the Hussite Wars which dragged on for decades. 
This movement paved the way for the eventual emergence of Protestant 
Reformation in their fight against the Church. Again the Jews were 
deemed resposnible for contributing to the political and religious 
insubordination of the heretical Hussite leaders. 
"When the armies of King Sigismund marched through the Rhine provinces 
in their 'holy war' to squash the Hussite revolt, they assaulted 
Jews everywhere. As perturbed communities were preparing themselves 
for new persecutions, R. Jacob Moellin [Maharil], then Rabbi of ~1ayence, 
seu L 111essengers Lo Lhe coutuuni Lies Lo eugage i11 Lhree -<..lay [as L lot· Llle 
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CC[Jeal o[ the deccee. When in 1L.50, Pope Nicholaus V held a jubilee 
in Rome, the .Jews were feArful that the pilgrims on their way might 
corrrnit excesses against thc Jcws by anti-Hussite crusaders, R. Isser-
lein as well ordered a fast day. 
"During the years of the clerical reaction following the Hussite 
movement, Franciscan and Dominican monks made their rounds to Germany 
pouring fire and brimstone on the Jews in their sermons. TI1e fanatic 
monk, John Capistrano, a Franciscan, already held the post of Tnquisi-
tor in Italy. In 1450 the Pope delegated him to Germany with the 
mission of consolidating the Roman Catholic faith which the llussites 
had undermined. He threatened with G-d's wrath those rulers who 
protected Jews and earned himself the title, 'whip of the Jews, ' 
in his effort to incite the ignorant masses against Jews by staging 
ritual murder trials and inquisitorial scenes. Capistrano claimed 
to have performed many miracles. When he came to Neustadt, R. 
Isserlein offered to follow him to the burning stake and let G-d 
decide between them. Capistrano naturally declined the offer ." 
According to the Jewish historian, Simon Dubnov, Mlat sustained the 
German Jews during that appall{ng epoch when the entire surrounding 
world conspired to annihilate them, and what enabled them to with-
stand against fire and sword and persecution of rights, was the con-
t ·inll.1tion of intensive spiritunl Clctivi ty. 84 This c=tppnlisnl is 
supported by Margolis and Marx who write: 
"It is remarkable that in those evil times, when .the Jews of Ger-many 
were harrassed by malicious persecutions, Jewish studies continued 
Lo thrive. ErfUJ:t, Nurenburg, Ratisbon, Prague and other cities 
maintained colleges for Jewish studies . One of the outstanding 
figures of this period was the Rabbi of Neustadt near Vienna, Israel 
Isserlein, whose mother had been one of the Vienna martyrs of 1421. 
!lis responsa reflect throughout the uncertain position of the Jews 
• h. d II 1n 1s ay . 
1ne imminent feelings of Messianism and expectation of Elijah current 
with the Messianic period which had prevailed among Jews during the 
eadier tJer:.-lod o[ Sefet: llasidint and llosldci Ashkcnaz, in des pe t-~tle 
hope for de livenmce from their trouhled predicament, undoubtedly 
pcnneated the minds and hearts of German Jews once again during the 
early fifteenth century which witnessed similar turbulence and cer-
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Lainly evoked the same sentiments.
85 
R. lsserlein himself was greatly influenced by the tradition of 
t~sidei Ashkenaz. t~sidei Ashkenaz stressed the value of hasidut 
(piety) as a way of bringing men nearer to "devekut" ("comnunion" 
with G-d). Extremism in ethical and religious behaviour, which in 
the sayings and literature of the Rabbis characterized the term 
"hasid" (pious) as against "zaddik" (righteous), was the central 
norm of these teachings. R. Isserlein's renowned ascetic and pious 
lifestyle was certainly comnensurate with these teachings. In 
addition, the influence of Sefer Hasidim is recognizable in many of 
the rulings of Terumat ha-Deshen. 
Aside from the moralistic ethical aspect, Hasidei Ashkenaz developed 
another plane of equal importance -the esoteric theosophical aspect. 
Many Hasidim attained the highest spiritual levels and were con-
sidered to be the masters of the holy spirit, or even prophets. The 
theory of Merkavah remained the main object of inquiry, and even a 
practical guide toward the "ascent to heaven" became interwoven Hith 
number mysticism and speculations based on it. 
In addition to the ecstatic or visionary "ascent to heaven" there 
developed a tendency toward deep meditation, prayer and the deep 
mysteries which were communicated orally. The phenomenon of "ascent 
to heaven" and corrmunion with G-d experienced by Hasidei Ashkenaz was 
quite similar to the concept of "a revelation of Elijah" experienced 
by the Spanish Kabbalists during that time. This was a mystical 
experience of spiritual awakening through which something novel was 
revealed. 87 The mystical experience of "revelation of Elijah" of 
the Kabbalists corresponded to the "ascent to heaven" experience of 
I-13sidei Ashkenaz in that each "state" represented a transcendental 
experience of comnunion with G-d, the supreme objective of both Hasidei 
Ashkenaz and the Spanish Kabbalists. 88 
It was against this kind of social-political-religious background 
that the enquirer put forward his question to Terumat ha-Deshen con-
cerning the halakic status of a man who transcended to become an 
angel such as transpired with Elijah. In the words of the enquirer: 
"There would also be a practical difference for future generations 
if one were to merit a similar fate." When viewed in the context 
of this historical framework one begins to realise that what was 
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irking the enquirer was by no means a wildly odd notion posed merely 
for the purpose of entertaining one's speculatory faculty! 
This was a period steeped in Messianic expectations, where Elijah's 
advent was considered imminent both by Jews and Gentiles alike. 89 
Just as l-~sidei Ashkenaz had long before expected Messiah's arrival, 
this tradition grew even stronger as conditions in Germany worsened 
d h Ch h be . . 1 d. . d 90 M h an as t e urc came 1ncreas1ng y 1sun1te • oreover, t e 
spiritual activity which succeeded in sustaining Je\vish survival 
was the moralistic and esoteric-theosophic techniques of the Hasidei 
Ashkenaz traditions along with penetrating kabbalistic elements. 
Both the hasidic and the kabbalistic trends propounded transcendental 
exercises such as devulging practical guides to attain "ascent to 
heaven," merkavah mysticism, visitation of Elijah, which were consi-
dered the supreme ideals that would lead one to the ultimate hasidic 
ideal of "communion with G-d". 
It is in this context that the likelihood of "if one were to merit 
a similar fate," i.e., encountering a transcendental experience of 
ascending heaven or being visited by Elijah, was considered imminently 
possible and rather vital for one to successfully withstand the 
hostile environment while methodically aspiring towards the true 
ideals of the Hasid. Indeed, the question would not have been 
treated were it not a practical one. For, the German Rabbis of 
that period were preoccupied chiefly with professional Rabbinism, 
compiling questions and customs (minhagim) pertaining to practical 
daily living. 91 Even Sefer Hasidim itself is an example of pragmatic 
and realistic ethical teachings in Jewish ethical culture. 92 
One of the principal objectives of the Hasidei Ashkenaz tradition, 
despite the paradox inherent in the situation,was to try as far 
and as much as possible to integrate the Hasid, ostensibly an un-
natural phenomenon, into the Jewish community, and to make him 
responsible in practice to the community. 93 It is in light of this 
paradoxical situation, i.e., the Hasid immersed in transcendentalist 
ideals pursuing an active and practical Jewish way of life fully 
integrated and involved in the Jewish community, that we can now 
comprehend the full profundity of the enquirer's challenge. 
For it was exactly this paradox which confounded the enquirer. The 
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enquirer asked R. Isserlein how the hasidic tradition could require 
that one pursue transcendentalist ideals while at the same time 
expect of one to fully and actively integrate himself within the 
llklinstrcam of religious life. There is an intensely inherent con-
tradiction between the two, as is explained so punctiliously by R. 
Joseph Ber Soloveichik in Ish r~laka. R. Sol~veichik explains that 
transcendental aspirations are generally pursued through a process 
of negation. The negation of life, the negation of this world, abro-
gation of the existing and of reality. One attains transcendental 
states by following ascetic ideologies of Naziritism and seclusion. 
Vhereas the realist, on the other hand, is a man of this world \vho 
meets his creator not far away in the distant horizons of a utopian 
I 
and secretive holy enchantment of transcendentalism, but rather in 
the very heart and centre of man's universe. The ideal of the realist 
is not to redeem his world through a higher world, but rather through 
himself -by encountering reality as an ideally halakic phenomenon . 94 
Although esotertic theosophies give emphasis toG-d's '~iding his 
face" from this world and that the world has no existence before G-d 
(since the world came into existence as a result of His self-contrac-
tion), the Halakist accentuates G-d's revealing Himself in this world 
and G-d's affirming of the existing. Halaka itself is proof of this 
activity. For G-d's very "coll1T1anding" of man, affirms man's existence . 
How then is it possible for a Hasid immersed in sublunary worlds 
and pursuing an ascetic life of abnegation of self to integrate him-
self in the real world of his fellow man? The closer the Hasid 
comes to attaining higher transcendental states the further he removes 
himself from a real halakic society. The two goals of transcenden-
talism and integrated halakic living are diametrically antipodal 
to one another. 95 
Furthermore , Halaka in general looks pejoratively upon death and after-
life; the dead are free of commandments, and all forms of death are 
labeled as defilement and unholiness. An Aggada in tractate Shabbat 
relates how Moses succeeded in obtaining the Torah despite the ob-
jection of the angels. Moses refuted the angels by proving that the 
laws of Torah appertain to humans only and have no relevance to 
angelsor transcended sublunary entities. Indeed, even the righteous, 
living in a noncorporeal world to come, discuss those laws which 
pertain to corporeal life of a lowly world. Indeed , even G-d 
-222 -
TI-lE RELEVANCE OF TO'S RESPONSUM: DECODIFYING TERUMAT HA-DESHEN 
Himself and his entire Holy Retinue all deal with halakic problems 
which are relevant to a tangible and real world -the red heifer, 
the beheaded heifer, leprosy, etc. They do not deal in transcen-
dentalism, in questions which are above time and place, but rather 
with questions of earthly life in all their minute details. 96 
The ~~lakist recognizes transcendentalism; he does not ascend 
towards it but rather brings it down to him. Although the trans-
cendentalist submerges reality in order to rise up to G-d, the Halakist 
brings G-d down into reality. In a most succinct aphorism, R. Solo-
veichik coins the phrase in Aboth: "Know what there is above thee," 
as "Know,what there is above -is from thee!" Verily, upon G-d's 
own adjudication, "It is not in heaven." Therefore, the prophetic 
transcendentalist cannot overrule the Sages and cannot determine the 
I~laka even if he employs the powers vested in him to uproot trees 
and move streams,as in the famous incident of the "Oven of Aknai" 
recounted in Baba Mezia. For the Halaka affirms a real and existing 
world and has meaning only therein. Consequently, it was given 
over to the possession of man, as ~~laka has no relevance in the 
heavens, nor does it pertain to states of transcendental euphoria. 97 
This contradiction becomes all the more intensified when one considers 
that the German Rabbis were preoccupied mainly with compiling only 
those laws and customs which were pertinent to daily Jewish living 
and that even the moral-ethical teachings of Sefer Hasidim were 
characteristically pragmatic. Any milieu or movement which so 
highly stressed the pragmatic aspects of Jewish Law and which was 
so firmly grounded in normative life could not possibly have simul-
taneously perpetuated transcendental ideals which are antithetic to 
it. 
This was precisely the enquirer's challenge. Suppose a person were 
to merit a successful transcendental experience and thus were to 
realize the greatest hasidic idea l of all - the transformation of 
self to become an angel . At that moment he would cease to be a 
man -his halakic status would then become extremely ambiguous. It 
would be difficult to determine whether l-~laka would pertain to him 
altogether. In which case the ideal of transcendental man stands in 
utter contrctcliction to the icleal of pursuing an integratecl hctlnkic 
Lifes tyle. '1he former ideal removes man totally from the practical 
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realm of halakic life and from the mainstream of normative Jewish 
living! 
Mclny \vorks had been written in criticism of the hasidic movements 
such as the works of Moses Taku in the early thirteenth century, 
who saw in the new tendencies of the hasidic movements "a new religion" 
smacking of heresy. They also attacked the attention Hasidim paid 
to the mysteries of prayer and particularly the dissemination of 
these mysteries in their books. It is most logical to suspect that 
the enquirer was reflecting or discreetly re-echoing these criticisms 
towards R. Isserlein for reply. These criticisms form the basis 
for many of the same condemnations which were rehashed much later by 
the Mitnaggedim (Hasidic opposers) such as R. Hayyim of Volozhin in 
his Nefesh ha-Hayyim and later on following in his path R. Joseph 
Ber Soloveichik in his aforementioned Ish Halaka. They in their 
polemics against the modern hasidic movements, developed a cognitive 
teleology which defined Torah lishma as study for the sake of under-
standing rather than an ecstacy or mystical theurgy. For they belie-
ved that true ecstacy could be experienced through maintaining a 
correct cognative-normative approach to r~laka rather than by enter-
taining mystical notions which are alien to Halaka. "Communion" 
with G-d, they believed, can be attained only once one has acquired 
a true understanding of G-d, which is obtained through intensive 
study and through familiarisation with the entire corpus of r~laka . 
Cognizance of G-d's law is a precondition for attaining the amor dei 
. ll l" . h . 98 -- --lnte ectua 1s concurrent w1t commun1on. 
R. Isserlein ostensibly was the optimal choice for directing this 
dilemma. For R. Isserlein was an outstanding halakic expert who 
was eruditely proficient in all aspects of Jewish Law and whose au-
thority was widely acclaimed. As the leader of the Jewish community 
of Austria-Germany , R. Isserlein was extremely involved in communal 
affairs. This is evident in his endeavours to establish harmonious 
relations with the Christians, the public fast which he instituted, 
his challenging the notorious monk, John Capistrano, his stand 
against the institution of a Chief Rabbinate, as well as being engrossed 
in private study while heading a large Yeshiva. He was obviously 
the epitome of a fully integrated communal leader responsible in 
proctice to the con1nunity as well as a halakic giant. At the same 
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time R. Isserlein was a ~~sid. Greatly influenced by Sefer Hasidim, 
this pious ascetic was steeped in the teachings of a movement which 
inculcated abnegation and encouraged introverted transcendental 
aspirations. R. Isserlein, in short, was both the communal Ish 
Halaka and the seclusively aloof Ish Hasid; the pragmatic Halakist 
and the abstruse mystic. 
In R. Soloveichik's view, the Ish Hasid and the Ish r~laka are two 
radically and diametrically opposed entities. The one is an extra-
terrestrial metaphysical domain concerning angels which is utterly 
divorced from reality, while the other involves the daily norma tive 
l i fe of men. The enquirer thus challend R. Isserlein -himself the 
quintessence and embodiemnt of both- to reconcile the two. It was 
precisely because R. Isserlein had so perfectly meshed the two spheres 
until they completely dovetailed that he found difficulty in even 
understanding the enquirer's problem. This is indicative in the 
opening remark of R. Isserlein's responsum: "I am greatly astonished 
as to why you bothered to pose such a query." 
In R. Isserlein's mind there is no contradiction whatsoever be tween 
transcendental man and the Ish r~laka. The two complement each 
other rather than stand in opposition to one another. For even 
\men one reaches a transcendental state, one still retains the innate 
characteristics which one dare not relinquish. Indeed Elij ah, R. 
Isserlein explains, although transcended -still continues to perform 
the commandments. This, in fact, is cons is tent with the teachings 
of Sefer Hasidim- which inspired R. Isserlein so greatly- and which 
states tha t the pious continue to observe Mitzvot even after death. 
(For only ordinary men are exempted from Mitzvot upon their death, 
unlike the pious, who observe Mitzvot even posthumously). 99 
Certainly, Elijah who never died but merely transcended, continues 
to adhere to the commandments. His transcended state only serves 
to enhance and add dimension to his previous state. Elijah's trans-
cendence to angel, for example, does not complicate his social-
hal akic life but only heightens it. Being self contained entities, 
complete in their own unit~ angels are not in need of wives,as ex-
plained earlier. The Torah requires laws of matrimony only be t\veen 
man and woman because of the na ture of their r elationship and their 
interdependence upon one another -but not between angels and women. 
- 225 -
THE RELEVANCE OF TD' S RESPONSUM: DECODIFYING TERUMAT HA-DESHEN 
But that is not to say that once man transcended to angel he no 
longer relates to his original manhood. For although the enquirer 
might well be correct in assuming that angels arc separate entities 
of a metaphysical domain who are divorced from everyday life of man, 
this is true only of angels who originate as such. However, the 
man who transcends to angel still possesses much of his "manhood ." 
Except that he is now an elevated form of man, a type of "superman" 
but nevertheless, still very much a man. His new status does 
not contradict his former earthly position, it only adds dimension 
to it. Consequently he is still very much bound to llalal<a. 
Thus when the Ish ~Ialaka, tl'e pragmatic man of law who pursues an 
active normative communal existence - transcends to become Ish Hasid, 
in pursuit of the highest hasidic ideals of communion with G-d- he 
does not relinquish his normative halakic activities. To the con-
trary, his halakic activities become greatly enriched as they now 
take on an added dimension which only serves to augment his appre-
ciation for Halaka. 100 
In actual fact, in most mystical texts, inner perception and the way 
to "communion" are deeply connected with the preservation of the 
traditional framework, the value of which is increased seven-fold. 
The mystical viewpoint strenythens the tradition and becomes a cons-
cious conservative factor. 10 To wit, an important subject of 
discussion in Sefer ~lasidim is the question of the esoteric purpose 
of the commandments. The profundity of the laws of the creation 
102 are delved upon there as well. It is important to bear in mind 
that the main intention of the various theosophical doctrines was to 
invigorate and reinstil religious enthusiasm and to fortify strict 
adherence to laws. Were it not for the theosophical embellishment 
there would have been a witnessing of alienation from Jewish Law and 
religious life would have deteriorated greatly . Given their severe 
hardships and the dry intellectual climate of talmudic pilpul (casuistry) 
and straightforward ~Ialaka, people who were thristy for an emotional 
charge would have invariably become estranged from religion. 
The Mitnaggedim assert that man can attain ecstacy and communion by 
pursuing a correct cognitive approachto~Ialaka and through properly 
I 
understanding the dynamics of the halakic system . Though this ideal 
is indeed both noble and grand, the conception itself is intangible 
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for most men and obviously falls short of the needs of the people 
who are incapable of attaining such a high form of intellectualism 
owing to its lack of emotional appeal. Therefore, the esoteric 
discussions, by invoking strong emotional reactions through their 
colourful overtones and embellishments of the Torah and its laws, have 
succeeded in securing a strict compliance to Jewish Law. Indeed in 
one theosophical work the author's main object was to prove the 
"llalaka" itself has no literal meaning and that its meaning is mys-
tical.103 Verily, R. Solomon Adret, in his Responsa of Rashba, 
relates that the entire realm of Halaka and every one of its de tails 
have a corresponding esoteric value which belongs to a parallel 
theosophical system. 104 Undoubtedly the mystical value of Halaka 
intensifies the appreciation of Halaka generally. 
Indeed it would have been counterproductive were it true, as the 
Mitnaggedim claimed, that transcendentalism removes man from the 
domain of Halaka and causffihim to remain aloof from the practical 
r ealm of halakic life. For the whole purpose of these teachings 
is to allure man and bring him infinitely closer to a zealous pursuit 
of Halaka because of his added appreciation and reverence for it. 
This then reconciles the seeming "paradox" between the active involve-
ment of the Ish Halaka on the one hand the mystical quality of the 
Ish Hasid on the other. 
Thus R. Isserlein's responsum is infinitely "practical" as the r espon-
sum extols the virtues of the halakic system in that it evinces 
that Halaka has relevance both in the real physical world as well 
as the transcendental, because the two are intricately interwoven. 
Although we have shown earlier that R. Isserlein's responsum is of 
"practical" value as it serves as a basis for determing whether a 
person who undergoes existential transitions of sorts, retains his 
pre-transitional status ,or assumes his post-transitional status. 
However, this practical significance, as we noted earlier, is only 
an outgrowth of R. Isserlein's responsum. Now we are able to posi-
tively establish that the responsum itself is immeasurably practical. 
As it confirms that even when one has attained a transcendental peak 
and has undergone an existential change of becoming transformed to 
c:m [lngel, as Elijah, the halakic system still very much pertains to 
one ' s new reality. 
- 227 -
THE RELEVANCE OF 'ill'S RESPONSUM: DECODIFYING TERUMAT HA-DESHEN 
Thus, R. Isserlein's responsum resolves the utilitarian value of 
the hasidic tradition which conclusively demonstrates the fantastic 
magnitude and scope of Halaka. It pertains not only to the mundane 
terrestrial sphere but encompasses the metaphysical plane as well. 
This is in glaring contradistinction to R. Soloveichik, echoed in 
the confused question of the enquirer, who writes resolutely: 
"The Halaka does not deal with metaphysical mysteries."105 
R. Isserlein meets U1is challenge by disclosing with equal r esolve 
in Terumat ha-Deshen the transcendental and pneumatic nature of 
Jewish Law. As Professor Baer writes: 
"The pneuma tic resource which accompanies the Jewish Sage is not a 
matter of Aggada alone. This resource claims its merit in the 
r ea lm of the Halaka itself. "106 
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Thus far, our work has endeavoured to uncover a certain twilight zone 
somewhere between the natural-human sphere of man and the supernatural-
celestial sphere of G-d and l-Iis angels . We demonstrated that 1-lalaka 
is compelled to identify this undefined twilight area in order to 
resolve an entire gamut of issues pertaining to estra-terrestrial 
existence such as the Elijah issue, the statusofagolem, test tube 
babies, life in the next world, changes in existential states, defini-
tions of life and death, etc. In the coming chapters we shall see 
that there are many other issues in Jewish Law which emanate in this 
confusing twilight area, bordering between the natural and the supernatu-
ral, with which Halaka must of necessity contend in order to legitimize 
its purpose of guiding man in every walk of life which he encounters. 
Providence and Prognostics 
To begin with, we find that the religion not only developed the concept 
of G-d ' s providential care over man as an ideological principle but 
actually legislated this belief as a full positive commandment. 
Deuteronomic Law ordains : 
"Thou shalt be whole-hearted [tamim] with the Lord your C-d " 
[18:13], 
The Sifri interprets the verse that if man shall be whole-hearted with 
G-d, he can be certain of gaining G-d's providence. 1 Sifri in 
another place explains the meaning of whole-heratedness as follows: 
How do we know that one must not enquire of the future [Goralot]? 
Because it is said: Thou shalt be whole-hearted with the Lord 
your G-d . 2 
A similar explanation is found in Talmud: 
How do we know that one must not consult the Cltaldeans [astro-
logers3]? Because it is said etc .4 
I3ased on the Sifri ' s and talmudic expositions of the scripural text, 
the biblical commentators interpreted the verse as a providential 
commandment ordaining that man is obligated to place his destiny in 
the hands of G-d and trust in Him whole-heartedly, rather than to 
r 
contcmplntc the futun.' hy c ons ult ·ing nstrologc n:; nnci divine r s . J 
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Notwithstanding the above, R. Elijah b. Solomon Zalman (Vilna Gaon) 
r ecords many instances where the talmudic Sages involved themselves 
in prognostics and heeded Chaldean predictions often taking precau-
tionary measures against them. 6 Thus it would appear that the 
Sages did not consider all forms of prognostication forbidden. In 
order to identify the areasofprognostication which Halaka either 
sanctions or prohibits, it is significanttoverify how exactly one's 
involvement with prognostics constitutes a contravention or a challenge 
to the notion of G-d's providence . 
Nahmanides writes: 
In a responsum on the subject 
It is certainly clear that astrology [itztagninut], is not in-
cluded in proscribed divination. Moreover, R. Hananiah main-
tained that the planetary influence [mazal] gives wealth and 
Israel stands under planetary influences. Although the Halaka 
does not accord with him, nevertheless, it appears that this is 
not considered divination. Those that divine through stars 
do not include astrology.7 
Nahmanides continues to cite numerous instances from the Talmud to 
prove that one is permitted to listen and believe in astrology. 
However, Nahmanides adds: 
Except that sometimes G-d works miracles for those who fear Him 
to cancel the decree of the stars ••• Therefore, one should not 
ask of them, and should rather go in whole-heartedness, as it 
is written 'Thou shalt be whole-hearted with the Lord your G-d.' 
And if he saw in them [stars] something undesirable, he should 
perform Mitzvot, and intensify his prayers. But if he saw in 
the horoscope a day which is not fit to work, he should take 
precaution and not rely on the miracle. For I maintain that 
one is not permitted to oppose planetary influences [mazalot] 
and rely on ~iracles. 
Nahmanides establishes a distinction between astrology (itztagninut) 
and divination. The Torah proscribed the enquiry of diviners. How-
ever, to believe in their predictions without enquiry, or to take 
precautionary measures to escape the outcome of one's horoscope, 
such practice we find even in the Talmud . Nevertheless, since G-d ' s 
providence can miraculously circumvent the forecast of the stars, one 
should not enquire of them but rather trust in G-d's providential care 
whole-heartedly. If one did see an inauspicious horoscope, one should 
not rely on miracles to circumvent it. 
According to Nahmanides it would appear that it is the seeking out of 
one ' s destiny which challenges G-d ' s providence, since in doing so, 
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Notwithstanding the above, R. Elijah b. Solomon Zalman (Vilna Gaon) 
records many instances where the talmudic Sages involved themselves 
in prognostics and heeded Olaldean predictions often taking precau-
tionary measures against them. 6 Thus it would appear that the 
Sages did not consider all forms of prognostication forbidden. In 
order to identify the areas of prognostication which l-lalaka either 
sanctions or prohibits, it is significanttoverify how exactly one's 
involvement with prognostics constitutes a contravention or a challenge 
to the notion of G-d ' s providence. 
Nahmanides writes: 
In a responsum on the subject 
It is certainly clear that astrology [itztagninut], is not in-
cluded in proscribed divination . Moreover , R. Hananiah main-
tained that the planet&ry influence [mazal] gives wealth and 
Israel stands under planetary influences. Although the Halaka 
does not accord with him, nevertheless, it appears that this is 
not considered divination~ Those that divine through stars 
do not include astrology.' 
Nahmanides continues to cite numerous instances from the Talmud to 
prove that one is permitted to listen and believe in astrology. 
However, Nahmanides adds: 
Except that sometimes G-d works miracles for those who fear Him 
to cancel the decree of the stars . .. Therefore, one should not 
ask of them, and should rather go in whole-heartedness, as it 
is written ' Thou shalt be whole-hearted with the Lord your G-d . ' 
And if he saw in them [stars] something undesirable, he should 
perform Mitzvot, and intensify his prayers. But if he saw in 
the horoscope a day which is not fit to work, he should take 
precaution and not rely on the miracle. For I maintain that 
one is not permitted to oppose planetary influences [mazalot] 
and rely on miracles . 
Nahmanides establishes a distinction between astrology (itztagninut) 
and divination. The Torah proscribed the enquiry of diviners. How-
ever, to believe in their predictions without enquiry, or to take 
precautionary measures to escape the outcome of one ' s horoscope, 
such practice we find even in the Talmud. Nevertheless, since G-d's 
providence can miraculously circumvent the forecast of the stars, one 
should not enquire of them but rather trust in G-d's providential care 
whole-heartedly. If one did see an inauspicious horoscope, one should 
not rely on miracles to circumvent it . 
According to Nahmanides it would appear that it is the seeking out of 
one ' s des tiny which chnllenges G-el ' s providence, since i_n doing so, 
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man relies on the stars rather than on G-d. llowever, the know l edge 
of one's destiny as predicted by the stars does not contradict G-d's 
providence. In fact man must take precautionary measures should this 
knowledge come to his attention. However, he must not actively set 
out to gain such knowledge. Thus, Nahmanides considers astrology a 
genuine source of knowledge despite man's having no recourse to actively 
consult it. A similar view is propounded by R. Joseph Habiba in 
Nimmukei Yosef: 
That which is stated, 'Ye shall not divine nor observe times, 
this refers to those who divine by means ofweasle~ birds, and 
stars,' is similar to what is mentioned in the [Talmud] above. 
Namely, 'so and so's bread has fallen out of his hand, his staff 
has fallen out of his hand.' These things contain no wisdom 
but are complete folly. However, one who understands the chirpings 
of birds, this is not divination. For it is a disciplined 
knowledge of those ~o understand it, and is permitted, as we 
find of Rav Illish. 
Nimmukei Yosef confirms with even greater resolution than Nahmanides 
that prognostication based on astrological knowledge rather than on 
folly, even if it be in the form of deciphering birds is absolutely 
legi timate to those who are erudite in this science. 9 Divination 
constitutes a contradiction to G-d's providence only insofar as its 
basis is rooted in nonsense. However, knowledge which is based on 
perception of reality is a legitimate form of pursuit. 
Quite an opposite view is taken by Maimonides who writes: 
Who is a diviner [me'onen]? Forecasters who predict by astrology 
and say this day is propitious this day portentous ..• Whoever 
does an action because of astrology and plans his work or his 
goings to coincide with a time determined by astrologers, is liable 
for lashing because of divination [lo te'onennu]. 
And these practices [i.e., magic and astrology] are all false 
and deceptive with which the early star worshippers led the nations 
astray to follow in their ways ..• Anyone who believes in these 
things or their likeness and thinks in his heart that they are 
true and matters of wisdom except that the Torah forbade them, 
are fools and deficient in understanding ••• But sensible people, 
who possess sound mental faculties, know by clear cut proofs 
that all these practices which the Torahforebad, have no 
scientific basis but are chimercal and inane ... And because of 
this the Torah said when warning against all these follies, 
'thou shalt be whole-hearted with the T~rd your G-d. •10 
~laimonidcs clearly rejects LhaL magic and astrology have any claim 
to being true sciences. They Are not even forbidden sciences since 
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they are not sciences at all but rather a concoction of fabricated 
lies and deceits construed by idolators to lead people astray. 
By quoting the same aforementioned providential verse, Maimonides 
clearly indicates that the problem which astrology poses in this 
regard is that belief in any supreme powers governing fate, outside 
of G-d, constitutes a form of idolatory. 
The Vilna Gaon cites numerous instances in the Talmud which indicate 
that both astrology and various types of magic are real sciences. 
In a lashing criticism of Maimonides' view he writes: 
Philosophy led him astray in his overpreoccupation with it to 
explain away the talmudic references metaphorically by uprooting 
them from their plain meaning. And G-d forbid I do not believe 
in them nor in all their kind. Rather all the sayings are 
understood as their plain meaning. Except that they have 
an inner meaning which is not the innerness of philosophers who 
are outsiders, but rather of those who know the truth.ll 
One might well wonder whether the Vilna Gaon gave any thought to the 
possibility that it was Maimonides' halakic Weltanschauung which 
guided his philosophic thinking rather than vice versa. Let us 
recapitualte Maimonides' halakic objection to the claim to science 
which he codified in Laws of Idolatry: 
But men who have acquired wisdom and are of perfect knowledge 
know by clear cut proofs that all these things which the Torah 
forbade, are not matters of wisdom, but rather emptiness and 
vanity. 
We recall from our discussion in Chapter I that according to Maimonides, 
'Halaka' differs from 'Mitzvah' in that Halaka integrates the Mitzvah 
by transforming it from a level of emotional based belief to inter-
nalised cognative knowledge based on demonstrative proofs. This 
rational motif of Halaka will reject any human invention of the mind 
which cannot be verified through demonstrative proofs. Indeed, 
from the 'Oven of Aknai' incident we saw that even a Divine inter-
jection will be rejected by Halaka if it does not conform with the 
rational understanding of the majority view. Thus, this very same 
rational integrity of Halaka, rather than philosophy, which caused 
Maimonides to reject theesoteric teachings of Kabbalah, also caused 
him to reject astrology and all forms of magic. Since any science 
which "sensible men who possess sound mental faculties" could not 
demonstrate by "clear cut proofs" does not exist and must of necessity 
be brandished as a concoction of lies and deceit. 
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The "inner meaning" of which the Vilna Gaon speaks, and possibly 
Nimmukei Yosef and Nahmanides had in mind, which is known only to 
"those who know truth" is a type of "truth" which is rooted in the 
same realm of kabbalistic knowledge which can not be rationally 
demonstrated according to reason and consequently perforce be rejec-
ted by Maimonides. 
Thus we have embarked upon another twilight area of Jewish Law. 
Namely, can Halaka admit an intangible body of knowledge the existence 
of which can not be rationally proven? According to Maimonides, 
such speculation must be rejected outright as pure mythology. 
According to Nimmukei Yosef and Nahmanides, in the same way as Halaka 
endorses Kabbalah, astrology is yet another branch of metaphysical 
knowledge which Halaka may endorse without automatically rejecting 
is as divination. 
In Maimonides' view, prognostics contradicts providence since it 
involves nothing more than imaginary beliefs in mythical powers 
which necessarily constitutes idolatry. According to Nahmanides and 
Nimmukei Yosef, prognostication does not challenge providence if its 
facts are scientifically based, even if it be a mystical science. 
However, if these facts are of a non-scientific nature, then they 
must likewise be discounted as divination based on myths which oppose 
the providential injunction. 
It would be expedient to investigate, according to the authorities 
who consider astrology a veritable science, the exact way in which 
astrology differs scientifically from divination such that the one 
is regarded as a legitimate metaphysical science whereas the other 
is dismissed as prohibited mythology. We will analyze various forms 
of magic in the next chapter in a similar way. 
In order to facilitate an understanding of the scientific distinction 
between the two, as well as its application in Jewish Law, we will 
first state our conclusion at the outset before proceeding to prove 
it. It is our contention that although these codifiers regard 
astrology as an acceptable metaphysical science - this metaphysical 
science itself can be divided into two distinct areas. The one is 
a natural manifestation of metaphysics and the other is a supernatural 
form of metaphysics. It is the former which constitutes a pseudo-
science which we will call Astral Science whereas the latter is mytho-
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logical and thus constitutes divination which we will call Astral 
Mythology. Astral Science interprets metaphysical events which 
occur regularly, and are believed to be generated by a Divine source, 
and the likelihood of wh~ch appear sensible to the human mind. In 
this sense Astral Science is a natural science as its events occur 
naturally and can almost be regarded as factual. Astral Mythology, 
on the other hand, is erratic, its events occur supernaturally, and 
are not connected specifically to any Divine source. Whether its 
events actually occur or are only delusive legerdemain is immaterial 
since its preoccupation does not constitute a science and is there-
fore regarded as pure mythology. 
Signs 
We have already seen Nimmukei Yosef's objection to considering the 
second category a science because its information is based on non-
sense rather than wisdom. Nahmanides considers the events of Astral 
Science realistic and can not accept Maimonides' contention that this 
category also constitutes myth. Man is obviously affected by these 
events in a real way and he must safeguard himself against them as 
man "is not permitted to rely on miracles by contravening the constel-
lations." 
In Nahmanides' opinion it is as hazardous for man to ignore an ominous 
astrological signal which beckons him as it is to ignore a speeding 
bus which moves towards him. Unless he takes precautionary steps, 
he will be affected in a real way by each calamity, the one situation 
occurring just as naturally as the other. Therefore, Nahmanides 
rules that for this reason one is permitted to heed astrological 
warnings and delay the beginning of court proceedings or postpone 
th t f k . 12 s . . ld k e commencemen o wor proJects. ~nee ~t wou ta e a super-
natural feat, or miracle, to prevent its materialisation, and one 
may not rely on rmixacles. One would no more venture into a wild 
jungle than one would embark upon a journey or a project during 
portentou~ conditions. One must suspect the outcome of each as 
naturally as the other. Whereas according to Maimonides, since one 
can not rationally explain these astral signs, one would incur the 
13 penalty of me'onen everi for postponing a journey. 
Referring to the talmudic incident which narrates how Abishai b. 
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Zeruiah deciphered the flapping of the wings of a dove as an omen 
that King David lay in trouble, Nimmukei Yosef writes: 
That was not augury [nahash] as he [Abishai] did not rely on it 
completely but it was only a sign that he considered. In this 
manner it is permitted as it is customary to wed when the moon 
is full as a good sign. And so it is concerning the stars, 
it is only forbidden to establish them as signs for himself 
and to practice augury through them. However, whatever a man 
understands concerning the galaxies of the stars and their 
orbits, such as the astrologers, this is not augury but a great 
science which G-d decreed from the six days of creation to govern 
the world. In this way, therefore, every pious man should 
pray to cancel the planetary decree, for everything which 
transpires is from the Lord, and it is in His power to alter 
everything in accordance with His will.14 
In this succinct paragraph, R. Habiba itemizes a number of essential 
points which characterise Astral Science and significantly distin-
guishes it apart from Astral Mythology. Probably the most significant 
of all his points is the remark that astrology is a "great science 
which G-d decreed from the six days of creation to govern the world 
thuswise." From this one remark alone we may derive three important 
principles: 
1. Astrology is definitely a science. 
2. G-d established this science as a "decree from the six days of 
creation." It is therefore a natural science. 
3. G-d established the astral system in order to "govern the world" 
through it. In other words, the constellations are real powers 
which actively 'assist' G-d in implementing the government of 
his World. 
The fact that men who understand the galaxies of stars and their orbits 
are involved in a great science is no small consideration. By acclaim~ 
ing this field of science so highly R. Habiba discreetly promotes its 
study. 15 Man does not necessarily have to be an astrologer by pro-
fession in order to benefit from acquiring astrological knowledge. 
An important purpose of Halaka 'guiding' man towards his Maker is 
fulfilled when man considers it amain task to discover the present by recognising 
and reading the signs which nature spreads before his eyes. We have 
already demons.trated in "The Relationship of the Future Worlds to 
This World," that the more man seeks to learn what will be , the more 
man comes to know what is. This undeniable fact is no less true of 
astrology. Furthermore, astrological knowledge \Jhich is necessary 
for deciding a number of important Halakot, not the least of which 
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is the intercalation of the calendar months, is greatly enhanced 
through study of astrology. That R. Isserlein was proficient in 
this science there can be no doubt as his biographer, Leket Yosher, 
records how R. Isserlein once mounted a tower which stood in the 
street of the Jews and examined a comet at close range. He then 
portentously announced, "It's tail points towards Venice." "In the 
same year," his bibliographer continues, 
The King of Vienna [Ladislaus VI Posthumous] whose father had 
initiated anti-Jewish persecutions, was poisoned in Prague 
[by Geor&e of Podiebrad], and the Hungarian King [Ladislaus 
Corvinusj was murdered in his capital.16 
The fact that astrology was established as a "decree from the six 
days of creation"legi.timates the study of cosmology as natural a 
pursuit as cosmogony - a subject which is dealt major treatment in 
Genesis. The natural astrological feature of the "decree of creation" 
leads to the credulity that the moon promotes decay and death. The 
fact that G-d established the astrological system "to govern the world" 
f~rther served to .strengthen this belief which eventually gave rise 
to the custom of planning "to wed when the moon is full as a good 
sign." 
Another important point mentioned by R. Habiba is that Abisha's 
interpreting the flapping wings of a dove did not constitute augury 
because 'be did not rely on it completely, but was only a sign which 
he considered." In other words, it is the complete reliance on 
the knowledge rather than the knowledge itself which constitutes augury. 
However, to merely consider the possibility of the knowledge as a 
sign and to act upon it in case it is accurate (rather than relying 
on it implicitly) is certainly a sensible course of action to take. 
It is in this context that the planning a marriage when the moon 
is full is cited as a good sign. 
This brings us toR. Habiba's last essential point that "everything 
which transpires is from the Lord and it is in His power to alter 
everything in accordance with His will." In other words, relying 
on astrological knowledge poses a double problem. Firstly it reflects 
the identical challenge between religion and modern science today. 
Namely the secularist tendancy to believe implicitly in the science 
and all that transpires is from the science rather than from G-d, the 
originator of the science. As Yehezkel Kaufman correctly points out, 
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what differentiated the Israelite religion apart from pagan mythology 
was not the Bible's denial of the scientific basis of divination skills 
but rather 
wisdom."17 
"What offends the Bible is the heathen reliance on human 
Secondly, that Astral Science is actual only as long as G-d has not 
willed to alter its facts. Hence, it is hardly a final science since 
its facts are in effect, nothing more than mere hypothetical possibi-
lities. Thus, astrology breeds the inherent danger of dissociating 
Astral Science form a Divine source as well as the danger of becoming 
oblivious to the fact that G-d' s providence can transform at any moment 
the factual data of Astral Science into the fictional elements of 
mythology. Nevertheless, one may consider astrological signs since 
they are definite possibilities. In the words of the Talmud: 
"Although there is no divination, there are signs."18 
Not all "signs" however, were accepted for consideration as many 
signs were associated with divination proper. We shall see that the 
same criteria, mentioned above, which dissociated astrology from divin-
ation were employed in the differentiation between legitimate signs 
and divining omens. Signs which belonged to Astral Science were 
sanctioned whereas signs which were features of Astral Mythology were 
proscribed. The Talmud records Rav's view who postulates: 
An omen which is not after the form pronounced by Eliezer, 
Abraham's servant, or by Jonathan the son of Saul, is not 
considered a divination.19 
Although this talmudic dictum seems straightforward, a controversy 
arose among the codifiers whether planning an action on the basis of 
signs similar to Eliezer and Jonathan constitutes augury or not. 20 
Among the reasons cited in justification of Eliezer's and Jonathan's 
deeds, we find the following arguments: R. Nissim b. Reuben Gerondi 
in his commentary known as Ran writes: 
Nevertheless, the matter requires reconciliation as it is impos-
sible that these pious ones [i.e., Eliezer and Jonathan] were 
augurers. And this would appear to be the explanation of the 
matter. The Torah forbade augury whereby one bases an action 
on a sign which is senseless and does not cause benefit, or harm 
to the matter. Such as bread which fell from one's hand or a 
deer which crossed one's path, and similar things which are 
Ammorite folkways. But one who utilizes signs which logically 
cause benefit or harm, this is not augury. For all dealings of 
the world are thuswise. Behold, one who says: 'If it rains I 
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will not go on a journey and if not I will go,' is not augury, 
but rather the way of the world.21 
Ran goes on to explain the logic implicit in the signs of Eliezer and 
Jonathan. Thus Ran mentions the first of the essential characteris-
tics which qualify Astral Science. Namely, that the sign must be 
scientific in that it is rational and has a natural causal effect 
on its circumstances. It is logical to postpone a journey because 
of the natural difficulties caused by rain as it is to plan an action 
on any other cosmic sign which naturally affects one's circumstances. 
Were these signs irrational, they would appeal to. the category of 
Astral or Cosmic Mythology. An identical explanation is rendered 
by R. Eliezer of Metz who writes in his Sefer Yereim: 
However, Jonathan's action was not augury, for were it augury 
Jonathan would not have done it. And the reason is that augury 
is only that which is illogical, and Jonathan gave a reason for 
the matter.22 
Radak, in reconciling Jonathan's action, in his commentary to Samuel 
imparts an interesting psychological value to signs: 
However, if a man desires to execute an activity and makes some-
thing a sign for that action in order to· strengthen his heart 
and waken his heart to the matter, it is permitted.23 
R. Isserles cites Radak's view as a halakic principle in Darkei Moshe. 24 
R. Joel Sirkes in his commentary to Tur, known as Bach, explains the 
legitimacy of the signs by connecting them to a Divine source, another 
essential trait for constituting a science. Men of G-d are endowed 
with minor prophecies which enable them to discern the expression of 
G-d's will implicit in certain signs as opposed to signs which are 
ad hoc and incidental. These latter signs are perceived by ordinary 
men who have no access to Divine knowledge. 
Another essential mentioned by virtually all codifiers is the partial 
rather than complete reliance on signs. One accepts the providential 
hand of G-d affecting the astral or cosmic decree, by interpreting 
the decree as an indication of potential rather than an absolute fact. 
Similar views are propounded to explain the coadunate talmudic dictum: 
Although a house or a child or a marriage must not be used for 
divination, they may be taken as a sign.25 
The Ammora, R. Eleazar, was the first to qualify this dictum by imme-
diately adding, "Provided it was established three times." The 
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apparent necessity of the sign occuring three times was that the sign 
had asserted itself as a perfectly natural phenomenon and proved its 
reliability once it recurred thrice. No longer could it be considered 
mysterious or coincidental. Rabad probably had this explanation in 
mind when specifying that these signs were reliable because of their 
threefold recurrence whereas other signs were not to be relied upon. 26 
In fact, R. Joshua b. Alexander ha-Kohen Falk, in Perisha explains Tur's 
interpretation of "or a child" as child-bibliomancy rather than 
childbirth (as Rashi) because childbirth is a perfect natural phenomenon 
and could not possibly constitute a divining omen. 27 
Many of the codifiers approved bibliomancy despite their proscribing 
other signs because most of man's actions are directed by the Bible 
as well as the ~ible being immediately connected with Divinity. 28 
A similar thesis is maintained by Yehezkel Kaufman in distinguishing 
Urim ve-Tumim from other forms of divination. This will be further 
treated in our discussion concerning lots. Other authorities con-
sidered child-bibliomancy as a form of minor prophesy with which 
children are endowed. 
These essential features of scientific signs are instructive in 
analysing the connection between the sign and the portended event. 
The authorities who understood sign interpretation on the basis of 
prophesy need not assume any natural, inherent connection between 
the omen and the portended event. G-d merely reveals His intention 
through various signs which are interpeted by means of prophesy. 
Only the prophets can ascertain the will of G-d as revealed to them 
in signs. The interpretation of these signs by ordinary men necessarily 
constitutes Astral Mythology, as there exists no rational connection 
between the omen and the event. 
Other authorities such as Ran, assumed a strong natural and causal 
nexus between the sign and the portended event. These signs are termed 
by Kaufman as "causal signs." Or, that coming events cast their 
shadows before- a sort of inverted causality in which the posterior 
cause creates a prior effect. Such portents are a product of the 
natural mysterious connection between the present and the future. 
Kaufman terms these signs as "preminotory signs."29 
We are now in a position to analyse the halakic premises for validating 
the practice of many customs which were based on signs. We have 
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already mentioned R. Habiba's position who condones the custom of 
entering a marriage when the moon is full as a good sign. This view 
is codified approvingly by R. Caro in Shulchan Arukh. 30 
A number of essential factors justify this practice. A natural 
causal relationship was assumed between the waxing/waning moon and 
its influence upon terrestrial phenomena. This is a natural astrolo-
gical feature which G-d established "to govern the world from six 
days of creation." Secondly, it is clear from the ritual of blessing 
the new moon that the fluctuating moon reflects the Shekinah, and is 
thus connected to a Divine source. 31 And thirdly, because it is 
only considered an indication and not relied on completely. 
Sedei Hemed, investigates certain intricate details relating to this 
custom: For example, he investigates whether one should solemnise 
or delay a wedding in order to merit an auspicious day. The real 
question is whether spiritual considerations factor in delaying wed-
dings in the same way as would a dispute which developed over material 
items. Many authorities argued that the Mitzvah of contracting a 
marriage would cancel the harmful effect of a waning moon. Other questions 
considered by Sedei Hemed _are whether the sign concerns the entire 
first portion of the month when the moon is waxing, or only the middle 
of the month when the moon is full; if the engagement is performed 
before the marriage whether the engagement also requires an auspicious 
sign; whether a second marriage also requires an favourable omen. In 
an interesting disclosure Sedei Hemed writes that even should scientists 
discover that the moon exerts harmful influences upon terrestrial 
phenomena, G-d's providential care would work to nullify such an effect 
on the merit of entering a marriage on a day which the Sages considered 
auspicious. Perhaps we have a principle of natural metpahysics: 
Even if the natural physical conditions undergo change, G-d influences 
the metaphysical conditions to naturally adjust themselves to suit those 
who follow His will. Another illustration of this can be seen in the 
case when Beth Din proclaims the new month, the universe's metaphysical 
conditions will automatically exert a natural effect on man's circum-
stances to correspond with the first day of the month. A menstruant 
whose cycle commences on the first day of the month must suspect a men-
stral flow on the day proclaimed by Beth Din. Sedei Hemed discusses 
whether a marriage planned on the first day of a two day Rosh Hodesh (beginning 
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of the month) corresponds to the last day of the waning moon or the 
first day of the waxing moon. He rules that because the Beth Din 
included the first day in their proclamation, its effects will prove 
auspicious. Finally Sedei Hemed decides that in the months of Elul 
and Adar a couple may marry under waning moon conditions since these 
ausp~c~ous months would cancel the negative lunar effects. These 
monthsareadditionally favourable because students gather during 
these months to study Torah, known as yerach kalah, which is a play 
on words also meaning "bridal moon."32 
In his Responsa Yehudah Ya'aleh, R. Aszod discusses the custom which 
he views disparagingly. He recounts the providential principle of 
shomer mitzvah lo yeidah davar ra-he who performs a Mitzvah (i.e., 
marriage) will encounter no harm. Moreover he cites the talmudic 
(aggadic) statement: 
As soon as one attains twenty and has not married, G-d exclaims: 
'Blasted be his bones.'33 
R. Aszod remarks that G-d's curse is certain whereas the sign is 
only a possibility and certainty always takes precedence to that 
which is doubtful. It is significant to note how R. Aszod employs 
an aggadic statement to butress his halakic verdict. 
The author of the work Ori ve-Yishi disagrees with R. Aszod's view 
arguing that since this custom is codified in Shulchan Arukh, the 
providential sa~eguard only accompanies the Mitzvah when the Mitzvah 
is performed in its proper halakic time. Regarding the "curse," 
he states that any delay for the purpose of improving the marriage 
does not fall under G-d's curse. 34 
These opposing views are reflected in a famous case incident that 
occured in which R. Abraham b. Hiyya clashed with his contemporary R. 
Judah b. Barzillai. The former persisted in postponing a wedding 
because the day was not propitious while his contemporary wished to 
proceed with the ceremony as he held an astrological belief to be a 
custom of the Chaldeans. 
The consideration of not exposing oneself to a situation in which 
one tampers with planetary influences (mazalot) bears heavily on the 
question of inducing labour. R. Moses Feinstein is attributed with 
the ruling that one is not permitted to unnecessarily induce labour 
for the sake of convenience since each day (and hour) that the child 
- 241' -
ASTROLCX;Y SCIENCE OR MYTHICAL LORE? 
is born carries a different planetary influence on its life. 35 
An illustration of another powerful omen which was considered to 
exert a powerful influence upon human life is the law which appears 
in Shulchan Arukh that a menstruant who has imnersed herself at the 
end of her period in a Mikvah (ritual bath) must take care upon leaving 
the Mikvah not to encounter an impure (non-kosher) animal such as a 
dog, ass, pig or horse. If she falls pregnant the child will be 
naturally affected by this experience. A G-d fearing woman must repeat 
the imnersion should such an encounter occur. The Talmud records how 
the great Sage R. Johanan: 
Was accustomed to go and sit at the gates of Mikvah. He said: 
'When the daughters of Israel come up from bathing they look 
at me and have children as handsome as I am.'36 
Other omens that forebode or influenced portented events and are re-
corded in Shulchan Arukh are: the emission of seminal pollution on 
Yom Kippur, the cast of one's shadow on the night of Hashana Rabbah. 37 
A man's shadow does not merely reflect his outer presence but more 
profoundly reveals a connection with his inner being. Till this day 
the bulk of Jewry are accustomed to partake in an assortment of food-
stuffs listed in Shulchan Arukh which are regarded as tokens of good 
fortune. The 'apple and honey' have practically become canonized 
as sacred ritual. 38 The response to sneezing of "Asuta" (health) or 
"G-d Bless You" developed as a result of regarding sneezes as porten-
tous. An Aggada records that before Jacob's time people would suddenly 
meet their death by sneezing. The sneeze was thus an omen of death 
39 which could be averted by invoking the traditional response. The 
Mishna as well was not inhibited to state: 
If a man makes a mistake in his prayer, it is a bad sign for him. 
And if he is the reader of the congregation, it is a bad sign 
for those ·who have comnissioned him, because a man's agent 
is equivalent to himself.40 
Sortilege 
The same scientific criteria which were employed to distinguish accep-
table signs from mystical ones can be applied in the differentiation 
between permissible and prohibited sortilege by means of lots. 
The aforementioned providential verse, "You shall be whole-hearted 
with the Lord your G-d" is taken by Sifri as a source for the prohi-
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bition of inquiring of lots. 41 A corrmon form of proscribed lots, 
well known to Jews was the use of a piece of wood from which the bark 
had been peeled on one side. The rough side was designated as "man" 
while the smooth side was designated "woman." It was then tossed 
into the air twice. If the "man" fell first, followed by the "woman" 
this was a good portent; the reverse betokened bad luck, and two of 
k. d .d d . 1 42 a 1n was cons1 ere non-consequent1a • 
Yet despite this we find that the Divine Will is acertained through 
lots. Examples abound which show that the ascertainment of Divine 
\.Jill through lots played an important role in public affairs. The 
distribution of the Land by means of lots, theselectionof the scape-
goat on the Day of Atonement, Moses' election of the elders, the surplus 
of 273 firstborn over Levites who were redeemed by lots, Achan's 
death, Jonathan- had he not been ransomed by the people, priesthood 
shifts, the election of Saul etc. 43 A proverbial verse advises: 
"The lot causeth strife to cease and parteth asunder contentions." 
An even more telling verse two chapters earlier states: 
"The lot is cast into the lap and the whole disposing thereof is 
from the Lord."44 
R. Yair Bachrach rules in his Responsa Havot Yair that lots are 
1 . bl d . f D. . . d 45 I h R f h re 1a e an a s1gn o 1v1ne prov1 ence. n t e esponsa o t e 
Geonim we find the following assertion: 
"One who opposes [the outcome of] lots is as if one transgresses 
the ten commandments." 
There is not one source in all the ancient rabbinic literature which 
states anything to the effect that one who opposes lots is comparable 
46 to transgressing the ten commandments. Especially in light of 
Sifri's understanding of Scripture" You shall be whole-hearted etc.," 
as a negative commandment proscribing inquiry by lots. 
Ostensibly, one may distinguish between "inquiring of lots" and "making 
a lottery." The former constitutes divination in that the inquirer 
believes wholeheartedly in the predictions of the diviner who fore-
tells his destiny by throwing lots. This method of procuring knowledge 
is without sense and mythological. In the second case one is not 
interested inprocuring knowledge. One is merely undecided about choosing 
between various alternatives. One consciously allows one's indecision 
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to be resolved arbitrarily by casting lots. Or in the event that 
two or more parties are undecided as to how to divide up portions, 
by means of mutual agreement they engage in a lottery and accept 
its outcome. The lottery does not produce any knowledge through a 
special technique. Nor do they rely on the lot itself. They 
merely rely on their decision to divide up portions arbitrarily. 
This form of deciding fate is sensible not mythical. It is a 
scientific method which man devises in order to allocate resources 
or duties. Havot Yair simply adds that even the outcome of a lot-
tery only appears arbitrary; there is a Divine hand in all that 
befalls man. Therefore, one may not oppose it. 
This leads us to a second criterion in distinguishing between per-
missible and forbidden sortilege. If the outcome of the lot reflects 
a Divine hand of providence which governs it, as in the distribution 
of the Land with the aid of Urim ve-Tumim and the other biblical 
examples mentioned above, then it is permissible. If this Divine 
mark is missing and instead is ad hoc, it then becomes undistinguish-
able from pagan divination. This distinction is maintained by Yehezkel 
Kaufman who writes : 
It is no accident that the religion of ·YHWH preferred lot oracles 
to all other manner of augury. They are the simplest, most 
unsophisticated method of decision making. They address G-d 
rather than nature and express complete reliance on His decision 
rather than on an [esoteric] science of omens ••• The priest 
needed no esoteric knowledge to use the Urim; even as employed 
by him they remained the ideal vehicle for expressing dependence 
exclusively on the decree of G-d ••• The application of divinatory 
techniques 70 learn the de.cisions of YHWH is neither banned nor 
condemned.4 
What concerned the Bible in proscribing divination was not its 
validity or accuracy as a technique, but mor.e so its utter divorce-
ment from the realm of Divinity. 
Other Divinatory Techniques 
Other forms of divination which were equally validated or disqualified 
by the same scientific distinction are: 
oneiromancy 
anthrosposcopy 
the art of interpreting dreams, the first form 
of fortune telling; 
divining by the features; 
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chiromancy divining by the hand; 







in the soles and palms and on the forehead; 
finger nail divination; 
divining through sand and stones; 
divining through sounds made by drops of oil 
or wax against the sides of a water goblet; 
divining through plants; 
deciphering a man's fate by his name, and the 
matrix of his character and personality; 
use of Scripture in divining. Either by asking 
children to recite verses they were studying 
in school, or opening the Bible at random and 
taking the first word or sentence as an omen. 
Among these techniques there were some which were not relied upon 
completely, yet, they were taken as signs connected with a Divine 
factor. Their method of interpretation was rational- the portent 
relating to the omen in a natural and logical manner, or even 
allowing for the possibility of prophecy by a recognised man of G-d. 
Such techniques could be sanctioned up to a point, beyond which they 
were disqualified as mythical and prohibited divination. 
Oneiromancy for example could have significant halakic implications, 
such as necessitating a fast day, engaging in ritual liturgy for 
neutralising ominous dreams, release from a vow or decree of excom-
munication pronounced in dreams, or even rendering a ruling on the 
basis of a responsum from Heaven communicated in a dream. On the 
other hand we find such statements as "Dreams have no importance 
for good or ill," and, "a man is shown in a dream only what is 
suggested by his own thoughts." Only through the employment of 
sensible scientific criteria can Halaka distinguish a consequential 
dream from myth or folly. 48 
In another case we find the practice of exam~n~ng the finger nails 
by the light of a candle during the Habdalah rite, related to the 
49 science of metoscopy. In the case of bibliomancy we find that 
although Maimonides considered all forms of divination mythical and 
proscribed, he nevertheless accepted certain forms of bibliomancy. 50 
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Planetary Influences 
The fact that planetary influences (Mazalot) affect man's terrestrial 
circumstances and behavioural patters is of substantial halakic 
consequence and a factor which must be reckoned with in Jewish Law. 
A case in point is the Katlanit woman, already treated in part, in 
a previous chapter. We recall that a Katlanit is a woman who became 
widowed twice. The Talmud, in seeking to determine which women 
fall under this category, investigates the cause of death of a Kat-
lanit's husbands: 
Thus said Abimi from Hagronia in the name of R. Huna, 'The 
source [a malignant disease in the womb] is the cause.' 
But R. Ashi stated, [the woman's] Mazal is the cause.' What 
is the practical difference between them is the case where the 
man only betrothed her and died [before consumating the marriage] 
or also when he fell off a tree and died.Sl 
According to Abimi, who opines that the source is . the cause, if a 
husband died before consumating the marriage or fell off a tree 
and died, the woman is not defined as a Katlanit since it was not 
"the source" which caused her husbands' deaths. According to R. 
Ashi, however, who stated that Mazal is the cause, even if the husband 
died of natural causes other than disease of the womb, the woman is 
nevertheless defined as a Katlanit. Her Mazal caused these natural 
circumstances. Hence she is not permitted to rewed. 
In a responsum on the subject R. Asher b. Yehiel, known as Rosh, 
discusses the nature of the metaphysical influence which the Mazal 
exerts on the Katlanit's life: 
The explanation of 'Mazal causes' appears to me that the woman's 
Mazal is bad since her husbands die. The matter is subject 
to Mazal because eeoples' lives and their livelihood depend 
on Mazal; [i.e.,J if one is born in an hour that one will 
become wealthy or poor. The woman is imprisoned at home and 
can not sustain herself without her husbands' support and it 
was decreed on this woman that her husbands should die in order 
that she live in poverty without anyone to support her.52 
A corollary emanating from Rosh's explanation is his ruling that if 
a man became twice a widower, he would not fall under the male cate-
gory of Katlan and hence he may rewed. This is because the Mazal 
decreed that the woman's husbands should die in order that no-one 
should support her. This does not apply to men since they support 
themselves. R. Shelomo Luriah offers another reason for the distinction: 
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The Talmud teaches that a husband is responsible for his wife's 
sins. Therefore, a woman who became twice widowed is a Kat-
lanit and they died because of her sins. However, a man, even 
if a number of his wives died, each one died as a result of 
her own sin and therefore he can marry a third woman.53 
Another practical halakic consequence resulting from Rosh's explana-
tion is a ruling of R. Landau in his responsa Nodah Be-Yehudah: 
A woman who has proven herself to be a woman of valour and is 
successful in business even after her husband's death is 
permitted, according to the opinion that Mazal causes. Behold, 
her Mazal does not cause poverty!54 
R. Landau's reasoning disturbed Hatam Sofer who challenges in a 
responsum; 
Is it sustenance alone that cau~es? Rather her Mazal causes 
that she will not live complacently under her husband and that 
her husband's name will not be attached to her. And certainly 
when he dies after marriage one must explain that her Mazal 
caused her to suffer personal grief deprived of the conjugal 
rights which are obligated by Torah.55 
Many of the authorities however, did not agree to R. Sofer's objection 
and the R. Landau-R. Sofer conflict becamea widespread controversy 
among codifiers. 56 There were important practical halakic differ-
ences according to the authorities whomaintained R. Landau's position 
apart from the consequence which R. Landau himself mentioned: If 
upon contracting a marriage a condition stipulates that the woman 
will provide her own sustenance, she would not be considered a 
Katlanit if her husbands died. Or, if she had already become 
classified a Katlanit, she would be permitted to marry a third time 
if she contracted her new marriage on the above basis. Since she 
is not dependent on her husband for sustenance he will be unaffected 
by her Maza1. 57 
There were halakic consequences even according to those who maintained 
R. Sofer's view. If the woman had lived complacently under both 
husbands for many years before their death, then her Mazal did not 
cause her to suffer the anguish described by R. Sofer. Or, if she 
had separated herself from her husband and moved into another home 
by herself before his death, her actions demonstrate that she is not 
grieved by his demise. In these cases one would not be able to 
58 determine resolutely that Mazal played any part. 
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An interesting question entertained by the authorities is if a 
Gentile woman became twice widowed and subsequently had undergone 
conversion. Do we say that her Mazal also undergoes some form of 
metaphysical transition? Does the woman acquire a different Mazal? 
The resolution of these questions are essential in order to decide 
halakically whether she is permitted to rewed. 59 
Another explanation of the nature of the cause of the husbands' 
deaths is divulged by R. Shelomo Luriah in his commentary to Semag-
the Sefer Mitzvot Gedolot of R. Moses of Couey: 
There are those who explain the reason is because she is decreed 
above [by the cosntellations, be-ma'arachah] to another man. 
Consequently whoever marries her will die until she marries the 
one who was decreed by the Heavenly Family. This does not 
apply to men however, since they can take additional wives to 
their own. 
[R. Luriah comments:] This reason is faulty. Because either 
way, if she was decreed to another man, how did the Sages forbid 
her to rewed? If it is decreed she will perforce rewed! 
And if we say that G-d doesn't cancel the decree of the Sages 
but rather nullifies His own decrees, certainly the man who 
she married will not die. For He cancels His decrees!60 
Other natural or metaphysical factors which affect the Katlanit's 
predicament but were not caused by her Mazal are also discussed by 
the authorities. A distinction had to be drawn between Mazal in-
fluences and other factors since it was only the former which desig-
nated her the Katlanit status and its concurrent consequences. 
Therefore, we find in a ruling by Terumat ha-Deshen: 
If the husband died through pestilence or in a similar manner, 
any plague which affects the entire country, even the one who 61 opines Mazal causes will not inculpate the Mazal in this instance~ 
The authorities were divided on whether one could apply R. Isserlein's 
principle in the case that the second husband died from old age. 
Some maintained that: "there is no greater plague which affects all 
countries like old age." While others contended that plagues are 
different since by remaining in the country one exposes oneself to 
the plague and thus endangered one's life which is not the case re-
garding old age. 62 
Concerning other factors which may be responsible R. Isserlein writes: 
From Sefer Hasidim it seems that it is the place [where one 
resides] which causes [death].63 
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Rashba also seems to concur with this opinion. In a responsum 
he explains the taLmudic advice that a man who is ill-fated in one 
town should move to another town where his fortune may change for 
the better. One of the reasons why such a step can prove effective, 
Rashba writes, is that his bad luck is due to the influence of the 
64 stars in that particular place. 
Another interesting factor other than Mazal which 1s considered is 
the taLmudic instruction that the marriage of the daughter of a 
priest to a non-priest will not fare well. It is noteworthy that 
the statement which is normally aggadic, is halakically employed to 
determine that the marriage was affected by the couples' incompata-
bility rather than by Maza1. 65 
Regarding whether her Mazal alone is responsible R. Kluger writes in 
Hochmat Shelomo: 
According to the one who opines Mazal causes, one may distinguish 
a woman who married her husband by herself to a case where his 
father married them whilst she was a youngster. Then we must 
say that the Mazal of his father causes and not her Mazal. 
And if she grew up later and married herself she has no law of 
Ka tlani t. 66 
The problem of Mazal being vested with certain powers which seems to 
oppose the providential notion also presented specific halakic prob-
lems for the Katlanit. For example, the question whether the Katlanit 
must undergo a Levirate marriage. Many of the authorities were of 
the opinion that the merit of performing the Mitzvah of entering a 
Levirate marriage would counteract the influence of Mazal. Other 
authorities opined that the Mitzvah provides no protection where 
danger is certain. Hatam Sofer counters by positing that Mazal 
influences are .taken only as a sign to be suspected, and can not 
be considered an instance where danger is certain. Therefore one 
can rely on the providential protection which accompanies Mitzvot. 67 
R. Kluger considers the marriage of a scholar who studies Torah while 
being supported by his wife. Does the Mitzvah of studying Torah 
provideadequate providential protection to circumvent the powers of 
Mazal? R. Kluger rules positively. Avnei Nezer challenges that if 
Mitzvot are capable of engendering sufficient strength to ward off 
Mazal, why is it that the Mitzvah of procreation does not entitle 
every Katlanit to rewed. Amazingly, Avnei Nezer distinguishes between 
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varying degrees of protection engendered by different Mitzvot. 
Certain unique Mitzvot are of such immense strength that they can 
act as defense mechanisms against Mazal while others hopelessly suc-
cumb before her. 68 
A marvelous example of application of Aggada to Halaka in this 
regard, is the question of whether a Katlanit who immigrates from 
the diaspora to Israel is permitted to rewed. The talmudic commen-
tators distinguish Israel form the diaspora in that the diaspora is 
governed via the medium of Mazalot which are subservient to G-d. 
Israel, however, is under the direct guidance of G-d without the 
mediation of Mazalot. Therefore, some respondents ruled that since 
Mazal plays a role only in the diaspora, a Katlanit woman would be 
permitted to rewed in Israel. Others held that the mere Mitzvah 
of settling in Israel itself would provide the necessary protection 
. Ma 1 69 aga1nst za . 
Determinism versus Free Choice 
While explaining the nature ofthemetaphysical influence which Mazal 
exerts on Katlanit .' s life the authorities were extremely cautious 
to address the sensitive philosophic dilemma which predestination 
(by Mazal) presents to the principle of Free Will. In his responsum 
explaining how "Mazal causes," Rosh was careful to add: 
But one must not explain that the woman was born in the same Mazal 
that her husbands would die, as we don't find this in the Talmud 
to be dependent on Mazal except wealth or poverty or longetivity 
of life and related matters. However, other things are not 
dependent on Mazal.70 
Rosh cautiously alludes to the fact that Mazal can not affect the 
Katlanit or her hsubands in a manner which will interfere with their 
freedom of choice. It is only in matters such as sustenance, children, 
length of life, and related matters which_ have no connection with 
man's efforts to exercise free will. However, other matters such 
as man's moral attributes and deeds, whether he be righteous or wicked, 
good or evil, are direclty determined by man's free will. These can 
not be influenced by Mazal and therefore, can not be included in an 
explanation of "Mazal causes." 
Radbaz similarly explains in a responsum, a verse in Jeremiah \vhich 
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seems to entirely contradict the concept of free choice: "0 Lord, 
I know that man's way is not his own; it is not in man to direct 
his steps as he walks." Radbaz replies thatthe verse does not 
refer to man's ethical and religious life, which he is free to choose, 
but to such matters as sustenance. This does not depend on G-d's 
decree, but on man's efforts. 
71 .. 
The reason which -explains the Katlanit's predicament because of her 
having been decreed to another man, as dicussed by R. Luriah, is 
also related to the issue of free choice. The reasoning is based 
on an aggadic passage in the Talmud which states: 
Forty days before a child is formed a Bat Kol issues forth 
and proclaims the daughter of A is for B.72 
Marriage is preordained before birth and therefore, not dependent 
upon man's conduct. Maimonides was disturbed by the obvious problem 
of determinism -implied in the passage. In a responsum Maimonides 
explains the meaning of the passage, that if a man and a woman are 
worthy, G-d will match them so that their marriage will be happy. 
If they are unworthy, He will arrange for them to contract an unhappy 
marriage. The supposition that marriages are made in Heaven does 
not mean to suggest that a man can not t ake steps of his own when 
acquiring a wife. He can freely decide to live a virtuous life and 
G-d will arrange for him to marry a virtuous wife. 73 
R. Hayyim Halberstam (1793-1896) discusses the Katlanit woman in 
his Responsa Divrei Hayyim. He explains that G-d ordered His world 
in such a way that the stars can have some effect as to ward off 
death and the like. Ultimately, it is G-d who governs the world. 
The meaning of "Mazal causes" is that her Mazal prevents any suspen-
sion of death due to husbands. 74 
In this brief explanation, R. Halberstam tackles a number of complex 
philosophic -problems: Firstly, he reconciles the confrontation between 
G-d's providence and an astral system with its own invested powers 
by positing only limited powers to the constellations. Their power 
is not independant but is derived from G-d who ultimately governs 
them by exercising His providence. Nor is this astral system mythical. 
These are real natural powers through which G-d governs His world. 
In the words of R. Halberstam: "Like an axe in the hands of a wood-
cutter." Finally, he states that there is no contradiction between 
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predestination and free choice because Mazal does not challenge 
man's free will. 
Another example illustrating how Mazal could not be held responsible 
where man's free choice is concerned is a case when one of the 
husbands conmi t tErl suicide. Since the husband took his life in his 
own hands as a· result of his own free will, the consideration of 
the wife's Mazal must be dismissed. Hence the woamn is not classi-
fied as a Katlanit. 75 
Perhaps, we may now venture another halakic criterion in differen-
tiating between Astral Science and Astral Mythology. Namely, if 
the astral system will affect man's lot in life in a manner which 
interferes with his free will then these "lots" belong to the category 
of sortilege which constitutes divination. Halakically speaking 
these "lots" are mythical as no causal relationship exists between 
the Astral System and man's fate wherever free choice is concerned. 
A number of explanations were devised in answer to the more general 
problem of how the Halaka could acknowledge any existence of Mazal 
pmvers affecting Jewish life in view of the talmudic verdict: "The 
Mazal has no effect on the people of Israel." Rashba simply resolves 
in a responsum that only virtuous Jews are inmune form Mazal. How-
ever, by sinning G-d removes His providence and hence they become 
subject to Mazal's influence. Rashbash (R. Solomon b. Simeon Duran), 
follows a similar line in his responsum and points out that Jews 
are not automatically inmune. But they can shake off the influence 
of Mazal by pursuing virtue. Man has to take every step to avoid 
harm, just as his trust in G-d does not permit him to walk through 
a fire hoping not to be burned. 76 
Thus we see that according to Rashbash, Mazal exerts a very real 
and natural influence over man's life. To walk forward and ignore 
Mazal without taking any preliminary course of action can prove as 
hazardous as walking through an open fire. R. Halberstam, like 
Ninmukei Yosef, ascribes to Mazal natural powers which were vested 
in it by G-d during Creation. It is imperative for Halaka to scien-
tifically analyse the metaphysical workings of Mazal as well as 
resolve the complex philosophic issues raised by it, in order to 
render cogent halakic decisions \Jhenever situations in Jewish life 
arise when Mazal is encountered. 
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Ammorite Folkways 
A final factor which rrus.t be included in our discussion of "Astrology: 
Science or Mythical l.Dre?", is the consideration of Darkhei Emori, 
or Ammorite Folkways. We endeavoured to show how astrological 
information of a non-empirical nature and which did not reflect a 
Divine hand, is discounted as astral mythology. Prognostic data 
which are determined by nonsensible, illogical techniques depicting 
essentially unnatural metaphysical phenomena also shared many of 
the elements a~d beliefs prevalent among pagan cults; thus consti-
tuting even further grounds for being banned as mythological. In 
addition, many pagan devining techniques comprised idolatry. The 
gods were often called upon for assistance in these techniques and 
pagan belief was that the gods could be influenced through their 
various manipulations. These were the mythical folk practices and 
beliefs of the Ammorites which the Torah expressively forbade. 77 
In view of the fact that astrology itself played such a large and 
important role in Ammorite folk tradition the question arises how 
could some of the authorities sanction Jewish interest in this field 
even if it constituted a logical pseudo-science? Indeed, most of 
the authorities who censured astrology, immediately associated 
it with Arnnorite folkways. The "Ammorite Folkways" refer to the 
prognostic arts as practiced by Ammorites which constitute a partialcategory 
of the more general prohibition of following the "Laws of Gentiles" 
(hukkot akum). 78 
One must understand the Torah never intended to forbid every facet 
of life which Jews shared in common with Gentile nations and in 
particular Ammorite society. It was only those practices which were 
specifically recognised as "their statutes" (hukkoteihem) which 
were proscribed. Therefore, a distinction had to be drawn between 
those practices which were particular to the nations and those which 
were universally common to all peoples. Generally, the Halaka 
considered all practices which had their origins in specific cultic 
traditions which were known only to the doctrinaires and promulgators 
of cultic beliefs but were nonsensible in themselves as "their statutes." 
In the language of the halakic authorities: 
Those matters which are not determined through natural logic, 
and have no precedent in the natural order of the world, but 
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rather are void actions which are of no use. These are 
strange and astonishing things and therefore, are called hukkot, 
like a huk [statute] which is without reason. All of them 
cleave to idolatry since they lead to witchcraft relating to 
the stars. The matter evolves until the stars are raised 
aloft, worshipped and praised.79 
It is now apparent why many of the codifiers did not associate astra-
logy with "their laws." Since its metaphysical components had 
a natural basis, occuring regularly in ways which were scientifically 
explainable according to reason, and did not exclude G-d's overall 
governing and control over them, they could be sanctioned as belonging 
tothecategory of universal values which Israel shared in common 
with all nations. 
Thus the "strange and astonishing" supernatural elements of meta-
physics were recognised as specific pagan mythological features 
which characte~ised "their ways." However, the natural metaphysical 
events whichwere empirically verified by all nations constituted a 
l egitimate body of Astral Science which had to be reckoned with 
halakically as any other real branch of the natural sciences. 
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The mytholgocial character of pagan cults engaged in actual magical 
practices was stikingly more pronounced than in prognostics. The 
Jew who practiced actual magic far more resembled his Ammorite counter-
part than his Jewish friend who had an interest in astrology. Never-
theless, not every magical activity would automatically qualify as 
Ammorite Folkways. The Halaka employed very definite criteria to 
distinguish between actual magic and what only appeared to be magic. 
In some instances actual magical practices were permitted. 
Jewish and Non-Jewish Magic 
In differentiating medieval Jewish magic from magic as practiced by 
Gentiles, Joshua Trachtenberg deftly writes: 
Jews were ab initio excluded form the medieval fraternity of 
sorcerers and witches because they were commonly branded as 
members of anti-iliristian sects. The witch cults employed 
various blasphemous burlesques of iliurch rites in their own 
ritual blasphemies to which sorcerers were also addicted \vith 
magical potency. 
These could have no meaning for Jews. Furthermore, medieval 
witchcraft and sorcery were based upon a perverted workshop 
of Satan, and individual warlocks were supposed consciously 
to accept the suzerainity of the Power of Evil and to operate 
through an appeal to his aid. Jewish magic to the contrary, 
functioned within the framework of the Jewish Religion, which 
naturally excluded any such association with the arch opponent 
of G-d. 
The primary principle of Jewish magic was an implicit reliance 
upon the Powers of Good which were invoked by calling upon 
their names, the holy Names of G-d and His Angels. This simple 
dependence upon names for every variety of effect obviated 
resort to all the other magical arts with which the non-Jewish 
tradition has familiarised us. The magician vmo could produce 
wonders by the mere utterance of a few words had no need of 
the devious 'business' of his non-Jewish colleague. 
It was this principle too, which kept Jewish magic securely 
within the bounds of religion and prevented it from assuming 
the role of anti-religion as its iliristian counterpart did. 
Magic was proscribed by the Church not because it was magic, 
but because it made a mockery of the Christian faith and became 
a powerful anti-iliristian force. Jewish magic during this period 
never strayed from the fold so that the magician remained a 
pious and G-d fearing Jew. 
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Nor was Jewish magic the exclusive skill of the 'magician.' 
One may define the Jewish magician as a scholar by vocation, 
a practitioner of the mystical-magical arts by avocation.l 
Perhaps a pertinent example of one of Trachtenberg's points is the 
following Halaka in Shulchan Aruk: 
Whosoever does not leave over bread on his table will never see 
a sign of blessing. However, one must not bring a whole loaf 
of bread and place it on the table. For if one does, it resembles 
idolatry, as it is written: 'those who prepare a table for 
Gad.' 2 
One must take precaution to ensure that the same loaf of bread (which 
is required by law!) to leave on the table in order to elicit a 
sign of blessing from G-d, should not be regarded as a meal offering 
. 3 
to Gad- the Mazal of Fortune. The magical mystical method of 
employing foodstuffs such as bread as a mechanism for appealing to 
the Powers of Good- be it Gad or G-d- seem virtually identical. Lf 
The difference is merely whether the object of appeal is Gad or G-d. 
An appeal to G-d to elicit blessing falls within the rubric of 
religion and is in fact dictated by it. Appealing to Gad for the 
same purpose, is anti-religious since it constitutes a denial of 
the suzerainity of G-d as the ultimate source of all fortune. 
Therefore, the method had tobemodified in order that it should not 
be misconstrued as idolatrous. Similarly we find a related Halaka 
where Rema rules: 
There are places where it is customary to prepare a table and 
place on it various foodstuffs on the night before circumcising 
a child. ·This ~s forbidden because of 'those who prepare a 
table for Gad.' 
In his c011mentary, Shakh explains that Rema forbade the custom only when 
food was specifically placed on the table to remain there. However, 
he who partakes of the food, is permitted to participate in the widely 
accepted custom of Wachtnacht in which a meal was prepared on the 
night preceeding the circumcision. 6 Again we are witness to the 
legitimisation of magical-mystical techniques, once correct measures 
were taken to ensure that they were not confused with idolatry. If 
the technique was self-evident that it was engaging the Deity, then 
no modification was necessary. Therefore, Shulchan Arukh rules: 
It is forbidden to create an illusion. But it is permitted 
[to do so] by using the Book of Creation.? 
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The Book of Creation 
The employment of magical mystical Names of G-d, as prescribed by 
the Book of Creation, to effect various metaphysical conditions, 
was a recognisably legitimate technique. Since it directly evoked 
the Deity- the obvious source from whence it derived its power-
it could not be mistaken for Gentile magic because it was of an un-
equivocal Jewish nature. Therefore, it could be endorsed by Halaka 
as a legitimate magical method. This contention is substantiated 
by Darkhei Moshe who writes: 
And from Asheri it would appear that it [the employment of the 8 Book of Creation] is a type of magic [kishuf] which is permitted . 
It is important to bear in mind the distinction between Jewish magic 
-i.e., magic sanctioned by Jewish Law- and magic that is performed 
by Jews but is prohibited because it imitates Gentile magic. An 
example which illustrates this distinction quite clearly is the 
question of whether food produced by magic is Kosher for consumption. 
In a responsum on the subject R. Aryeh Yehudah Leib Fraenkel-Teomim 
writes that if the food was produced by a Jew it is not permitted 
for consumption since Jews are forbidden to engage in magic. If 
the food was produced by a Gentile, however, since the Torah does 
not forbid Gentiles to engage in magic, the food must be rendered 
Kosl1er for consumption. Yet in another incident we find that the 
Talmud relates how R. Haninah and R. Oshaia created a one third grown 
calf by means of the Book of Creation and ate it. The unmistakable 
conclusion is that food which is created by Je\vish magic is permitted 
whereas food which is created by Jews who employ Gentile techniques 
. h"b" d 9 1s pro 1 1te • 
The Talmud in fact defines the Hebrew term of sorcerers (Keshafim) 
etymologically, as an abbreviation for Kahasl: F3.!'1alia shel Ma' alah-
contradicts the heavenly household. From here one might infer that 
he who practices magic in a manner that does not oppose the heavenly 
household would not be defined as a sorcerer. 
In his Responsa Shemen ha-Mor, R. Abraham Anakawa discusses the 
question whether it is permitted to create a man by the Book of 
Creation on the Sabbath since it results in the creation of a physical 
entity. R. Anakawa rules that it is permitted since creating through 
the Book of Creation is automatic and therefore does not constitute 
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a desecration of the Sabbath. Furthermore, R. Anakawa continues, 
we believe that whenever the Torah is studied new heavens are 
created and yet it is a religious obligation to study Torah on the 
Sabbath. It is illogical to draw a distinction between heavenly 
halls which are purely spiritual, and physical things created 
through the Book of Creation, since the latter is also a legitimate 
subject of study. It is interesting to note that R. Anakawa, like 
many of the respondents who treated the Elijah issue, confers a 
spiritual status upon a physical entity after carefully considering 
the logical reality of such a being. The Laws of Sabbath only pro-
scribe the physical creation of physical entities but do not apply 
to the spiritual creation of metaphysical bodies. Equally of interest 
is how he bolsters his ruling by settinga practical application of 
10 an aggadic account describing the creative powers of Torah study. 
In a similar manner as we saw in astrology, magical practices which 
could be explained away rationally and naturally were not regarded 
as magic proper and did not constitute a serious infraction of the 
Law. R. Joseph b. Solomon Colon (Naharik) postulates this supposition 
in resolving a difficulty which arises in Maimonides' Code. In one 
place Maimonides rules that one who creates illusions is liable for 
lashes and in another law writes that although it is forbidden, one 
is not liable for lashes. In reconciling this apparent contradiction 
Maharik suggests: 
There are two kinds of people who create illusions. One who 
appears to perform a strange and wonderous act which is beyond 
the realm of the natural world, in which case he receives lashes. 
But one who creates an illusion and shows something which is 
within the natural order of the world, for example, that he 
plants gourds and similar things which are natural, he is not 
liable for lashes.11 
Wondrous acts which are characteristic of supernatural metaphysics 
constitute magic proper and are proscribed by Torah. Ordinary 
illusory acts belonging to natural metafti,ysics are not regarded as 
magic, according to the Torah and hence were not outlawed by it. 
The Rabbis imposed a restriction only on account of its resemblance 
to magic. 
It would appear that the rabbinic attitude of spurning any magical 
practice which remotely resembled Gentile magic and sanctioning only 
magic which bore a distinctive Jewish nature, went far deeper than 
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a mere suspicion of idolatry. If one closely studies the laws 
concerning Ammorite Folkways, where most of the magic laws appear, 
one can almost detect a latent rabbinic motif to intentionally 
disassociate Jewish culture in general from Gentile culture. This 
motif is indicative in the enactmert of such laws which forbid Jews 
to dress in the same garb as Gentiles, to trim their hair in the 
same style as Gentiles, to erect buildings in the same design as 
Gentile architecture, etc. 12 This reveals a conscious attempt to 
utterly divorce not only Jewish theology from Gentile theology but 
more practically Jewish lifestyle form Gentile lifestyle. Although 
this is due largely to the fact that a nation's culture is but a 
physical expression of its theological and philosophical beliefs, 
is also seems that the Rabbis considered an . inherent value in main-
taining a separate Jewish culture by itself. 
We have already mentioned in our previous discussion of astrology 
that it was not their intention to forbid every facet of life which 
Je\vs shared in corrmon with Gentile nations, nor would it have been 
possible, but rather only those practices which were specifically 
recognised as "their statutes '' (hukkoteihem). 
It was in attempting to procure an accurate distinciton between 
Jewish culture and "their" culture that magic played a key role. It 
is an accepted fact that cultures tend to differ from one another 
in private traditions rooted in supernatural lore and tend to corre-
late with each other in communally agreed traditions based on natural 
order. The very word hok implies that which is unnatural, non-empirical, 
and irrational. In differentiating between ma'aseh (deed) and hok 
(statute), R. Samson Raphael Hirsch writes: 
The former are regulated by state-laws, the latter less by 
legislation but rather by rules which become sanctified by 
custom and convention. The former, the social condition of life 
of the country, show the attitude of a nation towards justice 
and civic life. The motives which prompt them and principles 
behind them are transparent and can be recognised by the condi-
tions of life which they effect and the purposes they are to 
accomplish. The traits of private and family life and also 
the personal national traits, i.e., those which are characteris-
tic of a nation, are usually influenced by more or less obscure 
ideas of jhe relation of the supernatural to individuals and 
nations.1 
Laws which regulate civic life and social order are logical, trans-
parent and generally universal to all cultures. The rules that govern 
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private life and characterise personal national traits are obscure 
and based upon supernatural ideas. It is here that cultures differ 
greatly. The very obscurity of magic and its intense involvement 
with the supernatural obviously designated it as a prime example of 
"their statutes." Nonetheless, ordinary magical practices evincing 
natural occurrences which could be explained simply, were universally 
practiced by all nations and were considered essentially natural 
phenomena. This latter form of magic could be condoned as it did 
not depend on '~their" specific cultic traditions. 
Consequently Rema rules that only the senseless and the morbid 
practices of Gentiles are condemned as Ammorite Folkways. However, 
those practices which have a utilitarian end, such as the incinera-
tion of the deceased kings' belongings and the special "cape" 
worn by doctors, are not specifically Ammorite and are therefore 
. .bl 14 permlSSl e. 
In a similar fashion R. Margaliot explains the talmudic dictum that 
a tree which casts its fruit may be painted with red paint and laden 
with stones. The Talmud states that it maybe laden with stones so 
that its strength is weakened but queries why it may be painted with 
red paint. R. Margaliot explains that the Talmud is prepared to 
accept the practice of laying stones about the tree since it is a 
natural and logical strategy. The tree's excessive fertility was 
no doubt the cause for it casting its fruits. The stones therefore, 
weaken its productive strength in a natural manner. However, since 
no logical explanation can be conceived for painting the tree red, 
the Talmud enquires that this should be prohibited as Ammorite 
. 15 practlces. 
Magical practices which are distinctively Jewish in character and 
explicitly mentioned in the Torah are permitted despite their resem-
blance to Ammorite culture. This point is made quite clearly by 
the Talmud which, in a similar circumstance, permits decapitation by 
the sword even though it was "their" (Roman) method of execution 
. "S . d d h d d . . h "16 H slnce: crlpture ecree t e swor , we o not lmltate t em. ence 
there are no problems with the trial by water ordeal of the Sotah, 
the healing of the copper serpent (nechushtan), Urim ve-Tumim, the 
crimson thread on the goat dispatched to Azazel on the Day of Atonement, 




More fundamentally however, there was abasicand salient difference 
between pagan magic and Jewish magic mentioned in the bible. Probably 
the most famous ancient encounter between Jewish and pagan magic 
recorded in the Bible is the challenge of the Egyptian sorcerers to 
the miracles of Moses. It is here that we observe the essential 
difference. The wonders of the Egyptian sorcerers emanate from fami-
liarisation of the magical arts which influence supradivine forces. 
Moses' miracles are the "finger of G-d" which stem directly from His 
will. The Egyptian world did not recognise a G-d who transcended 
the existential system that controlled everything and whose power is 
absolute. The magical power was conceived as something impersonal 
which was found in people and in substances. It was a visible and 
material power. Moses demonstrates that the power emanates from an 
invisible G-d who is immaterial. 18 The contest between Jewish and 
Egyptian magic· is between Divine and human wisdom. The reliance 
upon heathen wisdom seduces man into arrogant self-sufficiency. The 
Egyptian wizards rely on their magic. Only when they fail, do they 
acknowledge the finger of G-d. The Jewish miracle worker does not 
rely on human wisdom. He is a man of G-d, a faithful "servant" whose 
acts flow from and indicate towards Divine grace. This is the essential 
difference between Jewish miracles and pagan magic. Miracles establish 
the finger of G-d, magic ignores G-d. 
The trial by water ordeal of the Sotah, thecopper serpent, the goat 
dispatched to Azazel, Urim ve-Tumim etc., need not be conceived as 
legalised magic, scripturally ordained, but rather as miracles 
reflecting G-d's omnipotence. Similarly, the Book of Creation is not 
a book of magic but rather a book of miracles. The employment of 
Divine Names to produce metaphysical results demonstrates the omni-
potence of G-d revealed by those names. 
The famous talmudic miLaCle worker, Honi Ha-Me'agel (circle drawer), 
aquired his title by employing the ancient universal magical symbol 
of drawing circles. He wraught a great miracle by standing in a 
circle while uttering a decree which G-d fulfilled by bringing 
rain when it was needed. Honi was vouchsafed miracles because he 
was beseeching G-d as the object of his practice. Even R. Simeon 
b. Shetach who was opposed to the practice of magic could not censure 
Honi because Honi's character was one of a man who obviously emulated 
G-d in his every action.19 
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Likewise the setting aside of a loaf of bread for Grace after Meals 
and the partaking of a repast on the night before circumcision is 
not misidentified with magic because it is quite clear that G-d is 
the direct object of these rituals and not some mysterious material 
force found in substances. 
ccns titute "their ways." 
Consequently these practices do not 
Niracles further distinguished themselves from magic, in that they 
represented manifestations which fell within the natural metaphysical 
order of the world. Whereas magic was opposed to. the natural meta-
physical order of the world. All natural metaphysical phenomena were 
considered legitimate miracles; while supernatural metaphysical acts 
were banned as illegitimate magic. This seems to be the clear 
intention of the Mishna in Aboth which describes how: 
Ten [miraculous] things were created on the eve of Sabbath at 
twilight. 20 
The purpose of this statement was no doubt to naturalise these ten 
metaphysical occurrences by including them within the final moments 
of the creation process, when the natural order of the world was 
established. However, because these events constitute a metaphysical 
dimension of nature, they had to be created during "twilight"- which 
is the halakic 'zone which deals with metaphysics. Similarly, the 
Egyptian wonders (ten plagues) and all other miracles require natural 
b t . d . 1· 21 M. l ·11 . . su s ances 1n or er to mater1a 1se. 1rac es are 1 eg1t1mate 
unless they are incorporated within the "natural" rubric of the 
cosmos. 
Although a miracle is characterised by falling within the natural 
metaphysical framework of creation, it will not be defined as such 
unless it also manifests the finger of G-d and has an obvious Divine 
purpose. A mere intervention in the order of the universe is not 
automatically a miracle. A talmudic incident records howa ·man grew 
breasts to suckle his infant son upon the death of his wife. 
Abbaye refused to recognise this intervention in the natural order 
a miracle since it did not expressedly indicate a Divine purpose. 22 
Similarly a prophet who employs miracles to attest his prophecy is 
distinguished from an ordinary magician in his ability to prove that 
his miracle is the work of G-d Himself. Since no man can duplicate 
the miLacle, the prophet proves that G-d has a definite interest in 
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. h" . . 23 1n lS mlSSlOn. In addition the prophet's character must exemplify 
that he is a man of G-d who is worthy of having miracles performed 
through his agency. As the Talmud in Berakoth affirms: 
How is it that for the former generations miracles were per-
formed and for us miracles are not performed? The former 
generations used to be ready to sacrifice their lives for the 
sanctity of G-d's name; we do not sacrifice our lives for 
the sanctity of G-d's name.24 
Therefore, the entire reason for the miracle is negated if there is 
no willingness to sanctify G-d's name on the part of those who 
perform miracles or wait for them. 25 
Scripture states: 
And Moses built an altar and called it Adonai-nissi. 26 
Adonai-nissi can be translated either as the Lord is my banner 
or as the Lord is my miracle. The two translations are inter-related. 
If the miracle points to G-d, thenG-d is an upheld banner. If 
the miracle ignores G-d then it is simply mythology. 
Miracles were not limited to the sphere of metaphysics alone. The 
Rabbis considered the physical order of nature to bear even greater 
testimony to G-d's miraculous deeds than the metaphysical wonders 
which intervened in the order of creation. All of creation, its 
natural order and the normal occurances of existence were equally 
regarded as miracles. Precisely because miracles are such common 
events which occur innumerous times during the course of a normal 
day, an exact definition of "uncommon" miracles had to be obtained 
in order to fit the halakic requirements for marking miracles. Such 
as the blessing which is recited at the place where a miracle 
took place or the corrmemorating of a "Personal Festival" on the 
date that a miracle was vouchsafed. 27 If every common wondrous 
occurence were defined as a miracle then one would reach a reductio 
ad absurdum that every woman who has experienced childbirth should 
recite the blessing: "Who has performed miracles on my behalf" upon 
visiting the site at which her child was delivered and that a similar 
blessing should be recited by her progeny thoughout subsequent genera-
tions.28 It is here that one requires great perception to be able 
to detect the thin dividing line which differentiates ordinary physical 
miracles from uncommon metaphysical miracles. Both of them are natural. 




the natural order. 
In his commentary, Maharaz Hayes, R. Chajes explains ~hat the reason 
the Talmud narrates the miracle of the cruse of oil in answer to 
the query "What is Chanuka?" and completely omits the military 
victory of the Hasmoneans over the Greek forces, is because the mili-
tary victory, amazing as it was, was achieved entirely in accordance 
with physical laws of nature and did not in any way transcend the 
order of creation. In contrast the miracle of the cruse of oil 
clearly transcended the natural order . 29 
On the other hand R. Moshe Zevi Neriah argues that the events recorded 
in the Book of Esther, while undoubtedly reflecting divine providence, 
did not transcend nor suspend natural law . Yet on Purim the blessing : 
"He who has performed miracles for our father" is recited. 30 
For this reason we find a controversy in Shulchan Arukh regarding 
the salient characteristics of a miracle . The first opinion brought 
by Shulchan Arukh is Abudraham who opines that one only recites the 
benediction regarding unusual miracles which transcend the natural 
order. The second opinion brought by Shulchan Arukh is Rivash (R . 
Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet) who in a responsum rules that one must recite 
the benediction even upon returning to the place where commonplace 
miracles occurred, such as the safe delivery from a dangerous journey 
for which one ordinarily recites Birkat ha-Gomel (blessing of thanks-
. . d . ) f d 31 g1v1ng upon re empt1on a terwar s. 
This is basically the issue concerning whether the rebirth of Zionism 
and in its wake the attainment of Israeli independence constitutes 
. a miracle over which Hallel liturgy must be recited and for which a 
.day of national festivity proclaimed . Obviously this is a miracle . 
. But a keen halakic perception must be cultivated in order to deter-
mine whether the Zionist miracle is an ordinary one pertaining to 
the natural physical order of the cosmos or whether it is an uncommon 
metaphysical miracle which reflects G-d ' s intervention transcending 
the natural order. Such questions regarding whether soldiers of 
a secularist Jewish state can possibly be agents of divine providence 
and vvhether Zionism is an authentic messianic movement which has 
germinated as a result of a special intervention by G-d, all require 
sharp halakic expertise to correctly interpret the quality of miracles 
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observed. The same considerations would apply to the Entebbe 
Rescue Operation and similar events which recur throughout history. 
In his work, Contemporary Halakic Problems, R. David Bleich considers 
such halakic questions as: How is the term miracle defined? In 
the evert that any of the rescued hostages (or their descendents) 
should ever return to the Entebbe airport where the rescue occurred, 
is that person obligated to pronounce the benediction: "Blessed is 
He who performed a miracle on my behalf [or, on behalf of my father] 
in this place." It is in this twilight area where nature transcends 
itself that Halaka must exact precise definitions. 32 
Although G-d's method of working miracles is always within the 
natural parameters of existence, His decision to work a miracle 
must be regarded as an intervention within the course of nature for 
the immediate purpose it serves. Because such an intervention is 
certainly uncommon "one may not rely on miracles" and depend on 
them in the same way as one would rely on other natural occurrences. 
Furthermore, since miracles are only vouchsafed for righteous men 
of G-d, no man may assume that he is righteous enough to expect a 
miracle to be performed on his behalf. This fact is a guiding 
principle in astrology \\here events occur with far more regularity 
than miracles. In the previous chapter we saw how Nahmanides rules 
that one is permitted to heed astrological warnings because of 
the principle that "one may not rely on miracles." In other words, 
it would take a miracle for G-d to intervene upon the natural astro-
logical order, and one may not assume that one is righteous enough 
to elicit an intervention with the astrological system on one's behalf. 
In Chapter III.l we saw how the Tosafoth explained that Elijah the 
priest was permitted to defile himself in the process of performing 
the resurrection because he knew for certain that he would be success-
ful in saving the child's life. We recall how Radbaz queried this 
in a responsum since "one does not rely on miracles." Furthermore, 
if Elijah was truly convinced of the success of his endeavour, then 
this instance can not be regarded as a case of saving a life. 
In his responsa collection Hayyim Sheal, Hida answers both Radbaz's 
queries stating that only ordinary men may not rely on miracles. 
However, righteous persons who are confirmed men of G-d are permitted 




Secondly Elijah knew for certain that the child's life would be 
saved only though his own intervention. 
to defile himself. 33 
Therefore, he was permitted 
Even after Hayyim Sheal's answer it is clear from both Radbaz and 
Hida that an ordinary person is not permitted to rely on miracles 
even for the sake of saving a life. And the obvious question which 
requires reconciliation is that with the exception of three cardinal 
commandments, all of Torah may be violated even if there is a doubtful 
possibility that one might be successful in saving a life- how much 
more so in Elijah's case where he was certain of success. 
One must perforce explain that both Radbaz and Hida did not consider 
the reliance upon miracles to constitute even a doubtful possibility. 
The possibility of miracles is so remote that one must regard them 
as if they can not happen entirely. Therefore, because Elijah did 
not even have a doubtful possibility of being successful, then the 
only way he could revive the child is if he knew for certain that he 
would succeed. Elijah could only know this for certain through prophecy. 
This no longer constitutes a case of saving a life. 34 The fact that 
these respondents concur that one may not rely on miracles even for 
the sake of saving a life has great consequences regarding the viola-
tion of Sabbath in a case where there is danger to life as we shall 
see shortly. 
It is significant to mention that Halaka only deals with miracles 
in so far as Halaka recognises that man encounters numerous metaphysical 
conditions during his ordianry course of life. The Halaka must inter-
pret these events for him by placing them in realistic categories 
since these events affect man in a real way. However, the Halaka 
does not require miracles to certify itself as a system. In fact, . we 
saw in our discussion of the "Oven of Aknai" incident in Chapter I, 
that Halaka will ignore miracles if the miracle contradicts the 
Halaka assertions. This is because Halaka is a humanistic system 
in the sense that it was endowed by G-d to man at Sinai, and after 
handing it over to the jurisdiction of man, G-d does not impose 
Himself upon the system by intervening in it through miracles. The 
purpose of the miracle then is merely to establish G-d's presence, 
but not to establish balakic truth. If the miracle however, does not 
indicate G-d's omnipresence then it is nothing more than a magical 




As mentioned, despite the fact that the universal cultural elements 
which Jews share in common with every society were not technically 
defined as "their ways," nevertheless, this distinction was not 
approved by many of the Rabbis who apparently sought to drive a 
wedge between Jewish and Gentile culture by developing a separate 
Jewish culture of their own. This tendency may be particularly 
observed in clothes where some Jews went to great lengths to clad 
themselves in garments that were only worn by Jews and which Gentiles 
often frowned upon. Possibly the special Jewish garb of tzitzit 
(tassels) originated the basis of this idea. Even Joseph Caro in 
explaining Maimonides' law which states: "Jews must separate from 
' them' and be recognised by their clothing,'' explains : 
Since these garments have become associated with them on account 
of their Jewishness, when a Jew wears them he appears like them 
and \vill .follow them.35 
R. David b. Samuel ha-Levi seems to indicate a similar attitude in 
his commentary Taz regarding Shulchan Arukh's prohibition of growing 
long hair like Gentiles. Taz comments that the interdict does not 
refer to any particular hair cut since it is a habit of Gentile sol-
diers to wear long hair generally. And even if it did refer to a 
particular hair style Taz continues: 
The rule is that Israel must separate from them, what does it 
matter if it be in this way or that~ for countries differ in 
fashions concerning it [hairstyle].56 
Likewise R. Moses of Couey writes in Semag regarding the negative 
commandment, "And you shall not walk in their ways": 
It is all one matter; Israel is warned to be separate from 
Gentiles in clothing, in custom, and in language. And so it 
is written, 'I shall separate you from among nations. '37 
This position is reflected in numerous Midrashim which indicate that 
what preserved Israel from virtually a complete assimilation among 
Egyptian culture and eventually caused them to merit redemption was 
their remaining separate in clothing, names, and language. 38 
Nevertheless, highly placed Jews, close to the monarchy who had to 
adopt elements of foreign culture in order to be influential in re-
pealing anti-semitic decrees were permitted to do so in the interests 
of greater Jewry. 39 One may well wonder if the total separation 
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of Jewish lifestyle from Gentile culture in every respect had proven 
itself to be a major cause promoting antisemitism, whether by applying 
the above principle by extention, certain aspects of foreign culture 
could be integrated by Jewry in order to reduce antisemitism. 40 
Naturally this could not be decided arbitrarily and only a competent 
Rabbinate would be in a position to asses such a situation. 
An interesting corollary of the controversy whether Jews must inten-
tionally separate themselves by creating their own distinct culture 
or whether they must merely desist from adopting only those features which are 
specifically recognised as "theirs,"is the question concerning 
Gentile customs which disappear during the course of time. 
Many of the Rabbis felt that Ammorite customs which fell into disuse 
could no longer be classified as Ammorite Folkways whereas other Rabbis 
were of the opinion that once a particular custom had become recog-
nised as "theirs" it would eternally be considered as such in each 
generation, even if it fell into disuse. Similarly we find Rabbis 
who considered only those practices which are described by the Talmud 
as Ammorite Folkways, however; those practices which developed later 
were exempt from the interdict. Other Rabbis, on the other hand, 
forbade any practice which develops in each generation, that is 
specifically recognised as "theirs" as included under the ban. 
Therefore, we find that Minchat Hinnukh,who develops Taz's thesis, 
states that the laws of "their ways" are determined by each 
generation and in each country. Whatever clothing becomes "their" 
fashion at any time or place in history, Jews must automatically 
desist from such fasions and develop their own style of dress. 
Other Rabbis only forbade those conventions which were mentioned in 
the Talmud. It seems clear that the Rabbis who insisted on applying 
the restriction of Ammorite Folkways according to the conventions of 
society which become vogue in every generation were bent not only on 
protecting Jewish culture against idolatry but intended to maintain 
Jewish culture against infiltrations of Gentile society. 41 
The heated debate regarding whether it is permissible for Rabbis to 
don black clothing resembling Christian clergymen was probably a 
direct ougrowth of this controversy. For the same reason, would 
it be permitted for a Jewish child to take a Gentile name in addition 
to its Jewish name? Those Rabbis who absolutely forbade the donning 
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of canonicals or the appelation by Gentile names energetically strove 
to separate Jewish culture from Gentile culture in every respect. 
The Rabbis who permitted these and other items did not consider them 
a threat leading to idolatry and therefore, saw no danger in Jews 
d . h . 42 a opt1ng sue pract1ces. 
Ironically enough, the more that some of the Rabbis strove to keep 
magic apart from Jewish vocation by intentionally separating the two 
cultures, the more magic became associated with Jewish culture. For 
it was the very 'strangeness' of the complete Jewish separation from 
other cultures which itself aroused suspicion and consequently led 
Gentiles to conceive of Jews as mysterious sorcerers. As a result 
many aspects of Jewish Law which gave the impression that Jews engaged 
in magic were suspended in order to rectify this misconception which 
obviously could only have endangered Jewish life. 
Jews, therefore, were not required to include in their search for 
leaven substances on Passover, the tiny cracks and holes in the walls 
which separated Jewish form Gentile quarters, for fear this may be 
misconstrued for magic. Similarly the popular mourning rites of turning 
over the bed-, binding one's head, etc., became discontinued for this 
very reason. R. Moses b. Yehiel had to pursuade a king of the harm-
less character of throwing a clod of earth behind one's shoulder after 
a funeral, and in Provence the ritual cleansing of the public oven 
in preparation for Passover baking was neglected "because of the Gen-
tiles' suspicion of sorcery." It therefore, became doubly impor-
tant for Jews to suspend these practices in order to impress upon the 
Gentiles that one of the main elements \~ich separate Jews from other 
cultures is the fact that Jews do not engage in magic nor are they 
b . 43 sourcerers y vocat1on. 
Magical Cures 
One of the most contentious areas where Jewish culture seemed to bear 
a great resemblance to Ammorite folkways was the field of medications 
administered in the form of magical potions and amulets. Maimonides 
writes: 
All that is said to be useful, but is not necessarily proven by 
logical speculation concerning nature, and takes its course in 
accordance with special [segullah] properties, this is the meanin? 
of the dictum: 'And you shall not walk in the ways of the nation 
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and these are what they [the Sages] called 'Ammorite folkways.' 
They say explicitly: 'All that pertains to medicine does not 
pertain to Ammorite Folkways.' They mean by this all that is 
necessitated by logical speculation concerning nature is 
permitted whereas other [illogical] practices are forbidden. 
You must consider as a difficulty certain things which they 
have permitted, as for instance, the nail of one who is cruci-
fied and a fox's tooth. For in those times these things were 
considered to derive from experience and accordingly pertained 
to medicine. They entered into the same class as the suspension 
of a peony on an epileptic and the giving of a dog's excrements 
in cases of swelling of the throat and fumigation with vinegar 
and marcasite in cases of hard swellings of the tendons. For 
it is allowed to use all remedies similar to these that experience 
have shown to be valid even if reasoning does not require them.44 
In a responsum of Rashba, R. Adret points out a glaring contradiction 
in the words of Maimonides. First Maimonides forbids all practices 
which are not necessarily proven by logical specualtion concerning 
nature such as those practices which take their course in accordance 
with special segullah properties and forces. These illogical segullah 
practices Maimonides defines as Ammorite Folkways. Immediately after-
wards Maimonides permits the illogical Segullah remedies of the nail 
of one who is crucified and a fox's tooth! Raslb.:l queries, how are 
we to decide which Segullah remedies are forbidden because they 
resemble Ammorite Folkways and which illogical practices are permitted 
because they resemble the nail of a crucifix or a fox's tooth? In 
addition Rashba cites numerous Segullah remedies which are permitted 
by Talmud although none of them are necessarily proven by logical 
speculation concerning nature. Furthermore Rashba queries: 
What matter does the Rabbi [Maimonides] consider necessarily 
proven by logical speculation concerning nature? Is it what is 
logically deduced by the speculation of the wise men who composed 
works on the nature of drugs and foodstuffs which are useful 
according to their speculation? And all matters that their 
speculations can not comprehend are forbidden because of Ammorite 
Folkways. Since the speculations of these wise men who considered 
the science of nature include every possible activity within 
the nature of every existing thing. 
And it is in accordance with the speculation of these wise men, 
that the possibilities of true speculations concerning nature 
will be determined and that which is unacceptable according to 
reason. Because verily those matters which function by special 
properties [segullah] do not function in wonders but according 
to special natural properties. What I mean to say, is a natural 




Perhaps even the wisest of men [can't comprehend] because the 
properties concerning the nature of these matters are unknown 
to the human race who are [only] men. Such as the special 
forces of the stone whichdraw~whereby the iron jumps over it 
[i.e., the magnet] and it is even more commonly practiced by 
sailors at sea who insert a pin into a block of wood which 
floats upon the water until it faces towards the anvil and rests 
there [i.e., the compass]. And the logic of the nature of these 
properties can not be comprehended by the wisest of the wise 
men. And similarly all substances that have special properties 
[ba'alei selullah] that are found in nature function like drugs 
and foodstu fs and are not prohibited because of Ammorite Folk-
ways. 
Furthermore, I question the words of the Rabbi [Maimonides] 
that which Abbaye and Rabbah said: 'All that pertains to medicine 
does not pertain to Ammorite Folkways,' did they say all that 
pertains to medicine regarding the logical speculations of these 
wise men who composed works about nature alone, and everything 
else that their speculations can not comprehend are prohibited? 
If so, what did Abbaye and Rabbah innovate? It is a full verse 
which Scripture stated: 'And to heal he shall heal,' [is the 
source] whence it is derived that authorisation was granted by G-d 
to the medicine man to heal. And why did the Gemara bring 
Abbaye and Rabbah's words in the same context when speaking of 
practices which constitute Ammorite Folkways.45 
Rashba challenges the medical utility of even the natural cures which 
are determined by the general discretion of human wisdom. Since 
the greatest human mind is limited and the conclusions of one man 
may well differ from another, who will determine what is a logical 
cure? Moreover, Rashba charges, there are many natural cures that 
function in special ways that human logic can not understand. These 
are the special properties found in magnets, compasses and the like. 
Theseproperties are not "wondrous" since they function in a fixed 
natural manner despite the fact that they can't be comprehended 
according to the logical principles of natural science. Rashba is 
undoubtedly referring to the science which we classified earlier as 
natural metaphysics as opposed to the mythical elements of supernatural 
metaphysics. Although the special remedies in the Talmud, such as 
the fox's tooth and nail from a crucifix, are unexplainable according 
to natural science their properties fall within the natural parameters 
of the former category. It is only those remedies which are charac-
terised by the latter category which constitute Ammorite Folkways. 
Finally Rashba adds, that if Abbaye and Rabbah referred to ordinary 
natural medications, their dictum is superfluous. Scripture already 
permitted ordinary medical treatment. Rather, Abbaye and Rabbah 
were speaking of unusual medicines which nevertheless did not constitute 
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Ammorite Folkways. Rashba further explains the permissibility of 
administering special and ordinary medications as well as the nature 
of their function: 
And I say~ that it was an act of Divine grace at the beginning 
of Creation to bring into existence in His world substances 
that maintain the health of His creatures. That if sicknesses 
and other reasons occur which cause the creatures to depart from 
their perfect .natural states, these substances are readily 
available to cure them and to maintain their health. And He 
placed these properties within the essence of existing things 
in nature that are comprehended by logical speculation such as 
drugs and foodstuffs which are known to the wise doctors, or in 
a special nature [teva musgal] that is not comprehended by a 
speculation. And this is the very thing regarding other exis-
ting matter, that each one contains something useful, either 
in a comprehended nature or a special nature such as the nail 
of one who is crucified, the tooth of a fox, and the stone of 
preservation [against miscarriage]. And it is not prevented 
nor is there a prohibition even regarding words such as in 
amulets and the like. And regarding this did Abbaye and Rabbah 
state 'All things that pertain to medicine do not pertain to 
Ammorite folkways.' 
And one who became ill may not rely on miracles by not seeking 
doctors and becoming occupied in useful matters be it natural 
or special. And this is what [Scripture] states: 'And to heal 
he shall heal'- from here it is derived that authorisation 
was granted by G-d to doctors to heal. And in this category 
are included all medical practices even those things which are 
useful by vitue of special properties whether by themselves 
or by words. This is the manner of amulets both the written 
and the verbal kind. Moreover, one is not permitted to endanger 
oneself by relying on miracles. And they say. 'Whoever relies 
on miracles will not be vouchsafed a miracle.'46 
Rashba explains that G-d specifically included in His creation sub-
stances containing intrinsic medical properties capable of restoring 
defective and diseased organisms to their perfect and prime form-
whether these properties be special or ordinary. The effect of the 
special properties are so natural that an ill person who does not 
have recourse to them is considered to rely on miracles to overcome 
his illness without them. The natural metaphysical effect of special 
properties as opposed to supernatural mythical ones is made even more 
clear by Ran who developed Rashba's distinction even further: 
All things function in two ways, either natural actions or 
special actions. The special action is also a natural action. 
Except that the natural action can be logically proven by the 
intellect [whereas] the special action is accepted by the 47 intellect as a possibility, but its necessity can not be proven. 
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Ran then proceeds to describe the metaphysical effect that special 
actions have upon restoring the balance to unbalanced organisms 
in a natural or logical manner. Finally Ran concludes that man only 
understands'what' natural actions do but man does not understand 
their essence or 'why' natural actions do what they do. The mystery 
of their essence and the 'why' regarding natural actions is jus t as 
inexplicable as special actions. Ran explains that since special 
forces operate just as naturally as ordinary forces, the only meta-
physical actions which the Talmud prohibited because of Ammorite Folk-
ways were those practices which were believed to be useful because 
they anticipated the will of heavenly bodies. 48 Thus we see that 
according to Rashba and Ran, the Sages permitted special Segullot 
remedies because they functioned in a natural metaphysical manner 
even if they where in the form of words such as amulets. 
Despite Rashba's questioning of Maimonides, Maimonides' intention of 
permitting such cures as the nail of the crucifix and the fox's 
tooth is clear, regardless of their illogical effect. Any form of 
cure which has experimentally proven its utility three times over is 
empirically reliable. Despite its unexplainable mechanism, the fact 
that it has thrice repeated itself makes it a natural reality proven 
by experience. 
Rashba's and Ran's objection to Maimonides' distinction was probably 
because many of the mysterious cures which .. were outlawed as Ammorite 
Folkways may well have succeeded in curing illnesses repeatedly 
through experience and yet remained prohibited. Therefore according 
to Rashba and Ran inexperience itself does not factor as a criterion 
for classifying Ammorite Folkways. 
We find an example of this disagreement regarding amulets. Darkhei 
Moshe rules that according to Rashba and Ran all amulets are permitted 
with the exception of those which have proven to be ineffective. 
According to R. Yonah and Mordekhai only amulets which have proven 
their efficacy are permitted, all others are prohibited as Ammorite 
Folkways. 49 
Similarly we find the latter view substantiated by the Talmud which 
permits amulets to be worn on Shabbat if they have successfully been emp-
loyed by . three different persons. Such amulets have become "expert" 
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or "approved" via experience. Therefore, one who wears an expert 
amulet is not considered carrying on the Sabbath. However, amulets 
which have not yet proven their efficacy may not be worn on the Sabbath. 
R. Joshua Isaiah Noibert provides a practical application of the 
"expert amulet" in discussing the permissiblity of wearing eyeglasses 
so and hearing aid on the Sabbath. While Maimonides and many of the 
codifiers required that the "approved" amulet succesfully repeat 
itself on three different people, Rashba and Rashi considered the 
amulet expert even if it cured the same person on three different 
occasions. 51 This is probably because Rashba considered the amulet, 
quite apart from its proven experience, a natural metaphysical cure. 
A similar problem is investigated by Hida in Birkei Yosef. It once 
happered that a young Jewish girl drank a poisonous drug on the 
Sabbath and she became mortally ill. A certain man knew of a special 
formula to inscribe in an amulet which would cure this very illness. 
This prescription he found in a medieval book written by a famous 
authority. In that book it was recorded that this amulet had worked 
successfully several times. The man, relying on this work, proceeded 
to write the formula in an amulet on the Sabbath for the young girl. 
Upon wearing the amulet she instantly regurgitated and became completely 
restored to normal health. Once the incident became known the man 
was severely criticised by the town residents for having desecrated 
the Sabbath. The man argued in his defence, that one is permitted 
to violate the Sabbath to save a life, but they were reluctant to 
accept his arguement. Hida investigates whether the man acted correctly 
in Birkei Yosef: 
At first glance it would seem that the man acted incorreclty. 
Although it is a well known Halaka that one may violate the 
Sabbath to heal one who is dangerously ill, nevertheless this 52 is only by natural means but not through special [segullah] means. 
Birkei Yosef bases his contention on the Talmud in Yoma which prohibits 
a man who was bitten by a mad dog on Yom Kippur to be fed from the 
lobe of its liver. 53 Maimonides explains that the Sages did not 
permit the violation of a law (breaking the fast) except for adminis-
tering natural treatments. 54 Hida adds that Maimonides states 
this even though the Segullah remedy had proven itself by experience. 
Moreover, Hida states that althugh one is permitted to wear proven 
amulets and a hargol's (locust) egg, the Sages only permitted these 
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because they involve Rabbinic restrictions. However, since writing 
an amulet on the Sabath involves a Pentateuchal interdict, this was 
not permitted even for the sake of saving a life. 
However, upon closer inspection, Hida writes that he discovered in 
Responsa Admat Kodesh of R. Moshe Mizrachi, a discussion concerning 
whether one is permitted to feed someone a chicken cadaver (neveilah) 
which was not ritually slaughtered since it is a segullah (special 
remedy) for madness. R. Mizrachi proves from Nahmanides and Rashba 
who argue with Maimonides and contend that there is no difference 
between medicine which is administered by special means or by natural 
means . R. Mizrachi states that the Halaka is in accordance with the 
view of Nahmanides and Rashba and therefore rules that one is permitted 
to employ the cadaver remedy. 55 
Hida writes that he is aware of several other authorities who agree 
with R. Mizrachi. Consequently, Hida states that in our case the 
Halaka would also accord with thisviewand therefore he rules that 
it is permissibletowritean .amulet on the Sabbath in order to save 
life, even though it functions in a special manner. 
Moreover Hida adds that even Maimonides who forbids the transgression 
of a Torah interdict for Segullah remedies would agree that he is not 
guilty of sin in this case. Since the man's intention was clearly 
to perform a Mitzvah and he was certain of success, there was not 
even a Rabbinical infracture of the law. Hida concludes that retro-
activelythe man performed a great Mitzvah. 
The unmistakable conclusion of Hida is that according to Rashba 
and Nahmanides, since there is no difference between the effica~y 
and reliability of natural cures to Segullah remedies, one is permitted 
to violate the Sabbath, administer non-Kosher prescriptions, or trans-
gress any other Pentateuchal law in order to save a life through 
either method. The distinction between administering Segullah cures 
as compared to natural remedies with regards to vioalting Torah laws 
in order to save a life is also treated extensively by R. Isaac 
Elhaman Spector in Responsa Be'er Yitzchak. 
similar to Birkei Yosef. 56 
His analysis is very 
We recall in our earlier discussion in this Chapter that Radbaz and 
Hida were in disagreement over whether one is permitted to rely on 
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miracles in order to save a life. Possibly their argument is 
contingent on this issue. Hida rules that to save a life there is 
no difference between administering special remedies or natural cures. 
This accords with his view that Elijah was permitted to rely on miracles 
in order to perform the resurrection. Radbaz who states that Elijah 
was not permittedtorely on miracles to perform the resurrection 
probably concurs with Maimonides' view that one is only permitted to 
save a life by administering perfectly natural cures. 
However, it is probable that even the authorities who permit the vio-
lation of Torah laws in order to save a life by administering special 
Segullah remedies, would not permit ordinary men to rely on miracles. 
Although special properties and miracles are both metaphysical phenomena 
the former occur much more naturally and with far more regularity 
than miracles. The question only exists with regards to Elijah. 
Since Elijah's reliance on miracles is the same as performing any 
other Segullah remedy, is he permittedtodefile himself in order to 
save a life by administering metaphysical techniques as one is by 
natural methods? 
Often logical explanations were given to describe the natural effects 
of metaphysical cures. The diseased condition was considered to 
have developed as a result of a natural physical deterioration caused 
by neglect of health or some other human element, or as a result of 
an action on the part of a spiritual and metaphysical agent. The 
medication had to combat each cause. If the disease was afflicted 
upon the person by spirits, or by being possessed by spirits, disgusting 
medicines were often prescribed. The logic being that if nauseous 
drugs disgust humans, they are likely to have the same effect on spirits 
and demons. Therefore, the more obnoxious the dose the more likely 
it is to expel the spirit of its human habitat. Therefore, we find 
medications in such instances that prescribe such disgusting antidotes 
as menses, excrement, sweat, hair, nails, animalbloo~ etc. 
In truth there is no real difference between believing that the body 
is occupied by spirits and the modern medical notion which scientifi-
cally ascertains that the body is inhabited by viruses. Viruses 
are living mircroscopic organisms for which no natural medication has 
yet been developed. It is not surprising then that an effort was 
pursued to combat the metaphysical agent which brought on the malady, 
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where no natural cure was known. Similarly we find that fertility 
spirits wereindigenous to all peoples. Psychologically it seemed 
obvious that female spirits such as Lilit who desire men for themselves 
would be jealous of the women who displace them and so they will 
seek to harm them by causing infertility. Therefore, amulets were 
prescribed to ward off these spirits and induce fertility. If the 
metaphysical agent causing illness was an angel dispatched by G-d 
to punish the human, prayers were considered therapeutically effective 
in nullifying that decree. 
Incantations and Prayer 
The use of incantations in spiritually combatting various disorders 
was also subject to the same considerations. Namely, was this simply 
another magical form of Ammorite folk myth which led to idolatry, 
or was there a natural metaphysical pattern discernable among them, 
similar to Segullah remedies which could be resorted to in the case 
of illness. 
Maimonidesseverlydenounces the use of incantations to cure diseases: 
One who utters an incantation over a wound and recites a verse 
from the Torah and likewise someone who recites [a verse] over 
a child that he should not be afraid and one who places a 
Torah scroll or phylacteries on a minor to induce sleep. Not 
only are they included among augurers and enchanters but they 
are also included among the deniers of Torah. For they make 
the words of Torah medicine for the body, while they are 
medicine for the soul as it says, 'and they will be life for your 
soul.' 
When one is bitten by a scorpion or a snake, it is permissible 
to utter an incantation over the place of the bite and even on 
Sabbath in order to relax one's mind and strengthen one's heart. 
And even though the thing [i.e., incantation] is of no use what-
soever, since one's health is endangered, the incantation is 
permitted in order that one should not lose one's sanity.57 
Maimonides considers one who recites scriptural verses in the form of 
incantations a denier of Torah since he employs spiritual medication 
for physical hygiene. An interesting question would present itself 
that if the disease was diagnosed to have been caused by a spiritual 
agent- would Maimonides then permit biblical incantations? 
This question will be treated in a further chapter. In the case of 
a dangerous physical disease however, Maimonides concedes that one 
is permitted to utter incantations. Even though incantations are 
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absolutely mythical and are of no use whatsoever, since they bring 
psychological relief they are permitted. 
The question of whether incantations should be permitted or prohibited 
when life is not endangered is raised by the Talmud: 
R. Joshua b. Levi recited verses when retiring to sleep. How 
could he do so? Did not R. Joshua b. Levi say it is prohibited 
to heal oneself with words of Torah? To protect oneself is dif-
ferent.58 
The Talmud distinguishes between curative and preventative health. 
Where one is already wounded, one's intention in reciting verses is 
curative and therefore one's employment of Scripture is interpreted 
as incantation. However, if one's intention is to shield oneself 
from possible afflictio~ his employment of Scripture is interpreted 
merely as prayer rather than incantation. Prayer itself is only 
efficatious in the preventative sense of the future and not in the 
curative sense regarding the present or past. The Mishna in Berakoth 
states: 
If a man cries out to G-d over what is past, his prayer is in 
vain. Thus if his wife was pregnant with child and he said: 
'May it be Your will that my wife shall bear a male child', this 
prayer is in vain. If he was returning from a journey and heard 
cries of distress in the city and said, 'May it be Your will 
that they [which make lamentation] be not in my house,' this 
prayer is in vain.59 
This means that prayer has no effect against the laws of nature. 
That is why if a man prays against the laws of nature, it is an 
incantation and he commits a sin since it is a blasphemous and unuseful 
act. R. Dr. Chaim Zimmerman explains tha.t, man can not break the 
laws of nature since he is part of nature, and similarly prayer can 
not help to contravene the laws of nature. It is only in the preven-
tative sense regarding the future where there is probability of one 
occurence and a possibility of another, that the possibility remains 
in G-d's hands, and prayer can be efficatious. Where the natural 
course has already taken effect, man's prayer can not alter this fact. 
However, where the natural course has not yet taken hold and exists 
only as a strong probability, man's prayer can be effective in appealing 
to G-d to allow for the natural possibility of the opposite. 60 
Maimonides himself codified this distinction between preventative 
and curative health: 
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However a healthy person who recites verses and psalms in order 
that the merit of reciting them should protect him, and that61 he should be saved from trouble and harm, this is permitted. 
This view is corroborated by Sefer Hinnukh who writes that R. Joshua 
b. Levi's practice of reciting psalms before retiring is not considered 
enchantment because: 
These psalms contain matters that will uplift the soul of one 
who understands them to rely on G-d and to place all one's trust 
in Him, and to set in one's heart fear of Him and to rely on His 
grace and goodness. And by awakening oneself to this- one will 
undoubtedly be protected from all harm.62 
There is an essential difference between relying on G-d and relying 
on incantations. Prayers are not incantations since they are a 
means to arouse one's soul to trust in G-d. In this sense they are 
spiritual medicationwhichMaimonides allows. Just as we saw that a 
miracle differs from magic in that the former focuses upon G-d where-
as the latter ignores G-d, prayers differ from incantations in the 
same respect. Furthermore, several authorities who permitted Segullah 
remedies which could be explained in a sensible manner maintained 
th . d" . . 63 e same v1ews regar 1ng 1ncantat1ons. 
In a responsum by R. Jacob Weil the respondent relates how he recited 
the anti-demonic psalm before sleeping in the afternoon since, "all 
sleep is dangerous because of demons." Since the soul guards the 
body against spirits it was believed that when the soul leaves the 
body in sleep, the body is susceptible to attack and therefore the 
1 "d . 64 psa m prov1 es protect1on. 
Hypnotism 
R. Jacob Ettlinger was asked whether a sick person is permitted to un-
dergo magnetism, which is a form of hypnosis, in order to become 
cured from disease. It seems that spiritual powers beyond nature take 
hold of the patient and one must worry that, G-d forbid, impure powers 
are involved. In his Responsa Binyan Zion, R. Ettlinger answers: 
I asked the wise men of the nations their opinion on magnetism 
if there is any substance in this change in nature as people say 
or not, and I found conflicting opinions. 
There are those that say it is all vanity and deceit and there 
is no change whatsoever. Except that the patient's imagination 
envisions that it sees wondrous things. And there are those 
who say that in truth wondrous visions have occurred which 
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certainly have a source and a natural manner. However, all 
these things are hidden and very little of it can be understood 
rationally how nature can have acourseamong these visions. 
And therefore, it appears to me that even if it is not so, 
that one can not find any explanation according to nature how 
such a great change can be induced in any of these matters through 
magnetism, nevertheless we do not need to desist [from it] and 
worry that it occurs through impure powers. 
For behold it is clear from the authorities that one is permitted 
to become healed through incantations uttered by idolators 
when it is uncertain whether the name of an idol will be uttered 
in the incantation. And behold incantations have no precedent 
in nature to heal the sick and nonetheless we do not suspect 
perchance he is healed through impure powers. Rather we rely 
Lon the fact] that there are many natural phenomena which are 
hidden from us. And why should we suspect magnetism any more, 
since anyhow those that practice it believe that it works 
naturally and not spiritually... And anything which pertains 
to medicine does not pertain to Arrmorite Folkways even if they 
are things which have no natural precedent- certainly [then] 
to become cured through magnetism. Those who practice it say 
that it works naturally even if they haven't come to the root 
of understanding the matter perfectly. And don't wonder about 
this, for in other matters as well, after all the research which 
is investigated, they do not grasp the greatness of nature's work 
as a drop in the ocean.65 
R. Ettlinger approaches the problem scientifically, consulting with 
experts in the field to verify whether hypnotism is a natural phenomenon 
or not. There are those that feel it is. entirely mythical, nothing 
more than a figment of one's imagination, while others opine that 
the state induced by hypnosis is a real and natural one. 
R. Ettlinger replies that even according to the former view hypnosis 
is no worse than incantations, which is considered a natural phenomenon 
even though its mechanics are unknown to us. In the same way that 
incantations are not governed by impure powers neither is hypnosis. 
R. Ettlinger concludes with an observation similar to Rashba and Ran. 
That even after the scientific research and analysis into nature, man 
still doesn't understand the intricate workings of even a drop in 
the ocean. In this sense the unknown variables of natural metaphysics 
are no more mysterious than the marvels of natural physics. In his 
most recent volume of responsa, R. Moses Feinstein, a contemporary 
respondent, considers hypnotism for medicinal purposes and writes: 
And we do not see that there should be any prohibition in this 
matter for there is no magic in this. Since it is a natural 
matter that some people are able to influence others who have 66 weak nerves and the like, not to be aware of what happens to them. 
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In summary it seems that it is the natural character of metaphysical 
phenomena such as Segullas, incantations, hypnotism, which motivated 
R. Ett linger, R. Feinstein, and others to endorse these practices as 
legitimate cures. Those cures, however, which employ the powers of 
impurity, defy G-d, and reflect supernatural metaphysical phenomena 
were outlawed as Ammorite Folkways. 
It is noteworthy to mention that most magical practices which were 
forbidden as Ammorite Folkways were set aside in the case where 
there is serious danger to human life. From here we can see that 
although Ammorite Folkways were outlawed because they lead to idolatry 
they were not considered idolatry of themselves. Since idolatry is 
one of the three cardinal Mitzvot which one must suffer death rather 
than transgress, the waiving of the Ammorite Folkways' restriction 
clearly identifies the latter in a different halakic category than 
idolatry. 67 Therefore, we find that R. Menahem of Speyer, quoted 
in Mordekhai, went so far as to permit a Jew whose life was in danger 
to be treated by non-Jewish magician doctors despite their uttering 
words on behal{ of Jesus and saints in their incantations : 
The sounds effect the cure and not the words of the incantation; 
therefore, a heretic [i.e., a Christian] may heal a Jew even if 
he invokes the name of the hanged one fi.e., Jesus] and the 
saints in his spell.68 
Needless to say, this view was not accredited by many of the Rabbis . 
R. Ettlinger, following Rashba, stresses that only incantations 
which do not invoke the names of gods are permitted to be used to 
save a life. Indeed we find Latin and Greek names of gods, idols, 
and angels of foreign religions which found their way into the Hebrew 
and Aramaic texts of amulets worn by Jews. Some of the Rabbis opposed 
this practice so vehemently that they objected even to prayers which 
beseeched Jewish angels and excluded them from the liturgy. Hence 
we find that the custom of reciting Shalom Aleichem to welcome the 
Sabbath angels upon returning from the synagogue on Sabbath night was 
omitted by various communities for fear that such practice may lead 
to idolatry. 69 
Names 
Names were a mighty force in the hands of the magician. The magician 
could exercise power over another man and dominate even a supernatural 
- .281-
MAGIC 
being, given the knowledge of its name. Sefer Hasidim relates that 
Jacob attempted to force the angel with whom he struggled to reveal 
its name so that Jacob could overpower him by uttering an incantation 
against the angel through the knowledge of its name. The angel 
therefore, refused to reveal its name. A man's name was considered 
the essence of his being and his person. The Talmud states: 
How do we know that the name [of a person] has an effect [upon 
its life?] R. Eleazar said, Scripture says: 'Come behold the 
works of the Lord who hath made desolations in the earth.' 
Read not shammot [desolations] but sheimot [names].70 
Thus an entire halakic literature surfaced dealing exclusively with 
the subject of names. Questions ranged from naming a child after 
existing relatives or after people who suffered misfortune in life 
and contemplating a marriage in which a prospective spouse bore the 
name of one of the in-laws, to changing one's name in order to save 
oneself from ill health. The change of one's name was considered a 
clever deceptive maneuver in the strategem of averting dangers asso-
ciated with one's name. Sedei Hemed records actual incidents of ruined 
marriages in which spouses possessed like names to their in-laws. 
In the Hollekreisch ceremony in Germany, the baby's cradle (Kreisch) 
was tossed three times in the air to ward off the spirits Holle-Hulda 
who attack infants, for fear that bestowing a 
infant would engender an adverse affect. 71 
upon one's destiny was considered so real that 
principle of "we do not rely on miracles" was 
the hazards of one who thought to ignore them. 
secular name upon the 
The effect of a name 
often the halakic 
cited in warning of 
So natural was their 
mystical effect that it would necessitate a miracle to overcome them. 
As seen earlier in this section the many names of G-d were permitted 
to be employed in the performance of Jewish magic or miracles. A 
rational explanation of the efficacy of G-d's names in working miracles 
is simply provided. Since the name of an entity is the essence of 
its being, and G-d's essence is His power, then the name of G-d is 
His power. As Professor Urbach writes in his Sages: 
''The Name was endowed with power, the Name and the Power were 
synonymous." 72 
Consequently we find constant references to the synonymy of G-d's 
name and His essence throughout the liturgy, as in: "G-d is One and 
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His Name is One" and "Blessed be He and Blessed be His Name," etc. 
Few Jews, however, were privileged enough to come to know the special 
names of G-d to enable them to work miracles through them. For there 
was a rabbinic tradition that knowledge of these names could only 
be transmitted to scholars who were sufficiently erudite and G-d 
fearing. The study of G-d's name was a bona fide science. Since 
these names described the essence of G-d, the more one involved one-
self in the study of His names the more one came to learn and discover 
His essence. Thus the science of His names was a natural extension 
of Talmud Torah and a coveted ambition of any erudite scholar. 73 
Other Practices 
It is interesting to note that while Rashba and Nahmanides perhaps 
went furthest in seeking to deviserationalexplanations for the effi-
cacy of natural metaphysical cures, they were not keen to do so in 
situations absent of pending disease. Thus we find that Rashba in 
another responsum and Nahmanides both opposed the practice of the ex-
piatory sacrifice (kapparot) on the eve of Yom Kippur on the grounds 
of augury and Ammorite Folkways. Nevertheless it is found in the 
I 
Responsa of the Geonim that Rav Hai Gaon endorsed the custom of Kapparot. 
Mordekhai discounts the problem of augury by explaining the symbolic 
significance of this rite. 74 R. Moses Sofer in his Responsa Hatam 
Sofer discusses a testament in the name of R. Judah Hasid that it is 
dangerous to build a house of stone or a house on a site upon which 
a house had never been built before. People say that it is effective 
to place a cockerel and a hen in the house and slaughter them there 
to dispell the, danger. The question is whether this practice consti-
tutes Ammorite Folkways. Hatam Sofer provides a rationale legitimising 
the custom based on what he considers an identical enactment of the 
Kapparot rite on Yom Kippur eve. The logic implicit in this rite 
removes it from the restriction of Ammorite Folkways. However, R. 
Sofer concludes that it is best to ignore the entire matter since 
it is not mentioned in the Talmud or in the Codes, and R. Judah Hasid's 
signature does not appear on the testament. Darkhei Teshuva in 
examining Hatam Sofer's analysis of the issue derives a halakic prin-
ciple that "whatever can be explained according to insinuation or 




Finally, it seems clear to assert that whether one maintains, as James 
Frazer in the Golden Bough and others who followed him, that Jewish 
magic is entirely mythological, the Bible being loaded with paganistic 
ritual which Jews absorbed from their environment. Or whether one 
maintains as Yehezkel Kaufman that Jewish magic is radically divorced 
from pagan mythical beliefs and that magical practices recorded in 
the Bible had an entire character of their own, each rite reflecting 
the finger of G-d. Or whether one attempts to find, as many of the 
authorities did, a rational explanation that demonstrates the logic 
of a metaphysical phenomenon in a manner which separates it from the 
supernatural metaphysics of Ammorite folk mythology, one thing is 
certain. There was a constant friction between these two opposing 
forces. Jewish magic ran a direct collision course with non-Jewish 
magic whichever way one attempts to define either form of magic. 
The prohibition of Nahash and the legitimacy of Ephod and Urim can not 
be an accident. The question which requires serious deliberation is 
in view of the fact that the two types of magic bore such a remarkable 
resemblance to each other and could so easily become confused for one 
another, why did the Bible introduce ritual altogether that would 
require the hairsplitting precision of experts to demythologize 
biblical magic from "their ways"? 
Perhaps a perfect example of this confrontation as well as its abate-
ment is contained in the following midrashic account: 
A certain Gentile questioned R. Johanan b. Zakkai saying to him, 
'These things that you do, seem like magical practices. A 
heifer is brought and slaughtered and burnt and poudned and its 
ashes are collected, and when one of you is defiled by the dead, 
two or three drops are sprinkled upon him and you say to him, 
You are clean.' He [R. Johanan b. Zakkai] answered him 
'Has the spirit of Tezazit [demon of madness or epilepsyj never 
entered you?' - He replied, 'No.' The Sage then said to him, 
'Have you not seen anyone else into whom the spirit of Tzezit 
has entered?' He replied, 'Yes!' Thereupon [R. Johanan b. 
Zakkai] said to him: 'And what do you do?' He replied, 'We 
bring roots andfumigate under him and spray water upon it [the 
demon spirit], and it flees.' Said [the Rabbi] to him, 'Do 
not your ears hear what your mouth speaks! Such too- is the 
spirit - it is the spirit of impurity, as it is said, 'And also 
the prophets and the impure spirit etc.' 
\~en [the Gentile] had left, [R. Johanan b. Zakkai's] disciples 
said to him, 'O, Master, him you have dismissed with a straw, 
but what explanation will you offer us?' Said he to them, 'By 
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your life! neither the dead person defiles nor does the water 
purify; only this is the decree of the Holy One Blessed be 
He. The Holy One Blessed be He hath said: 'I have ordained 
a statute I have issued an edict, and thou hast no right to 
transgress my edict.'76 
The narrative is instructive from many aspects. R. Johanan is chal-
lenged by the Gentile's observation taht Israel's Torah seems to 
contain magical practices like those of the ancient world around them. 
R. Johanan responds providing a rational explanation of the red heifer 
ritual based on the exorcism of the evil spirit, which was considered 
a universally established fact beyond doubt rather than a magical 
belief. To his own disciples, however, R. Johanan explains that the 
red heifer ritual is a precept by virtue of Divine decree and one has 
no right to transgress His edict. Thus we discern all the elements 
of our observation: 
1. A striking similarity between Jewish and pagan magic. 
2. A rational explanation which separates Jewish magic from pagan 
mythology by identifying the natural metaphysical process at 
work (in this case exorcism- a scientific fact accepted by 
the Gentile).77 
3. A Divine Will which ordains obedience of the ritual over and 
above the context in which it is given . 
We may regard these three elements as three steps of a process in 
the development of a relationship between the G-d of Israel and His 
people. It would have been highly improbabletoexpect the people 
of Israel to develop an unswerving devotion to their G-d unless the 
people were presented with a religion which was palatable. Its 
ritual had to incorporate various elements from the religions around 
them with which they were already familiar, yet to remould them into 
a unique Jewish character reflecting a particular approach of their 
G-d toward them. 
The religion was considered reasonable in that it dealt with realistic 
concepts which were considered factual simply because they were 
accepted as such by the ancient world around them. In other words , 
Israel's whole concept of reality as far as religion is concerned 
and what could be considered a realistic demand, were those items 
which transposed the religious credo of their time to a system which 
revealed the unique approach of their G-d. 
Maimonides advances an identical thesis regarding sacrifices: 
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The Egyptians used to worship the sign of Aries and they there-
fore forebade the slaughter of sheep and abominated shepherds ••• 
Similarly .certain sects of the Sabians worshipped the jinn and 
they assumed the outward form of goats and therefore, called 
the jinn goats ... Hence these sects used to prohibit the eating 
of goats. As for the slaughter of oxen, nearly the majority of 
idolators abominated it, as all of them held this species in 
very great esteem. Hence you will find that up to our time the 
Indians do not slaughter oxen. Thus it was in order to efface 
the traces of these incorrect opinions that we have been ordered 
by the Law to offer in sacrifices only in these three species of 
quadrupeds. In this way an action considered by them as an 
extreme act of disobedience was the one through which one came 
nearer to G-d and sought forgiveness for one's sins.78 
Maimonides clearly emphasizes the purpose of sacrificial ritual was 
for Israel to involve herself in a practice which all the nations 
around her had already developed their own beliefs and to transform 
those universal religious credo into one which was uniquely Jewish. 
It was the contravention and redirection of universal dogma within 
the dogma's own parameters "through which one came near to G-d." 79 
Maimonides' theory follows the three step process evident in the R. 
Johanan b. Zakkai narrative: Firstly one detects the similarity be-
t\veen Jewish sacrificial ritual and paganistic offerings. Thus the 
religion presents a palatable concept which is already universally 
entrenched and hence realistic. In the second phase a distinction 
is advanced which exemplifies a unique Jewish approach towards the 
ritual basedonreason rather than on fictitious mythology. Thirdly, 
the Israelites are prepared to demonstrate unswerving devotion over 
and above the context in which it is given and even when the original 
rationale no longer applies, such as after the disappearance of 
pagan sacrificial ritual. 
It seems that Maimonides' same thesis regarding sacrifices can be 
applied in the field of magic. The same three step process is dis-
cernable: Firstly one observes a clear parallel between wondrous 
precepts and phenomena in the Bible such as the red heifer, copper 
serpent, Urim ve-Tumim, Sotah waters, the Scapegoat on the Day of 
Atonement, etc. Thus Israel is presented with a code of values 
which are already universal. In phase two, various distinctions 
demarcate a particular Divine element which contrasts reasonable 
Jewish practice from pagan magical mythology. These two steps are 
necessary preliminaries to reach the ultimate level of observance. 
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Namely unswerving devotion to G-d's precepts over and above the con-
text in which they are given. Indeed the application of Maimonides' 
theory regarding sacrificial rites to magic is far from remote. 
All ceremonial regulations have a magical cast. The animal for 
sacrifice had to be a proper age, sex, colour, etc. The construction 
of altars and temples had to conform to certain specifications as 
80 well, etc. 
Even Nahmanides' objection to Maimonides' explanation of sacrificial 
rites can be distilled upon considering the transition from step 
two to step three. Nahmanides criticizes Maimonides' theory stating: 
Heaven forbid, that they [sacrifices] should have no positive 
value and desire except to eradicate idolatry from the mind 
of fools.81 
Maimonides would undoubtedly agree that at level three a definite 
positive value exists and is known to the Creator who commanded it. 
Even if His reason for willing it eludes them, Israel must observe 
with unswerving devotion nevertheless. 
that level it is necessary to progress 
firstly discover the particular Jewish 
Ammorite practices. 
However, in order to reach 
from stage two. Namely, to 
flavour which refutes similar 
Professor Urbach notes a similar development in describing the Talmud's 
question of a later Jewish practice to remedy a tree which casts its 
fruit by painting it with red paint. This seems to resemble Ammorite 
Folkways. The answer given is so that people may see it and pray 
for it. As the leper makes his grief known to the public so that they 
make supplication for him. Whereupon Urbach remarks: 
Obviously the original reason for the red paint derives from a 
popular belief in the power of red. This is an example of the 
extrusion of magical aspects from the widely current customs and 
their replacement by religio - ethical explanations. 82 
According to this theory we encounter an interesting paradox. Namely, 
it was important for the Israelite religion to have been given in a 
similar context to Ammorite Folkways in order to pave the way for the 
religion to develop its own cultural characteristics that would dis-
tinguish it from their Ammorite neighbours. 
The very defiance of their ways brought the Israelite closer to G-d. 
Without the Jewish peculiarity within a universal value system the Jew 
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would have no basis for comparison to bring him closer to his G-d. 
As a result, we shall see in our chapter on Metaphysical Development, 
that as the Ammorite folk tradition became extinct the frequency of 
miracles and Jewish magical.ritual diminished. 
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Demonology 
The ancient world regarded itself inundated by myriads of spirits 
which populated the earth. In the previous chapter we saw how R. 
Johanan b. Zakkai discounted the Gentile's challenge that the Jewish 
red heifer ritual involved magic by describing its analogy to spirit 
exorcism- an undisputed fact in the ancient world. The Mishna in 
Aboth, which ennumerates all the metaphysical phenomena which G-d 
incorporated into nature during the twilight hour, includes spirits 
among them. Not only was belief in the existence of spirits not 
considered mythological, in many respects it was considered a much 
more natural and real form of scientific inquiry than magic. The 
Talmud explains the difference between legitimate demonology and ille-
gitimate magic in the following manner: 
R. Aibu b~ Nagri said in the name of R. Hiyya b. Abba: 'Belatehem,' 
[Exodus 7:22] refers to magic through the agency of demons; 
'belahatehem,' to sorcery Lwithout outside help]. And thus 
it is also said, and the flame [lahat] of the sword which turns 
of itself [Genesis 3:24].1 
In his biblical commentary Torah Temima, R. Barukh Epstein explains 
the enigmatic talmudic passage as follows: Demonology is not able 
to effect illusory visions before the viewer. Rather, the demonologist 
possesses the ability to gather near, in reality, items which lie at 
a great distance. Magic, however, is able to create illusions, causing 
the viewer to see items which do not existinreality. The verse in 
Genesis is cited as an indication of the magical property. Just as 
the sword turned by itself, so is magic "turned" i.e., creates over-
turned illusory images; and "by itself", i.e., without any intermediary, 
and independent of substance- purely mythical. Demonology, on the 
other hand, deals with real substances and always depends on the agency 
of demons. 2 
The Respansa of Rashba cites Responsa of Nahmanides as an authoritative 
source for legitimizing demonology and invalidating magic: 
And I am of the opinion that demonic acts are one thing while 
magical practices are another. As they [the Sages] said 'Belatehem, 
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refers to demonic acts; belahateihem, refers to magic.' 
And Rashi explained that magical acts are performed via the 
agency of angels of destruction [mal'achei habala] and it is 
this which the Torah forbade. Howe3er, acts performed through 
the agency of demons are permitted. 
Nahmanides cites Rashi's explanation in justification of the Hasidim 
of Allemagne who, "dealt with demons, adjured them, sent them around, 
and employed them in different matters."4 R. Epstein 's explanation 
in Torah Temimah clarifies the distinction between demonology and 
magic. 
Similarly we find the op1n1on of Rosh who states that R. Hiyya b. 
Abbah and Abbaye in the Talmud took the trouble of precisely clarifying 
and distinguishing demonic acts from magical acts so that we shall 
know what sort of acts are permitted and which are forbidden. Were 
they both forbidden, then what difference would it make for us to 
know how magic differs from demonology? However, in his conclusion, 
Rosh remarks, that since new actions are not produced through the 
agency of demons but they only gather near things which already exist 
in distant places, Rosh wonders whther one is permit ted to perform 
actual actions through demons. Rosh's son Tur writes that his 
father tended to permit actions as well. Beit Yosef suggests that Tur 
probably heard so from his father. 5 
Hmvever, many of the authorities distinguished between inqu1r1ng of 
and adjuring demons to performing actual actions through them. Thus 
we find the opinion of R. Eliezer of Metz: 
It seems to me that demonic acts are permitted such as the 
adjuring of demons to perform one's intentions, for what is the 
difference between adjuring demons or angels? It is similar 
to those who employed the Book of Creation. It is only considered 
magic if one uses something to perform an act, or via bread 
without adjuring. However, go adjure demons is permitted ab 
initio as we find in Talmud. 
R. Eliezer clearly saw no difference between adjuring demons to im-
ploring angels. The same natural metaphysical factors which are at 
force to legitimate the latter,equally validate the former. In 
addition, the adjuring of demons and the employment of the Book of 
Creation do not constitute actions, as we saw in the previous chapter 
regarding the creation of a physical entity via the Book of Creation 
on the Sabbath. It is only the performance of an action through the 
agency of a physical object (i.e., a wizard's wand), which constitutes 
magic. 
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Finally we find the third opinion of Ramah (R. Meir b. Tadros Abulafia) 
who equates demonology with sorcery in every respect, forbidding its 
practice in all forms. 7 Precisely because there existed so many 
different opinions regarding the employment of demons Radbaz was asked 
to adjudicate. In a responsum, Radbaz rejects all of the proofs 
advanced by Rosh legitimizing demonic acts and he only permits the 
adjuring of demons by uttering the Holy Names in a way which would 
not bring about an action nor cause danger to the user. 
he writes: 
In conclusion 
It is appropriate for one who fears Heaven to distance oneself 
from them and not to inquire of them, because they are connected 
with idolatry which recognizes the power of another god, 
G-d forbid.s 
In our discussion of Astrology and Magic we saw a controversy among 
the Rabbis whether planetary influences and other metaphysical 
phenomena const1tuted a real science or a danger of being associated 
with idolatry. In demonology we find the identical problem. 
On the one hand we find that according to Job and other sources Satan 
is a real and undeniable force in the world which must be reckoned with 
as much as any other natural metpahysical factor in the world- no 
less than angels. On the other hand there existed the inherent danger 
that Satan would be worshipped as an independant force in itself as 
the Dualists who saw Satan as a separate power who is the arch-rival 
of G-d. Rashba and Nahmanides consistently follow their view in 
Astrology and Magic and therefore, consider demonology a natural 
metaphysical science- permitting even the performance of actions via 
the agency of demons. 
Incubus and Succubus 
Intriguingly Isaiah Tishbi writes that demons which are born as a 
result of intercourse between spirits and men and germinate from human 
nocturnal pollutions bear many human characteristics. With the excep-
tion of the mother demons, all demons are mortal, and there are some 
which even resemble animals. All this may suggest that demons are 
natural metaphysical beings rather than supernatural in their origin. 9 
To be sure, there were halakic consequences regarding the fecundity of 
human-spirit relationships. At the end of the seventeenth century a 
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lawsuit occurred in Posen between the inhabitants of a house and 
the demonic offspring of a former owner. R. Joel Baal Shem of Zamosz 
presided over the court and the lawsuite was argued by the contestants 
in a strictly legal manner. 
The demonic offspring argued that the former owner of the house had 
illicit relations with a fema£demon, who had borne him children. 
Before his death the demon prevailed upon him to bequeath to her and 
her offspring the cellar of his house. Now that the man's human 
heirs are all dead, the spirit children claimed the house as sole 
heirs. The inhabitants of the house argued that they purchased 
the house at full value from its owner and the spirits are "outsiders" 
and are not called the "seed of men." R. Joel decided against the 
outsiders, since their proper habitat is in waste places and deserts 
. 10 
and not among men, they can have no share in that house. 
This incident might beregardedas an effort to verify just how closely 
demons resemble humans, and is also valuable in determining the exis-
tential status of yet another transcendental being, which, as we 
saw from our discussion of the Elijah issue, is purposive in pin-
pointing man's halakic status whenever he enters the transcendental 
zone. Possibly these incidents served the moral purpose as well 
of impressing upon man how exposure to outside evil can itself breed 
further evils. 
The phenomena of man's intercourse with outside demons on the one hand, 
and the act of exorcising from within him possession by internal 
demons on the other hand, is no doubt a reflection of the theological 
debate of whether the "evil inclination" is an external factor outside 
of man which exposes him to evil or whether it is an internal power 
inherent within man's spiritual metabolism which incesstantly drives 
him towards evil. 
Another halakic ramification of man's union with spirits is discussed 
at length in the thirteenth century by R. Isaac b. Moses of Vienna. 
Was a man or woman who had been seduced by a demon to be regarded 
as an adulterer? And if so, was such a woman forbidden to her husband? 
The same questionswereconsidered again three centuries later by 
. 11 
Maharam (R. Meir b. Gedaliah) of Lublin in his Responsa. One 
can only guess about the practical halakic relevance that these issues 
were of interest to the codifiers. Perhaps their eagerness to establish 
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just how natural and real these spirits were and how man's ordinary 
life was affected, halakically, when he encounters transcendental 
experiences. Or perhaps there arose a need to verify whether it is 
the physical indulgence of intercourse or the forbidden partner with 
whom one engages in intercourse which constitutes adultery. If it 
is the physical action which is the main factor, then even if that 
action transpires with a metaphysical being the consequences of adul-
tery should be the same. However, if it is the non lawful human 
partner which is the principal concern, then it is another matter. 
Possibly still, the doctrine of Imamculate Conception intrigued the 
codifiers who were interested in verifying the halakic status of the 
offspring of a human-spirit union as well as the marital status of 
the mother subsequent to such a union. 
Specific Spirits and Defensive Strategem 
Sefer Hasidim describes a baby born with teeth and a tail. The Rabbi 
of the community advised that these be cut so that when he grows up 
he won't eat people. This seems to testify to a case where a child 
was considered born a werewolf and could be cured naturally. A 
responsum from Teshuva me-Ahava is cited by Pitchei Teshuva in his 
gloss to Shulchan Arukh regarding a woman who conceives to a werewolf 
whether, it is permissible to kill it. 12 In another instance Sefer 
Hasidim records a community where women ate children. The story is 
told as a clinical fact and there seems to be no supernatural conno-
tation or implication. 
The acceptance of the existence of spirits and demons played an 
important role in motivating the Halaka to enforce numerous laws 
aimed at minimizing man's exposure to them. Ketev Meriri is the bib-
lical name of an active demon during the period of mourning between 
17 Tamuz and 9 Av, between fourth and ninth hours of the day. As 
late as the thirteenth century, R. Zedekiah b. Anav reports in Shibbolei 
ha-Leket that in Rome pupils were not punished during these days 
because of Ketev Meriri which held S~C!Y on them. 
his fellow codifiers warn against walking alone 
sun and a shadow during these hours for fear of 
Shulchan Arukh and 
or in between the 
K M 
.. 13 etev er1r1. 
Shibbeta is the name of a spirit which rests upon foods and strangles 
people and children who ate food touched by unwashed hands. The 
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spirit can only be dispelled by washing the hands prior to the 
handling of food. Another demon Bat Melekh is the name of an impure 
spirit (ruach ra'ah) which rests upon the hands during the night. 
It is necessary to wash each hand three times in succession in order 
to dislodge the spirit. Otherwise: 
If the hand be put to the eye [without prior washing] let it 
be cut off, the hand to the nose let it be cut off, the 
hand to the ear let it be cut off, the hand to the vein [for 
blood letting] let it be cut off, the hand to the membrum let 
it be cut off, the hand to the anus let it be cut off, the 
hand to the vat let it be cut off, because the unwashed hand 
leads to blindness the hand leads to deafness, the hand causes 
a polypus.14 
Even on the Day of Atonement when all ablutions are forbidden the 
interdict was lifted in the case of washing the hands in the morning 
because of the dangers of Bat Melekh Shulchan Arukh codifies the 
custom of spilling out all the water that was gathered in basins 
and stood overnight in the neighbourhood of the deceased because of 
the death pellets which the angel of death dropped in the waters. 
Tashbetz (R. Simeon b. Zemah Duran), records an incident of man 
who drank from such waters and died. Certainly one is not permitted 
to kiss the corpse itself. 15 
I have heard of a medical survey which has recently discovered that 
the body emits a certain toxin into the saliva upon death, and if 
one were to taste this saliva, by kissing the corpse one would severely 
endanger one's life. 
In another law we find that Mordekhai writes: 
It appears to me that one should be careful not to eat on the 
Sabbath between Mincha and Ma'ariv as it says in Midrash: 'Who-
ever drinks water during twilight on Sabbath is as if one steals 
from the deceased relatives.' Because they [the deceased] 
drink when they return to judgement. And R. Meir the father 
of Rabbeinu Tam reported that in Lotir the people ate between 
Mincha and Ma'ariv and it became dangerous until they stopped. 
k1d that which was said 'Whoever drinks etc.,' is only in regards 
to one's relatives for which one mourns but not for others. 
And R. Yehiel says that one only needs to be careful for [the 
first] twelve months when the soul _ ascends and descends in 
the body but not longer. And the world practices caution 
even after twelve months. Rabbenu Meshullam began the practice 
in his city Melun of eating after Mincha on Shabbat, and Rabbenu 
Tam inquired of him why he did so. He answered that he found 
an edition in his Midrasb, 'Whoever eats on the eve of Sabbath 
after Mincha,' the reason being that they are tired from the 16 judgement which they suffered all week long and so they drink. 
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Remah codifies Mordekhai's law in his gloss to Shulchan Arukh both 
regarding the prohibition of drinking water during twilight on Sabbath 
eve and on Sabbath night. 17 Whether the reason for the1nterdict of 
drinking waters is because water cools down the souls suffering from 
the intensity of the heat upon exiting the fires of hell that subside 
on the eve of Sabbath or whether it is because water cools down the 
souls from the severity of heat upon re-entry into the first of hell 
which start up once again on Sabbath night, it is clear from the 
Midrash that Sabbath is not just a day of rest decreed arbitarily 
by the Almighty for man to observe. Indeed Sabbath is a metaphysical 
reality in the world which affects all of creation. Even the fires 
of hell rest on Sabbath, the souls of the deceased rest from their 
judgement on the Sabbath, and man who drinks from the waters which 
cool these fires endangers his health. Possibly when the souls of 
the deceased lap these same waters they contaminate them in the 
same way as the pellets of the angel of death contaminated the waters 
in the neighbourhood of the deceased. 
So powerful were the metaphysical forces of evil that they were able 
to generate laws which applied to man even after death. For example 
a child who died before reaching the age of circumcision must be 
circumcised and named after death in order to be saved from the evil 
forces of hell.18 
In certain communities, special prayers were instituted in the Friday 
night service for the Hazan to recite to detain the congregation so 
that no man be left behind in the synagogue alone to go home unaccom-
panied, since Friday night was particularly dangerous as hordes of de-
, 19 
vestating spirits were let loose upon the world. 
Many other halakic practices and customs were instituted for the 
purpose of warding off the spirits. Some examples of these are: 
the introduction of the acrostic Kera Satan (destroying Satan) in 
the High Holiday liturgy prior to the sounding of the Shofar. The 
Shofar itself was considered an instrument highly capable of confoun-
ding Satan; the custom of the bride wearing a white gown and encirc-
ling the bridegroom with candles under the canopy; the vigil on the 
night before circumcision; halagua-cutting the infants hair at three 
years old. 
Symbolic offerings of substitutes were made to the supernatural powers 
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to save oneself from heavenly punishment such as: kapparot, the propi-
tiatory rite on the eve before the Day of Atonement; the bread 
given over to spirits at Tashlich; hibbut arava, the beating of the 
willow branches on Hoshana Rabbah; libidation of spilling the Habdalah 
wine on the ground. In the Laws of Mourning we find that it is for-
bidden to remove a feather from a dying corpse. Although the feather 
of the fowl substitutes man in the fowl-demon relationship thereby 
causing prolonged death agony, nevertheless, because it is necessary 
to touch the body, one is directly responsible for hastening death. 
Ou the other hand, it is permissible to discontinue the chopping of 
wood. Although the noise prolongs the death agony by preventing the 
soul from leaving the body, nevertheless, the discontinued noise does 
not directly hasten death but only overcomes the factor causing its 
delay. In another instance R. Meir of Rothenberg wrote how the Mezuzah 
has an antidemonic effect and how a demon stopped visiting him once 
he attached a Mezuzah on the door of his house of study. The Talmud 
in Baba Kama establishes a legal principle that one who occupies his 
neighbours premises without any agreement is under no legal obligation 
to pay him rent since he causes his neighbour to benefit from the 
eviction of She'iyyah the demon who haunts and damages uninhabited 
20 places. 
A demon called Sh.D.- acrostic for shomer dappin (guardian of pages)-
causes forgetfulness to those who leave open books unattended. The 
Shakh in his commentary to Shulcahn Arukh cites this demon in caution 
to one who leaves his studies unattended. 21 
Spirits as an Educative Edifice 
Because evil spirits were everywhere, impatiently awaiting the unguar-
ded moment when they might seize one, they served the constructive 
purpose of causing man to be eternally vigilant- constantly on guard 
for himself. Not a moment could pass when man would not be actively 
conscious of h~s every deed, lest he be caught unalert. One of the 
main aims of Halaka was to serve this function. Its myriads of minute 
details were specifically designed for this purpose, whether it be the 
laws concerning what thoughts to think in the toilet or the laws 
regarding which shoelace to tie first. Namely, to thoroughly engross 
the Jew to intenselyfocus on his every action no matter how trite or 
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seemingly insignificant. The Jew must always be conscious of him-
self and thoroughly alert. The slightest heedlessness and distraction 
instantly became a wide open invitation for demous and spirits to 
take hold of man and lead him astray. The seizure by the demon of 
forgetfulness of one who unmindfully leaves his studies momentarily 
unattended seems to indicate this concept. The preoccupation with 
demons served a further educational purpose similar to the science 
of G-d's Names. The more man studied about the spirit world the more 
man came to understand its essential nature as well as how it affects 
man in his relationship with i t. 
Although demons are of superior strength to man they are of inferior 
intelligence. Therefore, man is capable of utilising his genius to 
outwit and deceive demons once he has gained sufficient knowledge 
to master their affairs. In an educative sense the warding off demons 
may be regarded as maximizing man's awareness of his actions, not 
leaving himself unguarded or oblivious for even a moment. The nulli-
fication (bitul) of the "powers of impurity" may be regarded in the 
same sense. N~ely, the maximization of purity. As Trachtenberg writes: 
Since all creation is engaged in the quest for perfection, all 
things striving to attain the next higher degree of being, the 
demons too, are perpetually seeking to acquire the body of man, 
their greatest desire being for that of the scholar, the highest 
type of human. This is why scholars in particular must be care-
ful not to be alone at night.22 
Since the scholar represents the highest degree of spiritual purity, 
he is a natural feasting ground for the spirits of impurity. The 
scholar's quest to surge to higher levels of spirituality will auto-
matically involve him in the process of nullifying the spirits of 
impurity -since it is these very spirits which are the obstacles he 
must overcome to attain higher levels. The more the scholar studies 
and the more he discovers, the greater his level of purity. His 
ascent from one level of purity to another is the inverse of nullifying 
theimpurity which exists at each level prior to his attaining the next 
level of purity. The incessant struggle between the scholar and the 
spirits of impurity represents the ability of man to overcome all 
obstacles and master himself through constant study and application. 
The magnetic attraction of demons to scholars manifests the great ad-
miration and esteem in which scholars are held and therefore furthers 
the educative goal of illustrating the paramountcy of scholars who are 
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thoroughly familiar with halakic knowledge. 
Evil Eye 
The phenomenon 'of the "Evil Eye" was the result of belief in demons 
and spirits. The Evil Eye was believed to manifest itself in one of 
two ways. Either the angry or jealous glance of a man's eye calls 
into being an evil spirit who takes vengeance on the cause of wrath. 
Or, the eye itself contains a natural potency of fire which spreads 
23 rays of destruction with every baneful glance. This question of 
whether the Evil Eye is an external phenomenon whereby some external 
demon is summoned by man's glance, or whether it is an internal pheno-
menon where man possesses an inherent power of casting the evil eye, 
seems to reflect the original issue of whether the evil inclination 
is essentially an external or internal force. 
Many Halakot were introduced to avert the Evil Eye which indicates 
that Halaka regarded the Evil Eye as a real and active force. Thus 
we find such laws which prohibit the solemnization of two weddings 
together, the calling to the Torah of two immediate relatives of the 
same family successively, and the inclusion of two circumcisions 
h · h bl · 24 s· ·1 1 h toget er ~n t e same ess~ng. ~m~ ar y t e custom arose not to 
name the person called to the Torah for the portions dealing with 
curses (tocheicha) as well as to read the~portions in an undertone. 
In addition we find the universal Jewish practice of qualifying each 
statement which may potentially arouse jealousy with the words 
keyn oyin hore (may there be no evil eye). By veiling one's beauty, 
not exhibiting riches, and giving a child an ugly name, the happy event 
will pass by unnoticed and the Evil Eye remains passive. The idea 
that "blessing only comes upon those things which are hidden from the 
eye" is probably connected to the Evil Eye concept. 25 
The magical power of the Evil Eye, especially according to the opinion 
that it is a natural internal force inherent in the eye itself, would 
seem to indicate that if a person concentrates on a baneful thought 
hard enough until he can almost visualise his thought before his eye 
in a tangible form, that thought will then be sufficiently concretized 
to generate itself into a physical reality. The Evil Eye then, is 
an expression of actively realizing one's palpable fascinations. The 
transmission of a concrete thought to the visible eye stage actually 
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causes the very thought to materialize. The same concept may apply 
in the realisation of one's dream. Since the dream is a state in 
which 'one sees one's thoughts' the very tangibility and concretisa-
tion of the thought being seen in a visible form causes the imagined 
events to materialise. The halakic discussions whether hirhorei 
aveira (thoughts of sin) or mahshavot mitzvah (thoughts of Mitzvah) 
are considered as acts of sin or Mitzvah may well depend on this 
question of the level of reality which is generated and actualised 
by thought. 
Along similar lines one might say that the purpose of Halaka acknow-
ledging a metaphysical reality in which one's thought or eyes produce 
actual effects, was to check man's moral and ethical behaviour. If 
a man knows that another man's evil eye can destroy, he will take 
painstaking care to perform the kind of actions .which do not arouse 
the jealousy and envy of his fellow man. And he himself will dismiss 
from his mind any evil thoughts which may lead to the destruction 
of his fellow man's possessions or welfare. The very dismissal of 
such thoughts and the attempt to prevent his fellow man to entertain 
such thoughts about him will act as a safeguard to ensure that both 
he and his fellow man will not involve themselves in any of the sort 
of evil activity which one is imagining. Even the qualification of 
the prophylactic phrases keyn oyin hore, or holilah (G-d forbid) 
serve the important purpose of making man consciously aware of the 
consequence of one's statement. By preventing oneself from saying 
something one prevents oneself from doing it. Thus man's ethical 
and moralistic activities are enhanced by Halaka's recognition of 
the Evil Eye phenomenon and other such concepts. 
Necromancy 
In view of the various media in which the metaphysical world of spirits 
communicate withthemundane terrestrial world of man it became impor-
tant for Halaka to consider the phenomenon of Necromancy. Scripture 
ordains: 
There shall not be found among you any one that. •. , or one that 
consulteth a ghost or a familiar spirit(Ob) or a wizard (Yidoni) 
or a necromancer.26 
Despite Scripture's proscribing necromancy the Talmud abounds with 
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incidents describing consultations which were held between illustrious 
Sages and the spirits of the dead. Therefore it became important 
for the codifiers to investigate and clarify precisely what kind of 
phenomena were included under the biblical prohibition of necromancy, 
or in Hebrew, doresh el ha-metim. 
Thus the Talmud specifies: 
'Or that is doresh el ha-metim,' this means one who starves 
himself and spends the ni~ht in a cemetery so that an impure 
spirit may rest upon him. 7 
Following the talmudic definition Maimonides codifies: 
Who is a doresh el ha-metim? One who starves himself and 
spends the night in the cemetery in order that the dead shall 
come to him in a dream and predict for him whatever he asks. 
And there .are others that dress in known clothes and utter 
words and offer up a known incense and sleep alone in order 
that someone dead will speak to him in a dream. The rule 
is that whoever causes the dead to come and predict is liable 
to lashes as Scripture states. 'There shall not be found 
among you .•• or one who consulted the dead.'28 
On the other hand, R. Eliezer of Metz who wrote in justification 
of the practice of adjuring spirits, as we saw in our discussion on 
Demonology, similarly writes regarding necromancy: 
One who adjures a sick person to return to him after death in 
order that he may inform him whatever he asks, this is not 
inquiring of the dead, since he is not inquiring from the body 
of the dead but rather from the spirit of the dead, and the 
spirit is not considered dead.29 
R. Eliezer was very exacting on the biblical terminology of "consulting 
the dead" which enabled him to distinguish between consulting the 
corpse which is dead and therefore forbidden and consulting the immortal 
spirit which is eternally alive and therefore not banned under the 
category of consulting the dead. It is well worth noting that R. 
Eliezer's classification of the spirit as alive is a halakic defini-
tion which legally exempts one who inquires of the dead man's spirit 
from the Torah penalty of necromancy. R. Eliezer further states 
that his principle was operative by the talmudic Sages who employed 
the same distinction in justification for consulting the spirits of 
the dead. 30 Therefore, R. Eliezer permits the adjuring of a sick 
person to return after death since it is the spirit of the person 
which one adjures rather than the body. 
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The major codifiers Shulchan Arukh and Rema, were at variance over 
whether or not to accept R. Eliezer's destinction. 31 Alternative 
explanations were advanced in justification of the Sages' conduct. 
Perisha writes: 
It seems to me that they meant to forbid specifically one who 
sleeps in a cemetery in order that a spirit of impurity may 
rest upon him. This was not the case of that pious Sage 
whose intention was not that an impure spirit should rest 
upon him but rather ·to hear what the spirits of the souls were 
saying to one another.32 . 
Thus, Perisha distinguishes between causing a impure spirit to rest 
upon one which is supernatural and therefore, illegitimate, and 
listening in to authentic spirits in conversation which is a natural 
metaphysical phenomenon. It would seem that Perisha arrived at his 
distinction from Rashi's explanation of "spirit of impurity" in 
Sanhedrin, the ·source which describes the necromancer as one who 
"starves himself and spends the night in a cemetery so that an impure 
spirit may rest upon him." Rashi explains the impure spirit as: 
The demon of the cemetery will become fond of him and assist 
him in hi's witchcraft. 33 
Thus it would appear that Rashi, as Perisha, does not censure consul-
ting the dead but rather the method of consultation. If the dead are 
consulted through the agency of demons and magic, as Saul did through 
the witch of Endor this method is mythical and hence constitutes 
illegitimate necromancy. 34 However, if the dead are consulted 
directly without the assistence of any artificial means, this is 
an authentic metaphysical phenomenon which is sanctioned. R. Caro 
offers an alternative explanation distinguisl1ing between one who 
performs an action which causes the dead to appear which is prohibited, 
and one who consults with the dead without invovling oneself in an 
action which is permitted. Shulchan Arukh, however, agrees with R. 
Eliezer that one is permitted to adjure a sick person to return after 
death since the person is alive at the time of adjuration and there-
fore, is not considered inquiry of the dead. 
The talmudic injunction against lying in the cemetery and conversing 
with the dead seemed to run contrary to the universal Jewish practice 
of prostrating oneself over the graves of one's ancestors and pouring 
out one's sorrows to them on the eve of Rosh Hashana (New Year) in 
similar fashion to Caleb, who the Talmud reports: 
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Went and prostrated himself upon the graves of the Patriarchs 
sating to them, 'My fathers, pray on my behalf that I may be 
de ivered from the plan of the spies.'35 
While some authorities thought to prohibit the latter practice, 
relating it to necromancy, most of the authorities resolved the 
apparent contradiction by distinguishing between inquiring of 
the dead and prayer to the dead. In the latter instance one was not 
concentrating one's attention on the dead who lie there but rather 
directed one's prayer to G-d Himself, who is more receptive to one's 
prayer on account of the merits and the pleadings of the righteous 
who intercede and act on one's behalf. 36 In the same way as we saw 
in our discussion of Astrology and Magic, if a Divine factor can be 
identified as the object of one's curious actions, one can still be 
regarded within the realm of being "wholehearted with the Lord your 
G-d" rather than within the realm of one of the idolatrous branches 
of mythology. Moreover, the ascertainment of a Divine element 
earmarks the practice within the confines of natural metpahysics 
rather than supernatural mythology. 
Thus it may be concluded that, as far as the Halaka is concerned, 
if the medium through which the terrestrial and spiritual world 
conmunicate with one another is a natural metaphysical one, it is 
permitted, for this an authentic reality. If the medium is an arti-
ficial supernatural one then it is proscribed as necromancy, which 
isnoneother than one of the many magical branches of mythology. 
Regarding our discussion on "The Relationship between the Future 
Worlds and This World," we have here another instance of such a rela-
tionship. By contacting the spirits of one's righteous ancestors, 
through following the correct procedures which are halakically endor-
sed, these spirits are able to intercede on one's behalf and ensure 
that one's prayers are answered in this world. Thus man in this 
world benefits himself by contacting spiritual bodies which occupy a 
transcended sphere of existence. 
Saving a Spiritual Life 
Another instance in which the spirit was dealt by Halaka with the 
srune degree of exactitude and tactility as the physical was with 
regards to the laws of saving a life on the Sabbath. One is permitted 
to violate the Sabbath in order to save onewhosephysical life is in 
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danger. The question arises whether one is permitted to violate 
the Sabbath to save one whose spiritual life is endangered. The 
Hebrew term, Pikuach Nefesh which translated literally means, saving 
the spirit, seems to indicate that the main concern in preserving a 
life, is in fact to preserve the spirit. In a fascinating article 
Rabbi Shaul Yisraeli discusses the issue stating that the question 
would apply in any situation where a Jew was becoming infidelic and 
might lapse into committing transgressions, whose spiritual life 
was therefore in danger. If there was an opportunity to save this 
person by violating the Sabbat~would it be permitted?37 
R. Yisraeli records that the question was originally treated by 
Rashba who was asked in a responsum whether a father, who \vas informed 
on the Sabbath that his daughter was forced out of his house by 
Jewish apostates to make her abandon Judaism, if the father is permit-
ted to journey on the Sabbath in oder to try and prevent it. Rashba 
rules that the Sabbath is not violated in order to save another from 
committing transgressions. As the Talmud declares: "One is not 
permitted to sin in order that one's neighbour may gain thereby."38 
The Tosafoth however, disagree, stating that the talmudic dictum 
was only stated where one's neighbour had already committed a trans-
gression and not otherwise. Furthermore, the dictum would not apply 
in the case of a great Mitzvah. Beit Yosef deduces that since 
the girl had not si1med and it is a great Mitzvah to save her 
from apostasy the Tosafoth would permittheviolation of the Sabbath 
wi1il8 aithough a severe act, in comparison to apostasy is a minor 
transgression. 39 It would appear that Rashba did 11ot consider the 
committing of transgressions on the same dimension nor as serious as 
saving a life, whereas Tosafoth considered it at least as serious. 
Shulchan Arukh codifies the case in accordance with the position of 
Tosafoth. Magen Avraham explains that compared to apostatising and 
committing transgressions all her life, the violation of Sabbath is 
a minor offense. Taz comments that saving this girl is better (adif) 
than saving alife! 4o-- R. Yisraeli questions the reasoning that a 
major transgression should outweigh or cancel a minor transgression. 
This concept only applies when the same person is confronted with the 
two possibilities. Then the one over-rides the other. In our case 
however, the person about to commit a minor transgression is not at 
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all confronted by a major one, only his friend, is. The action of 
the first one remains a sin and is not cancelled by any corresponding 
action on his part. By what right then is a person permitted to 
commit an offense on behalf of someone else? R. Yisraeli resolves 
that this is the principle of Pikuach Nefesh which the Talmud derives 
from the verse: 
'And the children of Israel shall keep the Sabbath.' The Torah 
said, profane for his sake one Sabbath so that he may keep many 
Sabbaths.41 · 
R. Yisraeli adds that the entire source and basis for the law of 
saving a life is a spiritual saving - in order that one may observe 
many Sabbaths. This is what Taz meant that saving one from apostasy 
is better than saving a life. The reason for violating the Sabbath 
to save a life is based on the spiritual gain that the person who 
is saved will be enabled to observe many more Sabbaths. Therefore, 
included in the law of saving a life is the axiom that one is permitted 
to commit a minor offense in order that another person should merit 
a spiritual gain- or be saved from a spiritual loss. 
The question remains, however, by what criterion is one to differen-
tiate the level of severity of each transgression. In other words, 
it is clear that one may violate the Sabbath to save one from apostasy 
and violation of all laws. But what about violating the Sabbath in 
order to prevent one fromviolatingother transgressions. How is 
one to assess the net spiritual loss or gain? R. Yisraeli states 
that this would depend on whether one derives the law of Pikuach 
Nef esh from: "'He shall live by them' - but he shall not die by them, "42 
or from: "'And the children' ••• Profane for his sake one Sabbath so 
that he may keep many Sabbaths." If it is derived from the former 
source then one is permitted to violate the Sabbath only for the sake 
of preserving human life but not in order to prevent one from commit-
ting transgressions. If it is derived from the latter source, then 
one is always permitted to commit a minor offense in order to save 
one from committing a major one. This is essentially the controversy 
between Rashba and Tosafoth. Rashba concurs with the former position 
while Tosafoth maintains the latter. 
R. Yisraeli concludes, however, that with regards to apostasy and 
abandoning one's religion, this constitutes loss of life in this world 
and the next world and therefore, according toallauthorities conforms 
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to all the laws of saving a life. 
Thus we see from R. Yisraeli's article that one is permitted to 
violate the Sabbath in order to preserve spiritual life. An interes-
ting application of this ruling would exist if a person was dying 
on the Sabbath and it was discovered that he had entered in his will 
to be cremated after death. Since one whowillfullyundergoes cremation 
denies himself spiritual life in the next world, 43 if the patient 
can be influenced to change his mind, is it permitted to write a 
new will on the Sabbath? This is the reverse case of the question 
earlier discussed if it is permitted to write a spiritual cure in 
an amulet to save physical life. Or another example, is it permitted 
to violate the Sabbath in order to say confession with a patient 
about to die on the Sabbath and who is not able to do so himself. 
Since by confessing and reciting prayers before death one greatly 
enhances one's spiritual position in the next world. This question 
was asked by Rabbi Alexander Carlebach who personally encountered 
this very situation while serving as Rabbi in Belfast, to Rabbi 
Isaac Jacob Weiss who was then Ab Beth Din of England and is discussed 
in the latter's work, Responsa Minchat Yitzchak .44 
Other applications of this ruling would exist in every situation 
\vhere one has an opportunity of saving a Jew from committing an 
offense by violating the Sabbath. Since the committing of sin 
weakens one's spiritual welfare, one would then have to weigh the 
severity of the offense as compared to the loss of violating the 
Sabbath . 
In any event once it is established that Pikuach Nefesh is literal, 
that is, it pertains to the nefesh- the soul-equally if not more, 
than to the body, then it might be inferred that this may apply to 
each area in Jewish Law which deals specifically with the nefesh. 
Such as Okhel Nefesh, i.e., whether it is permitted to violate Yom 
Tov to provide spiritual consumption in the same way as one is permit-
ted to violate Yom Tov for physical consumption; or Geneivat Nefesh, 
i.e., would one incur the penalty for spiritual kidnapping as one 
would for physical kidnapping, etc. 45 Earlier we discussed Maimonides 
who forbade the use of scriptural incantations to cure diseases, and 
considered those who do so deniers of Torah because: "they make the 
words of Torah medicine for the body, while they are medicine for the 
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The question now arises, if a person contacted a spiritual ailment 
where his soul was afflicted, whether it would be permitted to utter 
a scriptural incantation to preserve his spiritual welfare, in light 
of the above discussion. Would this case meet Maimonides' require-
ment of employing spiritual medication (Torah) for spiritual hygiene? 
Certainly it seems clear from R. Yisraeli that where his spiritual 
life is endangered, there would be no question. The question is 
only regarding ordinary medical procedure where one's condition was 
not serious. Would one be permitted to recite a scriptural incantation 
to remedy a minor spiritual ailment in the same way as one could 
take an aspirin to relieve a headache? 
It is clear that the application of actual Halaka in the preservation 
of spiritual welfare opens a Pandora's box revealing the vast degree 
of halakic concern for transcendental man. This is not surprising 
since the main aim of Halaka is to guide man towards spiritual perfec-
tion. 
Determinism and Man's Spirit 
We recall in our discussion of Astrology that the planetary influences 
of Mazalot over man's terrestrial circumstances posed a great theo-
logical problem of Predestination versus Reward and Punishment. How 
can man be punished or rewarded for actions which Mazal caused him 
to do? Why should t~laka hold man accountable for situations over 
which he has no control? Ran unravels this dilemma based on the 
reality of man's spiritual existence: 
The reason is that Mazal functions within physical bodies until 
it influences them. But it does not function within the soul 
which is higher than it. And this necessitates that everything 
which is related to natural matters is determined by Mazal. 
But the performance of Mitzvot and sins which is not a natural 
action is determined by the guidance of the soul. 
For this reason they [Sages] stated, the name of the angel who 
is in charge of conception is 'Night' and he takes a drop and 
places it in the presence of the Holy One Blessed be He saying, 
'Sovereign of the universe what shall be the fate of this drop? 
Shall it produce a strong man or a weak man, a wise man or a fool, 
a rich man or a poor man?' Whereas 'wicked man' or 'righteous 
one' he does not mention, in agreement with the view of R. 
Haninah. For R. Haninah said, 'Everything is in the hands of 
heaven except Fear of G-d.'47 
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Ran explains that Mazal only influences man's physical characteris-
tics such as strong or weak, wise or fool, rich or poor, but not his 
spiritual make up such as righteous or evil. Halaka may well hold 
man culpable for his actions because they are guided by the spirit 
and Mazal bears no influence over spiritual qualities. 
Planetary Spirits 
Ran's remark that the Mazalot have no influence upon the soul does not 
imply that the heavenly bodies themselves are devoid of spirit. Even 
Maimonides, who denies .the influence of Mazalot even overman's physical 
conditions, concedes that the heavenly bodies are spiritual entities 
possessing soul, knowledge and intellect. 48 In a gripping and 
fascinating book, Man on the Moon- in the light of Torah and Faith, 
R. ~·lenahem Kasher discusses whether man's landing on the moon and 
excavating thereof disproves Maimonides' position, who quoted from 
Bible and the Sages to corroborate Aristotle's theory that the heavenly 
bodies are alive and endowed with mind, soul and intellect. 49 
R. Kasher begins by recording the opinion of many of the great 
earlier Sages who disputed Maimonides' and Aristotle's theory long 
before man landed on the moon such as R. Saadia Gaon, R. Yehudah ha-
Levi, R. Hisdai Crescas, Abrabane~ Yavetz, and Maharal. Nevertheless 
R. Kasher writes that Maimonides' position itself does not become 
invalidated by man's presence on the moon. For R. Kasher proves 
that we are aware of various matter which exist in the world that 
appear to be inanimate yet nevertheless are imbued with organic life. 
Similarly with regards to all heavenly spheres, the moon, and even 
our earth, even though they appear inanimate, it is possible that 
they have an inner spirit of life. Not necessarily life in our sense, 
but life of their own and intellect of their own. Man's reaching 
the moon does not establish it one way or the other. 
Spiritualism 
We have already demonstrated in this section that Halaka attached 
such importance to man's spiritual existence that the Halaka generated 
laws which applied to man even after his death to improve his spiritual 
welfare, such as in the case of circumcising and naming a child who 
died before reaching the age of circumcision. Another example can 
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can be found in the case of Hibbut ha-Kever- or, 'beating in the 
grave .' According to this kabbalistic belief the deceased is punished 
for his sins by being struck by a fiery chain immediately after 
burial by the angel Duma. Only those who die in Erez Israel or, if 
outside, are buried on Friday afternoon before sunset, are exempted 
from this punishment. Pitchei Teshuva records a responsum of Rad-
baz in which he discusses whether it is permitted to delay the funeral 
of someone who died on Thursday until Friday afternoon during sunset 
in order to escape the punishment of Hibbut ha-Kever. Another form 
of torment suffered by the dead is Gilgul Mehilot, the underground 
rolling of the dead to their eventual Resurrection in Israel. 
Despite the prohibition of exhuming the grave, the Halaka permitted 
the transfer of the corpse to be buried in Israel in order to save 
it both from Hibbut ha-Kever and Gilgul Mehilot. 50 
Is the Priesthood an Indellible Property? 
Thus far we have seen that a great many Halakot deal specifically 
with man's spirit and are greatly concerned withthemetaphysical 
dimension of human existence. We will conclude this section by 
investigating the ordinary halakic category of the priesthood and 
explore whether the priesthood is a physical or spiritual property. 
Because a sizeable amount of halakic literature has been apportioned 
to this question in treating the Elijah issue with which we are 
already familiar, our examination will take us back to review some 
of the material discussed in the first part of this work. 
In Chapter II we discerned two conceptions on the effect of Elijah's 
ascension upon his degree of involvement in the commandments. R. 
Attiah differentiated between the continuation of Elijah's 'man-G-d' 
relationship, and the termination of his 'man-man' relationships, 
\vhile R. Falcon distinguished between Elijah's continued existence 
and the terminated relations which emanated from him. \Je recall 
evincing that a manifestation of the practical difference between 
these two positions reflects directly upon Elijah's priestly status. 
According to R. Attiah, since Elijah's priesthood was an intrinsic 
aspect of his 'man-G-d' relationship, Elijah's status of Priest was 
entirely unaffected by ascension. Accoridng to R. Falcon, however, 
as Elijah's priestly status was a relation (no less of a relation 
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than being his wife's 'husband,' or Elisha's 'master'), just as 
all Elijah's relations terminated upon ascension, so did his relation 
of priesthood. Thus the practical difference between the two 
positionsis that according to R. Falcon, Elijah relinquished his 
priesthood upon ascension, whereas according to R. Attiah, Elijah 
retained his priestly status. 
In Chapter III.l we divulged tha.t respondents R. Sofer and R. Kluger, 
demonstrated different areas of involvement in the commandments 
than R. Falcon or R. Attiah. This difference was attributed largely 
as a result of their viewing the entire incident of ascension diffe-
rently. They conceived of a schism, whereby Elijah's soul was 
liberated from body thus evoking a dual form of existence: one in 
the form of spirit, devoid of body, and one in the form of man-
an aggregate existence of body and spirit. When Elijah assumes 
human form he is automatically obligated in the commandments, where-
as whenever he reverts to spirit form his obligation is absolved. 
By applying this dichotomy to Elijah's preisthood, we discover 
that his priesthood has relevance upon his human form only. The 
impurity laws c.oncern Elijah the 'priest' only when he is bound to 
observe the commandments, that is, when he assumes human form. For 
this reason R. Kluger permitted performing a circumcision in the same 
room where a corpse lay. Since Elijah attends circumcisions in 
spirit form, the impurity of the corpse would not prevent Elijah's 
presence. His priesthood is utterly inconsequential to his spirit 
form, and, therefore, is relevant to his human form alone. 
In R. Attiah's view, however, Elijah's priesthood is an intrinsic 
aspect of his 'man-G-d' relationship which exists in every form-
both human and spirit. Therefore, R. Attiah accords with the R. 
Sofer-R. Kluger view insofar as Elijah's priesthood is relevant to 
his human form. On the other hand, R. Attiah discords with R. 
Sofer-R. Kluger concerning Elijah's spiritual form. According to 
R. Sofer-R. Kluger, Elijah's priesthood is irrelevant to his spirit 
form, whereas in R. Attiah's view, Elijah's priesthood is a crucial 
aspect of Elijah's 'man-G-d' relationship, which exists in the form 
of spirit as well. 
Conversely, in R. Falcon's view, since Elijah's priesthood is a 
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relation which terminated upon ascension, this relation is neither 
pertinent to his human form not to his spiritual form. Therefore, 
R. Falcon is in accord with R. Sofer-R. Kluger insofar as Elijah's 
priesthood is irrelevant to his spirit form. However, R. Falcon 
disaccords with R. Sofer-R. Kluger concerning Elijah's human form. 
The practical difference between these four positions is immediately 
apparent in the aforementioned case of performing a circumcision in 
the same room where a corpse lay. According to R. Falcon, one could 
perform the circumcision even if Elijah were to appear in person, 
since in his view, the priesthood is a relation which Elijah relin-
quished upon ascension. Therefore, even if Elijah the person were 
to attend, Elijah the priest no longer exists. 
According to R. Kluger-R. Safer, the presence of the corpse would 
prevent Elijah's appearing in person. However, since Elijah can 
still appear in form of spirit, the circumcision may be performed. 
According to R. Attiah, however, since Elijah's priesthood is an 
intrinsic aspect of his 'man-G-d' relationship which exists in 
every form, whether human or spirit, the circ~ision may not be 
performed, since the impurity of the corpse would prevent Elijah's 
presence even in the form of spirit. 
Whether in fact, R. Attiah, held this view with regards to every 
possible form of existence, spiritual inclusive, depends on the 
resolution of the important halakic-pneumatological question of 
whether the priesthoodis a spiritual or a physical property • . For, 
seemingly, only if the priesthood were proven to be a spiritual 
property is there room for R. Attiah to maintain that Elijah must 
shun impurity even when assuming his form of spirit. 
It would appear that R. Kluger opines that priesthood is not a 
spiritual property, since he permitted the circumcision on the basis 
that Elijah only appears in spirit form. Were the priesthood a 
property appertaining to the spirit, Elijah should be prevented from 
attending the circumcision even in the form of spirit. Radbaz, 
likewise, indicates that the priesthood is a non-spiritual property. We re-
call that Radbaz dealt with the question how Elijah could perform 
a resurrection since he is forbidden to come in contact with a corpse. 
In his final explanation Radbaz proposes the theory of Elijah's re-
incarnation. That is, although Elijah's spirit originated in Phinehas 
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the priest, his biological parents were not of priestly descent. 
Therefore, Elijah could come in contact with the corpse, since his 
body was not of priestly origin. Were the priesthood, however, 
a property of the spirit, being that Elijah's spirit was of priestly 
origin, he should have been forbidden to perform the resurrection 
lest his spirit becom2 defiled. Hence, it seems that had Radbaz 
regarded the priesthood as a spiritual property, he would not have 
vindicated Elijah's performing the resurrection by advancing the 
theory of Elijah's metempsychosis. 
Seeing that R. Michaelson cites the theory of metempsychosis advanced 
by Radbaz without the slightest reservation, we may adduce tha t R. 
Michaelson can be added to the list of respondents who presumably 
maintain that the priesthood is a physical property and does not 
pertain to the spirit. 
However, this view can be contested. Indeed we find that Scripture 





the priest's lips should keep knowledge, 
they should seek the law at his mouth 51 he [i.e., the priest] is an angel of the Lord of hosts. 
Many of the Bible exegetes were troubled by Scripture's identification 
of priests with angels. They, therefore, suggested a non-literal 
interpretation, rendering the final section of the verse, "for he 
is like an angel," rather than, ''he is an angel." Which means to 
say: The priest, who is an intermediary between G-d and Israel, 
is like the ministering angels who are G-d's messengers. Or alter-
natively, the priest, who in the course of ministering the Temple 
service is permitted entrance even into G-d's domain- the Holy of 
Holies, is like the ministering angels who enter within G-d's domain. 52 
However, many of the sources preferred to expound the verse in the 
literal sense, rather than interpreting the verse allegorically. 
Hence, our verse was considered a source for the views which desig-
nated both priests as angels and angels as priests. 53 
Midrash Rabbah questions the verse, "And there shall be no man 1n 
the appointed tent when he [i.e., the High Priest] would go in to 
make an expiation in that holy place," asking: "Was the High Priest 
not a man?" Thereupon, R. Abbahu answers that the High Priest 
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became transformed into an angel upon entering the Holy of Holies. 
He entered there not as a man but as an angel. Otherwise he would 
have been forbidden entry as a man, and could not have survived 
the experience. R. Abbahu cites the verse in Malachi, "for the 
priest is an angel," in support of his contention that the High 
Priest actually became transformed to an angel when he entered the 
Holy of Holies on the Day of Atonement. 54 
It is probably for this reason that towards the end of the Second 
Temple period, when the office of the High Priest was purchased by 
wealthy priestly families, the High Priest perished each year on 
the Day of Atonement upon entering the Holy of Holies, and had to be 
replaced annually. Namely, because they were unworthy of beco~ing 
transformed to angels. They, therefore, remained "men," who are 
forbidden entry and never survived the experience of leaving the Holy 
of Holies alive from one year to the next. 55 
It seems that Midrash Rabbah considers the priesthoodaproperty of 
the spirit, as well as a physical property. Although the physical 
priest is forbidden to enter the Holy of Holies, the spiritual priest 
(as an angel) is permitted entry. Even as an angel he remains a 
priest, since Scripture stipulates that the Temple service can only 
be administered by a Priest. 
In another instance Midrash Rabbah relates that because "the priest 
is an angel of the Lord," Phinehas' priesthood endowed him with 
angelic powers, such as the ability to disappear and reappear. There-
fore, although Caleb and Phinehas were both suspected of spying, 
only Caleb needed to be hidden by Rahab. Since Phinehas was a 
Priest, he could make himself invisible as an ange1. 56 The Zohar 
expounds the verse in Malachi literally as well. Not only are priests 
angels, but angels can also be priests. 
'For the priest's lips should keep knowledge and they should 
seek the law of his mouth, for he is ·the angel of the Lord of 
Hosts.' Where did the priest merit to be called, 'angel of 
the Lord of Hosts?' Said R. Judah: As the angel of the Lord 
is a priest on high, so is the priest below an angel of the Lord 
of Hosts. The angel of the Lord of Hosts on High is Michael 
\vho issues from the celestial Grace [Hesed] and is the celestial 
High Priest. So the High Priest on earth is called, 'angel 
of the l.otd of Hosts,' by reason that he belongs to the side 
of Grace.'J7 
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The Zohar proves that the priest on earth is considered an angel 
because Michael, the parallel of the earthly priest in heaven, is 
an angel. The Zohar can more easily conceive of an angel who is 
a priest than a priest who is an angel. The former is stated un-
equivocally, the latter must be proven. Michael, the great prince, 
is also a celestial priest because he performs the identical function 
as the High Priest, in that he evokes G-d's grace by sacrificing 
the souls of the right~ous. Just as Michael the angel is a priest 
on high, so is the High Priest an angel on earth, as both are 
elicitors of G-d's mercy. 58 
R. Jacob b. Judah Weil (died 1456), in his collection of responsa, 
also writes of the relation of the High Priest above to the High 
Priest below with regards to the Temple service on the Day of Atone-
ment. R. Weil'srulings attained great importance and were considered 
binding by the subsequent codifiers, such as R. Moses Isserles. 
Apart from their halakic import, R. Weil's responsa are a valuable 
59 source of the social and religious history of German Jewry. In 
Responsa number 192, R. Weil writes: 
And the Temple service can only be performed by the High Priest. 
On this day [of Atonement] Michael is appointed over him and 
he is the High Priest on above and he is the Angel of Grace. 
And for this reason only the High Priest can perform the service 
of the Day of Atonement.60 
Not only does R. Weil affirm the zoharitic notion that Archangel 
Michael is a High Priest, but moreover R. Weil attaches great halakic 
significance to Michael's priesthood. As it is for reason of Michael's 
being High Priest that no other priest below can perform the Temple 
service on the Day of Atonement. In addition, R. Weil's responsum 
verifies that the priesthood is a property pertaining to the spirit, 
as Archangel Michael is a High Priest, even though he is a metaphysical 
entity. Michael's priesthood is of halakic consequence as it affects 
the physical priests below. 
The notion of a High Priest existing in the spiritual world is not 
surprising, as it is a well-known doctrine that the entire physical 
world is just a reflection of an identical world which exists abov~ 
Every existing thing in the lower world has a parallel equivalent in 
the upper worlq. This parallelism is discussed in detail by the 
philosopher exegete, R. Isaac Arama, in his biblical commentary, 
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Akedat Yizchak. On the relation between the activity of the High 
Priest above to the High Priest on earth on the Day of Atonement 
R. Arama writes: 
Just as the Holy One above enters the Temple on high to saturate 
Himself with mercy in order to pardon his holy ones, so to 
the holy one on earth enters the Temple below, which is directly 
beneath it [the Upper Temple] to join His Holiness through his 
sacrifices and his order of service. 
And on the relation between angels and priests: 
See that the Sages placed priests and angels in one common 
context until there is nearly no distinciton between them, . 61 except for them being as two people from different families. 
It is not surprising then to find that Elijah the priest is also 
assigned a priestly function of a spiritual nature. In one tvlidrash 
we read: 
But the highest reward [given] to Phinehas was that G-d 
granted him an everlasting priesthood. For Phinehas is none 
other than the prophet Elijah. His task is to make atonement 
for Israel. And without tasting death, he constantly discharges 
the duties of his everlasting priesthood until the resurrection 
of the dead, offering up daily two sacrifices for the children 
of Israel. And upon the skins of these animals he records the 
events of each day.62 
The Targum to Ecclesiastes also describes Elijah a priest, at the 
same time an ange1. 63 From these sources, it is clear that Elijah 
did not relinquish the priesthood as they speak of Elijah'spriestly 
activities subsequent to his ascension. It also appears evident 
that Elijah pursues these priestly functions, such as offering the 
daily sacrifices, even in the form of spirit and need not assume 
his human form to perform these duties. Much in the same way as 
the Archangel Michael carries out his priestly duties of sacrificing 
daily offerings despite his being a nonphysical entity. 
At this point it would seem reasonable to suppose that those respon-
dents who permitted Elijah the priest to contact impurity of a corpse 
when appearing in spirit form, understood the 'Priest-Angel' identity 
as purely allegorical, by virtue of the fact that they perform 
similar functions. In reality, however, the angel is not a priest, 
and is permitted to contact impurity, since the priesthood is not a 
property which belongs to the spirit. On the other hand, the school 
which maintains that the priesthood is an intrinsic aspect of Elijah's 
'man-G-d' relationship, presumably understood the 'Priest-Angel' 
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identity according to its literal sense. Since the priest is literally 
an angel, he must avoid impurity in every form that the relation-
ship manifests itself - even in spirit. 
Nevertheless, we shall see that this supposition may be contested, 
as indeed we find the question of whether the spiritual priest must 
shun impurity concerning G-d Himself. The Talmud in Sanhedrin 
relates: 
A certain heretic said to R. Abbahu: Your G-d is a ~riest, 
since it is \vritten, 'That they take for Me Terumah. [i.e., a 
wave offering given to priests.] Now when He buried Moses 
wherein did He immerse Himself [after contact with the corpse?] 
Should you reply, In water, is it not written, "Who hath 
mueasured the waters of His hand?' [i.e., all the world's water 
could not contain Him]. He immersed Himself in fire, he answered, 
for it is written, 'Behold the Lord will come in fire.' Is 
then purification by fire effective? On the contrary, he replied, 
immersing oneself [for purposes of purification] should essentially 
be in fire, for it is written, 'And all that abideth not the 
fire ye shall make go through the water.•64 
The talmudic commentaries discuss the peculiar phenomenon of G-d's con-
tacting impurity, which this passage seems to be suggesting. None 
of these commentators are troubled by the identification of G-d as 
a priest. 65 This identity they seem to accept readily. The only 
peculiarity as far as they are concerned is - given that G-d is a priest 
how is it ~ssible for G-d to be defiled by impurity? 
Why did. R. Abbahu answer the heretic saying that G-d purified Himself 
by immersing in fire, rather than answering that impurity is irrelevant 
to G-d? 
From the fact that the commentators were not in the slightest per-
turbed by the identification of G-d as a priest, which seems to be 
supported by the fact that G-d is identified in various other rabbinic 
sources as a priest, we must adduce that the priesthood is a property 
66 of the spirit as well. Being that G-d is a non-corporeal, non-
physical entity, one can not speak of G-d as a priest unless referring 
to a spiritual property. Were the priesthood restricted to the 
physical only, G-d's identity as a priest would be meaningless. 
Moreover, G-d's priesthood cannot be understood as an anthropom-
orphism as there would be no question of G-d's contacting impurity 
were His priesthood merely allegorical. Rather, it appears that 
the identity of G-d as a priest is intended to be understood quite 
literally. 
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Nevertheless, the commentators were puzzled that accepting the con-
tention that G-d is a priest, how is it possible to suggest that 
G-d Himself may become defiled and that He requires purification! 
In other words, even after the priesthood is established as a spiritual 
property, one must still verify whether the spiritual priest must 
shun impurity. 
Many of the talmudic commentators maintain 
th . . . l . . 67 any 1ng sp1r1tua to contact 1mpur1ty. 
that it is impossible for 
Only the physical can 
become defiled. R. Abbahu never intended to suggest anything to 
the contrary. He merely answered the heretic according to the heretic's 
own erroneous assumption. Even if it were true that G-d could 
become defiled; the heretic's quip could still be silenced by rejoining 
that G-d purifies Himself by immersing in fire. 68 Many of the 
commentators explained that the reason G-d cannot become defiled 
· b G d · · f. 69 s· f. ·f· f 1s ecause - 1s a consum1ng 1re. 1nce 1re purl 1es rom 
. . . . 1 be d f. 1 d 70 1mpur1ty, 1t certa1n y cannot come e 1 e • 
Perhaps one may infer from these latter comment:ators that a spiritual 
entity which is not a consuming fire may well possess the capacity 
to become defiled. Were this the case, spiritual priests of such 
an order might indeed find it necessary to shun impurity. 71 Con-
sequently, while G-d's burying of Moses might be condoned, this may 
not be so were the same act performed by a spiritual priest of a 
lesser order. 
R. Joseph Bordjel (Burgel), in his explanaiton of this curious passage, 
also seems to understand that impurity is relevant to spiritual 
priesthood. R. Bordjel explains that R. Abbahu could have retorted 
that since Moses' body will be intact when he is eventually restored 
to life, there is no impurity in such a case. Or, alternatively, 
that the righteous (i.e., Moses) do not defile others. In either 
case, G-d need not be concerned about impurity. R. /hbahu, however, 
did not reply thus, because the heretic would have denounced the 
72 eventual resurrection of the dead in any event. 
As R. Bordjel offers alternative rebuttals with which to silence the 
heretic, and does not simply say that impurity is irrelevant to G-d, 
it stands to reason that R. Bordjel did in fact consider the notion 
of defilement of the spiritual priest quite seriously. 
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In view of the above it would now seem clear that according to the 
first opinion, which maintains that anything which is spiritual 
cannot be defiled, even if respondents R. Kluger and Radbaz conformed 
with the literalist view that the priest is an angel and that the 
priesthood is a spiritual property, it would still be possible for 
Elijah to perform the resurrection and to attend the circumcision 
in spiritual form, as according to this view impurity is entirely 
irrelevant to the spirit. 
However, according to the latter opinion, which appears to maintain 
that impurity is relevant to the spiritual priest, respondents 
Radbaz and R. Kluger could not have conformed to the literalist 
view. For Elijah could neither have performed the resurrection nor 
attended the circumcision, as he must shun impurity even in spirit. 73 
\Je recall surmising earlier that according to R; Attiah, who maintained 
that the priesthood is an integral aspect of Elijah's 'man-G-d' 
relationship, Elijah would be prevented from contacting impurity 
even in the form of spirit. In view of the above, this supposition 
is inconclusive. 
Once again we are witness that prior to determining Elijah's halakic 
status vis-a-vis the commandments, a thorough investigation is required 
to ascertain whether the priesthood is a spiritual or physical property, 
and whether impurity is relevant to the spirit altogether. 
By now it should be quite apparent that the application of Jewish 
Law to the spiritual dimension of human existence occupies no small 
role in halakic process. There seems to beample evidence to support 
Professor Baer's thesis that pneumatics constituted an integral aspect 
of the Sages' halakic Weltanschauung. 
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Eschatology 
Possibly thegreatestmet.aphysical development in the world, which 
is a fundamental axiom of Jewish Faith, is the global process of 
evolving closer each day towards the Messianic Era and the final 
Redemption. These eschatological notions are fundamental metaphysical 
realities which are built into the progression of the universe. 
The world's history unfolds over cycles of time and man, since time 
immemorial, has applied his understanding and interpretation of 
metaphysical events to calculate the advent of the Great and Awesome 
Day. No matter which system of calculation was employed, they all 
shared one element in common- the unswerving belief that the world 
was moving in a direction which would eventually witness an exact 
portion of a certain cycle when the evolvement of metaphysical move-
ments in the universe would become complete and culminate with the 
advent of the Messiah. There was however, one basic dilemma over 
which the eschatological advocates disagreed: whether these meta-
physical events unfold via the process of philosophical naturalism 
or through supernatural traditionalism. The former view maintained 
that the Messianic Era would be a perfectly natural process and evolve-
ment in the history of the world and that the Messianic period will 
not be vastly different from ours, in accordance with Shemuel's 
dictum: 
There is no difference between this world and the days of 
the Messiah except [that in the latter there will be no] 
bondage of foreign Powers.l 
The latter approach espoused that these events would unfold in a 
supernatural manner, superimposed over the progress of history, and 
radically different from it. As we saw in our discussion in Chapter 
III.l regarding the Bar Cokhba period, where we elaborated upon these 
two positions, there are great halakic consequences depending on which 
eschatalogical position one espouses. These questions range from 
how to identify the proper Messiah and expose the pretentious impos-
tor to whether Zionism is an authentic Messianic movement, the conse-
quences of which were discussed in Chapter VIII. Throughout Jewish 
history events occurred where Jews repeatedly had to delve into 
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eschatological Halakot in order to establish and verify \ihether 
their period bore the correct symptoms which manifest the long 
awaited End. 
The notion of redemption carried halakic implications with regard 
to prayers such as ~ether one recites Hallel on Israeli Independence 
Day, or the laws regarding the adjoining of the geula (redemption) 
to tefillah (silent prayer). The fact that there is no redmeption 
at night is a halakic principle ~ich causes Tur to rule that uva 
lezion gael (and the redeemer will come unto Zion) is not said on 
the night of the 9th of Av. 2 
The notion of resurrection of the dead as an evolutionary metaphysical 
process of mankind was also subject to the controversy of ~ether 
this process would occur according to philsoophic naturalism or 
supernatural traditionalism. An argument against cremation was for-
warded by the advocates of the former approach that like the biological 
cycle, ~ich is based on the decomposition of the original plant's 
prime organic matter into the soil to generate and evolve further 
plant life, resurrection would follow the same pattern in a natural 
and evolutionary manner. It required the decomposition of man's 
essential nutrients to become sewn back into the soil to enable the 
sprouting of new human life. No further life of any kind can be 
obtained from ash. Therefore, one ~o willfully has himself reduced 
to ash prevents himself from participating in a natural process ~ich 
enables and generates future life. 3 The advocates of the second 
approach maintain that resurrection is an utterly, supernatural pheno-
menon ~ich is not related to the biological cycle of nature. For 
this reason the incinerated victims of the Nazi holocaust have nothing 
to fear of the .future since the omnipotent G-d can produce life from 
ash as well as from dust. Nevertheless, one who deliberately allows 
himself to be cremated will not vouchsafe G-d's performance of a super-
natural feat to resurrect him in the future. According to the advocates 
of the former theory it is necessary to bury the limbs which are 
accidently or surgically removed from the body in order to become 
fully resurrected to one's former self. According to those who 
espouse the latter theory, it is not necessary in order to realise 
complete resurrection. Nevertheless they might still maintain that 
4 the limbs must be buried because of sanctity of parts of the body. 
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Apart from the world ' s direction of metaphysical development towards 
the future, the Kabbalists maintained that G-d brought the world 
into existence through a system of metaphysical evolutions known as 
Sefirot, or emanantions descending from the highest form to the lowest 
form . 
This process called Tzimzum, whereby G-d contracted Himself so to 
speak to allow for the various emanations, occured in the reverse 
process to Darwinian evolution, where the world evolved from the lowest 
form of existence to the highest . The purpose of the world being 
created in this way, according to the Kabbalists, is to enable the 
world to reascend again, through the course of time, to its highest 
form. Emanation combines with Eschatology which envisions reversion 
of the soul to its ultimate source . Then the entire process of 
metaphysical develo~ent will have become complete . 
Even R.H . Olarles who, in his work Eschatology: The Doctrine of a 
Future Life in Israel, Judaism and Christianity, postulates that the 
doctrine of Eschatology underwent various theological stages through-
out the Bible, recognised that it was the Divine hand which was 
responsible for guiding these evolutionary stages from one to another: 
And herein, as throughout this evolution of religion, we can 
trace the finger of G-d. For it was no accident that His 
servants were unable to anticipate any futur e blessedness 
save such as they shared ~n common with their brethren and 
nation . (Emphasis added . ) 
Exploring the relationship between eschatology and cosmology is 
mutually beneficial for much of the Afterlife can be learned from 
the cosmological description of creation. While at the same time, 
many matters concerning the physical universe can be more clearly 
evaluated and explained through gaining an understanding of the 
future . 
Transmigration of Souls 
The concept of Gilgul- transmigration , or literally, evolution of 
souls, was a natural sequence of this system. Since everything in 
the \vorld is constantly changing form, descending to the lowest 
form and ascending again to the highest, the particular form of the 
transmigration of the soul is replaced by its changed form. This 
version of the doctrine of gilgul, was upheldinresponse to the 
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philosophical criticism of gilgul by R. Saadiah Gaon, R. Joseph 
Alba and others who based on the Aristotelean definition of the soul 
as the "fom" of the body, rejected the doctrine of gilgul, since 
the particular form can not become the form of another body. 
Transmigration was seen as a harsh punishment for the soul which 
undergoes it, yet, it is also an expression of mercy of the Creator 
who provides an opportunity for restitution. The belief in gilgul 
served as a rationale for the apparent absence of justice in the world. 
The suffering of the righteous is explained as punishment for his 
sins in a previous gilgul. 
The halakic basis which the Kabbalists posited as the source for 
the gilgul concept is the commandment of Halizah, the levirate marriage. 6 
Through Halizah the brother of the childless deceased replaces the 
deceased husband so that he may merit children in his second gilgul. 
Later on otherMitzvotwere interpreted on the basis of transmigration. 
Accordingly, the Zohar established the Halaka that the corpse must 
be buried immediately upon death or as soon as possible, in order to 
enable the souls to transmigrate. The Kabbalists also maintained 
that the souls of the deceased do not depart from this world until 
one year after death. 
This gave rise to the conviciton that the demonic spirits, which we 
discussed in the previous chapter, are in fact the souls of evil 
men who have died but have not yet departed this world. Thus all 
the Halakot contingent on demonology are related to the idea of trans-
. . f 1 7 m1grat1on o sou s. 
The notion of Dybbuk, or possession by spirits, is also related to 
the gilgul concept. Dybbuk is an ibbur (impregnation) whereby a 
foreign soul enters a human during his life and dwells in him for 
a limited period of time. The ibbur is the impregnation of the soul 
of a wicked man in another man. Ibbur is an actualised situation in 
which an evil inclination takes possession of a person who has to 
struggle with all his might to overcome, subdue, and expel this evil 
spirit. The Shulchan Arukh in laws of menstruation, discusses 
whether a woman who has become possessed (ibbur) with a spirit (ruach) 
must observe the laws of menstruation once the spirit exits, as all 
women who conceive. 8 The widespread belief in Dybbuk as an actual 
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reality no dou~t influenced Tur and Shulchan Arukh to deal with this 
question from a practical rather than theoretical perspective. In 
another instance Terumat ha-Deshen considers the question of whether 
one is permitted halakically to bury a person before death to shake 
off the spirits that are causing once's misfortune, as simulated 
burial was considered an effective therapeudic device. 9 
Another phenomenon related to the gilgul concept and the notion of 
ibbur is the Neshama Yeterah, the additional and benevolent soul 
\roich enters the body on eve of Shabbat and exits at the end of the 
Sabbath. The source for this belief is found in the Talmud: 
Resh Lakish said, 'On the eve of the Sabbath G-d gives man an 
additional soul and at the close of the Sabbath He withdraws 
it from him for it says: 'He ceased from work and rested,' 
i.e., va-yinnafesh, once it [Sabbath] ceased, woe! the [additional] 
soul is gone [vay avdah nefesh].10 
The phenomenon of Neshama Yeterah gave rise to the Halaka of using 
spices during the Habdalah ritual at the end of Sabbath in order to 
fortify the faint remaining soul at the departure of the Neshama 
Ye terah. 11 Spices are not used during the Habdalah ritual at the 
conclusion of Yom Tov (festivals) because according to the Talmud 
the Neshama Yeterah only enters the person on Sabbaths and not on 
Yomim T.ovim. Therefore, the remaining soul is not faint at the 
end of Yom Tov and doesn't require spices to strengthen it. 12 
The reality of the existence of Neshama Yeterah is a halakic principle 
~ich establishes the difference between the Habdalah ceremony on 
Shabbat and Yom Tov. R. Ephraim Margoliot in Mateh Ephraim, cites 
the Neshama Yeterah phenomenon as the basis for the custom of passing 
around smelling salts on the Sabbath itself because the Neshama 
Yeterah delights in its fragrance. 13 In iliapter III.l we saw how 
Radbaz employed the gilgul concept as a halakic principle in justifying 
Elijah's performance of the resurrection. We also saw how the notion 
of Elijah's metempsychosis clarifies many of the difficulties surround-
ing the Elijah issue. 
The expansion of the notion of transmigration into a general principle 
contributed to the rise of the belief in transmigration of souls into 
animals and even into plants and inorganic matter. In his work 
Metzudat David, Radbaz discusses the transmigration of souls in animals. 
The Shulchan Arukh of R. Isaac Luriah (the Ari) gives the reason for 
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the prohibition of eating the heart of an animal or a chicken was 
because of the spirit of the reincarnated animal will affect the 
consumer . R. Jacob Zemah in his work explaining Jewish customs 
and their origins explains the biblical prohibition of grafting trees 
(kilayim) as related to the problem of mixing, i . e . , accommodating, 
reincarnated souls . R. Ovadiah Yosef in a responsum discussing the 
birkat ha- ilanot,<the special blessings for trees blossoming in spring, 
relates this practice to the tikkun (restitution) of the reincarnated 
souls in trees . R. Jacob Safer in his commentary to Shulchan Arukh, 
Kaf ha-Hayyim, writes that one should intensely concentrate while 
reciting this blessing in order to make restitution for the trans-
migrated souls in the trees and one should ask mercy on their behalf. 14 
In Chapter III .1 we recorded the responsum of R. Levi Ibn Habib (Maharal-
bach) who discusses whether it is halakically legitimate to believe 
in reincarnation . Maharalbach writes that although the rationalists 
denied the theory of gilgul since it could not be empirically proven 
according to reason, nevertheless because many great Rabbis who 
enjoyed \vide acclaim and authority, "telieved in the doctrine as 
a true and basic principle of Torah we are obliged toaccept their 
words without doubt or reservations. " If Metaphysical Development 
can be established as a fundamental reality of universal evolution, 
then transmigration of souls is nothing but a branch of this process 
and therefore, "a true and basic principle of Torah . "15 It is not 
surprising that so many Halakot developed as a result of man's encounter 
with this metaphysical process . 
Metaphysical Forces 
One of the most puzzling aspects of the Talmud is its description 
and acceptance as fact, of numerous phenomena in nature, many of 
them which carried halakic consequences, that are not l<no\vn to exist 
today . This enigma baffled talmudic scholars to such an extent that 
many of its critics seriously doubted whether these phenomena ever 
r eally existed and caused its detractors to mock talmudic literature 
in its entirety . The Jersualem Talmud ' s declaration that G-d Himself 
11changes His world once every seven years, " would seem to suggest the 
16 concept of metaphysical development . That is, that natural or 
metaphysical phenomena which may indeed have existed at one timewere 
caused by G-dtodisappear through changing form and mutation during 
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the course of time. Our task is to research the halakic sources 
to investigate whether there is any evidence to substantiate this 
theory. 
The Talmud records the phenomenon of Zuggot or pairs. The talmudic 
belief is that even numbers, "pairs," are unlucky and even dangerous 
as the invite the malevolent activities of demons. A special dis-
pensation was made for Passover night to allow the drinking of 
four cups of wine at the Seder, despite the danger inherent in 
drinking in pairs since Passover is a night of protection from demons: 
And they should give him not less than four cups. How could 
our Rabbis enact something whereby one is led to danger? 
Surely it was taught, a man must not eat in pairs, drink in 
pairs, not cleanse [himself] twice, not ~erform his requirements 
twice? Said R. Nahman 1 Scripture says it is a night of pro-tection unto the Lord, i.e., it is a night that is guarded 
all the time from harmful spirits.17 
The Talmud provides a detailed list of precautions which the Rabbis 
took to avoid committing actions in pairs lest they involve hazards, 
which are not known to be dangerous today. 
The Tosafoth remark that the reason the world is not careful about 
contacting Shibbeta, which is a demon which rests upon food and will 
choke those who eat without washing their hands, is because: "this 
evil spirit is not known to exist in our countries, just as we are 
nolongercareful about gilui [drinking from uncovered containers] 
and Zuggot." Tosafoth indicate that just as the phenomenon of 
Zuggot seems to have disappeared the danger of Shibbeta is no longer 
known to exist. Therefore, the halakic measures against these 
phenomena no longer apply. 18 
Likewise, R. Nathan b. Yehiel in his Arukh, cites Rav Hai Gaon who 
confirms that the superstition of Zuggot lost its hold in post 
talmudic times "for they [i.e. , Zuggo t dangers] are no longer as 
frequent as they once were."19 The Talmud itself concedes tha t, 
"In the West [i.e., Israel] they were not particualr about 'pairs'." 
This is possibly because of the different spiritual and psychological 
conditions which permeate in Israel as compared to the diaspora, 
the phenomenon of Zuggot was not as common in Israel as it was in 
the diaspora. 20 Even with regards to the diaspora the Talmud states: 
This is the position in general: when one is particular they 
[the demons] are particular about him, while when one is not 
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particular, they are not particular about him. 21 
Although the Talmud is replete with laws concerning situations in 
which the danger of Zuggot apply, the major codifiers, Maimonides, Tur, 
and Shulchan Arukh, are all silent about these laws. R. Yehiel Michel 
Epstein, a later authority (d. 1908) writes in his Codex of Law, 
Arukh ha-Shulchan: 
"In our time we have not heard that people are particular about 
Zuggo t. ''22 
From the above it is clear that while the codifiers unquestionably 
accepted the talmudic belief that the dangers of Zuggot most definitely 
existed at one time, various changes evolved over the course of 
time that caused the reality of Zuggot to become debilitated, so 
that the Halaka is no longer concerned with the metaphysical dangers 
23 they pose for man. 
Not only do we find that the malevolent activites of demons in Zuggot, 
and certain demons themselves such as Shibbeta which seem to have 
been rendered impotent by the course of time, the entire field of 
magic was largely devitalised by the same process. Despite Shulchan 
Arukh's severe stricture against inquiring of sorcerers, R. Judah 
Ashkenazi in his commentary to Shulchan Arukh, Ba'er Heitev writes 
that ordinary people are permitted to inquire various matters of 
sorcerers today, since the Torah only prohibited ancient magic of 
the earliest times, 'however, today there is no [more] magic in 
the world, and it is all vanity."24 Ba'er Heitev's statement is 
extremely significant halakically as it establishes a principle 
that magical activities are only forbidden if magic is a reality. 
Hmvever, if magic is only fictional then there is no harm in it. 
This position would most likely be untenable by the codifiers who 
maintained that the prohibition of magic was against believing in 
magic irregardless of whether magic is reality or myth. The problem 
magic poses for belief would certainly exist today. Nevertheless, 
from Ba' er Hei tev it is clear that in his opinion although magic 
was undoubtedly a reality in ancient times, its potency diminished 
in the course of time. At the end of Chapter VIII we applied Maimo-
nides' theory on sacrifices to magic and remarked that the Bible 
only introduced magical notions such as Copper Serpeant, Sotah Waters, 
Urimve~im, miracles, scapegoat of Atonement etc., because the 
ancient world in which they lived accepted magic as a reality of life. 
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It is only natural then that as man witnessed the gradual evanescence 
of magic as a real force in the world, the biblical proscriptions 
no longer constituted an essential aspect of normative Jewish Life. 
In his book Ez ha-Hayyim, R. Jacob Hagiz advances a remarkable theory 
\vhy the magical and demonic forces have lost their power with the 
passing of time. He explains that as we approach the End of Days 
the light of G-d spreads to every person, and everyone will see that 
there is none other but Him. As this light brightens all impurity 
vanishes into nothingness. For G-d has already rebuked Satan and 
the powers of impurity have become nullified. All those people 
\vho have previously practiced magic now realise the ineffectiveness 
of this art. The only people \vho believe in these things today are 
fools and children. 25 
R. Hagiz's theory on the eventual disappearance of magic is related 
to the world process of metaphysical development discussed at the 
onset of this chapter. While the world moves progressively closer 
to\vards the end of time, the near physical reality of G-d, expressed 
by His light, becomes increasingly manifest. As this process evolves 
the powers of impurity devolve at a proportionate rate. The greater 
the manifestation of G-d's presence the more squandered Satan and 
the powers of evil become. R. Hagiz's thesis establishes a halakic 
principle that the Laws concerning Magic and Demonology no longer 
apply today because of evolution. It is the eschatological process 
of metaphysical evolution \vhich caused the reality of magic to devolve 
into myth in the course of time. It is not surprising then to 
find the halakic principle which emerged repeatedly throughout the 
last few chapters of this work, that the more any questionable 
activity could be associated with G-d the less likely it was to 
pose a problem for magic. For R. Hagiz clarifies how the reality 
of one is automatically negated by the other. 
Ammorite Folkways 
In Chapter VIII we saw a halakic controversy \vhether Jews are allowed 
to practice various actions which the Ammorites have long since 
abandoned. One might regard this controversy as whether the laws 
concerning Ammorite Folkways are affected by the process of Metaphysical 
Development. Does the prohibition of "following their ways" become 
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irrelevant once the very beliefs and practices which once character-
ised Ammorite Folkways themselves undergo change over the course of 
time? Or is the prohibition considered an independent law for all 
times regardless of whether the metaphysical concepts and practices 
of the various nations undergo change? The former view regards 
Halaka as binding so long as the metaphysical realities which it 
describes are still in existence. The latter opinion disassociates 
Halaka completely from the metaphysical circumstances in which it was 
given and considers Halakaeternally binding. One may regard the 
controversy over whether there are Mitzvot in the next world or not. 
The former view regards the Torah as being specifically given for man 
in this world and that Mitzvotspecifically relate to man's conditions 
in this world. Once man's metaphysj_r..al circumstances change, those 
Mi tzvot become no longer l:cle-J&lli: to his new reality, since the 
context in which they were originally given has undergone change. 
According to the latter opinion the Mitzvot of the Torah remain 
eternal irrespective of man's immediate circumstances and therefore, 
apply in the next world as much as in this world. 
~1etaphysical Cures and Dangers 
One of the greatest criticisms leveled against talmudic literature 
was the exotic description of seemingly primitive medical prescriptions 
coupled with the employment of outlandish words designed to cure a 
vast array of diseases which have no apparent logical basis and are 
not known to be efficatious today. 
Although we saw in Chapter VIII that the paramountcy of safeguarding 
health gave rise to the injunction that, "Whatever pertains to healing 
does not pertain to Ammorite Folkways," one can not ignore the great 
similarity which existed between these strange talmudic cures and 
Ammorite Folk practices. If we understand that the talmudic Sages 
considered the metaphysical factors which contribute towards or cause 
disease and that their prescriptions were designed to overcome these 
metaphysical factors, then we can understand why they prescribed treat-
ments based on their metaphysical efficacy rather than "nautral" 
cures. Furthermore, we can also understand that once the world's 
metaphysical conditions undergo stages of evolutionary change, the 
medicaments which were originally designed to counteract man's medieval 
metaphysical circumstances can no longer be effective today. 
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The Tosafoth, in corrmenting on the talmudic statement that, "fish 
is at its best when it is about to turn putrid," states that, 
"nowadays it is dangerous to eat when it is about to turn putrid." 
In explaining why man encountered a different reality during Tosafoth's 
time than in talmudic times Tosafoth writes: 
Perhaps things have changed such as the talmudic medicines 
which no longer heal in our days.26 
The Tosafoth unequivocally confirm that because of the process of 
change the medications which were once effective during talmudic 
times are no longer therapeutic today. The Kesef Mishne in his 
corrmentary to Maimonides' Code explains that the reason Maimonides 
advises in Laws of Deiot (moral-intellectual qualities) against the 
practice of phlebotomy in contradistinction to the talmudic practices 
of phlebotomy, is because not all places are alike and the Talmud 
only instructed practices which were effective in Babylon. Sedei 
Hemed remarks that: 
From here we derive that talmudic medical practices and the 
like were not stated for all places nor for all times.27 
Sedei Hemed continues to discuss whether it is permitted to practice 
talmudic treatments today to see whether they are of any use. 
Sedei Hemed records the opinion of Hida who writes that nowadays 
talmudic medicaments are ineffective in the same way as Zuggot \Jhich 
were once dangerous are now harmless. From Hida it is uncertain 
whether one may experiment with those practices today. However, 
Sedei Hemed cites the opinion of others who record that there existed 
an ancient ban not to rely on talmudic medications in order to prevent 
slander agains~ the early Sages. This would indicate that it is 
actually forbidden to conduct such experimentation today. In 
conclusion Sedei Hemed states that since the reason for the prohibition 
and the ban is only to prevent slander of Sages, then those talmudic 
treatments which are known to be still effective today may be practiced. 
For, perchance, if they were to prove ineffective one could always 
say that the procedure of treatment was not followed correctly. 28 
The halakic implication of Sedei Hemed's discussion is that it is 
permitted ·to administer talmudic medical treatments in places and 
times which have not been affected by metaphysical development. 
Furthermore, Sedei Hemed's inclusion and association of the disappearance 
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of Zuggot and other Ruchot (evil spirits) indicates that he considered 
all these phenomena to have been affected by the same metaphysical 
process. 
In a responsum by R. Abraham Samuel Benjamin Sofer in his work Hashav 
Sofer, R. Sofer was asked whether it is permitted to use plant oils 
which contain a mixture of fish oil in emergency situations such as 
World War II in Nazi governed Europe when other oils are extremely 
. b . bl 29 R S f . h h expens1ve, or uno ta1na e. • o er wr1tes t at t ere are two 
principal factors of concern: 
1) the prohibition of impure (non-Kosher) fish, . and 
2) the (talmudic) danger of mixing (Kosher) fish with meat comestibles. 
Regarding the second consideration, R. Sofer discusses whether food 
items which are dangerous can become nullified in mixtures containing 
sixty parts more than the problematic food. The halakic principle 
that "regulations concerning danger to life are more stringent than 
ritual prohibitions [harmirah sacanta me-isura]," would not apply 
in ourcase, since Magen Avraham has already ruled that nature has 
changed (nishtanu ha-tevaim) and that mixing fish withmeat is no 
30 longer dangerous. R. Sofer also records the opinion of his father's 
great-grandfather, R. Moses Sofer who in a similar responsum states 
that because nature has changed Maimonides did not codify the talmudic 
ban on mixing fish withmeat, as Maimonides no longer considered it 
31 dangerous. In view of the above R. Abraham Sofer rules that in 
emergency situations one can certainly be lenient. 
The danger which R. Sofer addresses is foundinPesahim: 
A fish was roasted together with meat. Rabba of Perzika forbade 
it to be eaten with kutah [a preserve of relish made of bread-
crusts and sour milky:---Mar b. R. Ashi said: Even with salt 
too it is forbidden, because it is harmful to ~ne's smell and 
in respect of 'something else' [viz. leprosy]. 2 
Since there is no record of non-Jews desisting from mixing fish and 
meat comestibles it would appear that this danger was a metaphysical 
one. Ln the same way as leprosy was considered a moral retribution 
for speaking slander and libel, shedding of blood, taking oaths in 
vain, incest, arrogance, robbery, and envy, as well as benefitting 
from sacred objects. 33 Nevertheless as far as Jews are concerned 
this metaphysical danger is just as pernicious as any other natural 
danger. However, since this danger is not known to exist today, 
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despite the talmudic dictum that the mixing of fish withmeat causes 
leprosy and is therefore forbidden, R. Abraham Safer applies the 
principle of evolution in nature as a halakic basis for permitting 
fish oil mixtures in emergency situations today. 
Evolution as a Halakic Principle 
In discussing the question of evolution in nature as a halakic 
principle in general, Sedei Hemed records that Remah in his gloss to 
Shulchan Arukh accepts the principle as applicable to Laws of Levirate 
Marriage in contravening the talmudic dictum that "a woman \vho bears 
at nine months does not give birth before the full m.inb.er of months 
has been completed."34 
In his discussion Sedei Hemed cites a responsum of Maharam Shick 
(Moses b. Joseph Schick) who formulates two rules regarding \Jhere 
the principleof natural evolution is applicable: 
1. 
2. 
One can not say times [or nature] have changed [shinui itim] 
with regards to a Halaka le-Moshe mi-Sinai La law transmitted 
by tradition to Moses at Sinai]. For G-d's statements exist 
forever. If so, since they were transmitted by G-d for all 
times and for all places and G-d knows that there will be a 
future in which times [or nature] will change, how could He 
transmit such statements to Moses at Sinai to forbid them forever? 
Of necessity [one must say] that either they do not change, or 
even if they change it nevertheless remains forbidden. Such 
as the eight tYE€s of treifot [animals which suffer from serious 
organic defectsJ which were forbidden to Moses at Sinai, can 
not change. Even if we see a change that it lives and our 
Sages said that a treifa can not live, it is proven that the 
[laws of] treifot are not dependant on life. Even if it 
lives, since it has a defect and an anatomical doubt, it is 
a treifa. And the proof is that there are some Sages who opine: 
'a treifa can live'[treifa haya]. 
The laws of Torah follow the rule of hazaka [presumptive contin-
unance of an actual condition until evidence of a change is 
produced]. All its laws are based on the majority [rubah] and 
hazaka. Therefore, since we know that it was this way at 
the time that it was given to us by tradition, the law remains 
as it was on the basis of hazaka and on the hazaka that it has 
not changed, unless clear proof of a change is produced. And 
we have already explained that something which is empirically 
verified by experience and investigation is only considered 
evidence on the basis of a majority [rov]. Therefore, this 
only pertains to a case where a majority is sufficient and is 
not a Halaka to Moses from Sinai. In that case, since experience 
has proven · that in the majority of cases a change has occurred 
and it is not a Halaka to Moses from Sinai, then we may well 
say 'It has changed.'35 
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On the basis of these two rules Maharam Shick disagrees with Magen 
Avraham who was not wary about the mixing of fish with meat because 
nature has changed. Maharam Shick argues that since it was forbidden 
because of danger to life, and in Pikuah Nefesh we do not follow 
the majority, and on the minority doctors can not testify, then how 
do we know it has changed? On the contrary, we must follow the 
hazaka, and the hazaka is that it has not changed! 
~~haram Shick's responsum divulges an extremely important rule re-
ga~ding the relationship between Halaka and Metaphysics and the 
cosmos in general. And that is, insofar as hermeneutics are con-
cerned, whatever laws are Halaka to Moses form Sinai or are derived 
from the thirteen hermeneutic principles of R. Ishmael, no cc sr;1ic 
change whether natural or metaphysical can affect the Halakic system 
and produce a change in law. For G-d would not have communicated 
laws which are temporal and not relevant to all times and all places. 
However, as far as'metahermeneutics'are concerned, i.e., laws which 
\vere not transmitted to Moses at Sinai or derived from R. Ishamel's 
hermeneutic principles, Halaka may well recognize evolution and 
changing conditions and thereby acquiesce to modification within 
the Halakic system provided tha.t the specific case follows the majority. 
Maharam Shick applies this latter rule to the aforementioned case 
of Rema regarding the Laws of Levirate marriage. Since the talmudic 
dictum, "a woman who bears at nine months does not give birth before 
the full number of months has been completed," is not a Halaka to 
Moses from Sinai; therefore, Rema exempts a woman, who bears a 
child during the ninth month before its full completion, from under-
going Levirate marriage. For experience has proven that today 
\vomen conceive normally before the full completion of the ninth 
month. Hence nowadays such offspring are perfectly healthy and of 
identical status as full nine month siblings, to qualify the mother 
for exemption. 
~bharam Shick additionally applies his principle to the case of 
Tosafoth. The Mishna in Bekoroth states that a person who buys 
an animal from a heathen not knowing whether it had ever given birth 
previously, so that it can not be ascertained whether its young is 
a first born which belongs to the priest, R. Ishmael says: that in 
the case of a cow three years old, its calf certainly belongs to 
the priest. The Talmud in Avoda Zara deduces a principle from 
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this Mishna that a cow does not bear under three year3 of age. 
Otherwise its offspring would not automatically belong to the priest. 
The Tosafoth state that nowadays it is a normal occurrence for a 
cow to bear at two years of age. Therefore it may be concluded 
that since our. times have changed, it is doubtful whether the calf 
of a three year old cow is a firstling. Consequently the animal 
grazes until it is blemished and is then eaten by the owners, and 
does not automatically belong to the priest. 36 
Similarly R. Akiba states in Bekoroth that, "milk exempts from the 
law of firstlings since the majority of animals do not milk unless 
they have already given birth." Rema in his gloss to Shulchan 
Arukh rules that according to many of the codifiers nowadays milk 
is no longer considered a sign that the animal has already given 
birth. 37 Maharam Shick concludes that since the talmudic dicta 
that " d t be d th of age," and, "the : a cow oes no ar un er ree years 
majority of cows do not milk unless they have already given birth," 
are not Halakot to Moses from Sinai, one may well apply the principle 
of evolution in time to modify the Halaka in these cases. 
It is significant to note that Maharam Shick applied his metaherme-
neutic rule in a case where he sides with Tosafoth. Because we 
recall that Tosafoth postulated the principle of evolution in nature 
both with regards to natural changes such as birth period in cows, 
as well as regarding metaphysical changes such as the disappearance 
of Shibbeta and Zuggot today. Therefore there is little doubt, that 
in the same way that Maharam Shick sided with Tosafoth, applying his 
metahermeneutic principle regarding natural changes, he would apply 
it equally regarding metaphysical development. 
To be sure, the parallelism which exists between metaphysical and 
natural changes is so strong that in fact they are often interdepen-
dent. In a responsum of Hatam Sofer, R. Sofer describes how natural 
changes are subservient to the metaphysical realities of Torah: 
A menstruant whose cycle commences on the first day of the month 
must suspect a menstrual flow on the day proclaimed by Beth Din. 
A girl whose hymen was penetrated before the age of three, will find 
it restored by the first day of the third year proclaimed by Beth 
Din. This miraculous change will occur even if the girl became three 
years of age and then Beth Din subsequently decided to add a leap 
month!38 These and other cases demonstrating this interdependence 
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were discussed in greater detail in Chapter VII. 
Metaphysical Creatures 
We will conclude this chapter with one of the most puzzling and 
peculiar phenomena recorded in the Talmud which caused a great 
degree of scepticism regarding the apparent primitiveness of scienti-
fic thinking of the Sages. 
"The belief in spontaneous generation was firmly rooted among Jews. 
Mice, worms, insects are often born of dust, mud and filth; gnats 
and flies are fathered by the atmosphere; man's sweat and body-
heat produce some types of lice and worms. According to the Rabbis 
there exists a kind of mouse which is generated from the earth itself." 
Thus we find the Mishna in Hullin: 
With regards to a mouse which is half flesh and half earth, 
if a man touched the flesh he becomes impure but if he touched 
the earth he remains pure. R. Judah says, even if he touche~9 the earth, which is over against the flesh he becomes impure. 
The source for impurity of the mouse is the biblical verse: 
And these are they which are impure to you among the creeping 
things that creep upon the earth: the weasel, and the mouse, 
and the toad after its kind.40 
The Talmud explains the necessity of Scripture's including the 
expression "among the creeping things" despite that it is self evident 
from the text, as follows: Since Scripture mentions the mouse 
together with the weasel one might think that just as the weasel 
breeds so the mouse includes all species that breed. And so one 
might have excluded the mouse which is half flesh and half earth 
from causing impurity- since it does not breed. Therefore, the 
text states: "among creeping things" to teach that even the mouse 
which is half flesh and half earth is included. 41 
A similar halakic discussion appears in tractate Sabbath~ 
R. Eliezer taught: He who kills vermin on the Sabbath is as 
though he killed a camel on the Sabbath. The Rabbis disagree 
with R. Eliezer only in respect to vermin which does not multi-
ply and increase, but as for other abominations and creeping 
things which multiply and increase, they do not differ. And 
both learn it from none but the rams. R. Eliezer holds, It 
is as the rams: just as there was the taking of life in the 
case of the rams, so whatever constitutes the taking of life 
constitutes [a culpable offence]. While the Rabbis argue, 
It is as the rams, just as the rams multiply and increase so 
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all which multiply and increase. 42 
In conjunction with the above Maimonides codifies: 
Insects, that increase and multiply from male and female or 
that generate from the earth such as the flea, one who kills 
them is like one who kills a domestic or wild animal. 
However, insects which generate from dung or from rotten fruit 
and the like, such as worms of the fleas and worms inside lentils, 
one who kills them is exempted.43 
Likewise R. Caro codifies in Shulchan Arukh: 
"It is permissible to kill vermin [on Shabbath]."44 
R. Israel Meir Ha-Kohen in his commentary to Shulchan Arukh, Bi'ur 
Halaka, explains that according to Maimonides it is forbidden to kill 
a flea which generates fr~n the ground because although it does not 
generate from a male or female it nevertheless possesses the ability 
,. 
to increase and multiply. Therefore, it is only those insects 
which do not generate from male and female and do not possess the 
ability to increase and multiply, such as insects which generate 
from dung, rotten fruit, sweat etc., which one is permitted to kill. 
Bi'ur Halaka further explains that Nahmanides disagrees with Maimoni-
des and maintains that whatever does not generate from male and 
female, according to the laws of nature can not possibly increase 
and multiply. 45 
R. Menahem Kasher discusses the question that in view of the fact 
that contemporary scientists have established the impossibility of 
spontaneous generation, whether it would be forbidden to kill vermin 
on the Sabbath nowadays. R. Kasher suggests that this may well be 
one of the many cases where one may apply the halakic principle of 
natural evolution which recognizes that nature has produced quite 
a different reality today than was known during talmudic times. 
The current scientific evidence does not prove the non-existence 
of such creatures nor the primitive nature of the Sages' thinking, 
nor the mythological character of Talmud, but simply reveals the 
different evolutionary stages which nature has undergone since 
earlier times. R. Kasher concedes that if Halaka accepts the 
current scientific evidence as fact then according 
of natural evolution one may well be forbidden by 
kill vermin on the Sabbath. 46 
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R. Kasher clearly regarded the existence of insects, vermin which 
generate from earth, sweat, rotten fruit, dung, as well as the mouse 
which is half earth and half flesh as perfectly natural creatures 
which because of various evolutionary stages no longer exist. There 
seems to be ample evidence of this. Nahmanides' dispute with 
Maimonides over future reproductive possibilities after spontaneous 
generation is on purely scientific grounds. 47 Maimonides himself 
claims: 
The formation of this mouse is specifically from the earth 
until it becomes part flesh and part clay and it moves in its 
entirety. It is a very well known occurrence, and the many 
people who told me that they saw it are uncountable.48 
R. Kasher cites from the works of renown gentile scientists who 
were greatly familiar with this phenomenon and testified to its 
existence. They located its habitat and denominated its scientific 
49 name. Notwithstanding the natural evidence of the existence 
of these creatures and their having undergone natural evolution, 
even if one were toreject the above, it is possible to maintain 
that the existence of these creatures were of a metaphysical nature 
and that they might possibly have undergone metaphysical evolution. 
Indeed the Talmud in Sanhedrin relates: 
A sectarian [min] said to R. Ammi: Ye maintain that the dead 
will revive; ~t they turn to dust, and can dust come to 
life?' He [R. Ammi] replied: I will tell thee a parable .•. 
Yet, if thou doest not believe, go forth in the field and see 
a mouse, which today is but part flesh and part dust, and yet 
by tomorrow has developed and become all flesh.SO 
R. Ammi proved to the sectarian that the resurrection of the dead 
from dust is as natural as the formation of the mouse from the earth . 
As we pointed out at the onset of this chapter that resurrection is 
part and parcel of the metaphyscial eschatological process of the 
world, R. Ammi may well have advanced proof to this effect from a 
well known creature which possessed similar metaphysical characteris-
tics which is affected by the same developmental stages. 
Another such well known metaphysical creature which was similarly 
advanced by the Rabbis as proof of the resurrection was the phoenix. 
The Talmud in Sanhedrin explains the reason for the immortality of 
this bird which Scripture refers to in Job: 
"But I shall multiply my days as the phoenix."51 
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Some of the midrashic sources explain the immortality of the phoenix 
as a reward for its refusal to eat of the Tree of Knowledge. Some 
ofthesesources which enumerate the immortals who merited entry to 
Paradise during their lifetime, many of whom were reviewed in the 
earlier part of this work, include the phoenix. 52 
The fact that all of the immortals enumerated in this list are real 
biblical characters who share in common the metaphysical dimension 
of immortality which they attained during their lifetimes, would 
indicate that the phoenix as well is a real rather than a legendary 
creature, except that it differs from other creatures in that it too 
has attained the metaphysical dimension of immortality to its exis-
tence. The reason why it is not known to exist today could probably 
be explained by the principle of memphysical evolution which recog-
nizes that metaphysical beings which were known to exist in earlier 
times, no longer exist today owing to various metaphysical universal 
changes. Except for one small problem. If the phoenix were in 
fact an immortal bird, why does it not exist today? By virtue of 
its immortality it should not have been affected by metaphysical 
evolution! 
Here we come to one of the most interesting characteristics of this 
amazing bird. When he has lived a thousand years, his body shrinks 
and it sheds its feathers, until he is as small as an egg. This is 
the nucleus of the new bird. 53 It is this characteristic which 
is in fact the proof which is advanced for the resurrection of the 
soul which sheds its body and then forms a new body thousands of 
years later, during the Resurrection. Rashi alludes to this resur-
rectional characteristic of the phoenix in his commentary to the 
psalmist verse: 
"So that thy youth is renewed like the eagle."54 
It is this incredible characteristic of the phoenix wherein lies 
the answer to our problem. Since shrinking to the size of an egg 
for an indefinite period of time to form the nucleus of the new bird 
is part of its metaphysical nature, the reason why this bird is not 
known to exist today may well be because it has reached this very 
stage of its metaphysical evolution. And as this bird continues to 
progressively undergo the further stages of its evolutionary develop-
ment we will once again be able to positively identify it as in earlier 
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times, when its nucleus will have fully matured and grown new 
feathers . It's unperceived existence today does not disprove its 
reality but only fortifies its particular character. 
It is thismetaphysical existential feature which man shares with 
several other metaphysical characters, and which is part and parcel 
of the unique dimension of man's existential nature. Man is not 
alone in encountering the transcendental zone of life and thus man 
finds himself situated in the midst of its parameters in the good 
company of other metaphysical beings. The Talmud in Baba Kama 
similarly, describes yet another creature which like man begins 
life with a fully natural existence and subsequently undergoes a 
series of natural and metaphysical evolutions eventually transcending 
itself to a complete metaphysical being: 
The male zabu'a [hyena] after seven years turns into a bat, 
the bat after seven years turns into an arpad [a species of bat], 
the arpad after seven years turns into kimmosh [a species of 
thorn], the kimmosh after seven years turns into a thorn, the 
thorn after seven years turns into a demon.55 
Another fascinating winged creature which appears in rabbinic lite-
rature and is no longer known to exist today is the barnacle goose . 
This bird was another example of spontaneous generation . It was 
believed to generate from the barnacle, a shell fish growing on a 
flexible stem, or from trees. The birds grow like fruit and hang 
by their beaks until they fall off. Responsa of R. Meir of Rothenberg 
(Maharam) considers the determination of this bird as fowl, or fruit, 
or plant. He discusses its legal status whether it is Kosher for 
consumption as permitted or forbidden food, as well as whether it 
requires ritual slaughter. If it is a plant it would not require 
ritual slaughter. Maharam's halakic treatment of this bird would 
seem to indicate that he considered this creature a real one and 
worthwhile discussing on a practical level. Its unperceived existence 
today may also be attributed either to natural or metaphysical 
evolution . 56 
As the barnacle goose is attached to a tree by its bill so we find 
the Adne Sadeh (man of the mountain), or briefly Adam, which is 
fixed to the ground by its navel string. This animal has the form 
of a man whose life is dependent on its navel string and dies once 
the cord is snapped. Because of its human appearance this animal 
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is called "man." Adne Sadeh is mentioned in the Mishna in Kilyaim 
and is translated by the Jerusalem Talmud in Aramaic as bar nash 
deturah - man of the mountain. R. Israel b. Gedaliah Lipschutz 
in his commentary to the Mishna, Tiferet Yisrael:Yachin, identifies 
the Adne Sadeh as a species of ape known as Orangutang which has 
human appearance and can be taught to perform many human tricks 
such as chopping wood, drawing water, to dress in clothes exactly 
as a man, to sit at a table and eat with a knife and fork. Today 
this animal is only found in the vast forests of central Africa. 
Hmvever, in talmudic times it lived in the environs of Israel in 
the mountains of Lebanon and is hence rendered by Jerusalem Talmud 
as "man of the mountain."57 However, according to the mishnaic 
commentaries of R. Obadiah of Bertinora and the Tosafist, R. Samson 
b. Abraham of Sens, this animal is fastened by its navel to the moun-
tain and no creature may venture to approach within the radius of 
its cord, for he seizes and demolishes whatever comes in his reach. 
To kill him, one may not go near him, the navel string must be 
severed from a distance by means of a dart. This is in fact the 
Yideoni (Yaduah) referred to by Scripture whose bone is employed 
in magic rites, and is alluded to in Job: 
"For thou shalt be in league with Avne ha-Sadeh."58 
According to this opinion, R. Lipschutz explains in his more pil-
pulistic commentary Bo'az, one need not wonder why it is no longer 
known to exist for one finds today fossils in the ground of many 
other animals which have long ago disappeared! Possibly because 
of their great danger to human survival they were annihilated by 
ancient man. One should also not wonder how it grows form the ground, 
as we also find the mouse whichgrows from the earth as is mentioned 
. H 11' 59 1n u 1n. 
The halakic issue of Adne Sadeh is debated in the Mishna of Kilayim 
as follows: 
The Adne Sadeh are deemed as belonging to the category of Hayyah, 
[an animal of chase]. R. Jose said: when they are dead they 
[or part of their corpses] convey impurity [to men and to objects 
susceptible thereto which are] under the same roof.60 
R. Samson of Sens in his commentary to the Mishna, Rash, explains 
that according to the Jerusalem Talmud, R. Jose states that Adneh 
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Sadeh causes impurity under a roof because R. Jose considers Adneh 
Sadeh a species of man. The Rabbis, however, disagree with R. Jose 
because they consider Adneh Sadeh a Hayya, or more specifically a 
. f h d . . . 61 spec1es o ape w ose corpse oes not 1mpart 1mpur1ty. 
Whilecontemporary scientists may hitherto have regarded the mishnaic 
discussion of a seemingly hypothetical issue of this strange man-ape 
phenomenon with a great deal of scepticism, Halakists never had any 
problem in envisioning such a phenomenon, accepting it at face 
value and provided rational explanations in their commentaries. It 
is fascinating to note the recent development that scientists now 
for the first time, are beginnign to accept the plausibility of 
such a bizzare notion with the emergence of "Baby Fae," a human infant 
\vhose heart was transplanted from a baboon. While scientists were 
grappling to determine her ultimate classificating as man or Hayyah 
and are at a complete loss of standardised normative criteria for 
making such a decision. Halakists for thousands of years have had 
an authoritative precedent and a source, for determining such an 
issue which has once again surfaced. If one accepts the theory 
of metaphysical development and that Adneh Sadeh was a metaphysical 
creature which has since evolved, then as in the case of Elijah and 
test tube babies, we have once again witnessed how halakic discussions 
pertaining to metaphysical realities have now found practical appli-
cation on a natural plane. The stunning event of Baby Fae's 
receiving a simian heart was considered a medical sensation, since 
there has never been a successful cross-species transplant. The 
paediatric cardiac surgeon who treated Baby Fae, Dr. Leonard Bailey 
confidently disclosed: 
"There is evidence that the chimpanzee, orangutang, or gorilla, 
may be a better donor. "62 
Amazingly, R. Israel Lipschutz, in his mishnaic commentary, Tiferet 
Israel, made the association between the ape-man and the orangutang 
over two hundred years ago, in commenting on a phenomena which is 
reported by the Mishna fifteen hundred years ago. 
It is significant to mention here the mishnaic commentators who 
described the Adneh Sadeh's life source through its attachment by 
its navel to the ground, thus resembling a plant-man. This under-
standing might pave the road for future scientific marvels, should 
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science develop a technique of sustaining human life by transplanting 
man with plant life, since we may already have an ancient authorative 
halakic source dealing with this future phenomenon as well. 
) 
Similar to the Adneh Sadeh, the Midrash describes the mandrake 
(dudaim), a plant-man, which destroys whoever tries to uproot it. 
According to this Midrash it once happened that Reuben was tending 
his father's ass during the harvest and bound him to the root of 
dudaim (mandrake) and went his way. On returning he found the man-
drake torn out of the ground and the ass lying dead beside it. The 
beast had uprooted it in trying to get loose and the plant has a 
1 . 1· h wh . d. 63 Th M. d h pecu 1ar qua 1ty t at oever tears 1t up must 1e. e 1 ras 
continUE!S to relate that Reuben carried the plant home to his mother 
Leah. Rachel, who could not conceive, desired the mandrakes and 
bartered her evening with Jacob in exchange for the mandrakes. 
Because of the plant's human resemblance its roots were believed 
efficatious in expelling the demons which impede fertility. The 
mandrakes were coveted plants because of their quality to promote 
conception. Their non-effectiveness today may also be attributed 
to metaphysical evolution. Either the mandrake of today is not the 
same, or even if it is the same, its metaphysical properties have 
undergone evolutionary changes. 
One need not search as far as Shibbetah, Zuggot, etc., to find examples 
of phenomena which have undergone metaphysical evolution. For we 
find far less remote examples in the well known phenomena of the 
Shamir, the Salamander, and the Tahash. 
The fact that the Mishna in Aboth records that the Shamir was made 
at "twilight" on the sixth day of creation together with other extra-
ordinary things indicates its metaphysical nature. 64 The Shamir 
possessed the remarkable property of cutting the hardest of diamonds. 
For this reason the Talmud relates that it was used for engraving the 
names of the twelve tribes on the stones in the breastplate worn by 
the High Priest. It was also used for hewing into shape the 
stones from which the Temple was built because the Halaka prohibited 
the use of iron tools for work in the Temple. The Talmud relates 
a fantastic aggadic account how King Solomon sent his chief man, 
Benaiah the son of Jehoiada to capture Ashmmedai the king of the 
demons to reveal the secret of Shamir's hidden abode, so that Solomon 
could once again use the Shamir for Temple work as Moses had done 
in the Tabernacle in the past. The Mishna in Sotah relates that with 
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the destruction of the Temple the Shamir vanished. Although the 
medieval authorities such as Rashi, Maimonides and others, identified 
the Shamir as a worm, it is unclear from the old sources whether it 
was a mineral, a plant or an animal. The disappearance of this 
creature after the Temple is another instance of the many metaphysical 
65 beings which have long since undergone metaphysical changes. 
A similar fate· overtook the Tahash which had been created only that 
its skin might be used for the Tabernacle. Once the Tabernacle was 
completed, the Tahash vanished. It had a horn on its forehead, was 
gaily coloured, and belonged to the class of clean animals. 66 
The Salamander is a marvelous reptile. According to Rashi, it 
orginates from a fire of myrtle wood which has been kept burning 
for seven years by means of magic. The Talmud relates that it 
possesses ~he property that one who smears himself with its blood 
is invulner-able and that the web woven by it acts as a talisman 
against fire. According to the Talmud in Sanhedrin, King Hezekiah 
owed his life to the Salamander. His vvicked father, King Ahaz, 
had delivered him into the fires of Moloch, and he would have been 
burnt, had his mother not painted him with the blood of the Salamander, 
so that the fire could do him no harm. 67 
The fact that the Salamanader is discussed by non-Jewish sources 
such as Aristotle and Pliny and that many of the other creatures of 
spontaneous generation appear in earlier gentile scientific sources 
and were claimed to have been seen, such as the mouse which is half 
earth half flesh, would indicate that at least as far as the ancient 
world was concerned, these creatures were universal phenomena which 
. d . 1. 68 exlste ln rea lty. 
The difference between such metpahysical phenomena as Zuggot and 
Shibbeta and creatures such as the phoenix, Adne Sadeh, Salamander, 
and Shamir is that while the former category is entirely metpahysical 
the latter creatures are physical beings with metaphysical properties. 
Nan himself may well be another such creature belonging to the 
latter category in that he is a physical being possessing inherent 
metaphysical properties. Man's eschatological nature in which he 
will eventually become resurrected is just one of these many proper-
ties. Man's participation in metaphysical development may be no 
different than any other being. The Halaka dealt with the entire 
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gamut of metaphysical phenomena because of the many properties 
which man shares in common with them. This 'halakification' of 
Aggada would invariable shed light in clarifying man's halakic 
status whenever he steps upon the threshold of the twilight zone 
and encounters similar experiences to the phenomena described in 
this chapter. 
In view of the substantial evidence confirming metaphysical develop-
ment, it is now apparent that our earlier distinction between natural 
metaphysical science and supernatural metaphysical mythology (i.e., 
as in Astral Science versus Astral Mythology etc.) is not an absolute 
one. Since many elements belonging to the former category have 
themselves undergone metaphysical change, they have thus become 
transformed from veritable realities to mythological abstractions. 
Thus a great deal of aggadic and folkloristic literature which 
scientists and rationalists dismiss as outright mythology, if it 
can at all be regarded and classified as such, it is only because 
of the metaphysical evolutionary stages they have undergone in terms 
of our present reality. 
In a brilliant essay, Rabbi Dr. Chaim Zimmerman describes hmv 
contrary to the popularly held notion that the progress of civilisation 
is a result of the evolution of science and technology the very 
opposite is true. That is, in proportion that mankind becomes more 
civilised, in the same proportion man is allowed, by means of Divine 
Providence (Hashgaha Peratit), to devlop science and technology. 
R. Zimmerman explains that if Julius Caesar would have had modern 
explosive weapons he would have destroyed the world. If Ivan Gruznei 
or Hitler would have had the atomic bomb, the devastation of the 
world would have been unimaginable. If the medieval tyrants \vould 
have had modern rocketry, there would have been a complete holocaust. 
R. Zimmerman continues to prove that Divine Providence permits the 
flow of science and technology only in proportion to the civilisation 
of mankind. Hence progress is not a result of science and technology 
but rather technology is a result of human civilisation. 69 
As R. Zimmerman's theory is undoubtedly true regarding science and 
technology the same thesis is equally valid regarding metpahysics. 
In proportion to the degree that man's epistemological perspective 
changes the metaphysical realities which man encounters are caused 
METAPHYSICAL DEVELOPMENT 
by Divine Providence to undergo change. We no longer experience 
overt miracles with the same degree of frequency as the ancient 
Hebrews because the modern world is no longer submerged in the magical 
arts. Therefore, miracles are no longer necessary to counter them, 
as in the confrontation between Moses and the Egyptian sorcerers. 
Neither are the pseudo-magical Mitzvot and sacrificial ritual pre-
dominant factors of practical Jewish Law today because the universal 
concepts and practices of the ancient world are no longer prevalent 
in modern society. Thus, contemporary Judaism has no need to chal-
lenge them with similar features of its own. 70 
One thing is still certain however, the process of metpahysical 
developnent has not terminated. We are as much in the midst of it 
today as the Tosafists of the medieval period discovered they were 
in comparison to talmudic times. Metpahysical concepts and phenomena 
which are totally mythological and might never have existed even 
in ancient days may still surface in the future. Today's baboon-
human heart transplant may well be just one phase in the eventual 
spontaneous generation of such a creature. We have no way of 
knowing. The brilliant celestial light of creation enabling man 
to see from one end of the world to another, and the Leviathan, 
which were removed from this world before man arrived on the scene, 
the resplendance of First Man's countenance and his tall stature, 
longetivity of days far exceeding that of Methusalleh, the banquet 
of Behemoth (the wild ox or Shor ha-Bar) in Jerusalem under the 
canopy of Levi a than's skin, may \vell be in store for us in the future. 71 
No matter what tidings the future may bring, however, Halakic-man, 
need not worry and has no cause for consternation. The eternal system 
of Halaka has already bequeathed man the necessary tools, expertise 
and precedents, to properly equip and condition him to effectively 
resolve every twilight occurrence which he is yet to experience. 
In comparison to the level of human existence two thousand years 
from now man is still at a very primitive stage of his existence. 
Nevertheless, the Jewish legalist is already capable today, of extrac-
ting halakic principles concerning the perennial metathesis of uni-
versal man by discussing parallel changes in the life of plants, 




These halakic principles concerning the countless situations and 
experiences which man shares in common with these twilight areas, 
are sufficiently able to ground him whenever he enters and encounters 
the transcendental zone in life. This relationship, in the 
comparison between metaphysical phylogeny- the development of 
metaphysical species, and ontogeny- the development of the indivi-
dual, provides the trans-logical reasoning which Halaka requires 
to guide transcendental man towards the total fullfillment of a 
practical and meaningful existential experience vix-a-vis his Maker. 
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The main purpose of this chapter is to present a type of codicil 
which concisely reviews selected instances throughout this work 
where metaphysical concepts and data are operative in the halakic 
process. As well as to formulate some observations, principles, 
and conclusions regarding its value and usages. 
We began our Introduction by describing the development of the history 
of Halaka from its inception- long before the Sinaitic instructions 
regarding religious performances- when the study of metaphysical 
and Divine sciences constituted the main components of Halaka. The 
halakic system continually developed and adapted itself to preserve 
the macro-halakic approach which it embraced. This series of 
transitions and safe-guards were built into the structure of Torah 
Law so that Halaka should be constantly relevant and accessible to 
men of all levels of intellegence. We explained that despite the 
obvious existence of Theonomy- whereby the Torah, Midrashim and 
the Talmuds, legislated theology in the form of normative Halakot-
the reasons for its rare appearance in the Codes is attributable 
to the great difficulty of codifying this qualitative dimension of 
the Law with t~e same degree of precision as legal and ritualistic 
laws. Nevertheless we demonstrated that the existence of the meta-
physical component of Halaka is discernable and skillfully woven 
throughout many of the works of the main compilers of Jewish Law 
and that great Jewish thinkers and Halakists like Maimonides and Rav 
Nachman of Bratslav overtly incorporated their macro-halakic Weltan-
schauung within the main structure of their Codes. Indeed the 
historian Yitzkhak Baer purports that the eventual emergence of 
kabbalistic theosophy was n~a new development in Judaism but rather 
that the Kabbalists simply rediscovered the mystical dimension of 
Halaka which had been in existence since its earliest stages. 
One of the main principles operative in the computing of metaphysical 
data within the Halakic process is the extent that this material can 
be assimilated logically and trans-logically according to the majority 
reason. We saw that this ultra-rationalistic integrity of Halaka 
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served as a basis for admitttng not only esoteric Aggadot, but even 
the postulates of Gentile scientists. Since the principal aim of 
Halaka is to uncover truth, once the postulates are proven correct 
according to reason, Halaka accepts this truth on its own merit 
regardless of origin. In fact, the very demonstration of the truths 
of various theological categories such as proofs of G-d's existence, 
unity, etc., is itself a halakic process and activity in fulfilling 
the first commandment of Knowing G-d. Notwithstanding, our paper 
concentrated on documenting those supra-mundane issues which lead to 
definite practical results. 
In Chapter II we introduced our first metaphysical issue with Terumat 
ha-Deshen's responsum concerning whether Elijah's wife requires 
divorce. We saw that this question is part of a much broader 
ideological problem of divorce. That is, whether Elijah's person 
maybedivorced from relations which emanate from him and whether the 
cOITunandments based on Elijah's relationships vis-a-vis G-d may be 
divorced from his relationships vis-a-vis his fellow men. The re-
solution of these broader questions essentially depends on whether 
Elijah is classified as dead or alive. Such a decision could not 
be determined before turning to an in depth analyses of the nature 
of Elijah's essence. 
In discussing Elijah's origin in Chapter III.1 we encountered our 
next metaphysical responsum concerning the Resurrection issue. Here 
we noted how Halaka encompasses transphysical science. For even the 
performance of a supernatural act involving the saving of a life is 
not permitted unless it fully conforms to the requirements of Halaka. 
Radbaz's expl~nation of the issuing of a "special dispensation" which 
enabled Elijah ' to defer certain details of the Halaka due to extenuating 
circumstances of achieving a higher worth as in case of Elijah at 
Mount Carmel, demonstrates the buoyancy of Halaka in adapting itself 
to recognize "special" circumstances. Moreover, R. Bleich discusses 
the practical consequences of the Resurrection issue in terms of Halakot 
involving continued medical treatment to resuscitate a patient the 
moment after he has been determined clinically dead and the consequen-
ces of any patient who temporarily ceases to function as alive. 
\.Je further showed how according to R. Michaelson, the H.alakot emerging 
from the Resurrection issue would change according to the different 
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methods employed in producing variant forms of resurrectional 
existence. We also saw how Hatam Sofer utilizes these distinctions 
in discussing whether a synagogue may be converted to a house of 
study. Radbaz's theosophic solution of Elijah's metempsychosis 
which maintains that the origin of Elijah's soul is divorced from 
his biological origin, is useful to verify the ideological categories 
of divorce mentioned earlier, as well as resolving many other obscuri-
ties resulting from the Elijah issue which become neatly clarified 
by this theory. We further compared Maharalbach's responsum concerning 
the acceptability of theosophic notions in halakic process, to our 
discussion of rationalism as a necessary criteria for determining 
Halaka in Chapter I. 
We concluded this section with a discussion of the practical relevance 
of the Sages being almost overly concerned with Elijah's origin and 
found this question to be of great consequence during the Bar Cokhba 
period. Here all the Halakot pertaining to identifying the Messiah 
andcoipso exposing the pretentious impostor become imminently 
germane. It is conceivable to suggest that the application of these 
halakic criteria at various intervals of Jewish history, radically 
influenced the face of Jewish expierence whenever times of Messianic 
expectations were exceptionally high. In this context we saw how 
the question of whether the manifestation of Messiah will materialize 
via natural or supernatural means greatly influenced the Halakot 
contingent on identifying the Messiah. It was in the interpre tation 
of the metaphysical events and canponents of these Halakot tha t R. 
Akiba differed from his colleagues. 
Having investigated the question of Elijah's or1g1n in section 1, 
we turned towards a halakic evaluation of the mysterious events 
surrounding Elijah's ascension in section 2. The R. Sofer-R. Kluger 
school forwarded a theory that Elijah leads a quasi-schizophrenic 
existence. In human form he adheres to commandments whereas in 
spirit form he is absolved, while vacillating continually, from one 
form to another. It was halakically essential for Rabbis Sofer ·and 
Kluger to consider Elijah's metaphysical reality in order to determine 
such problems as the performance of a circumcision on the Sabbath, 
or during the week in a room where a corpse lay as well as verifying 
certain aspects pertaining to the laws of the Sabbath Limits. We 
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We observed an important distinction between the R. Sofer-R. Kluger 
school and R. Falcon-R. Attiah school in terms of the "obligating 
element" responsible for determining commandment observance in general. 
While the former school considers Elijah's existential state and 
mode of appearance as main criteria responsible for commandment 
activity the latter school considers the various relations and re-
lationships which Elijah pursues as the main factors which affect 
commandment observance. In the course of our paper we indicated 
several Halakot which are contingent on this dichotomy. 
In sections3and 4, we turned our discussion to an in depth analysis 
of the various philosophical, theological and metaphysical considera-
tions over which these schools were consistently divided and were 
responsible for them maintaining their different halakic positions. 
These considerations include such classical dilemmas as the Aristote-
lean doctrine of an eternal and primordial world versus Creation in 
time, the theory of generation and corruption versus G-d's Will and 
His ability to suspend its laws, an effort to deny or ignore any 
relation between Elijah's ascension and Jesus, the various angeological 
ranks and the problem whether angels are considered higher or lower 
than pious men. We showed how these debates emerged from and were 
intricately worded in the earliest sources themselves. The respon-
dents merely elucidated these age-old concepts and gave them a 
more tangible form by analysing them in their halakic context. In 
addition, these motifs were seen to equally involve several other 
important biblical characters such as Melchizedek, Enoch, Moses, 
David, and Messiah and pertain to may of them not only regarding 
the question whether they ascended to become immortal or angels but 
whether they originated as immortal men or angels even before the 
beginning of their earthly careers. With respect to Messiah, the 
question of a pre-existing Messiah has profound halakic significance 
in the process of his identification in terms of whether the ~1essiah 
is a angel or a human endmved with a special spirit. 
In the courseof these discussions we encountered several other Halakot 
contingent on these motifs such as Avnei Nezer's responsum concernin8 
impurity of the righteous, Tzitz Eliezer's ruling on, whether a priest 
may undergo plastic surgery to restore a dead limb, the Responsa of 
the Geonim con~erning liturgical supplications in Aramaic, Radbaz's 
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analysis into the psychology behind Adam's ethical conduct and its 
influence over his actions, and R. Reischer's responsum concerning 
the Law of Conformity. The Law of Conformity also demonstrates the 
pliancy of Halaka as it exposes this law as a supercommandment in 
that, like Pikuach Nefesh (saving a life) and Hora'at Sha'ah (theis-
suing of special dispensati8ns), under certain circumstances halakic 
details will be waived in order to achieve the higher halakic ethic 
of conformity and the prevention of quarrels. In other situations, 
Halakot which were originally not practiced, may suddenly become 
enforced in order to preserve this same ethic. The vast amount of 
Halakot which are dependent and vary according to the custom of one's 
place (Minhag ha-Makom), further evinces the pliancy of the halakic 
system in exercising moderation or stringencies in order to achieve 
the higher halakic goal of Darkhei Shalom- ways of maintaining (local) 
peace. 
Even the school that maintains that Elijah continues to exist as a 
man, technically obligated to obey commandments, may find that he 
is constrained not to observe them in order to conform to the practice 
of angels among whom he communes. Conversely, even if he is an 
angel absolved of commandments, he may be obligated to observe them 
when consorting among humans in order not to deviate from our practices . 
Thus the resolution of whether Elijah's wife requires divorce, r:1ay 
well depend not on Elijah himself but rather upon the environment where 
he associates . Since Elijah constantly fluctuates between the environ-
ment of angels and humans, the question is essentialijan extension 
of the problem of determining the halakic requirements of a person 
who continuously commutes form one town to another, where the practices 
in each town (minhagei ha-makom) differ. 
In Chapter IV we saw that it was this question of whether Elijah's 
hovering between angelhood and manhood is a complete or only partial trans-
formation which was the main variable in processing the motifs of Chapter 
III, and implementing the dictum "among the dead I am free" in the 
stages of the respondents arriving at their rulings. Our comparative 
analysis of the various stages of computing metpahysical data in 
halakic process by the main schools revea~d tl1e necessity to provide 
precise criteria for defining the parameters of life and death, and 
how these criteria themselves were influenced by the various philoso-
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phical positions of these schools. Thus R. Isserlein's responsum 
was seen to bear considerable value in precipitating and bringing to 
the fore the discussion of establishing definite criteria for deter-
mining the parameters of life and death. Man's commandment obligation 
is a direct consequence of these considerations. 
As mentioned in our summary of Chapter III there are instances when 
the place where one resides is an important element in determining 
one's commandment responsibility. In analysing the relationship 
between the Future Worlds and This World, in Chapter V, we saw the 
respondent R. Goldbaum considers the "place" as the main factor in 
determining one's halakic activity. He arrives at this conclusion 
in the course of investigating Elijah's commandment obligations in 
Paradise. Thus, the extent of Elijah's pursuit of commandments in 
the next world affects the halakic status of his wife in this world. 
Sedei Hemed contests R. Goldbaum's thesis that the non-requirement 
of divorce in the case of Elijah's wife proves the invalidation of 
commandments in Paradise. For Sedei Hemed claims that divorce may 
simply be irrelevant in Paradise while other commandments may well 
pertain there, just as the commandments contingent on the Land of 
Israel are irrelevant in the Diaspora while the bulk of commandments 
still apply there. Thus the many Halakot contingent on the circum-
stances of transcendental man may not necessarily require as much 
as an exemption from existing commandment obligations when simple 
irrelevancies can more easily be established. This is an important 
aspect in the modification of Halaka. That is, the very recognition 
within the halakic system of situations, places, and circumstances 
where many of its laws may be entirely irrelevant. 
Sedei Hemed further develops the concept of different degrees of 
commandment involvmentcommensurate with different levels of personhood. 
Pious men (Zadikim), for example incur commandment obligation after 
death while ordinary men do not. Similarly a Priest has a different 
responsibility towards commandments than an Israelite. An Israelite 
male is involved in more commandments than a female or a male-slave. 
These latter two have a different degree of commandment responsibility 
than a minor or a sick person. And so on. It is entirely conceivable 
that somewhere among these many gradations, exists yet another rung 
which transcendental man occupies on his own. This level is equally 
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recognized by Halaka as any other. Since all men possess a trans-
cendental component all men share this category in common, in addition 
to their own particular levels. As man continually discovered more 
and more latent transcendental trends within himself, it became all 
the more necessary for the respondents to define this category and 
establish the exact requirements pertaining to it. All of the laws 
contingent on the Future Worlds are relevant in illuminating the 
parameters of this category in this world. 
Man's absolvement from commandments in the Time to Come poses a 
potential problem, according to R. Elhanan Wasserman, in leading 
man to believe that .it is the element of" time" which causes this absolve-
ment and that laws can become "outdated" and irrelevant in time. 
R. Wasserman proves that the ephemeral nature of commandments is 
due to Scripture's ordaining that commandments are terminal upon 
death, rather than a result of their becoming obsolete in time. 
For belief in the eternality and immutable nature of Torah is a 
fundamental principle of faith. However 1 we documented several 
halakic authorities who question the evidence with which he substan-
tiates his thesis and accordingly, maintain that it is the element 
of time rather than death, which is principally responsible for the 
irrelevance of commandments in the Time to Come. Therefore there 
is room within the Halaka for recognizing a "twilight period" when 
commandments become invalid, without refuting the~ernal nature of 
Torah. The principles and criteria as outlined by Maharam Shick 
and others in Cl1apter X, for accepting the concept of "Nature and Times 
Vndergo Change" (nishtanu ha-tevaim veha-itim), as a halakic premise, 
fall within the general rubric of such a period. Moreover these 
rules demonstrate the need for specific halakic guidelines to inter-
pret the features of such a period and apply them to twilight 
occurrences in the modern world. Again, all Halakot concerning 
Future Worlds are instructive in enabling Halakists to construct 
a twilight model that will serve as a basis for applying the rules 
of this model to similar situations which occur in the modern world. 
Man's rapidly increasing ability to penetrate extra-solar environments 
is creating an even more pressing need for halakists to develop this 
model further. 
In discussing the various factors which cause obligation or absovlement 
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in corrmandrnents we saw that the "degree of death" forms an important 
consideration. While Hida compares the state of any particular 
death to the "death of all men," R. Joseph Hayyim inspects the 
extent of biological decomposition undergone by the deceased. 
These considerations factor as further determinants for establishing 
criteria for death. According to certain criteria, death may not 
necessarily be pronounced upon cessation of life but rather only 
after continued state of remaining dead. These criteria are extremely 
valuable in the field of Medical Ethics. In a footnote we recorded 
how R. Zimmerman included the scientific resources available to man 
at each point in time within his criteria for defining death, rather 
than focusing on the state of death of the human body. 
In that chapter we further saw how the resumption of one's marital 
status in the Future Worlds has several consequences for current 
marital laws concerning all widows in this world. Especially in 
verifying whether the religious institution of marriage effectively 
describes the psychologicalemotionalrelationship between husband 
and wife, or the physical bond which unites them. We considered 
several opinions concerning this issue. According to R. Aszod, the 
mechanics involving future marital status is not only an outgrowth 
of R. Isserlein's responsum, but in fact served as a basis for 
determining his ruling concerning the present circumstances of the 
enquiry. According toR. Aszod the resolvement of the reality of 
events concurrent with the eventual Resurrection, described by the 
classical medieval debate whether man will be resurrected in body 
or soul, etc., directly influence the outcome of R. Isserlein' s ruling. 
In addition we considered the concept of Darkhei Noam (Ways of Pleasant-
ness) as an important halakic principle in applying, in certain 
"difficult" situations, those Halakot that would cause as little 
personal unpleasantness as possible. This could be an important 
avenue in tackling certain twilight issues which, because of their 
special nature, cause complications which need to be abated and 
neutralised with the greatest amount of sensitivity possible. We 
suggested the possibility that it may even be the principle of 
Darkhei Noam itself which is primarily responsible for the absolvement 
of commandments in the Time to Come- simply because of the vast 
number of remarkable complexities and practically unfathomable contra-
dictions of Halaka reviewed in that chapter- which will inevitably 
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surface in the future. In any event, the unpleasantness and diffi-
culties which may complicate one's circumstances in the future often 
motivate the application of Darkhei Noam principle in the present. 
After considering the philosophical, theological, and metaphysical 
dimension of the Elijah issue we turned our discussion in Chapter VI 
to examine whether any direct practical halakic value could be 
derived from Terumat ha-Deshen's ruling. Here we documented how 
R. Hirschler found the responsum instructive in resolving the complex 
halakic problem concerning the ascertainment of the identity and 
status of test tube babies. R. Hirschler confirms the necessity of 
researching the psychological, neurological, and other behavioural 
sciences in ascertaining the essential characteristics that comprise 
a profile of humanhood and thereby contribute to Halaka in arriving 
at a definition of man. For although test tube creations show 
signs of possessing qualities similar to humans, they may be mere 
semblances of men that are in effect nothing other than sophisticated 
plants , or a sub-category of angels. Thus an ontological definition 
of persona is essential for verifying their halakic status. Immediate 
halakic consequences arise from this issue such as whether a scientist 
is permitted to "wash out" an undersirable test tube experiment or 
\~ether this constitutes manslaughter, whether one is permitted to 
violate the Sabbath to save the life of a test tube being, and 
their obligation in commandments in general. 
We saw how Hakham Zevi's responsum of the halakic status of a golem 
(homonculus automation) is pertinent in obtaining a definition of 
humanhood. His requirement of the "formation of a man within a man," 
is germane in establishing the halakic status of test tube creations. 
Our era is now witnessing the rapid advancement of the onset of the 
Computor Age with its ever increasing sophistication in perfecting 
the humanziation of computors. Hakham Zevi's responsum on the status 
of automations will undoubtedly be an important source for Halakists 
who will soon be asked to render decisions concerning a very real 
issue. 
We also saw how R. Isserlein's responsum was employed to establish 
the identity of ovarian, embryonic, and heart transplant recipients. 
Concerning heart transplant patients, R. Waldenberg dissertates how 
he consulted various existentialist writings in considering what ulti-
- 353 -
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
mately defines man as man. He deduces that although cardiac activity 
is the crucial indication of the presence of life; it is not the 
source of life, nor is it the hallmark of personhood. It is man's 
spirit which is primarily responsible for generating his "life force" 
and man's rational faculty which constitutes the dominant feature of 
his essence. 
R. \~aldenberg utilised Terumat ha-Deshen's responsum to determine the 
identity of a patient who has undergone trans-sexual surgery. The 
immediate question of whether such a patient is required to divorce 
his spouse is obviously germane. In a broader sense we saw how Terumat 
ha-Deshen's responsum is paradigmatic in resolving any issue involving 
existential change in which it is necessary to verify whether one 
takes on thepre~transitional or post-transitional identity. Even 
remote eschatological discussions such as one's future marital status 
upon the Resurrection is imminently germane as it equally clarifies 
whether man, who is destined to undergo a great existential change, 
will relate to his former identity or will take on a new identity with 
a new status. We noted that the different interpretations among 
respondents concerning the method that R. Isserlein employed to process 
these data and arrive at his ruling produced completely different 
results in the application of his ruling to the areas and issues 
we have now described. 
Finally we considered the problem of the exact location of Paradise 
in light of the ·challenge that scientists have surveyed the entire 
face of earth and have verified its non-existence. R. Joseph Hayyim 
delineates how Paradise could well occupy a place on this earth and 
nevertheless still be unperceived by scientists. Just as science 
recognizes the existence of fourth, fifth and even an eleventh dimen-
sion in this world- although these dimensions remain imperceptable 
by ordinary vision Paradise could have a similar nature. Just 
as the computor is now able to graph four dimensional constructs 
which the human mind hitherto was barely capable of grasping let 
alone visualize, the laws and location of Paradise serve a similar 
purpose. The halakic probing into the realities of Paradise may 
assist scientists in picturing multi-planer dimensions in a more 
tangible form. 
Although R. Isserlein's responsum certainly bears inestimable relevance 
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for dealing with a host of contemporary issues in a modern scientific 
society, in the next section we considered the relevance of Terumat 
ha-Deshen to Shulchan Arukh and his colleagues who cited this responsum 
many centuries before these modern issues surfaced . Here we saw 
that the codifiers found R. Isserlein's responsum invaluable in alle-
viating the plight of the Aguna woman in that it empahsizes the distinc-
tion between the definition of widowhood (Almana) from the Aguna and 
reviews the type of evidence necessary to enable Agunoth to change 
their status to Almanot. For Elijah's wife is a model of a woman 
whose husband disappeared, of whom there is no evidence of death, 
nay more, is assumed to be alive and yet, she is not classified as 
an Aguna. This leaves the status of Aguna open to redefintion on 
the bases of termination of her relationship with her husband rather 
than on the basis of his physical existence, as well as other consi-
derations. 
We further saw that the medieval codifiers found R. Isserlein's res -
ponsum instructive in resolving whether a divorce is necessary in 
many other cases besides the Aguna where an existing marriage suddenly 
reaches a point where the same couple would not be eligible to enter 
a new marriage with each other. These included such cases as the 
apostate, the Sotah, marriages which become invalidated because of 
a nega tive precept according to R. Akiba, dubious marriages, consan-
guineous relatives, and any other case in which the couple experience 
a change in marital status of the nature described. In additon we 
saw that the different interpretations among the codifiers in ascer-
taining the exact principles R. Isserlein employed in processing the 
various metpahysical data to obtain his ruling, produced substantially 
different results in practically all the above cases. 
We concluded this section with a discussion of how R. Isserlein's 
responsum is instrumental in clarifying the status of a Katlanit 
woman. Similar to the Aguna , the Halaka was extremely sensitive ln 
recognizing the plight of an unfortunate woman who as a result of the 
deaths of her husbands is barred from marrying a third time. The 
Halaka exercises great leniency in finding ways to prove that the woman 
does not qualify for Katlanit status. R. Isserlein's responsum probes 
the definition of a Katlanit in exploring whether she is responsible 
for the death of her husband or for the termination of the husband-wife 
- 355-
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
relationship. This verification opens avenues for uncovering even 
greater leniencies in alleviating the difficult circumstances of the 
Katlanit . The very issue of a Katlanit woman's Mazal metaphysically 
influencing the fate of her husband's is discussed at length in Chapter 
VII . 
In the final section of this chapter we remarked that the many practical 
halakic consequences reviewed in the first two sections were essentially 
outgrowths of R. Isserlein's responsum. However, we did not as yet 
ascertain whether Terumat ha-Deshen himself was dealing with a real 
practical issue. This discussion led us to investigate the whole 
question of celibacy of angels, prophets, deities and their reproduc-
tive possibilities. 1he question of Elijah's reproductive possibilities 
is furthermore useful to illuminate another issue of great halakic 
sensitivity. Namely, the plight of a childless widow who rrust wait 
several years until her brother in la\v who is still a minor reaches 
maturity and becomes of age to grant her a Halizah (exemption from 
Levirate marriage) before enabling her to remarry. Since many of 
the codifiers ruled that Elijah's wife was exempted from undergoing 
Yibum (Levirate marriage), this opens further vistas of extracting 
halakic leniencies to amaliorate the plight of such women. 
We discovered that the verification of Elijah's "wife" and his married 
life hinged upon many of the philosophical considerations of the main 
schools dissertated earlier who debated whether Elijah's existential 
reality was that of an immortal man or an actual angel. The former 
school considered Elijah's involvement in married life and propagating 
activity entirely possible, while the latter school established Elijah 
as being celibate. 
In light of these considerations we saw that the question of Elijah 's 
wife serves as an excellent method in guaging Elijah 's polarisation 
to manhood or angelhood. If he retained his human characteristics 
upon ascension, he would continue to be attached to his wife. His 
marital relationship would halakically be regarded as 'human' and he 
would require a divorce to terminate it. If, however, he transcended 
to become in essence an angel, who has no functional attachment to a 
human wife, he would not require divorce, as divorce is a halakic 
concern of human relationships only. 
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Hence, the question of whether Elijah's wife requires divorce is 
essentially a question of whether transcendental man continues to 
retain any functional and halakic association with ordinary human 
life and society. 
Upon examining the historical conditions of R. Isserlein's period 
we saw that the question was posed as adirectchallenge to the Hasidei 
Ashkenaz tradition which advocated asceticism and transcendental 
aspirations as supreme ideals. 
The enquirer's remark "there would also be a practical difference if 
one were to merit a similar fate" reflects the paradox inherent in 
that form of hasidic theology. For the "practical difference" of one 
who was to "merit" a successful transcendental experience is the 
extremely "non-practical" consequences of almost total "divorce" 
from the halakically integrated communal way of life. There seems 
to be an utter contradiction between the aloof. mystical seclusion 
of the Ish Hasid and the pragmatic integrated communal approach of 
Ish Halaka. R. Isserlein, who himself was the quintessence and 
embodiment of both, saw his responsum as immensely important in 
resolving the tension between hasidic philosophy and Halaka in 
determining the practical value that hasidic philosophy contributes 
to Halaka in general. 
The responsum recognizes that ordinary man is not a totally finite 
and limited human being for whom transcendental matters are theore-
tical and unrealistic, as the enquirer conceived. For there does 
not exist a fine distinciton between ordinary man and transcendental 
man. Ordinary man himself is by his very nature a transcendental 
being in intellect and soul- and therefore, possesses a real trans-
cendental component which forms a part of his essence. Consequently 
an abundant overlap exists between ordinary man and transcendental man. 
R. Isserlein's responsum adduces that whenever man undergoes trans-
cendental experiences he continues to identify with his original 
status, and, consequently, is still very much bound to Halaka and 
the observance of Mitzvot. This is because Halaka itself is not only 
concerned with the finite and limited domain of ordinary man, since 
ordinary man h~mself is not a totally finite and limited being. There 
are numerous instances and moments during man's everyday life within 
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the community when ordinary man steps over the threshold of his 
human limitations and enters the transcendental zone. He suddenly 
finds himself at various stages of life in an undefined inexact 
situation of neither life nor death but somewhere in the parameters 
ranging between the two. The Aguna, whose husband has suddenly dis-
appeared and not known to be either alive or dead, has found herself 
having to relate to her husband as having entered the transcendental 
zone between life and death. Today scientists are busy developing 
test tube babies who are also situated in the transcendental zone 
somewhere between life and death. Ordinary man is thus capable of 
transcending himself in encountering in life many transcendental 
experiences of this nature. R. Isserlein's responsum establishes 
that because of the great proximity and overlap between transcendental 
man and ordinary man, man can clarify and define with far greater 
exactitude much of his ordinary day to day halakic activities by 
investigating the metaphysical orbit of transcendental man. 
In the first section of that chapter, we recalled how R. Hirschler 
musefully suggests that R. Isserlein entertained the Elijah issue 
because he prophetically envisioned a period in which test tube 
creations would be promenading the face of the earth. Our analysis 
has determined that R. Hirschler's suggestion should not be entirely 
regarded as museful. However, we need not go so far as R. Hirschler 
in saying that R. Isserlein !!prophetically envisioned" a period of 
test tube babies. For R. Isserlein was very much aware of the many 
situations in life in which ordinary man enters the transcendental 
zone and clarifies his ordinary halakic activities by investigating 
the transcendental region and its ramifications upon halakic life. 
Test tube babies have now become just another illustration of a 
phenomenon that Terumat ha-Deshen was intimately familiar with already 
during the fifteenth century, although he was not necessarily familiar 
with the specific instance of test tube babies. 1 
In Chapter VII we investigated the sphere of extra-terrestrial 
influences such as Mazalot and various other metaphysical bodies or 
agents over man's earthly circumstances. On the one hand the Torah 
proscribes Divination while on the other hand we see that many of 
the Sages endorsed various forms of Astrology. We examined the 
metaphysical variables operative in the Halakic process which enabled 
the Halakic system to sanction astrology and at the same time prohibit 
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divination. We saw that Maimonides rejected astrology because he 
relied completely on rationalism as a basis for accrediting other 
disciplines. Therefore he rejected as mythology any discipline 
which could not be rationally demonstrated. However, we saw, and 
as Baer ratifies, that while rationalism is an important criteria 
for admitting other disciplines in Halaka, it is not the only criterion. 
Even many natural phenomena such as the compass and magnetic force 
are not entirely understood rationally and share in common many of 
the same enigmas as metaphysics. 2 Here we developed several princi-
ples which provided the trans-logical reasoning that enabled the 
codifiers to recognize various forms of astrology as a veritable 
science which manifests itself in a natural metpahysical manner and 
to reject all phenomena which did not comply with these principles 
as supernatural mythology. Thus while Maimonides would have rejected 
any twilight occurence that could not be proven rationally, many 
of the Sages and codifiers who followed them, formulated various 
halakic principles that provided the ultra-rational logic for accre-
diting twilight phenomena. In the course of this discussion we 
distinguished the biblical accounts which record the practices of 
Eliezer, Abraham's servant and Jonathan, and the Urim ve-Tumim, 
from divinition. We investigated the difference between astral 
signs and augury omens and examined the nature of the relationship 
between signs and portended events as part of the halakic process of 
validating the custom of scheduling the consecration of a marriage 
under a full moon. In addition we documented an entire array of 
Halakot in the Shulchan Arukh which are contingent on astrological 
beliefs. Even contemporary Halakot such as whether it is permitted 
to induce labour are contingent on this issue. 
We saw a similar value of astrological pursui~ as in Chapter V,in 
that the probing into the future educates man to discover much about 
himself and his cirucmstances in the present. Astrology is further-
more useful halakically in theintercalation of the calendar months. 
One of the Halakot which is most directly affected by planetary in-
fluences is the status of the Katalnit .• Here we saw that the con-
sideration of such theological and philosophical questions as Deter-
minism and Predestination versus Free Choice, the special providential 
system of Israel, the "protection" of Mitzvoth, etc., are all computed 
in the process of determining the Katlanit'sstatus and the resolution of any 
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one of these issues greatly affects her halakic status. 
In Chapter VIII we saw that magic posed a much greater problem for 
religion than prognostics because magic involved a much greater 
degree of practical activities. Nevertheless we saw that the same 
principles which distinguished Astral Science form Astral Mythology 
in the previous chapter, to a large extent differentiated between 
prohibited magic of Gentiles from legitimate Jewish practise. Since 
magic was one of the main elements which separated Ammorite culture 
from Judaism, we further analysed the cultural requirements of religion 
which militate against the infiltration of some foreign cultural 
values into Judaism while Judaism can accept some specific facets 
of other communites. Halaka can exercise flexibility in allowing 
and possibly even encouragingsuch exposure. Many halakic principles 
which define the salient differences between Jewish and non-Jewish 
culture were derived from investigating the laws and practices of 
Ammorite Folkways. The distinction between acknowledging mirac l es 
and proscribing magical wonders was especially pertinent here . 
This Jed us to examine the nature of the confrontation between Moses 
and the Egyptian sorcerers, the difference between biblical practices 
and pagan ritual, the amazing phenomena engendered by the Book of 
Creation and the like. Even once the miracles were authenticated 
they still had to conform to specific halakic guidelines before one 
reached a position to observe the laws which are contingent on 
miracles, such as reciting the blessing over miracles and celebrating 
a holiday marking miraculous events. These considerations led us 
to investigate the differences between ordinary and uncommon miracles, 
Zionism and the establishment of the state of Israel, the principle 
of "one may not rely on miracles," and its applications. In addition 
\ve observed that in certain instances, such as the "Oven of Aknai" 
incident, miracles do not affect halakic outcomes whereas in other 
situations they do. We postulated various rules for establishing 
their difference. 
One of the areas most affected by magic was the field of medicine. 
We investigated the halakic guidelines which allow for administering 
"special" medications and treatments which have magical casts while 
forbidding others. We saw that many diseases were contacted by 
various metaphysical and psychological factors and they had to be 
combatted via the same media. One of the main problems in differen-
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tiating natural from special cures, is the absence ofaclear dividing 
line which determines the exact point at which the natural becomes 
unnatural. Many seemingly natural phenomena are swelled in the un-
known while other unnatural phenomena recur with such regularity 
and are so commonplace they become practically naturalised through 
experience. t·1oreover, the same proper ties of the one, of ten govern 
the other. It is here that probing into twilight Halakot is bene-
fitial in helping to locate the dividing line. 
This discussion led us to investigate such questions as \Jhether it 
is permissible to violate the Shabbat to administer special remedies, 
the difference between incantations and prayer, whether hypnotism 
is a natural therapeutic technique or considered magic, etc. All 
these issues were essentially resolved by undergoing virtually the 
identical halakic process of striving to uncover the exact demarcation 
be tween the sphere of the natural and the supernatural. 
In the same chapter we saw the metpahysical effect of names upon 
one's life and we investigated many of the Halakot that are contingent 
on names. With regards to the Ineffable Name we saw that the study 
of Divine Names is primarily a study of the essential features and 
truths of G-d. 
Specific guidelines and principles were developed in this chapter 
to differentiate Jewish religious practices from non-Jewish magic; 
Nevertheless, because of the similarities between them, we concluded 
the chapter by proposing various theories as to why the Bible did 
not avoid this confusion by excluding ritual which bore magical casts, 
and what purpose its inclusion served the religion. Yitzchak Baer 
shmvs that the analogy with which R. Johanan ben Zakkai dismissed the 
Gentile between the red heifer ritual and magic was based on R. Johanan 
b. Zakkai's own understanding of the mystical elements of this law. 3 
In the next chapter on pneumatology, we dealt with the Halakot 
contingent on spiritual beings and other spiritual phenomena. We 
began our discussion with a study of spirits. We investigated the 
halakic criteria for approving the engagement in various forms of 
demonology while proscribing others. We documented numerous Halakot 
in Shulchan Arukh which developed from belief in evil spirits and 
the harmful effects of coming in contact with them. 
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Demons bore a much stronger resemblance to humans than angels. 
Demons were outgrowths of seminal pollution and intercourse with the 
spirits. Demons possessed sex differentiation which was unkno\m 
among angels and were capable of reproduction. Their appearance 
often resembled that of men. The very nature of demons' connection 
to evil bore a powerful similarity to man's inclination for sin~ 
Because man bore possibly an even stronger resemblance to demons 
than to angels, the category of transcendental man could be more 
easily clarified by further comparing man's spiritual affinity to 
demons rather than considering angels only. For this reason, 
questions which emerged in the Responsa literature such as whether 
a woman who had intercourse with a spirit requires a divorce from 
her husband should not be dismissed as a rehashing of the Elijah issue, 
because R. Isserlein's ruling concerning angels may well have little 
or no applciation to demons. Man's contact with demons affects him 
wholly otherwise than his association with angels. For this reason 
the question of the inheritance rights of spirits who are of human 
offspring must also be considered. Namely, to elucidate the exact 
halakic param~ters of transcendental man for every area that ordinary 
man manifests metaphysical qualities which he shares in common with 
this category. 
We related many of these Halakot as being instructive in enabling 
man to overcome evil by analysing the exact mechanics of how evil 
affects man on a practical level, as well as serving the important 
educative purpose of keeping man constantly vigilant. In our discus-
sion of the Evil Eye we saw how thought process alone can generate 
various realities without any other action. By concentrating on 
piercing thoughts until they become almost visual, the thoughts 
themselves can become actualised in a tangible manner. We further 
saw how the laws of Evil Eye are also benefitial in circumscribing 
man's moral and ethical behaviour. 
Other spirits aside from demons, that man communicated with were 
the spirits of the deceased,and we investigated the media in \vhich 
it is permitted to contact the spiritual world and when such consul-
tationwasprohibited as necromancy. Many of the halakic principles 
which we saw in Chapters VII and VIII which differentiated acts of 
religious devotion from mythology were pertinent here. 
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Even planetary bodies were believed to possess intellect and spirit 
and we investigated whether man's recent landing on the moon disproved 
these notions, as well as whether the ability of the spiritual powers 
of planets to affect man ' s circumstances constrains his freedom of 
choice . The resolvement of this latter question had important 
bearings on determining the extent in which man is bound by ~~laka. 
An important spiritual consideration discussed in this chapter is 
whether the Laws of Saving of Life pertain only to physical life or 
to preserving spiritual welfare as well, even when one's physical 
condition is not endangered . This led us to investigate halakic 
criteria for assessing spiritual loss and to evaluate the spiritual 
quantum of conmandments in deciding which commandments could be 
deferred to preserve one's spiritual welfare. Here we noted how 
halakic criteria are necessary to ascertain the net spiritual loss 
engendered by submitting to one's circumstances as compared to the 
loss sustained by waiving the laws that may enhance one's predicament . 
\ve observed that since Pikuach Nefesh essentially involves saving a 
Nefesh, i.e., the soul, it becomes even more important to analyse 
\vhich commandments specifically concern one's physical circumstances, 
and which relate to one's spiritual condition as well . 
As an example of this exercise, we investigated whether the priest-
hood is an indelible property and saw how the halakic consequences 
vary considerably depending on whether the laws of priesthood concern 
physical or spiritual priests . 
In our last chapter we examined not only the influence of metaphysical 
phenomena upon man ' s halakic obligations, but more strikingly, the 
influence of change and development of metaphysical phenomena in 
halakic process. We proposed that the readiness of Halaka to recog-
nize changing conditions within its system is an important element 
in the process of modifying Halaka to incorporate further changes in 
the future, and it is the same rules and principles analysed in this 
chapter in which changing metaphysical data are comptued within 
halakic process, that can be applied in incorporating changing trends 
in the future. 
We began this discussion by examining eschatology as a metpahysical 
development in incessant process in the world. We saw how many 
Halakot such as the prohibiton of cremation, the burial of limbs, 
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the identificaiton of the Messiah, various liturgical customs, depend 
on whether eschatology is a natural metpahsyical process in its 
development or a supernatural one. 
We saw that the phenomenonof transmigration of souls is a further 
eschatological concept concerning other metaphysical realities which 
are in the process of continuous development. Not only did later 
laws emerge based on this belief such as the prohibition of eating 
animal hearts, grafting of trees, prayers for blossoming of trees, 
the impurity laws in Elijah's case, etc., but in fact many of the 
Sinaitic laws were predicated initially upon the premise of reincar-
nation. Yitzchak Baer asserts that Sinaitic laws such as the Levirate 
~~rriage, purity and impurity, were based upon the mystical, metaphysi-
cal obligation of the family to actively involve themselves with the 
responsibility of metaphysical realities such as life after death, 
transmigration of souls, etc. 4 One of the main aims of his work 
is to prove that the Kabbalists did not begin a new trend in Halaka 
which rrust be treated with the same degree of suspicion as any new 
developnent, but rather the Torah ab initio contained these mystical 
elements as the basis of its Mi tzvot which were well known to the 
early Sages, and were merely revived by the Kabbalists centuries 
later. 5 Thus, according to Baer, the kabbalistic interpretation of 
Torah is not a separate branch of Jewish Law of a new dimension, 
superimposed over the halakic system, but rather the inevitable 
result of the pneumatic nature of Torah which was Divinely injected 
into the halakic system already at Sinai. 
We saw various other issues related to the general concept of trans-
migration of souls which engendered halakic consequences such as Neshama 
Yeterah, Dybbuk, and Ibbur. We furthermore observed that the gilgul 
concept does concern not only the transmigration of souls in man, 
but also in trees, animals, and plant life as well. Thus, man is 
not alone as a transcendental being, but in a sense all of nature 
possesses a dynamic transcendental capacity, and Halaka therefore, 
governs man in his encounter with universal transcendentalism. 
\~e turned our discussion from ongoing metaphysical changes which are 
in constant progress to metaphysical changes which seem to have dis-
appeared in the course of time and the effects of these changes on the 
halakic system. We demonstrated this phenomena by investigating such 
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issues as Zuggot, the evanescence of magic and many of the Ammorite 
folk practices, the nonefficacy of talmudic medicine today, and the 
question of whether one is permitted to use oil which contains a 
mixture of fish extract for fear ofthe talmudic danger of combining 
fish and meat comestibles. In all these cases we discussed the halakic 
rules and principles involved in accepting these changes. An 
interesting approach was postulated by R. Hagig who explains how 
the disappearance of many metaphysical phenomena in the past is 
directly related to the ongoing development of the metaphysical 
eschatological process in the present and the future. 
Finally we considered the disappearance of many wonderful and amazing 
n1etaphsycial creatures which no longer exist today. Many of these crea-
tures engendered halakic consequences concerning the laws of 
impurity, the dietary laws of Kashrut and ritual slaughtering, and 
killing verminwhichdevelop from spontaneous generation on the Sabbath. 
We proposed that the halakic discussions regarding these metpahysical 
phenomena are valuable in establishing authoritative precedents to 
guide man when he encounters similar situations which evolve in 
the future, either through science or ordinarily in the course of 
nature. A~ an example we suggested how the discussion concerning 
the halakic status of Adne Sadeh (man of the mountain) as man or monkey 
may have bearing on the issue of determining the halakic obligations 
of simian heart transplant patients. We further observed how man's 
own metaphysical experiences have much in common with other metaphysical 
creatures which display similar properties. 
There is no question that as metaphysical phenomena continue to develop 
and change, man's epistemological comprehension of the universe is 
differently perceived; As a result his methods of computing meta-
physical data in halakic process and their application become modified 
accordingly. This accounts for the difference in halakic rulings 
concerning numerous metpahysical issues during the talmudic era in 
comparison to their laws in the present, as seen in that chapter. 
In a final observation one might agree that it is in good character 
for the scientist to dismiss the magician as a fraudulent adherent 
of pagan mythology. Never would he entertain the slightest imagina-
tion that science may well manifest itself as a modern form of ancient 
magic. Nonetheless, the magical feats produced by scientists undoub-
- 365 -
Sill1MARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
tedly mirror the great wonders of the magicians of old. For religion , 
both science and magic present similar problems. As we saw in 
Chapter VIII, it was not so much the magical techniques which Halaka 
admonished but rather the compelte reliance on human wisdom and 
exclusion of G-d from the magical system. It was because of the 
basic Jewish beliefs which magicians sought to controvert rather 
than the actual practices which they performed that magic was 
considered a branch of idolatry. Likewise, it is the drawing of 
anti-theological conclusions by some scientists rather than their 
actual feats which pose a similar problem for idolatry. The same 
breath in which a scientist may denounce the miracles of G-d, to-
gether with the wonders of the magicians of old, either explaining 
them both away logically on the bais of scientific reason or else 
dismissing them both as utter fantasy, parallels the identical skep-
ticism in which the Egyptian sorcerers who, thoroughly convinced in 
the efficacy of their own techniques, contested Moses' claim to 
faith in G-d and that all miracles were His. It is the challenge to 
faith based on an ability to perform marvelous feats which science 
and magic share in falling prey to the contagion of the supremacy 
of man and his creations over G-d. The Chief Rabbi of Great Britain, 
Sir Immanuel Jakobovits, sums it up well in an article. 
Today the struggle between science and religion is no longer a 
competative search for truth as in former times. It is a battle 
between excesses and controls, between the supremacy of man's 
creations and the supremacy of man himself. 
In the past, the human inventive genius served mainly to aid 
nature in the amelioration of life. Now it bids fair to supplant 
nature , replacing it by an artificial synthetic existence in 
\~ich the deepest mysteries of creation are not only. laid bare 
but subjected to the arbitrary whims of mechanised r.1an. 1he 
push of one button can now exterminate life by the millions; 
psychologically waged advertising campaigns can determine the 
eating habits of whole nations; chemical drugs can curb or 
release human emotions at will, and break down the most deter-
mined will power to extract confessions. The control over man's 
conscience, over procreation and extinction, over human existence 
itself is being wrested form nature and surrendered to scientists 
and technicians. 
In this new dispensation the physician too, is playing an ever 
more vital role. Human life, which he can artifically generate 
out of a test-tube and terminate out of a syringe needle, is now 
at his bidding. Psychiatry may soon bring even human behaviour 
under his .sway, almost like a robot plane guided by a remote 
radio operator. But vmo will control the physician and the 
growing army of other scientists? That is the crux of the 
moral dilemma of our time.6 
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In truth, there is no need for a confrontation between religion and 
science . For in the same way as we saw in Chapter VIII, that certain 
magical trends conformed to and were found compatible with Halaka, 
similarly there is room for Halaka to incorporate science within its 
four cubits expanse. Halaka has no problem in digesting scientific 
data, it is merely when the scientist over extends the area of his 
research in which alone he is skilled and implies moral and e thical 
judgements in which he has no training that he oversteps his mandate. 
While the scientist is competent to record various empirical laboratory 
obset-vations regarding organisms, life, etc., the question of defining 
the essence of life is a religious question which the scientist is 
not qualified to decide. Science merely observes subjects and objects 
as physical entities. Religion, however, deals with the relationships 
whichexist between subject and object. The scientist who recognizes 
this distinction in functions will not encounter any encroachment 
between the two domains. Religion will legitimise all scientific 
data which do not attempt to describe and impute conclusions about 
the relationships occuring between subject and object which it observes . 
Religion will embrace the scientist who, in addition to his research, 
perceives the 'miracles' of G-d which manifest themselves through 
the natural media which the scientist employs . Indeed, neither 
domain can operate in a vacuum without complete reciprocity between 
each other. Halaka can not cogently describe relationships existing 
between subject and object without taking into account scientific 
data regarding their physical states. At the same time, scientists 
are in dire need of moral and ethical guidance in the applicati·Jn of 
their findings . It is here that we discover the vast con tri bu 'cion 
that each field is capable of making to each other and that our paper 
has endeavoured to expand. 
In terms of the contribution of science to Halaka, it is becoming 
increasingly manifest that experimental science is speedily bridging 
the gap between theory and actuality. Scientific technology is 
busily transforming yeste:cday's dream into today's reality. And 
therefore, the distinction which once existed between theory and 
fact has been narrowed by science. The more sophisticated scientific 
technology becomes, the more each theoretical notion and speculatory 
whim of the mind is likely to present itself as a nafke mina le-ma'aseh 
(a practical halakic consequence). Here, the rapid growth of the 
- 367 -
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
scientific era is thrusting Ralakistsdeeper and deeper into intensi-
fied scientific and metaphysical research. 
In medicine, science is able to prolong the state of life to 
extend beyond the original halakic criteria of the cessation of res-
piratory functioning and cardiac activity. In the area of psychology, 
psychologists have the tools to examine the influence of halakic 
principles such as "kol man dekapid kapdinan bei" (whoever is parti-
cular will be affected in particular) upon the psyche. We are able 
to survey the statistics of Beth Din records throughout the world, 
and compute the great number of divorce bills in which spouses appear 
with like names which they share with in-laws, as discussed in Sefer 
Hasidim, and providing psychological counsel to young couples of 
the dangers of entering such a marriage as we would counsel them 
regarding certain genetic diseases that they may be carrying for their 
offspring. 
Likewise, Halaka has a great deal to contribute to science. Firstly 
in providing the moral and ethical guidance to "control the physician 
and growing army of other scientists, who are finding human life at 
their bidding," and to control "psychiatry which is gradually bringing 
human behaviour under its. sway" against "surrendering to scientists 
and technicians control over man's conscience and over human existence 
itself." Secondly, in providing precedents of golem, adne sadeh, 
treifa hayya, etc., in the event of science being able to produce human 
machines, man-animals, live-corpses, thus presenting the scientist 
with relevant material to further his research. And thir.dly, the 
study of the halakic system is valuable in itself in relating rules 
for converting theoretics in applied directions. Quite apart from 
its humanitarian guidelines, Halaka can be regarded as an isolated 
area of academia which divulges principles for converting abstract 
sciences to applied sciences, which technology is compelling man to 
confront. 
In Chapter I we mentioned an important difference between philosop~y 
of practice and philosophy in practice. vmile the Halakot of t ile first 
category are unaffected by changing philosophical conceptions, meta-
physical conditions and scientific data, the Halakot of the latter 
category are determined through the cognitive process of assimilatmg 
these data. Therefore, as man's epistemological perceptions of these 
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data change and become differently conceived, so too the Halakot 
which are contingent upon these understandings of necessity must also 
undergo change. 
An important question arises as a result of our study: If Halaka 
accepts change, recognises evolution and will modify its definitions 
of machinations, organisms, life etc. ,in the l,ight of modern scientific 
techniques, then the existential status of a golem, for example, 
which was halakically conferred by Hakham Zevi during the seventeenth 
century in absence of any knowledge and information regarding ordinary 
scientific technique today,whatvalidity does the original definition 
have? In which way does it serve as a relevant precedent? Other sig-
nificantly related questions are, what are the halakic criteria 
for modifying original halakic positions? And furthermore, if science 
is currently transforming the entire twilight area of Halaka uncovered 
in this study into normal occurrences, then what happens to this vast 
area of twilight Halaka? Is man really a twilight being in possession 
of transcendental dimensions after all, as we claimed throughout this 
work? 
Clearly, it is understood that whatever science has not yet discovered 
or produced is still very much in the dark and enshrouded in the twi-
light zone . One of the main purposes of twilight Halakot are to 
assist men of science to overcome this barrier and further their 
discoveries in naturalising these occurrences by expanding the scien-
tist's imagination, providing him with abundant precedents, and ample 
resources, with which to transform the opaque twilight into bright 
and everyday features of life. It is precisely because man is a 
twilight being in possession of transcendental dimensions that man 
is constantly motivated to discover, convert and thereby realise in 
a concrete and tangible manner, this fundamental aspect of his nature. 
The scientist who recognises his limitations and understands the 
relationship between twilight laws and science will be providentially 
assisted to succeed in his goal of eventually mastering the entire 
twilight zone and converting it to an ordinary feature of everyday 
life. The scientist who oversteps his bounds and plays the role of 
G-d (much like the pagan magical god) and denies this relationship, 
will remain groping in the dark and perforce relate to the twilight 
zone on the level of science fiction and myth. As we have already 
seen how G-d's providence will allow man access to new vistas of 
knowledge only at a proportionate rate to which he can propertly 
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assimilate such knowledge. 7 
Generally it can be stated that Halaka will allow for change and 
modification where the sciences, be they physical, metaphysical, 
philosophical, psychological or whatever, work in the same direction 
as Halaka. However, Halaka will resist any change in which science 
attemptstoundermine religion. A clear application of both the 
above conditions is demonstrated in a Responsum of Maharam Schick 
discussed in Chapter X, in which he formulates two rules for accepting 
or resisting change. According to Maharam Schick we find two kinds 
of Halakot. The first type are Halakot which are derived through 
R. Ishmael's thirteen hermeneutic principles and the traditions 
communciated orally as Halakot to Moses from Sinai. These Halakot 
can not change because they were communicated by G-d as eternal truths 
which are absolute for all time. Halaka will energetically resist 
any attempt by scientists in all fields to undermine religion by 
denying the validity of these traditions. In our Introduction we 
saw how one of the major purposes of Sinai was to disclose fundamental 
axiomatic principles regarding G-dwhichphilosophic speculation was 
forbidden to controvert. All of science are bound by these same 
axioms. . The scientist who seeks to subvert any of these principles 
will immediately encounter a violent confrontation with religion. 
There is another category of Halakot. Those which were not communi-
cated as Halakot to Moses of Sinai or derived via the hermeneutic 
rules, and as such, are in a sense metahermeneutic. These Halakot 
are derived through the cogitative process of assimilating natural, 
metaphysical, philosphical, data which man observes in his encounter 
with the unvierse. As those observational data become subject to 
changing conditions such as evolution, different philosophic and 
scientific orientations etc., then the Halakot which are contingent 
upon these data will also become modified. The halakic system will 
endorse such change since no essential truths were controverted in 
the process. Thus, the scientist who co-operates with religion 
will discover to his surprise considerable flexibility in religion. 
Even the first category of Halakot does not manifest a closed and 
narrow system of law stubbornly refusing to acquiesce in light of 
current trends which seem to be contrary to certain Sinaitic 
notions. For it is this very rigidity which may advance scientific 
exploration further. Every science recognises that its anxioms are 
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correct only as long as they haven't been disproved and that each of 
its facts is based on probability alone. Thus all of science is 
essentially in experimental stages. Since Halakot of the former 
category are revealed Divine truths which are absolute, then if 
these Halakot establish truisms which seem contrary to scientific 
fact, this serves as a monitor and an aid to the experimental science 
that it has not yet arrived at the truth and that the research must 
go on. Thus the Halakot of this category can act as a check and 
balance system for science, redirecting it towards the correct path 
whenever it goes astray. 
The fact that this paper has demonstrated that many twilight Halakot 
were derived by applying the hermeneutic principles of the first 
category reveals an important distinction between twilight Halakot 
and experimetnal sciences. Namely, that despite the vast degree of 
similarity between twilight Halakot and the experimental sciences, 
the Halakot themselves are not in an experimental stage but are every 
bit as resoltue, precise, tangible and eternal as the Sinaitic laws 
themselves. Thus they serve as superb guides in providing unshakable 
precedents to further scientific exploration and discovery. 
On the other hand, because many Halakot of Torah belonging to the 
second .category are also derivatives of probability laws such as 
rov and hazaka, Maharam Schick rules that those Halakot will invariably 
change once it is empirically and experientially proven that the pro-
babilities have changed. Here again, science can contribute to Halaka 
by providing the necessary facilities and expertise to be able to 
test and trace changes in probability trends. In fact, R. Zimmerman 
considers natural (scientific) probabilities to be more certain than 
technical(halakic) probabilities and uses this principle to explain 
why situations involving life and death (Pikuach Nefesh) take pre-
cedence over technical probabilities but not over natural probabilities. 8 
Thus science is superbly equipped to examine potential changes in 
Halakot based on probability conditions. 
Even with regards to the first category of Halakot communciated to 
Moses from Sinai we find great room for flexibility and that even 
these are not altogether immutable. For example, according to many 
authoritites since these Halakot are essentially traditions which are 
not found explicitly mentioned in the Torah, they do not carry the 
same weight or status as Penteteuchal (de'oraitah) laws. Therefore, 
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if a situation of doubt or uncertainty (safek) arose, the question 
might be resolved mGst leniently- applying the greatest degree of 
flexibility, in accordance with the principle of safek de-oraita 
le-humra ve-safek de-rabbanon le-kula. 9 Moreover we find that 
penalties such as lashes were not enforced for transgressing Halakot 
of this category. 10 According to many authorities, the Halakot to 
Moses from Sinai were only corrmunicated in a general sense. Hm;~ever , 
their details were not specified and are therefore, not bound by the 
same degree of irrmutability as the general laws themselves. For 
example, Moses was told of eight general categories of treifa animals. 
However, the exact details concerning these general categories were 
developed by the Rabbis. 11 Therefore, a great deal of flexibility 
could be applied to the details even if the general categories them-
selves appeared largely entrenched. Indeed we find that in certain 
12 instances the Halakot to Moses from Sinai uprooted Pentateuchal laws! 
This demonstrates flexibility even on the part of Pentateuchal laws 
where one would have expected utter inextricability when confronted 
by the lesser level of traditions corrmunicated to Moses. In some 
cases we find that traditionswererecorded as Halakot to Moses from 
Sinai while in fact they were not: Such as the talmudic statements 
that the restriction against eating in pairs (Zuggot) is a Halaka 
to Hoses from Sinai; and, that it is a Halaka to Moses from Sinai that 
Elijah will not come to pronounce purity or impurity, to put away 
or bring near, but to put away those brought near by for-ce and to 
13 bring near those put away by force; and others. 
From all the above it is greatly evident that even ~n the case of 
Halakot to Moses from Sinai where Maharam Schick rules that there can be 
no vacillating in Halaka despite changing conditions in nature, never-
theless there is still room within its own confines for ample 
flexibility and leniency. 
The very fact that the expression of Halaka to Moses from Sinai was 
employed concerning twilight Halakot such as Zuggot and Elijah, demon-
strates both considerations. Namely the need to approach the intan-
gible , metaphysical areas of Halaka with the same degree of definity, 
exactitude ·, and concreteness as the Sinaitic traditions themselves 
on the one hand. k•d, at the same time, the need to expand the resi-
lience of the Sinaitic traditions by broadening this category to include 
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within its sphere, twilight situations which would illuminate its 
parameters and thereby allow for greater room for flexibility. There 
is an undeniable paramountcy of the Halaka's incesstantly striving 
to incorporate greater leniencies within its precincts expressed 
in the Halakic principle: 
"The power for permitting is greater [than that of prohibition]. "14 
R. Israel Meir ha-Kohen in his introduction to his Mishna Berurah 
on the laws of Sabbath writes that one of the main values of studying 
the Sabbath laws is not so much to learn of the proscriptions of the 
Sabbath but rather to learn of the permissible forms of activities 
on the Sabbath- such as how to save one's animals in case they 
escape without trapping them, or how to extinguish a fire which 
suddenly erupts in one's household, etc. We find whole areas of 
Halaka operating under explicit directives to exercise the greatest 
measure of leniency possible in resolving various issues, such as 
"Halaka is decided according to the lenient opinion in matters of 
mourning" and "Halaka is decided according to the lenient opinion 
in manners of Erubin."15 This same attitude was adopted with regards 
to the stainings of the menstruant woman in deciding whether she 
may be permitted to her husband. The halakic principle of Darkhei 
Noam is also based on the recognition of the purpose of Halaka and 
its deep appreciation for augmenting and enhancing the pleasantness 
of life rather than making life stressful and awkward. There were 
areas of Halaka which were particularly sensitive and demanded an 
expecially delicate approach to Halaka to seek leniencies whereever 
1~ssible. These were issues such as the attempt to purify the 
bastard and explore means of making him eligible for marriage. 
The same consideration applied equally,if not more, for the Aguna 
woman. The Halaka labouriously strove to stretch over backwards 
and find any means possible to ameliorite the difficult conditions 
of the Aguna woman, even to extent of accepting extremely poor evidence 
to establish the death of her missing husband. 
The only means of prying open the sensitive issues and resolving 
these difficulties were on the basis of the hermeneutic principles 
and the Sinaitic traditons handed to Moses at Sinai, since these were 
the only available sources for researching the much needed room for 
elasticity of Halaka. The convening of the sessions of the Sanhedrin 
respresnted but a fleeting moment of Jewish history. Therefore, 
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it was incumbent upon the codifiers to unearth these twilight issues 
and magnify the hermeneutic logic to incorporate the metaphysical 
dimension of Halaka, in order to extrapolate Sinaitic authority for 
a greater measure of leniency in the absence of a Sanhedrin . The 
resolvement of the Elijah issue, for example, could go far in making 
such headway which is vital for improving the conditions of the Aguna 
woman . 
The rules for determining the criteria for change in Halaka were 
important not only in dealing with evolutionary changes in nature 
and metaphysics as seen in the Responsa of Maharam Schick and others, 
but more fundamenally in dealing with the process of the development 
and evolution of Halaka itself. Since the only source for the objective 
of modification was Halaka itself, of necessity, change could come 
only as an internal devleoprnent of Halaka exclusively. Thus it 
became essential to investigate evolutionary symptoms manifest in 
Halaka in order that the direction for change would organically 
flow out of Halaka itself. While the Reform movement and unskilled 
Jewish legalists impatiently tampered with Halaka from the outside 
in an effort to tag their views onto the Halaka and attain validity 
by forcing the Halaka in the direction of change they desired, the 
rabbinic codifiers patiently, expertly and resourcefully monitored 
change as it inherently flowed as a natural evolutionary process out 
of the halakic system, as evidenced by their research. Thus it 
was the applicaton of hermeneutic rules to metaphysical issues in the 
halakic process which provided the mechanics for monitoring halakic 
change . At the same time it provided authorative guidance in 
resolving twilight issues produced by science or any other means, 
where man requires assistance in concretising and assimilating in-
tangible developments. 
The halakic system in recognising and providing rules for change is 
able to provide much needed guidance to a world in which scientific 
discovery is compelling man to confront theoretics in applied directions . 
Thus, aside from its moral and ethical guidance, the study of the 
halakic system is therefore valuable as a field in itself which relates 
rules for converting abstract, hypothetical notions to applied sciences . 
The study of metaphysics on the other hand, contributes to Halaka in 
that the more halakic man soars to the heights of metaphysical specu-
lation, the more he is able to transform religious beliefs into factual 
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data. This is an important process in directing religion which was 
hitherto spurned by pragmatists concerned only with tangibles, 
to a practical feature of everyday life. 
Nevertheless, despite the complete intercourse between them, there 
continues to exist a vociferous school within the rabbinic persuasion 
who persist in their attempt to utterly divorce philosophy and meta-
physics from Halaka. The adherents of this school, in some cases 
carried on this paranoia even to the extent that pre-occupatin with 
the former was absoltuely forbidden: Whether it be the authorities 
\·lho took issue and contested Maimonides and forbade the study of 
philosophy and metaphysics. 16 Or whether it be the rationalistic 
approach which saw in theosophic pursuit a flagrant contradiction 
to halaka indicative in R. Soloveichick 1 s statement: "The Halaka 
does not deal with metaphysical mysteries." Or whether it be the 
great number of Yeshivot today which continue to ban the study of 
philosophy and sciences. 
This essay has endeavoured to expose that throughout rabbinic history 
Halaka was always as concerned with man 1 s thoughts as it was with man 1 s 
actions because it recognised that a great deal of ther~laka could 
only be arrived at through the process of applying philosophic and 
metaphysical principles. As science continues to narrow the gap be-
tween the theoretical and the actual, the study of Metaphysical Issues 
in r~lakic Process, is becoming all the more urgent as science has 
enabled ordinary man to attain under normal conditions what was 
hitherto considered exclusively transcendental. It will soon become 
exceedingly obvious that latter day Halakists will not be able to 
even begin to approach halakic issues materialising as a result of 
science without being thoroughly educated in the disciplines of philo-
sophy and metaphysics. For numerous lmvs pertaining to scientific 
man are deeply rooted in transcendental man. 
It is a fact that brilliant Posekim (Decisors) such as R. Yechiel 
Michael ha-Levi Epstein (1829-1908) author of Arukh ha-Shulchan and 
others were unable to render proper halakic rulings as to whether one 
is permitted to flick on a light switch on Yom Tov (Festival Days) 
because they were not familiar with the process of generating electricity. 
The Jerusalem Institute for Science and Halaka was founded as a result 
of a growing realisation that unless today 1 s Halakists intricately 
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familiarise themselves with the latest technical and scientific 
apparatus and become thoroughly knowledgeable in all the details of 
their operational activity Halakists will not be capable of rendering 
cogent rulings concerning their usages for example on Shabbat and Yom 
17 Tov. This fact has caused the ban outlawing scientific study to 
become lifted out of sheer necessity. Similarly, in the very near 
future, unless Halakists thoroughly familiarise themselves with the 
disciplines of philosophy and metaphysics, as did many of the halakic 
giants in the past who were reviewed in this paper, and unless the 
ban against these disciplines is altogether lifted as well, Halakists 
will soon find themselves unable to cope with fundamental halakic 
problems pertaining to everyday life. 
Consequently, one of the conclusions of this paper is that if 
Yeshivot aspire to produce halakic authorities to lead the Jewish 
world through the coming era, it is hoped that this work will serve 
as testimony in demonstrating the dire need of implementing within 
the curriculum of even the mostright-wing of Yeshivot the study of 
theerstwhileconsidered 'secular' disciplines of philosophy and meta-
physics as a part and parcel of Talmud Torah. For the Halakist who 
is uninstructed in these disciplines will soon find himself as stifled 
and incompetent' in his own field as tomorrow's uneducated individual 
who is illiterate in basic computer language. The introduciton of 
our field of study into the curriculum of Jewish Educati~onal Ins ti tu-
tions would undoubtedly function as an invaluable instrument in inte-
grating the vast and often hostile gap of intolerance which separates 
ultra-Orthodox zealots from secular Zionists in Israeli and Jewish 
contemporary society throughout the world today. 
A final conclusion of this work, which is especially born out of 
Chapter VI.3, is that we find in the Responsa literature discussions 
which seem to be totally theoretical and of no practical consequence 
whatsoever . Yet, it is most instructive to analyse carefully the 
socio-political conditions during the period of the respondent ' s 
lifetime, the character and biography of the respondent himself, and 
the exchange of ideas and philosophies current in his time. \~e must 
investigate the factors which were .most instrumental in motivating 
and inspiring the respondent to delve into seeminly totally theoreti-
cal issues because of the practical implications and relevancies 
which the respondent saw emanating from these particular inquiries 
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to the period in which he lived. 
According to Yitzchak Baer, it was the metaphysical feature of 
Judaism, which remained the central force responsible for maintaining 
the Jewish people after the destruction of the Second Temple: 
From that time on [i.e., the destruction of the Second Temple], 
there did not remain with nation except broken fossils and 
memories of that great metaphysical system which bound the 
terre.strial world to the heavenly world. It is those broken 
foss~ls which were to maintain the nation in the future in 
the generqtions after the destruciton.18 
Baer concludes his work by reiterating his contention that it was 
the metaphysical Weltanschauung of the Sages which moulded and preserved 
the historical character of the people: 
In the end, there will remain from the metaphysical-historical-
structure of the ancient people some great pillars, which the 
first Hasidim drove into the soil of the Land of Israel, and 
they are planted in the heart of every man, and through them will 
be earmarked in the future the place of Israel among nations.19 
We conclude this paper with a popular aggadic maxim which concludes 
a tractate of the Talmud: 
The Tanna debe Elijah taught: Whoever learns Halakot daily is 
destined to become a denizen of the World to Come, for it is 
said: 'His goings [Halikot] are to eternity' [Habakuk 3:6] . 
Read not Halikot [goings, ways] but rather Halakot.20 
The baraita attributed to Elijah taught that the Halikot (philosophic 
ways)converge with Halakot (deeds) and therefore can be used inter-
changeably. For both Halikot and Halakot are symptomatic of "eternity ." 
Halikot are the end goals and Halakot are the means. The Halikot 
must initially be interchanged with Halakot ("Don't read Halikot etc .") 
because it is the Halakot which lead to the Halikot. Keeping this 
causal realtionship in mind in one 's "daily" halakic ac ti vi ties 
("\~·10ever learns halakot daily etc."~ one will eventually reach a 
point where the Halakot and Halikot converge and become one and the 
same. This is the point where Maimonides culminates his halakic 
opus - a future world which is "replete with philosophic knowledge of 
G-d" - the epitome of the halakic experience. This is the ultimate 
destination of mankind, the same transcendental zone where Elijah 
abides, VJhere all mankind are to become permanent rather than tran-
s i ent denizens . Here Halakot will once again coalesce with the Halikot 
which are stated in Habakuk. Hence, the interchangeability is complete. 
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In our Introduction we discussed how the Halikot, i.e., the philosophic 
ways, were characteristic of pre-Mosaic man's halakic activity. At 
Sinai the Halakot, i.e., the deeds, were introduced in order to bind 
the post-Mosaic community and propel it towards realising the end 
goal of Halaka, the Halikot. We saw how Maimonides structured his 
Code Juris Mosaici following the same pattern of Halikot (Yesodei 
ha-Torah), Halakot (main body of Cbde), Halikot (conclusion of C~de). 
The above aggadic maxim describes that the halakic system itself 
mandates that it must evolve through various stages of transformation 
and change: from Halikot (pre-Sinai) to Halakot (Sinai, post-Sinai) 
and back to Halikot (post-Sinai, Messianic period), in order to 
complete the metaphysical transformation in man which the system 
aspires to realise. That is the realisation of the Day which the 
l-laggadis t summons G-d to "bring near the Day which is neither day nor 
night'!- but rather twilight- when the dark of night is as light as 
day. As the Haggadist concludes: "Make Thou light as the day the 
dark of night - and it came to pass at midnight. "21 
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thy statutes and Israel thy law~ (Deut. 33:10 )." Maim. would 
certainly no-t have quoted a biblical text which advocates the teachings 
of His .statutes and laws, were he intending to describe a way of 
life independent of Halaka. 
39see Shab. 88a, and A.Z. 2b, "'They stood under the mount ' 
(Ex . 19:17). R. Abdimi b. Hama b. Hasa said, 'This teaches that the 
Holy One Blessed be He, suspended the mountain over them like a 
vault and said to them, 'If ye accept the Torah it is well; but if 
not, there shall be your burial' • " This curious Aggada could quite 
possibly be explained in the same way. Namely, that the distingui-
shing trait which earmarked Sinaitic law apart from pre-Sinaitic 
Law was in the mandatory nature of the covenant in which the people 
became bound to G-d. 
40Intro. to the Comm. on the Mishna, p. 83 . 
41Kid. 40b. 
42Maim. in fact defines knowledge as philosophy earlier on : 
"What I mean to say by 'knowledge' - to draft in one's mind the 
truth of things as they are to "i-"1ir,1 and to understand all that is 
possible for him to understand." Intra. to the Comm. on the 
Mishna, p. 78. 
43Ibid., p. 79. 
44G 'd u1 e, Part III, ch. li, p. 619. 
45Ibid. 
46Pines, Shlomo, Forward, Maimonides: Torah and Philosophic 
Quest, by Hartman, David, p. xiii. 
47Maimonides, Abraham, Milchamot ha-Shem, ed. Margaliyot, R., 
(Jerusalem: Massad ha-Rav Kook, 1953), p. 53. 
48Maim.'s own definition of a Divine law and its difference 
to man-made law takes into account the type of Halaka which existed 
prior to Sinai: 
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"Accordingly, if you find a Law the whole end of which and the whole 
purpose thereof, who determined the actions required by it, are 
exclusively toward the ordering of the city and its circumstances 
and the abolition in it of injustice and oppression; If in that 
Law attention is not at all directed toward speculative matters, 
if no heed is given to the perfecting of the rational faculty, and 
no regard is accorded to opinions being correct or faulty - the 
whole purpose of that Law being, on the contrary, the arrangement, 
in whatever way this may be brought about, of the circumstances of 
people in their relations with one another and provision for their 
obtaining, in accordance with the opinion of that chief, a certain 
something deemed to be happiness- you must know that, that Law is 
a nomos and that the men who laid it down belong, as we have mentioned, 
to the third class, I mean to those who are perfect only in their 
imaginative faculty. 
If, on the other hand, you find a Law, all of whose ordinances 
are due to attention being paid, as was stated before, to the sound-
ness of the circumstances pertaining to the body and also to the 
soundness of belief- a Law that takes pains to inculcate correct 
opinions with regard to G-d, may He be exalted in the first place, 
and with regard to the angels, and that desires to make man wise, 
to give him understanding, and to awaken his attention so that he 
should know the whole of that which exists in its true form- you 
must know that this guidance comes from Him, may He be exalted, and 
that this Law is divine." Guide, Part II, ch. xl, pp. 383- 84. 
49 Supra, n. 31. 
so See Twersky, Intra. to the Code of Maim., The Historical 
Dimension, pp. 220-28. So important was this intellectual pre-
occupation with natural sciences which led the Patriarchs to halakic 
practices that the Torah, in Maim.'s view, recounted this system 
of Halaka as a prerequisite for the Sinaitic system. As Maim. 
writes: 
G-d, may His mention be exalted, wished us to be perfected 
and the state of our societies to be improved by His Laws 
regarding actions. Now this can come about only after the 
adoption of intellectual beliefs, the first of which being 
His apprehension, may He be exalted, according to our capacity. 
This, in turn cannot come about except through Divine Science, 
and this Divine Science cannot become actual except after a 
study of natural science. This is so since natural science 
borders on Divine Science in time as has been made clear to 
whomever has engaged in speculation on these matters. Hence 
G-d rna He be exalted caused his book to o en with the 
the Beginning which we have rna e clear, is natural 
Guide, Intra. to the First Part, pp. 8-9. 
Rabbi Shem Tov. in his commentary to the Guide, explains that it 
was the structure of Torah itself \Jhich induced Maimonides to 
incorporate Divine Science within his own definition of a Divine 
Law: 
"Do you not see that our Torah, the Torah of G-d, may He be 
exalted, began with the Account of the Beginning first which 
is the knowledge of the existence as much as one can make 
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known. And during the special 'stance' [ma'amad], at Sinai . 
He began to impart His reality and that He is unity and is 
not corporeal and that it is not worthy to worship another 
[deity], and that the one worships another [deity] denies 
all of Torah. And afterwards He ordained [laws concerning] 
our bodily activities. And therefore the tablets of the 
covenant were two; first in conveying correct opinions, and 
secondly, the correcting of bodily matters." Maimonides, 
Moreh Nevukhim, tr. into Hebrew bySamuel Ibn Tibbon, with five 
commentaries: Efodi, Shem Tov, Crescas, Abrabanel and Hanarboni, 
(New York: Om Publishing Co., 1946). 
51Yad, Avoda Zara, ch.i. 
52 see Nahmanides' remarks to Maim. 's first commandment, 
Nahmanides, Moses b. Nahman, and Maimonides, Moses, Sefer ha-Mitzvot 
Im Hassagot ha-Ramban, ed. Chavel, C., (Jerusalem: Massad ha-Rav 
Kook, 1981), pp . 151-53. 
53This is the meaning of the Midrashim which remarked upon 
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On the unity of the Decalogue see Ginzberg, Louis, Legends of the 
Jews, (Philadelphia: JPS, 1968), Vol. III, p. 104. 
54Ha . 64 rtman, op.c~t., p. . 
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Theology in the Respansa, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975). 
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knowledge of this truth is an affirmative precept etc." 
61Hediah, Ebed ha-Melekh, comm. to Yad, Yesodei ha-Torah, i,1. 
See also Stern, Shemuel Tuvia, Respansa ha-Shavit, (Jerusalem, 1970), 
novellae on Yad, ibid., who draws the same distinction in answer to 
how G-d can command a knowledge which itself is unattainable. 
Belief, he writes, continues where the limits of one's knowledge 
ends. 
62Aaron ha-Levi of Barcelona, putative author, Sefer ha-Hinnukh, 
(Venice, 1523, rpt. Jerusalem: Eshkol, n.d.), Mitzvah 25. 
63"And all of this concerns the matter of fulfilling the command-
ment, and the commandment is to be actively fulfilleci by lmowing 
this." Eliezer Menachem of Shakh, Abi Ezri, (Jerusalem, 1948), 
comm. to Yad, Yesodei ha-Torah, i,7. 
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64 Twersky, I., "Some Non-Halakic Aspects of the Mishne Torah," 
Jewish Medieval and Renaissance Studies, ed. Altman A., (Cambridge, 
Harvard Univ. Press, 1967), pp. 95-118. 
65Ibid., p. 99. 
66Ibid., n. 13. 
67 Kesef Mishne, comm. to Yad, Melakhim, xi,1. 
68 Sanh. 93b. 
69 Lam. 2:2. 
70 Sanh. 91b. 
71Kesef Mishne parenthetically concludes: 
he wrote that R. Akiba bore hisarmour requires 
which [source] he brings it." 
72see infra., notes to ch. iii.1, end. 
73Intro. to Maim. Code., p. 298. 
"Nevertheless, what 
investigation from 
74soloveichik, Joseph B., Ish ha-Halaka, (Jerusalem: Alpha 
Press, 1979), p. 31. 
75 Deut. 17:11, 28:14. 
76 Lev. 18:30. 
77Trani, Moses b. Joseph, Kiryat Sefer, (Venice, 1551), comm. 
to Yad, Melakim, xii, p. 576. 
78"s N' Hal k" A II 115 orne on- a 1c spects •.. , p. . 
79Ma· h" lf f . d" . . f h La 1m. 1mse re ers to a tr1partate 1v1s1on o t e w: 
"Thus all [the commandments] are bound up with three things; 
opinions, moral qualities, and political action." Guide, Part III, 
ch. xxi. Twersky, however, in recapitulating Maimonides with 
subtle variation writes: "Maimonides submits a threefold classi-
fication of the philosophic virutes: intellectual, moral and prac-
tical." "Some Non-Halakic Aspects ... , " p. 104. 
Twersky further combines the moral and practical virtues thus 
obtaining a twofold intention of the law: philosophic and halakic. 
(Ibid, p. 115). However, Maim. himself does not contrast his own 
first category of "opinions" (corresponding to Twersky's classifi-
cation of philosophy) against Twersky's combined category of moral 
and practical-halakic virtues, as Twersky recapitulates. For 
were Miam.'s first category non-practical and non-halakic, he would 
not have included the laws of repentance, sacrifices and fasts, 
within his first category. Guide, Part III, ch. xxxvi, end. 
80see "Halaka," Talmudic Encyclopedia, (Jerusalem: Fmet Press, 
1973), Vol. lX; Ginzberg, .Legends, Vol. VI, p. 448; J.T. Shek. 5. 
It is interesting to note that Rashi, comm. to Kid. 49a, explains 
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the term "Midrash" as: "Sifra and Sifri which are the Halakot of 
[the homiletical interpretations of]the verses." 
81"Some Non-Halakic Aspects ..• ," p. 114. See also Rabinowitz 
corrun. to Maim. , In tro. to the Corrm. on the Mishna, p. 83, n. 6: 
"Because Halaka in it's broad sense includes cognitive wisdom and 
practical wisdom together. And so Maimonides does not distinguish 
between cognitive commandments and practical commandments and taught 
them all in the form of halakic rulings." 
82T .E. ,loc .cit. 
83For this reason Maim. rules that commandments require inten-
tion (mitzvot tzerichot kavannah), Yad, Keriat Shema, ii,1, Tefilla, 
x,1, iv,14,15; Soloveichik, Hayyim ha-Levi, Hiddushei R. Hayyim 
ha-Levi, (Brisk, 1936), comm. to Yad, Tefilla iv,1. The halakic 
authorities who ruled that corrunandments do not need intention 
(mitzvot ein tzerichot kavannah) opted for the micro-halakic approach 
in which ritualistic-HRlaka is completely divorced from intellection 
as an obligation. This latter view is consistent with Caro's 
approach to Halaka in general as we will see further and consequently 
he also ruled mitzvot ein tzerichot kavannah, OH, Sh. Ar., 60:4. 
84soloveichik, Joseph B., Al ha-Teshuva, ed. Peli,P., (Jerusalem: 
Alpha Press, 1979), p. 44. 
85 Isa. 11:9; Yad, Melakhim, xii,S. 
86Maim. began with his Sefer ha-Mitzvot (Book of Commandments), 
which lists the beliefs and rules that were communicated at Sinai. 
1nese beliefs and rules were all specifically aimed at setting G-d 
in the forefront in every action (Yad, Me'zuzah, vi,13). 
Sequentially, Maim. embarked upon his Code beginning with Sefer Maddah 
(Book of Knowledge), whose aim was twofold: Firstly in instructing 
one towards internalising the Sinaitic beliefs through concentrated 
intellection until belief in G-d becomes demonstrative knowledge 
of G-d. This process of internalisation is the 'Halaka' of that 
commandment. Secondly, since it is knowledge which leads to deeds 
and not deed; which lead to knowledge and since "incorrect beliefs 
will lead to incorrect actions," Maim. regarded his Sefer Maddah 
as an overall exordial presentation of the ways of Halaka precursory 
to the rules of Halaka. ("For if knowledge is not achieved, no 
right action and no correct opinion can be achieved" [Guide, 
Part III, ch. xxxvi]). The remainder of the Code deals primarily 
with rules and halakic ritual. However, Maimonides was keenly 
aware how overpreoccupation with ritual can alienate one from the 
Reneral purpose and intention of the law and may well produce 
a student of Halaka [who] can become an expert in legal matters 
and a pagan in matters of belief " (Hartman, op.cit., p. 64). 
Therefore, Maim. diligently employed chapter titles and other devices 
such as perorations, exegetical comments, interpretive embellisl~ents, 
parenthetic explanations and assorted pretexts, to skilfully inter-
weave the rules together with the ways throughout the Code until 
the Code itself ultimately reaches a crescendo in a climatic restora-
tion of the rules together with the ways to the extent that the 
"entire earth is filled with knowledge of G-d." See Twersky, 
Intro . to Maim. Code, . p. 372. 
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87 See Rosenbaum, Asher b. Abraham, Shevilei Asher, (Tel Aviv, 
1960), comm. to Yad, Melahl1im, xii, who remarks on the educative 
goal which connec~ the first and last laws of Maim.'s Code. 
88Guide, Part III, ch. xiii. 
89 
Intra. to Maim. Code, p. 372. 
90"Knowledge leads to practice" Maim., Intra. to the Corrm. 
on the Mishna, p. 79; Twersky, Intra. to Maim. Code, p. 511, n. 390. 
91see Yad, Mezuza, vi, 13; and Guide, Part III, ch. xxxvi, for 
~him .'s reason for including the laws of re~entance, sacrifices 
and fasts in his Sefer Maddah; and Twersky s illustration of the 
Sabbath, Intra. to Maim. Code, p. 360, n. 18. 
92 Lev. 19-20; Ex. 21-24. 
93 Ish ha-Halaka, p. 84. See also Rashi and Sifra, ed. Weiss, 
(Vienna, 1862), comms. to Lev. 25:3, "'If ye walk in my ordances;' 
one might think that this denotes the fulfillment of the commandments, 
but when Scripture states, 'And ye shall keep my commandments and 
do them,' it is plain that in this passage there is mentioned the 
the fulfillment of the commandments. How then must I explain 
'If ye walk in my commandments?' As an admonition that you should study 
the Torah labouriously. See also Twersky who in explanation 
of the influence of Maim. on R. Moses of Couey (Sefer Mitzvot Gado l) 
writes: "Study per se is 'practical' and need not anchor itself 
in an external and self-transcending view. The word of G-d has 
itsown enduring relevance, its own continuity and integrity. If 
by studying divine law one is 'thinking G-d thoughts' eternity 
and temporality meet and there is no room for a present oriented 
slopism." Intra. to Maim. Code, p. 210. 
94"The Shulhan 'Aruk," p. 153. 
95Ibid., p. 154. 
96Ibid., p. 153, n. 35, end. 
97 Sh.Ar., OH, 1:1. See also Rema's concluding guideline to 
OH: "But he that is of a merry heart hath a continuing feast" 
(Prov. 15:15), as a halakic basis for indulging in special merriment 
and festive repasts on the 14th day of the first month of Adar 
during a leap ·year, because of thecontinualmiracles that recur 
in our times. In the same way that Rema concluded OH with an ethical 
Halaka (rather than simply on a pleasing note) so did Rema naturally 
begin OH with an ethical Halaka as well. See Ha-Kohen, Israel Meir, 
~1ishna Berura, (Warsaw, 1892-98, rpt. New York: Edison, n.d.), 
OH, 697:1.[5Jand Margolis, Mordechai, Sha'arei Teshuva, (Printed in 
std. eds. of Sh.Ar.), OH, ad loc. See also Nissim, Yitzchak, 
Res~nsa Yein ha-Tov, (Jerusalem, 1947), OH, No. 1, who discusses 
Rema s principleas aHalaka rather than simply a preamble. Specifi-
cally regarding whether this Halaka of Rema applies only during 
prayer or at other times as well. 
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98Guide, Part III, ch. lii; It is significant to note Rema's 
editing of the Guide exerpt, which indicates a somewhat different 
intention from Maim. 
99s M . ee ovsow~tz, 
Aviv, 1973), comm. to 
100 Aboth, ch. v; 
Mordekhai Solomon, Salmei Mordekhai, (Tel 
Yad, Yesodei ha-Torah, i. 
Ps. 57:9; Sh.Ar., OH, 1:1. 
101Even Ganzfried, Solomon b. Joseph, Kitzur Shulchan Arukh, 
(Levov, 1860), whose purpose was to "abridge" the Shulchan Arukh, 
found it impossible to omit the Laws of Ethics and therefore 
included them in his condensed version despite Caro's omission of 
these Laws. 
102"The Shulhan 'Aruk," p. 142, n. 2. 
103scholem, Gershom, Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism, (New 
York: Schocken Books, 1941), p. 95. 
104yad, Mezuzah, vi, 13; "For if knowledge is not achieved, no 
right action and no correct opinion can be achieved." Guide, 
Part III, ch. xxxvi. 
105"You know that I have said that opw10ns do not last unless 
they are accompanied by actions that strengthen them, make them 
known, etc." Guide, Part II, ch. xxxi. See also Hartman 's discussion 
how Halaka for the philosopher differs in quality than Halaka for 
others, Philos. Ques4 pp. 126, 195: and Hartman's description of 
how the halakic Jew relates all his activities to G-d, ibid., p. 87. 
See also Guide, Part III, ch. li, "Know that all the practices of 
the worship, such as the reading of the Torah, prayer and the per-
formance of other commandments, have only the end of training you 
to occupy yourself with His commandments, may He be exalted,but not 
with that which is other than He." See Twersky's discussion of 
this qu.ote, In tro. to Maim. Code, pp. 394-7, and p. 511, n. 390. 
106see also Stern, op.cit.,who distinguishes between command-
ments in which fulfilling the activity of the commandment leads 
one to greater wisdom yet does not in itself constitute wisdom 
and the first commandment in which the fulfillment of its activity 
itself involves wisdom and hence is described by Maim. as a pillar 
of wisdom (amud hokhma). 
107Twersky himself elaborates far more extensively on the 
influence of law upon philosophy than on the influence in the 
reverse direction of philosophy upon law throughout his discussion 
of reciprocity between the two disciplines. 
108Intro. to Maim. Code, pp. 298, 198. 
109several instan~es which manifest this phenomenon will bemen-
tioned briefly in the remaining portion of this Exordium and 
throughout the 'work we will document fully how the Rabbis employed 
a kind of "Rabbinic logic" in applying philosophical and metaphysical 
data to resolve halakic issues. 
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intro. See also Tosefta, Sanh.viiend, which records that Hillel 
the Elder had seven norms of interpretation. (Second half of the 
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T.E. , Vol. IX, p. 254, nn. 186-88. Cf., Landau, op.cit. 
1230tajes, Zevi Jlirsch, "Torat Neviim ," Darkhei Hora' ah, 
(Zolkiew, 1893), Part II, pp. 251-53. 
124Ibid. 
125Lieberman, Saul, ed., Introduction, Hilkot ha-Yerushalmi, 
(New York : Jewish Theological Seminary, 1947 . 
126Intro. to Maim. Code, p. 348, n. 48. 
127Elon, Menachem, Ha-Mish~at Ha-Ivri, (Jerusalem: Magnes 
Press, 1981), Vol. I, p. 145 an n. 14 
128S.f . 1 r1, (Venice, 1546), Beha'alotkha, 9:1; Rashi, Gen . 33 :1 
129M· h Ed 8 7 1s na, ~· : . 
130Tchernowitz, Hayyim (Rav Zair), Toledoth ha-Posekim: 
History of the Jewish Codes, Jubilee Committee, (New York, 1946), 
Vol. I, pp. 24-29. 
131The Talmud and Midrash which preceded it, "immersed Aggada 
and Halaka together in the same doug~" ibid. 
132Mikilta, attributed to Rabbi Yishmael, (Amsterdam, 1712), 
~lishpatim, ch. xiii. 
133R Za' . 29 9 av 1r, op. c1 t. , p. , n. . 
134samuel Ha-Nagid, Introduction to the Talmud, "Hali .kot Olam, 
Joshua b. Joseph ha-Levi, (Venice, 1545). 
135 Erub. 13b. 
136au 1 . f h 1 d' . 'd . . 11 . '1 r ana ys1s o t e ta mu 1c 1nc1 ent 1s essent1a y s1m1 ar 
to those of Joseph b. David of Pinczow, Rosh Yosef, (Amsterdam, 1707), 
B.M. 59b; Josef of Candia, Ta'alumoth Hokhma, (Bascilla, 1639), 
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intention of the verse, even though its time has passed, is itself 
a practical difference. See supra, n: 93. 
145J b . aco s, op.clt., p.x. 
146Ibid., pp. 345-46. 
147 Grunfeld, Intra., Horeb, pp. xliv-xlv. 
148Pirkei de Rabbi Eliezer< attributed to Eliezer ha-Gadol b. 
Hyrcanus, (Constantinople, 1514), ch. xvi, end. 
149 Sonnenfeld, Joseph Hayyim, Salmat Hayyim, (Jerusalem, 1938), 
Part I. No. 40. 
150see for example Vidal, Maggid Mishna, (printed in std. eds. 
of Yad), comm. to Shekhenim, xiv, 5, who comments on the law of 
dina debar metzra: "With regards to all this, it would not have 
been proper to command [about] details. For the Torah's comman~ 
apply at all times, in every period and under all circusmtances, 
whereas man's characteristics and his behaviour vary depending 
upon the time and the individual." If this be the case regarding 
man's ethical actions, how rnuch more difficult would it be to 
command details regarding man's religious thinking. 
151"Do J . h Tr d" . R . " 68 es ewls a ltlon ecognlze ... , p. . 
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152Th· f . . .bl d d .f . f ~s act ~s qu~te poss~ y a mo ern ay matn - estat~on o : 
"They shall not find a clear Halaka or clear Mishna in any place." 
Shab. 139a. 
153 Jacobs, op.cit., p. x. 
154Baer, Yitzchak, Yisrael ba-Arrrnjm, (Jerusalem: Massad Bialik, 
1955), ch. vi and p. 39. 
155rbid. pp. 103-4, p. 112 and p. 102. 
156see examples of laws of charity ioid., pp. 41-44; laws of 
purity, ibid., p. 52; laws of halipin (acquisition through symbolic 
exchange), ibid., p. 44, and many others. 
157Baer, (ibid., p. 44), shows that the evangelical preaching 
against the non-believers who worry today about tomorrow's food, 
in Sermon on the Mountain, originates in ancient Jewish teachings; 
so do the institutions of monastaries, asceticism, and Nazaritism, 
ibid., p. 48. On stoic influence, see ibid., p. 37. 
158Even regarding philosophy of practice Baer writes, (ibid., 
p. 10): "The rationales of the laws are not, according to this , 
matters of Judaism exclusively for esoteric groups which do not 
decide [the law]." (Emphasis added.) Possibly Baer included 
philosophy in practice under the former category. 
159. . Hartman, op.c~t., p. 26; Baer, op.cit., p. 103. 
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1Derekh Eretz Zuta, (printed in std. eds. of the Talmud), 
ch. i. Other sources have enumerated various totals consisting 
of different names. For a full bibliography and discussion on this 
topic see Higger, Michael, Mesekhtoth Zeirot (Minor Tractates), 
(New York: Bloch Publishing, 1929), pp. 129-31; Higger, Tractate 
Derekh Erez. (New York: Debay Rabanan, 1935), p. 63, n. 49 and 
pp. 68-69, nn. 49-51. 
2Ezek. 34: 31; Rashi, ad loc. , states that the term "men" 
is used in connection with the laws of impurity, based on the text 
in Numb. 19:14, "When a 'man' dieth in a tent'; B.~1. 114b. 
3Nid. 70b. The wife of Lot became a pillar of salt in Gen. 
19:26; Elisha restored the son of the Shunamite to life in I Kings 
4:35. Rashi, Nid., ad loc., discusses whether the child conveyed 
impurity before or after his restoration to life. 
4Presumably it could have been any of the nine cited in DEZ, 
loc.cit. This is implied in the query. 
5R. Isserlein is also called Nesi ha-Nesiim, Chief of Chiefs,se~ 
Mintz, Moses, Responsa of Moses Mintz, (Thessalonike: M. Nahman 
and D. Yisraligah, 1802), No. 12. 
6Edels , Samuel Eliezer b. Judah ha-Levi, Maharsha, Hiddushei 
Maharsha, (printed in std. eds. of the Talmud), ad loc., explains 
that the talmudic authorities disagreed with the philosophers 
of their times concerning Creation and natural phenomena. There-
fore the talmudic authorities considered three of the questions 
raised by Alexandrians (who were the followers of the philosophers) 
as, "nonsense." 
7 Lev. 20:10. 
8Erub. 43a-b. Terumat ha-Deshen, (Warsaw: N. Schriftgisser, 
1882), Pesakim u'Ketavim, Part II, No. 102, p. 22. Generally 
the questions in TO were posed by R. Isserlein himself and may have 
had practical implications. However, the question in our text 
involved an actual case presented to R. Isserlein for a decision. 
This fact emerges from Ha-Cohen, Malakhi, Yad Malakhi, (New York: 
Beit ha-Sefer, 1974), Part II, p. 203, who states that the Shakh 
(Ha-Cohen, Shabbetai b. Meir, printed in std. eds. of Sh.Ar.) 
stated that the questions in Part I of TO were provided by R. Isserlein 
himself whereas the questions Part II of TO were actual cases. See 
also Shakh, comm. to Sh.Ar., YO, 196:11.[20]. 
9Kesef Mishne, Yad, Mamrim, ii, 1. Compare Keseph Mishne's 
explanation on the "sealiug of the Talmud" to that of Karelitz, 
Abraham Isaiah (Chazon Ish), Iggeroth, (Jerusalem: S. Greiniman, 
1954-55), Part II, No. 24. This matter is also discussed by Rabinowitz, 
Abraham Hirsch, The Jewish Mind, (Jerusalem: Hillel Press, 1978~ 
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p. 208, n. 38; and Hartman, Philos. quest, p. 125. 
lOTh f. t . M K . d . h . d. . e 1rs passage 1n •• 1s treate 1n t e ensu1ng 1scuss1on. 
The second passage in Kid. 13b, will be dealt with infra, Ch. vi. 
For a complete list of the halakic works which noted the variance 
between R. isserlein's ruling and these two passages see Ozar 
ha-Posekim, ed. Herzog, Isaac ha-Levi, (Jerusalem, 1947, comm. to 
Sh.Ar., EE, 17:1. 
11Falcon, David, Bnei David, (Constantinople: Jonah b. Jacob, 
1738), novellae to Yad, Yesodei ha-Torah, ix, 1. 
12other eds. of M.K. state, "who t~ught him Torah." See 
Rabbinovicz, Raphaela, ed. Dikdukei Soferim, (New York: M.P. Press, 
1976), M.K. 26a. 
13n Kings 2:12. 
14E1· . h 1 f . . . lJa constant y reappears rom t1me to t1me commenc1ng 
with saintly persons. How can this be the guiding instance for 
rending on a loss by death. See Soncino Talmud, M.K. 26a, p. 164, 
n.6. 
15 M. K. , loc . cit. 
16Maim., Corrm. to the Mishna, Hul., vii, 7. 
17 Yom 28b; Kid. 82a. 
18n Kings 2:16. 
19II Chron. 21:12; Rashi, Radak (Kimchi, David), and Malbim 
(Meir Loeb b. Jehiel Michael), Chron., ad loc. all state that the 
letter was written after Elijah's ascension. TI1e comms. of Rashi, 
Radak, and Malbim are printed in most standard editions of the 
Bible. 
20Radak and Altschuler, David, Metzudat David, (printed in 
std. eds. of the Bible), Chron. ad. loc., offer an alternate 
explanation. Elijah dictated the letter in a prophesy to one of 
the prophets. The prophet in turn, wrote the letter, not Elijah. 
See our discussion on this point infra, ch. iii.3. 
21Attiah, ·Isaac b. Isaiah, Zera Yitzchak, (Leghorn: Yaakov 
Nunes Wise and Raphael Mildola, 1793), Pilpelet Kol She-hu, No. 11. 
22 Shab. 30a. 
23see Menachem b. Solomon (Meiri), Beit ha-Bechira, ed. 
Sterlitz, S., (Jerusalem, 1937), comm. to M.K. loc.cit.: "One may 
only r end in the event of death and not for the living, even if one 
were to be certain of never seeing his master again. Although the 
Talmud asserts that Elisha rent despite Elijah's remaining alive 
the Talmud interjects that since Elisha saw Elijah no more Elijah 
were as dead to him, the secret of the Lord is on those who fear 
Him ( Ps. 25:14) . " It is plain from here that Meiri' s usage of the 
psalmist's expression, "the secret," means that although he arrives 
at a similar conclusion to R. Attiah, he had great difficulty in doing so. 
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1u Kings 2:1 
2r Kings 17:1 
III. NaTES 
1we have cognomenced the author of this responsum anonymously 
since this responsum does not exist in any of the published material 
available to date on the Responsa of the Geonim and consequently 
we are unable to ascertain his correct identity. Tosaf., B.M. 
114b, s.v. mahu, seem to be the sole source for the existence of 
this responsum. 
4see infra., n. 7. 
5r Olron . 8 :27. 
6r Clrron. 17:3; the inference being that since Elijah was a 
priest it was incumbent upon her to first give him "challah" 
priestly share of dough. 
7The widow is a symbolic reference to Israel (lam . l), who are 
in exile (Babylon) separated from her husband the Almighty. Elijah's 
request to the widow to prepare his cake before her mvn was not 
because as a priest he was entitled to challah, (supra, n. 6), but 
rather he was intimating that he would appear before the Messiah; 
Seder Elijahu Rabbah, ed. Friedmann, Meir (Ish Shalom), (Jerusalem : 
Wahrman books, 1969), ch. xviii, pp. 97,98. The words. "why are 
you so distressed over this matter," appear in Seder Elijah Zuta, 
ed . Friedmann, ibid. , ch. xv, p. 199. Other eds • have: "They 
asked him: 'Give us a sign for what you have imparted.' He said 
to them: 'Is it not written, etc." Friedmann, SER, ibid. In his 
introduction to SER, Friedmann points out that this responsum is 
of great historical value in dating the authorship of SER. The 
style of language proves that this passage is not from the original 
SER, but from a later ed. This is evident by the fact that in all 
the narratives related in SER Elijah himself is the narrator. Here, 
however, rather than saying: "I came and stood before them," it 
says: "Elijah appeared and stood before them." Notwithstanding 
Friedmann's comment, other eds. of SER have the rendition "I came 
to them and stood before them and I said to them." See SER, ed. 
Salant, Uri Ze'ev, (Lemberg, 1870). On the problem of dating the 
authorship of SER, see Friedmann, Intro . to SER, and Zunz-Albeck, 
Derashot, cited in "Tanna De-Vei Eliyahu," Encyclopedia Judaica, 
Vol. iW . 
8Tosaf ., B.M. loc. cit. See also Asher b. Yehiel, Tosaf ha-Rosh, 
ed. Hirschler, M., (Jerusalem, 1959), B.M. ibid., who states explicitly 
that one must necessarily conclude that Elijah did not subscribe 
either to his refutation of Rabba b. Abbaha, B.M. ibid., or to his 
refutation of the Sages in SER,loc.cit. See also Chajes, Z.H., 
Novellae to Ta 'an 3a, and Tosaf. , Ta' an. , ibid. 
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9see Chajes, 8.~1. loc.cit.; Jacob b. Samuel, Beit Ya'akov, 
(Dyhernfurth, 1696), No. 130; Rappaport, Judah ha-Kohen, Battei 
Kehuna, (Izmir, 1736). Beth Din. No. 23; see the solution of Spira , 
Nathan Nata, Matzoth Shimurim, (Venice, 1680), Isa. 41:27, and cf. 
to solutions of Radbaz and ha-Ari, infra, n. 28. 
10Rashi, B.M., loc.cit.; Rashi's source seems to be PdRE, 
ch. xxix . Michaelson, Ezekiel Zevi, Tirosh ve-Yitzhar, (Lublin, 
1936), No. 71, bibliographs PdRE, loc.cit., as a source for Elijah's 
identity with Phinehas. Friedmann, Intra. to SER, comments that 
Rashi probably preferred this source to PdRE ch. xlix where the 
Phinehas - Elijah identity is even more explicit because it appears 
as a generally accepted opinion in PdRE ch. xxix. Yalkut Shimoni, 
(std. eds.), Numb. 25,is also similar to Rashi. However, it is 
unlikely Yalk. ibid., was Rashi's source as the Yalk. was unknown 
to Rashi, according to Zunz - Albeck, Derashot, cited in "Yalkut," 
E.J., Vol. XVI. . 
11Midrash Mishle, ed. Buber, (Wilna, 1893), Prov., ch. ix; 
Michaelson, op.cit. 
12I Kings 17; Tosaf. B.M. 114b, s.v. amar. 
13Radak, I Kings 17:17; Peretz b. Elijah of Corbeil, Tosaf . 
Rabbenu Peretz, (Jerusalem, 1969-70), B.M. loc.cit; Guide, Part I, 
ch. xlii; Ashkenazi, Bezalel, Shitta Mekubbezeth, (Amsterdam, 1721)~ 
B.M., loc.cit; Landau, Ezekiel ha-Levi, Doresh Le-Zion, (Prague, 
1817), p. 9. 
14Nid. 70b. 
15K· 1 . 18 23 1ngs, OC.Clt., VS. , • 
16Luria, David Biur ha-Radal, comm. to PdRE, ch. xxxiii, [4], 
elaborates on this point. 
17 J. T. Suk. , ch. v; Gen. R. , ch. xcviii; Midrash Shocher To.r , 
ed. Buber ,(Vilna 1891),ch. xxvi, 7. 
18This remonstration is not difficult. Scripture's reference 
to Amittai -"the son of truthfulness," could be referring to Jonah's 
mother, a non-Jewess herself a convert, who declared; "Now I know ••. 
that the word of the Lord in thy mouth is truth," I Kings 17:24; 
see Zohar, Ex. p. 197a, cited in Radal, PdRE,ch. xxxiii, [10]. 
Horeover, the son of truthfulness might refer to Jonah's stature 
as a prophet. He was also known as the person of truth because 
his prophecy concerning the restoration of Israel's borders under 
Jerobam: "from the entering of Hamath unto the sea of the plain" 
(II Kings 14:25h \vas explicitly fulfilled. See Jonah, (New York, 
Mesorah Pub., 1980), Art Scroll Series, p. 49, n. 1. Finally, it 
is feasible that Jonah's resurrection became proof that Elijah \vas 
the prophet of truth. Indeed that concept was imbedded in his o\m 
name. See "Overview," Jonah, Art Scroll. If Jonah's mother was 
herself a convert, Radbaz s next question is answered as well. 
19Kings, loc.cit., v. 12. 
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20Tosaf ., B.M. 114b, s.v. amar, based on the principle, 
"1here is nothing that can standbefore the duty of saving a life." 
Yom. 62a, 65b, and Shab. 132a. 
21Pes. 64b; J.T. Shek. 6:3; J.T. Yom. 1:4; see also "Ein 
Somchin al ha-Nes," T.E., Vol. I, on the exposition of this 
principle. 
22 I.e., since his own act would be inconsequential. 
23 See Radak, I Kings 17:21. 
24Kings, loc.cit., v. 19. 
251he penalty of sacrificing outside the Temple, is subject 
to death by Divine Visitation (kareth) which was lifted because 
Eli~ah issued a special dispensation for the sake of sanctifying 
G-d s name. See also Sifri, Deut. 18:15, ed. Friedmann, (Vienna, 
1864); Yeb. 9; Yad, Yesodei ha-Torah, ix,3. For exposition of 
this rule see "Hora'at Sha'ah," T.E., Vol. VIII. Although in this 
instance Elijah received a special dispensation by the word of G-d, 
as it is writ ten: "I have done all these things at thy word" 
I Kings 18:36, (Rashi ad lac; J.T. Meg. 1:11; Numb. R., ch. xiv; 
Lev. R. ch. xxii; Lechem Mishne, comm. to Yad, Yesodei ha-Torah, ix,3), 
we are nevertheless enjoined to hearken his command even lt he himself 
issued the dispensation independently. See Tosaf., Yeb . 90b; 
Tosaf., Sanh . 89b . Were Elijah to issue the dispensation because 
of such a receival by the word of G-d, he would have been authorised 
to issue the dispensation not only temporarily but permanently as 
well, even if not for the purpose of sanctifying His name. See 
Tosaf., Sanh . ibid., Tosaf Yom Tov, Yeb. 90b, s.v. kemo . See also 
Cha j es, Tor at NeVlim, ch. iii, who disagrees. However, Bal::ad, 
Joseph, Minchat Hinnukh, (Levov, 1869), 51b, is of the opinion that 
according to Maim., Yad, Yesodei ha-Tora, loc.cit., a prophet is 
authorised to issue a special dispensation only if received by word 
of G-d. See also Tosaf. R. Peretz, B.M. 114b, s.v. amar who seems 
to accord with Minchat Hinnukh. 
26Kings, loc.cit., vs. 18, 24. 
27 Ber. 19b, 20a; Naz. 47b, 48a; Meg. 36; B.K. 81a . 
281herefore, Elijah preferred to allow Rabba b. Abbuha to 
believe he was actually a priest rather than simply the reincarnation 
of one. Responsa of Radbaz, (Venice, 1749h Part VI, No . 2203. 
Luriah, Isaac b. Solomon (ha-Ari), also resolves the contradiction 
of Elijah 's different genealogy 's by employing the theorx of Elijah 's 
metempsychosis. See Vital, Hayyim, "Sefer ha-Gilgulim, ' Ez Hayyim, 
(Jerusalem, 1912), chs. li-lii, and "Sha'ar ha-Gilgulim," Shemonah 
Sha'arim, (Jerusalem, 1863), Intra. 32. 
29Bleich, J. David, Contemporary Halakic Problems, (New York : 
Yeshiva Univ. Press, 1977), Vol. I, pp. 389-91. 
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30see Me'iri~Perush le-Sefer Tehilim,(Jerusalem, 1936), 
comm. toPs. 119:26; Yom. 79a; Mei'iri, Beit ha-Bechira, notes by 
Hirschenson, (Jerusalem, 1885), Yom. ibid.; See Rashi Yom., ibid., 
s. v. eis; Ber. 63a; Rashi., Ber. ibid. ; See Rashi and Radak conrns. 
to Ps-:-Toc.cit., who interpret the verse: "Now when it is time to act 
in the Lord's cause, they have destroyed Thy teaching," in its 
reversed order: "They destroyed Thy teaching [i.e., Torah] because 
now is the time to. act in the Lord's cause." Thus they applied 
the verse in its reversed order as pertaining to the phenomenon of 
the special dispensation. 
31 Meg. 27a. See Sofer, Moses, Respansa Hatam Sofer, (Pressbourg, 
1885), OH, No; 98. 
32
see R~. Hatam Sofer, ibid; Rashi, Sanh. 65b, s.v. ibara 
gavra; Free n, H., notes to Soncino ed. Sanh. ibid., p. 4~ 
nn. 8-9. --
33Michaelson, op.cit. 
34Elijah b. Moshe Hayyim, Midrash Eliyaha, (Levorno, 1862), 
Derush III. Michaelson proves that the righteous do not defile 
others from Ket. 103b: "On the day that Rabbi died priesthood ceased." 
(Although Michaelson employs the term ''priesthood," in Ket. ibid., 
the term "holiness" is used.) Tosaf., Ket. ibid., s.v. otto relates 
that R. Hayyim the Priest said that he had been present during 
Rabbenu Tam's death, he would have occupied himself with the latter's 
burial. 
35 Supra, n. 31. The accepted halakic ruling, however, accords 
with the opinion of R. Joshua b. levi who differs with R. Johanan, 
Meg., loc.cit., and maintains that a house of study is of a greater 
level of sanctity than a synagogue, and therefore a synagogue may 
be converted to a house of study. 
36II Kings 25:9. 
37sanh. 65b· Ashkenazi, Zevi Hirsch, Responsa Hakham Zevi, 
(Amsterdam, 1712), No. 93- this responsum will be discussed at 
length, lupra, ch. vi.1; Halakot Gedolot, attributed to Yehudai 
Geon and or Simeon Kayyara, (Vienna, 1811), 61a. 
38 Although some of the commentators to SER attempted to resolve 
the question by suggesting that those Sages who argued that Elijah 
was a descendant of Leah were referring to Levi son of Leah, and 
those same Sages asked the sequelent question whether Elijah was a 
priest. However, this reasoning is entirely erroneous. For the 
same excerpt in SER is quoted practically verbatum in Yalk., Kings, 
208 with the following variation: "Once our Rabbis differed 
[concerning Elijah's ancestry]. There were those who said he was 
from Gad and those who said he was from Benjamin. He [Elijah] 
came and appeared before them saying: Rabbis, why do you argue. 
I am from the children of Rachel. They said to him. Are thou not 
a Priest? etc." Likewise, in Gen. R., ch. lxxi,8, we find: "On 
one occasion our Rabbis debated about him, some maintaining that he 
belonged to Gad, others, to the tribe of Benjamin. Whereupon 
Elijah appeared to them saying: Rabbis I am a descendant of Rachel." 
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And in Ex. R., ch. xl, 4, "R. Eliezar b. Pedat said: Elijah 
was a Jerusalmite, a member of the Chamber of the Hewn Stone, from 
the city of Judah." See comm. of Mirkin, Ex. R., ibid. Friedmann, Intro. 
to SER, quotes other instances where Elijah's ancestry relates to 
Gad. This is also exact in the wording of some of the eds. of SER, 
i.e., ed. Salant, (Lemberg, 1870; Lublin, 1899, Warsaw, 1873), 
which have : "This one said that Elijah was a descendant of Leah 
and this one said that he was a descendant of Rachel. Elijah 
appeared to them saying: Rabbis, why do you quarrel? I am a 
descendant from none other than Rachel. [Thereupon] they asked 
[Elijah]: Are thou not a Priest?" The transition from singular 
to plural suggests that even those who advocated Elijah ' s descendance 
from Rachel asked whether Elijah was a priest. Our conclusion is 
also born out of Vital, Sefer ha-Gilgulim, ch. xxxv, p. 52. R. 
Vital identifies Elijah as a descendant of Gad the son of Leah and 
Benjamin the son of Rachel. It is quite surprising that Friedmann, 
who devoted an entire introductory chapter to a discourse on Elijah's 
ancestry, was unaware of this problem. 
39There is room to say that the Sages disputed Elijah's or1g1n 
along two sepa'rate categories, one concerning his body and the other 
concerning his soul. Indeed we find R. Heida divulges that the 
Sages disputed Elijah's origin along two categories, one concerning 
his human feature, the other concerning his angel feature. See 
Heida, Samuel, Zikkukin de~Nura, comm. to SEZ (Prague, 1676), ch. xv . 
Heida's treatment of the said dispute will be elaborated upon infra, 
ch . ix. 
40 J .T. Suk . 5:1; Yalk., Jonah 350; PdRE, ch. xxxiii; Radal, 
Intro . to PdRE, [2]. 
41see Zikkukin de-Nura, ch. xviii and Israel b. Benjamin of 
Belzec, Yalkut Hadash, lJJblin, 1648,) No. 12, s.v. Elijah. 
4~ishnat Rabbi Eliezer , ch. vnL The Mishna reads: "Jonah 
was vouchsafed great stature in that he was equalled to Elijah . 
This is so because G-d commissioned Elijah, 'And Jehu the son of Nima 
[thou shalt annoint him to be King over Israel.' (I Kings 19:160)]. 
Elijah [in turn] commissioned Elisha and Elisha assigned Jonah to 
annoint him [Jehu] as it is written 'And Elisha the prophet called 
one of the sons of the prophets [identified in Seder Olam Rabbah 
with Jonah] ••• and look out there for Jehu ••• then take the vial of 
oil, etc. [II Kings 9:1-4]. From here one learns that a man ' s agent 
is equivalent to himself [Ber. 34b] ." 
43Although the Mishna relates that Jonah was equalled to Elijah 
because Jonah executed a ?erfmtctory task initially commissioned to 
Elijah (see previous note), this is merely an indication of their 
equality, however, the Mishna does not disclose what the essence 
of their equality was based on. 
44see Midrash Shocher Tov, ch. xxvi, 7: "Jonah the son of the 
\vidow of Zaraphath entered Paradise during his lifetime and in his 
glory ." And Yalk. Hadash, loc .cit., no. 3: "Jonah feared that since 
he was the son of Joseph, the people ot Ninve would wage against 
him the war of Gog and Magog and subsequently he would be killed." 
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45see su~~ n. 10,where we explained Rashi's preference in 
sourcin? Elija s priesthood to PdRE, ch. xxix, rather than to ~· 
Eliezer s statement in PdRE, ch. xlvii, because the statement in 
ch. xxix is brought as a generally accepted opinion by the author 
of PdRE. Although the author of PdRE is unknown, its putative 
author is R. Eliezer b. Hyrcanus. See Radal, Intra. to PdRE; 
PdRE, ed. G. Friedlander, Intra., (London, 1911), p.xiii; 
Zunz-Albeck, ha-Derashot be-Yisrael, (Jerusalem: Massad Bialik, 1947), 
pp. 134-40. Even if one were to contest R. Eliezer's authorship of 
PdRE thereby disqualifying him as the originator of the statement 
in ch. xxix, inch. xlvii however, R. Eliezer is quoted explicitly 
as relating Elijah to Phinehas the priest. 
46Albeck, Hanokh, ed. Genesis Rabbah (Berlin-J2r., 1902-1940), 
Vol. II, ch. lxxi,8, p. 833, cites Yalk., Arukh (R. Nathan b. Yeheil), 
and Midrash ha-Gadol all of which retain "R. Eliezer." However, 
Albeck, cites other editions which retain "R. Eleazar." One might 
have pointed out the contradiction we have alighted upon in R. Eliezer 
as proof that the editions which retain R. Eliezer are erroneous 
and that "R. Eleazar" is the correct retension, thus sovling the 
contradiction. However, according to this unique explanation of 
Radbaz, one can maintain all the editions as being correct as R. 
Eliezer could also have related Elijah's provenience to Benjamin 
despite his relating Elijah to Levi elsewhere. 
47Ibn Habib, Levi (Maharalbach), Responsa of Maharalbach, 
Venice, 1565, No. 8. 
48Elijah's reproach: "Rabbis, why are you so distressed 
over this matter," is indicative of a fervently heated debate ; 
see supra, n. 7. 
49 See supra, n. 46. 
so I Chron. 8:27; I Kings 17:1; Gen.R., ch. lxxi,9; Yalk., 
Kings 208; see supra, n. 38. 
51"nt... R El" . . d . h h wuenever . 1ezer 1s ment1one w1t no ot er surname , 
this refers to R. Eliezer b. Hyrcanus." Hyman, Aaron, Toledot 
Tannaim ve-Amoraim, (London, 1901-1911), Vol. I, p. 161. R. Eliezer 
studied under the tutelage of R. Johanan b. Zakkai upon the advice 
of Elijah who appeared to him. The Romans were well aware that 
R. Johanan b. Zakkai sought to reconcile peacefully with the Roman 
government and when R. Johanan wished to travel to Rome before the 
Emperor Vespasian, it was R. Eliezer and R. Joshua who bore his bed. 
R. Eliezer lived a long life and was already a Gadol hadar (title 
given to an outstanding personality of his generation) at the age 
of forty during the time of the destruction of the Second Temple 
which he saw with his own eyes. He died after the Bar Cokhba r evolt 
was defeated at Beitar by Emperor Hadrian in 132 BCE, 61 years after 
the destruction. Rashi, Git. 57a. Although R. Akiba was his 
disciple for 13 years prior to the Temple's destruction, we find 
that R. Akiba argues with R. Eliezer in 28 instances in the Mishna. 
It is due to their close comradeship that when R. Eliezer was placed 
under ban (B.M. 59b) it was R. Akiba who was chosen to deliver it to 
him. Hyman, TTA, ibid., pp. 161-167. On R. Eleazar referring to 
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R. Eleazar b. Shemoa, a disciple of R. Akiba, see 
p. 205; Rashi, Shab. 19b, Erub. 38b, Yeb . 72b; 
loc.cit., p. 833, n. 4. R. Eleazar b. Shamoa the 
ciple of R. Akiba (Yeb. 62). He argued with R. 
and with R. Meir (Naz. 7:4, Git. 4:7, B.K. 1:4). 
life (Meg. 27b, Sot. 39b), and died of martyrdom 
Hyman, TIA, loc.cit., pp. 205-210). 
Hyman, TIA, ibid . , 
Albeck, Gen. R., 
priest was a dis-
Eliezer (Tern. 3:3), 
He lived a long 
(Lam. R. ch . ii, 
52 Naz. Sa. Erub. 13b, states: "His name was not R. Meir but 
R. Nehorai. " Hyman, TIA, Vol. III, p. 865, questions how R. Meir 
could have been the selfsame R. Nehorai, as we find R. Meir and R. 
Nehorai disputing one another in Kid, end and in Sanh. 98b, which 
proves that they must have been two separate Tannaim. Hyman 
resolves this by suggesting that R. Meir's contemporary was also 
called R. Nehorai, so in order to avoid confusing R. Meir with his 
contemporary they preferred not to call him Nehorai and therefore 
renamed him Meir thereby retaining the original meaning of his name 
(the Enlightner) . In TIA, Vol. III, p. 918, Hymanidentifies R. 
Meir's contemporary R. Nehorai as one of the Sages of Usha, a 
disciple of R. Joshua, in Naz. Sa. Hyman also identifies R. Nehorai 
as R. Nehemia , in Shab. 147b, a disciple of R. Akiba and colleague 
of R. Meir . However
1 
this seems to contradict Hyman's above resolu-
tion since if R. Meir s contemporary R. Nehorai was the selfsame 
R. Nehemia, there would be no confusion with R. Meir . Unless perhaps, 
R. Nehemia was renamed for the same reason. According to other 
opinions in Shab. 147b, Erub .23b, R. Nehorai was the selfsame R. 
Eleazer b. Arak, the most prominent of R. Johanan b. Zakkai's disciples. 
See TIA, ibid., and in Vol. I, p. 191. Each of these Tannaim who are 
identified with R. Nehorai were contemporaries of R. Akiba. On 
R. Akiba, a student of R. Joshua see Ber. 62b, J.T. Sanh . 1:2. 
S3Although Hyman, TIA, Vol. III, p. 919, identifies R. Nehorai 
of our dispute as an Ammora no conclusive evidence exists whatso-
ever that such· an Ammora even existed. Probably Hyman designated 
R. Nehorai as an Ammora because he thought that R. Eleazar refers 
to R. Eleazar b. Pedat the Ammora. However, Albeck identifies 
R. Eleazar as R. Eleazar b. Shemoa the Tanna -not to mention all 
the editions of Gen. R. which read R. Eliezar who unqeustionably 
refers to R. Eliezar b. Hyrcanus the Tanna. See supr~ nn. 4S,46. 
The only possible evidence to classify this as an ammoraitic dispute 
is from R. Phillipi mentioned in the same passage in Gen. R. ibid. , 
who challenges R. Nehorai. However, R. Phillipi does not appear 
an~vhere else, see Albeck, op.cit., and Hayman, TIA, Vol. III, p. 
1011. It is therefore inconclusive to identify R. Phillipi as 
either an Ammora or a Tanna . 
S3·'-"This account is a condensed version of various excerpts 
from Urbach, Ephraim, The Sages: Their Concepts and Beliefs, 
(Jerusalem : Magnes Press, 1979), ch. xvii, pp. 658-73. The incidents 
concerning R. Johanan ben Zakai are found in Avoth de-Rabbi Nathan, 
J.T., A.Z., and Sanh. 9~ respectively and are cited in Sages, ibid., 
nn. SS,61,62. 
S4B.B. 60b. 
SSSot. 11b, MS Munich, cited in Sages, loc.cit., n. 7S. 
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56These facts are condensed from exerpts in Finkelstein, 
Louis, Akiva: Scholar, Saint and Martyr, (Cleveland: World Pub. 
Co., 1936/1962), pp. 266-71; as well as from Sages, loc.cit. 
57urbach describes the controversy over Messiah's lineage as 
politically biased and a direct result of an increased Messianic 
consciousness. Sages, p. 662. 
58 Sanh. 108a; Isa. 60:22. 
59 Gen. 48,49; Deut. 33; see comms. on Gen. and Deut., ibid ., 
ad.loc. 
60Rachel exemplified benevolence in transferring to Leah the 
signs that Jacob gave her, thus enabling Jacob to mistaken Leah for 
Rachel. Rashi, Gen. 29:25; Meg. 13b; B.B. 123a. 
61The men of the tribe of Gad marched before all the armed 
men during the conquest of the Land. Rashi, Deut. 33:21. See 
also Epstein, Kalonymus Kalman of Cracow, Ma'or ve-Shemesh, (Breslau, 
1842), comrn on Gen. 49:19. 
62 Jer. 31:14-17. 
63see Friedmann, Intro. to SER, p. 9, n. 1, who dates the or1g1n 
of the concept of Messiah b. Joseph to the period subsequent to 
the split of David's Kingdom into the House of Judah and the House 
of Ephraim, specifically, the end of the Rule of Ephraim. Just as 
in Judah it was their belief that the Messiah would emerge from the 
House of David similarly the other tribes of the Northern Kingdom 
believed that the Messiah would emerge from the House of Joseph 
the son of Rachel. Only much later in the time of Bar Cokhba were 
both traditions accepted. However, it is entirely possible that the 
belief that the · _ Messiah would emerge from the offspring of 
Rachel began already during the reign of Saul, much prior to the 
split in David's Kingdom. Saul, being the first King of Israel, 
and a descendant of Benjamin the son of Rachel was probably inter-
preted by many as an indication that the Ultimate King would also be 
a descendant of Rachel. Once David married Michal, the daughter 
of Saul, he united the two concepts. With the division of David's 
Kingdom during the reign of Jeroboam, arose a renewal of the ancient 
dispute among the tribes over who the greater Matriarch was and 
from whose offspring would the Messiah emerge. Hatam Sofer, Part VI, 
Resp. no. 98, explains that because of the split in the kingdom 
of David to the House of David and the House of Joseph, Messiah b. 
Joseph will eventually emerge form the House of Joseph and will 
fight the wars of G-d related in Zech. He will ultimately be 
killed thus enabling David to regain his complete Kingdom over the 
entire Israel. The death of Messiah son of Joseph will atone for 
the historic division of David's Kingdom. Schlesinger, Joseph 
Akiba, Tosafoth b. Yehiel, (Jerusalem, 1905), comm. to SER, loc.cit., 
even goes so far as to say that the different rites of liturgy of 
Ashkenaz and Sefard originated in the Matriarchs. For homology 
between versions of liturgy and the tribes, see Gombiner, Avraham 
Abele b. Hayyim ha-Levi, Magen Avraham, comm to Sh.Ar., OH, 68 . 
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Ashkenaz, being the older tradition originated in Rachel who was 
first in having a king (Saul) from her descent. Sefard, whose old 
tradition was revised by the saintly R. Isaac b. Solomon Luriah 
(ha-Ari) originated in Leah whose descendant David only later (after 
Saul) ascended the throne. Elijah 's response that he descended 
from Rachel confirms this thesis as we find that Elijah himself 
prayed in the old Ashkenaz liturgy rite, in SER, ch.xxi: "Each day 
one should rise up early and say, ' Sovereign of all worlds, Not 
because of our righteous acts do we lay our supplications before 
thee etc." This liturgy is absent in the Sefardic rite. See 
Jacob ben Asher, Arba'ah Turim, (standard editions1, OH, 41. It 
is noteworthy to mention that R. Luriah himselfwasadescendant of 
the House of David. 
Tosaf . b. Yehiel, SER., ibid., comments that the episode of Elijah's 
baking instructions was an intimation that the virtue of observing 
the ordinance of tithes would effect the arrival of redemption. 
64J.T. Ta'an., ch.iv,5; Lam. R., ch. ii,2; Numb. 24:17; 
Urbach, loc.cit., n. 82 . 
65M· h S h h 3 S 673 1s na, an . , c . x, ; ages, p. • 
66This is the conclusion of the Talmud, Erub . 43b and Maim., 
Yad, Melakhim, xii, 2 according to the opinon of Eybeschutz, Jona-
than, Kereit1 u-Fleti, (Vienna, 1819), end of Beit ha-Saphek. See 
also Levi Isaac of Berdichev, Kuntres mi-Gedolei ha-Hasidut, ed. 
Gutman M., (Belgorod, 1930-35), explanation of Ps. 95:7 according 
to Sanh . 98a. Although R. Akiba preceeded the Ammora, R. Joshua 
b . Levi, nevertheless, R. Joshua's exposition of the verse in 
Isaiah was probably well known to the Tannaim. 
67zech. 13:6; Mikhilta de-Rabbi Ishmael, Yitro, Messekhta 
de-baHodesh cited in Finkelstein, op.cit., p. 270 and in Urbach, 
op.cit ., p. 674. 
68Thisdoes nutaccord with Maharsha, Sanh . 97b, who comments 
that n. Akiba applied the apocalyptic verse in Haggai 2:6 to Bar 
Cokhba upon calculation of the verse corresponding to a fixed date. 
69~.Jhen R. Eliezer ' s pupils asked him "What shall a man do to 
save himself from the throes of Messiah's coming?' He replied: 
'Let him occupy himself with the study of Torah and with the practice 
of benevolence (Sanh. 98b)." The printed editions read Eleazar, 
however Dikdukei Soferim has R. Eliezer . In both cases our Tanna 
in SER is R. Eliezer orR. Eleazar (see supra, nn. 46,51), and hence 
this view is in accord with either Tanna. 
70
"R. Eliezer said: H Israel repents, they will be redeemed 
But if not they will not be redeemed . Said . R. Joshua to him: If 
they do not repent they will not be redeemed? Nay the Holy One 
Blessed be He will raise up for them a King whose decrees will be 
as brutal as those of Haman and Israel will repent (Sanh. 97b)." 
Urbach, loc.cit., p. 260, interprets this argument as a dispute 
over a Predetermined End. According to R. Eliezer, there is no 
fixed date for redemption as redemption is dependent solely upon 
repentance. If Israel does not repent there will be no redemption. 
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Furthermore, Urbach contends, R. Eliezer was silent on R. Joshua's 
defiance from the apocalyptic verse in Dan. 12:7, which explicitly 
establishes a predetermined date for redemption, because it was 
precisely this view that R. Eliezer opposed. 
Obviously such an interpretation of the dispute is far fetched. 
R. Eliezer could not possibly contest Daniel's prophecy. R. 
Eliezer was simply indicating that the hastening of Messiah before 
his "due time" is dependent upon repentance. If Israel does not 
repent they will not succeed in hastening the Messiah, nor in 
revoking the catastrophic evenmconcurrent with the Messianic period . 
This is congruous toR. Eliezer's latter statement in Sanh. 98b, 
that the study of Torah and the performance of benevolent acts can 
save one from the throes of Messiah (see supra, n. 69). Hmvever, 
should Israel procastinate their repentance until the "due time," 
then they will be redeemed irregardless of their repentance as 
prophesized by Daniel. The reason R. Eliezer was silent on R. 
Joshua's protest from Daniel was twofold: Firstly becasue Daniel's 
prophecy makes no mention of repentance and therefore is difficult 
toR. Joshua himself who asseverated Israel's forced repentance. 
Furthermore, Daniel's silence on repentance is supportive of R. 
Eliezer who maintains that should Israel procrastinate their repen-
tance until the "due time" they will be redeemed irregardless of 
their repentance. Secondly, R. Eliezer indicated that Israel's 
voluntary repentance would succeed in hastening Messiah before his 
"due time." R. Joshua Is defiance from D.aniel was irrelevant to 
this premise . In R. Eliezer 's view, the verse in Daniel is only 
relevant to the redemption at "due time" to which R. Eliezer \Vas 
in accord, and hence, his silence. See also David b. Naftali Fraenkel 
Karban Edah,(printed in std. eds . of J.T.), comm. to J.T., Taan., ' 
ch. i,1, s.v. istalik : "R. Eliezer agreed with R. Joshua concerning 
a predetermined end." 
Moreover J.T. Ta'an., ibid., attributes the statement "The Holy One 
Blessed be He will raise up a King whose decrees will be as brutal 
as Haman's and Israel will repent" toR. Eliezer and not toR. Joshua. 
This clearly supports our thesis that R. Eliezer himseii accepted 
Daniel's prophecy of a predetermined end. Should Israel volunt)rily 
repent they would succeed in hastening Messiah before his "due time" 
and in revoking the catastrophic events concurrent Hith that r.eriod. 
Ho\vever, should they procrastinate that repentance until the 'due 
time" they would repent forcibly and suffer the throes of the 
Messianic period. Urbach, however, in order to buttress his insinua-
tion that R. Eliezer did not believe in an independent "due time" 
alters our retentions of J.T., Ta'an., ibid ., claiming R. Eliezer 's 
statement to be in error, based on an inconclusive Tanhuma. See 
Sages, p. 996., n. 63. 
71Tosaf. b. Yehiel, comm to SER, ch. A~, n. 2. 
72"All the Sages of R. Akiba's generation were of the opinion 
that Bar Cokhba was the Messiah." Maim ., Yad, tvlelakhim, ch. xi,3. 
73 R.H. lla; Tosaf., R.H. ibid., s.v. beRosh . 
740ur presentation of the dispute concerning which month the 
Israelites are destined to be redeemed is diametrically opposite to 
Urbach (Sages, pp. 271-72) . . R. Eliezer maintained, according to 
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Urbach, that the future redemption will occur in the month of Tishri, 
the first day of which was the anniversary of Creation, the Day of 
Judgement, and the Day of Repentance. That is to say, without 
repentance there will be no redemption. This is, in Urbach's view, 
consistent with R. Eliezer in Sanh. 92, who maintains that there 
is no Predetermined End- contrary to Daniel's prophecy. In supra, 
n. 70, we demonstrated that it is far fetched to suggest that R. 
Eliezer contested Daniel ' s prognostication of a Predetermined End. 
Rather, the redemption of Tishri, the anniversary of Creation, 
Jignifies the natural order of the world, which G-d bestowed upon this 
universe during Creation. Contrary to Urbach, it is precisely 
a fixed date for redemption evolving along its natural course which 
R. Eliezer signified by the Tishri redemption. 
R. Joshua maintained, in Urbach's opinion, that just as the redemp-
tion from Egypt occured on a date fixed at the Covenant of Pieces, 
so also would it be in the coming redemption. Urbach, however, 
i gnores the fact that whether the Egyptian redemption actually occured 
on a fixed date depends on the interpretation of this verse in 
"Covenant of Pieces" : "They will be a stranger in a strange land, 
and will serve them and afflict them 400 years " (Gen . 15:13) . 
If the 400 year period refers to the former part of the verse, i.e . 
that they will be strangers for a period of 400 years, then the 
Egyptian redemption occured on a fixed date (see Nahmanides, comm. 
to Gen, ibid.). If, however, the 400 year period refers to the latter 
part of the verse, i .e . , that the enslavement and affliction \vi ll be su-
stained for 400 years- we find in fact that their actual enslavement 
was sustained for only 210 years (Rashi, Gen. 42:2; Yalk, Bo, 190; 
~nlbim, beShalach, beginning), in which case the Egyptian redemption 
transpired before its fixed date. The Pentateuchal commenta t~rs 
are divided on this issue and there is not the slightest indication 
in R. Joshua ' s statement that he held the former view, as Urbach 
contends, over the latter . In fact, the opposite seems more 
plausible. As we have demonstrated (supra, n. 70), that R. Eliezer 
himself conceived of a Predetermined End, it is illogical to assume 
that R. Joshua adduced the Nisan redemption as proof of a fixed date 
in defial of R. Eliezer . R.ather it is more reasonable to assume 
that R. Joshua held the latter view, that the Nisan redemption of 
Egypt ensued prematurely, prior to its fixed date . According to 
R. Joshua this was probably just another miraculous incident among 
rMny of which were characteristic of the supernatural redemption of 
Nisan. It is to this redemption that R. Joshua likens the future 
redemption. 
75According to ~os· t retentions of SER which haveR . Eliezer. 
See supra, n. 46. 
76 See supra, n. 52 
77Although R. Eliezer maintains that a voluntary redemption is 
capable of hastening the Messiah and even revoking the catastrophic 
events concurrent with the Messianic Era (see supra nn. 69,70), he 
is silent to whether it is capable of procuring Messiah prior to 
Elijah. Elijah ' s emergence from Rachel suggests this minimal con-
sistency . Accordingly, the ability of Israel's volutnary repentance 
to hasten ~1essiah and revoke the Messianic throes is also part of the 
natural process signified by the Tishri redemption (see supra. n . 74) . 
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The view that Elijah's advent must precede even the hastened arrival 
of Messiah is maintained by Gunzberg, Aryeh Leib b. Asher, Turei 
Even , (Metz, 1781), Novellae to R.H. 11b. 
78Maim., Yad, Melakhim, ch. xii, 2, initially asserts unequi-
vocally that Eiijah will arrive at the onset of the Messianic Era . 
However, subsequently, he contineus to say that only some Sages 
opine that Elijah will antecede Messiah. Eybeschutz, Kereti u-Fleti 
(supra n. 66), resolves this difficulty by postulating that in the 
event of Messiah's early arrival, he will not be preceded by Elijah . 
R. Eybeschutz, however, is forced to concede that the Talmud in Erub. 
43b, reversed its original position. It is possible that R. Eliezer 
maintained that the Talmu~ Erub. ibid, did not reverse its original 
position and that the Talmud's conclusion is consistent with its 
original position in that Elijah will precede the Messiah even in 
the event of a premature redemption. 
79This explanation of R. Nehorai's position accords with 
Eybeschutz's explication of Maim. See supra, nn. 66, 78. 
80see Sanh. 97b. 
81 Urbach, Sages p. 899, n. 82 states: "there is not the 
slightest evidence that Bar Cokhba claimed to the related to the 
house of David." However, Maim, Yad, Melakhim, ch. xi, 1-2, im- . 
plicates that Bar Cokhba was of the House of David. Kashey Menachem 
in ha-Tekufa ha-Gedolah, ch. xxi, postulates t~at R. Akiba believed 
Bar Cokhba to be Messiah b. Joseph. This seems to be Rashi ' s 
view as well. See Sanh. 93b, Rashi s.v. Ben Koziba. See also 
Arieli,Gershon (Jerusalem, 1958), comm to Maim., Yad, Melakhim, 
ch. xi, 3. 
82see Tosaf Yom Tov, comm. to Mishna, Ma'as Sh. 
83see Maim., Yad, Melakhim, xi,3; supra, n. 64. 
84 Ex. 3:9. 
85 I Sam. 10:6,9. 
86 Responsa Hatam Sofer, Likkutim, Vol. VI, No. 98. 
87 I Sam. 10:9. 
88sanh . 93b. Seder 'Olam Rabbah, however, (according to the 
reading of Dei Rossi), affirms the length of Bar Cokhba's reign as 
three and a half years. It is possible that the last year marking 
the disastrous siege of BethRr was omitted in the talmudic statement from 
the length of his "reign." See Freedman, comm. to Sanh ., Soncino 
ed., p. 627, n. 4; and Halevi, L, Dorot ha-Rishonim, (Jerusalem, 
1919), 1:5, p. 614. 
89 J.T. Ta'an,4:5; also recorded fully in Lam. R., ch. ii, 4, 
and briefly in Yalk., Ha'azinu, 94b. 
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90 Zech. 11 : 17 • 
91Yalk. and lam. R., loc.cit., have a "a Goth," instead of a 
"Cuthean." An alternate account is recorded in Sanh. 93b: "Bar Cokhba 
reigned for two and half years and said to the Rabbis, 'I am the 
Messiah.' They answered, 'Of Messiah it is written that he smells 
and judges [Isa. 11:21 let us see whether he [Bar Cokhba] is able 
to do so.' When they saw that he was unable to judge by the scent 
they slew him." Kesef Mishne, conrn. to Yad, Melakhim, ch. xi,3 
and David Abi Zimra, Radbaz, (printed in std. eds. of Yad), comm. to 
Yad, ibid., in his second explanation, both contend that the 
Babylonian Talmud account and the Jerusalem Talmud account are 
variant sources which discord one another. Lechem Mishn§ comm. to 
Yad, ibid., conrnents that the Babylonian Talmud records a controversy 
between R. Alexandri and Rabba on the exposition of the verse in Isa. 
11:3 in the passage immediately preceding the Bar Cokhba account. 
The Jerusalem ralmud account follows R. Alexandri's exposition whereas 
the Babylonian Talmud account accords with Rabba. 
Margaliot, however, ingeniously merges the two accounts by procuring 
that Bar Cokhba's suspicion of R. Eleazar of Modiim resulted in Bar 
Cokhba's death (as related in the J.T. account). In that Bar Cokhba 
should have realised by "judging through the scent" (as related in 
B.T. account) that there was no reason to suspect R. Eleazar of 
Modiim. His failure to do so caused him to be slain. See Margaliot 
R.,Margaliot ha-Yam, (Jerusalem: Massad ha-Rav Kook, 1971), p. 144. 
92 I Sam. 18:10; see Rashi and Radak comms~ ad.loc. 
93It is no mere coincidence that Bar Cokhba's reign of two and 
half years lasted exactly as long as Saul's reign of two and half 
years. See Ta'an. Sb; Seder Olam Rabbah; Margaliot ha-Yam, Sanh., 
loc.cit. 
In order to establish conclsuively that Bar Cokhba matched Hatam 
Safer's depiction of the Messiah it is necessary to confirm whether 
Bar Cokhba possessed the Divine spirit intrinsic to Redeemers. Here 
one must ask whether the "regal spirit and Divine overflow" which 
Hatam Sofer cites from Scripture in relation to Saul (see citation 
in main text: "Consequent to [Saul's] annointment, the s~irit of 
rulershi and Divine ins iration descended upon him etc., and supra, 
n. , was particu ar on y to Saul, or rather Scripture merely 
related this of Saul, since Saul was the first king but in actuality 
he shared this trait with all virtuous redeemers. Maim~ seems to 
contradict himself regarding this issue. In Yad, Yesodei ha-Torah, 
vii,1 Maim. discusses the various attributes necessary for attaining 
prophecy. He points to Saul as a paragon whose virtues enables him 
to merit the Divine spirit rest upon him and whose soul mingled with 
the angels called ishim, citing I Sam. 10:6, "and thou shalt prophesy 
with them and shall be turned to another man." From here it is 
clear that this trait was particular only to Saul as one may not 
assume that other redeemersbyvirtue of their rulership mingled with 
the angels. However, in Guide, Part II, ch. xlv, Maim. discusses 
the first degree of prophesy whereby an individual receives Divine 
help that activates him to an important action, such as the delive-
rance of a conrnunity. Maim. categorically states, thereon, that 
whenever Scripture relates "the spirit of the Lord rested upon him," 
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this degree refers to all Judges and all the virtuous Messiahs of 
Israel. He continues to illustrate by pointing to Jephthah, Samson, 
Amazia and Saul as examples of this, citing in Saul's case I Sam . 
11:6, "And the spirit of G-d came unto Saul when he heard those 
tidings." Here it is clear that this trait was not particular to 
Saul as this is the degree of all Judges and all vir tuous Messiahs ! 
The resolution of this seeming contradiction resides in the fact 
that in the Guide, when speaking of Saul's prophesy Maim. cites I 
Sam . 11:6, in reference to the spirit of regal poweG which is 
the first degree of prophesy whereby an individual receives Divine 
help that activates him to an important action -such as delivery of 
a community. This degree is shared by all redeemers bv virtue of 
their rulership alone. (See Radak and Targum Onkelos, [printed in 
std. eds. of Bibl~, comms. to Sam. ibid.) In Yad, Yesodei 
ha-Torah, however, when speaking of Saul's prophesy Maim. cites 
I Sam. 10:6 in reference to the second degree of prophesy of actually 
prophesizing by speaking with angels (compare to Yad, Yesodei Torah 
ii,7). This second degree of prophesy was particular to Saul and 
unat tainable by virtue of his rulership alone. See Abrabanel, 
Isaac b. Judah, Abrabanel: Commentary to the Prophets (Jerusalem: 
Torah ve-Da'at Pub., 1955), Sam, loc.cit., who relates I Sam. 11:6 
to Guide, loc.cit, as referring to Saul's regal spirit, while in 
I Sam . 10:6, Abrabanel discusses Saul 's prophetic spirit. Rashi on 
I Sam : 10:6 also makes a distinction between Saul's regal spirit in 
v .9 and his prpphetic spirit in v.6. See also Malbim, Sam., ibid., 
ad loc. Therefore one can safely assume that Bar Cokhba, by virtue 
of his rulership alone at least attained the regal spirit which would 
have accrued automatically upon his accession. 
94Yad, Melakhim, xi,3. 
95Th· . . l h . f . be Ma. d 1s 1s prec1se y t e po1nt o content1on tween 1m. an 
Rabad, in Yad, Melakhim, ch. xi,3. Maim. states: "Do not think 
that King Messiah will have to perform signs and wonders, bring 
anything new into being, or do similar things. It is not so. " 
Rabad, refutes this on the basis of the Babylonian Talmud which 
relates Bar Cokhba was killed because he was unable to judge by the 
scent (see supra, n. 91). The phenomenon of judging by the scent 
is cert~inly a marvel. Kesef Mishne, Yad, ibid. resolves that Maim. 
follows the Jerusalem Talmud account whereas Rabad follows the Baby-
lonian account (supra, n. 91). Ibn Gaon Shem Tov b. Avraham, 
Migdal Oz, (printed in std. eds. of Yad), comm. to Yad, ibid., 
explains that Rabad's refutation is invalid, as whether or not Messiah 
should be expected to judge by the scent was a matter of disputation 
among the Sages. M~rgaliot masterfully merges the two accounts 
procuring that since Bar Cokhba was unable to judge by the scent, 
he erroneously suspected R. Eleazar of betrayal and consequently 
sinned in killing him resulting in his own death. See supra, n. 91, 
end. 
Rabad's contention could be explained as follows: Rabad opined 
that the phenomenon of judging by the scent must necessarily preclude 
one's propensity to sin. (See Maharsha's explanation of moreach 
ve-dayan, Sanh. ibid.) Were Bar Cokhba able to judge by the scent 
he would have realised there were no grounds for suspecting R. 
Eleazar , thereby enabling him to avert his sin. Since the propensity 
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to sin is a natural inclination, the precluding of this inclincation 
is beyond the natural. Hence the entirephenomenon of judging by 
the scent is a sign and a wonder. 
Maim., as R. Margaliot claims, agrees with the B.T. account that 
Messiah must be able to judge by the scent. l{owever, this phenomenon 
does not preclude the Messiah's propensity to sin. Just as Moses 
and Saul's ability to pro~hesize did not avert their propensity to 
sin, similarly Bar Cokhba s ability to judge by the scent could not 
avert his sin of suspecting and killing R. Eleazar. Hence the 
phenomenon of judging by the scent is a natural phenomenon and is 
neither a sign nor a wonder. 
Alternatively, developing Migdal Oz's theory, one might posit that 
Maim. and Rabad disagreed over the meaning of "judging by the scent" 
itself. Maim. maintained that this refers to the spirit of regal 
pmver which is neither a sign nor a wonder. Rabad however, contends 
that this refers to the prophetic spirit which is a marvel. See 
supra n. 93. 
Maim., in Pe'er tmdor, ed. Tamma, Mordechai, (Levov, 1859), Resp. 
no. 225, confirms Margaliot's theory that he followed the B.T. 
account. However, the responsum itself is in complete contradiction 
to Yad, loc.cit. See also Bornstein, Avraham Joshua Herschel, 
Sanhedri Ketana, (Piotrkow, 1903), comm. to Sanh., loc.cit., who 
accords with Rabad that the phenomenon of judging by the scent is 
wondrous. 
Finally one could explain that Maim, and Rabad argued over whether 
the Messiah is a prophet. According to Maim., Messiah is not a 
prophet and consequently has no need to show signs or wonders to 
certify his prophesy. According to Rabad, Messiah is a least a 
prophet and therefore must show signs to certify himself as a true 
prophet. See Rashi, Sanh. 89b, s.v. hai gavra. 
96Rabad, 1oc.cit., who maintains that the divine overflow con-
ferred upon the Messiah necessarily precludes Messiah's propensity 
to sin (see hupra, n. 95), must identify this overflow of a different 
type than t at of Moses and Saul. Possibly this is intimated by 
llitam Sofer, "the spirit of Messiah which is hidden on high and 
preserved for his coming," cited supra, in main text. 
97 Sanh. 98b, 99a. 
98Rashi, Sanh. 99a, s.v. ein. Cf., however, Rashi, Sanh 98b, 
s.v. ein. Possibly the difference between these t\vO Rashis is 
attributable to the slight variation in Hillel's statement from 
ein Massiah le-Yisroel (Sanh. 98b), to ein Lahem Messiah le-Yisroel 
(Sanh. 99a). kasnr-implies from the word lahem (to them) that 
Messiah will not materialise from them (i.e., Yisroel) but from 
G-d. The reason being, as Rashi explains on Sanh. 98b, that Hezekia 
was the most suited human candidate likely to become the Messiah 
yet he did not succeed. Consequently no human will redeem them 
(Yisroel) except the Almighty Himself. Although certain eds. of 
Sanh. 98b, have ein lahem le-Yisroel, it is clear from Rashi's entry 
caption that he did not have the ed. of lahem. 
99R. Isserlein also used this source as proof that Elijah heeds 
all commandments in his responsum in TD cited supra, ch. ii. 
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100The source for this custom is Sefer ha-Zohar, ed. Margaliot, 
R., 5th ed.,(Jerusalem: Mossad ha-Rav Kook, 1970), Vol. I, Lech Lecho; 
and PdRE,ch. xxviii, end. Lorberbaum, (Jacob of Lissa, Siddur Derekh 
ha-Hayyim, [Berlin, 1860]) ,· and Werdiger, (Jacob, Siddur Tzeluta 
[Zelota] de-Avraham [n.p., 1957-62], in accordance with the usage 
of Landau, Abraham, "Service of the circumcision) , bring the kabba-
listic liturgical conms. of Toldot Ya 'akov and Horowitz, Isaac b. 
Abraham ha-Levi, Siddur ha-Shelah who maintain that if this statement 
is not proclaimed, Elijah will not participate. 
101Tur, OH 295, end, conments: "It is stated in Erub., 'Israel 
has long ago been assured that Elijah would not come either on 
the Sabbath eves or on festival eves owing to the people's pre-
occupation." Rashi thereon explains that people are preoccupied 
with their preparations for the following Sabbath or festival \vhich 
must be completed before the holy day beings. (His arrival and the 
subsequent bustle and welcome would intervene with these prepara-
tions [conm. by Epstein to Erub. ibid., Soncino ed. of the Talmud]. 
Thr continues: "Therefore, since the Sabbath has departed and Elijah 
is now permitted to come, we pray that Elijah should come, bringing 
tidings of redemption [with him]." Rema, Haggahot to Sh.Ar., OH, 
loc.cit., conments; "It is customary to remember Elijah on the out-
going of the Sabbath and we pray that he will come and bring with 
him tidings of redemption." Weil, Jacob, in his Tor at Shabba t, 
(Karlsruhe, 1840), comm. to Sh.Ar., ibid., contests this reason and 
offers alternative explanations, see thereon. 
102B.B. 121b; Midrash Shemuel, ed. Buber, (Cracow, 1893), 
ch. viii; Yalk, Kings, loc.cit. 
103 Shab. 30a. 
104see Tosaf~ Erub. 45b, s.v. leima; Ishbili, Yom Tov (Ritba), 
Hiddushei ha-Ritba, (Jerusalem: Pe'er, 1969), novellae to Eru~ ibid.; 
Di Trani, Isaiah b. Mali the Elder, Tosaf. Rid, (New York: Saphro-
graph Co., 1953), Erub., ibid. 
105 Shab. 104a; 
s.v. mai; A.Z. 26a; 
ch. viii, 7. 
Yad, Yesodei ha-Torah, ix,l; Rashi, Shab. 108a, 
Yeb. 102a; Maim., Corrrn. to the Mishna, Eduy., 
106This is the op1n1on of R. Joshua, B.M. 59b. See, however, 
Erub.13b. and J.T. Yeb., ch. i, end, where a halakic ruling was 
rendered based on a Heavenly Voice. For different explanations 
reconciling this toR. Joshua's opinion in B.M., loc.cit., see "Bat 
Kol," T.E., Vol. V. 
107Literally, a Heavenly Echo, so called because the Heavenly 
Voice itself is not audible, only the sound of its reflection is 
heard. See Tosaf., Sanh. 11a, s.v. bat kol; Guide, Part II, ch. xlii; 
Ha-Levi, Judah, Kuzari, (New York: Schocken Books, 1964), Part III, 
chs. xi, xli, lxx1i1; Nahmanides, Perush al ha-Torah, ed. Chavel, 
C., (Jerusalem: Mossad ha-Rav Kook, 1960), conm. to Ex. 28:30; 
Chajes, Z.H., Responsa of Maharaz Chajes, (Zolkiew, 1849-50), Part II, 
No. 6- all of whom are of the opinion that the Heavenly Echo continued 
even after the cessation of the Heavenly Spirit during the Second 
Temple (Yom. 21b). For a comparison of the difference between 
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the phenomena of a Heavenly Echo and Prophesy see Alfasi, Isaac 
(Rif), Responsa of Rif, (Levorno, 1781), No. 1, and Tosaf. Yom Tov, 
Mishna, Yeb., ch. xvii,6. 
108I Kings 17:1; Mishna, Eduy., ch. viii~_ : "R. Simeon said, 
[Elijah will come] to conciliate disputations." Tosaf Yom Tov, 
Edu~ ibid., confirms this Mishna as the source of the epithet that 
Teku mt:, Let it stand, i.e., the question remains undecided) in 
the Talmud is an acrostic for, "the Tishbite will resolve etc." 
See also Horowitz, Isaiah, Shenei Luchot ha-Brit, (Warsaw, 1930), 
Section on the Oral Law; Azulai Hayyim David (Hida), Mar'it ha-Eiyin, 
(Levorno, 1804), Yeb. 96a; Emden, Jacob (Yavez), Lechem Shamayim, 
(Muncazs, 1905), Eduy. end; and Arukh ha-Shalem, ed. Kohut, H., 
(Vienna-New York, 1878-92), s.v. Teku. 
109see Habib, Joseph, Nimmukei Yosef, (printed in std. eds . of 
Talmud),comm . to Rif, B.M. ch. ix, s.v. gamar Micha Mich5 and Rashba 
cited HI Shitta Mekubbezet, B.M. 114a. See also iliajes, Torat Neviim 
ch. ii, and the appendix to his Darkhei Hora'ah, who contends that 
when Elijah functions in the capacity of Prophet we may rely on his 
prophesy in determining doubtful questions in reality. However, in 
determining doubtful questions in Din (law) we may rely solely upon 
the wisdom he demonstrates in his capacity of Sage. See also Rosanes, 
Judah ~1ishneh le-Melekh, (printed in std. eds . of Yad), comm. to Yad, 
1shut, ix,6. 
110 B.M. 114b; Erub. 43a; Hatam Sofer, loc.cit. 
11111 Kings 11:1,11. 
112Ber. 25b. 
113 Kluger quotes Terumat ha-Deshen in his responsum. 
114B.M. 114b; in which case the presence of a dead corpse would 
prevent Elijah from attending the circumcision lest he become defiled. 
115Nid. 61b. 
116Kluger quotes Maharil (i.e., Jacob b. Moses Moellin) rather 
than Isserlein, which he copied exactly from Samuel b. Uri Shraga 
Phoebus, Beit Shemuel, (printed in std. eds . of Sh.Ar.), corrm. to 
Sh.Ar ., EE, 17.[11]. However Maharil in Beit Shemuel appears as a 
misprint. The Hebrew dleph in Maharai (al~ for 1sserlein) became 
erroneously transcribe to lamed rendering aril (Moellin). Maharil 
does not discuss this issue. 
117These words are italicized because they do not appear in 
1sserlein 's responsum and is Kluger's own interpretation. The 
interpretation is significant as 1sserlein exlicitly states that 
Elijah does observe commandments. This difficulty was raised 




119 Suk. 25a; Kluger continues: "granted the principle that 
one who is engaged in one religious duty is free from any other, 
applies only to positive commandments and not to befree of negative 
commandments [i.e., defilement, the prohibition of] nonetheless, 
that is only if he is obligated in the negative commandment when he 
can fulfill both commandments [i.e., positive and negative]. How-
ever, when he is not obligated [i.e., Elijah]; then, a negative 
commandment is no better than a positive one. And when he is 
engaged in one religious duty [i.e., circumcision] he is free from 
the other [i.e., defilement] which he fulfills as one who is not 
obligated yet fulfills willfully. 
12°Kluger, Tuv Ta'am ve-Da'at, 3rd ed., (Podgorze, 1900), 
Part II, YO, Hilkhot Aveilut (Laws of Mourning), No. 234. 
121II Chron. 21:12; Levi b. Gershom (Gersonides), Perush ha-
Ralbag, (printed in standard editions of the Bible), commentary 
to I Kings 17 : 1. 
122 See Seder Olam Rabbah, ed. Ratner, Dov Ber, (Vilna, 1894), 
ch. xvii; Rashi and Radak comms. to Chron., ibid. 
123Nahmanides, comm. to Lev. 18:4. 
124N hm "d a an1 es, 
Chavel, (Jerusalem: 
Reward," p. 304. 
Writin sand Discourses (Kitvei Ramc~n), ed . 
Mossa a-Rav Kook, 196 , Vol. II , Gate of 
125 Radak, comm. to II Kings 2:1,11, and Mal. 3:23. 
126
Mal. ' ibid. 
127Abudarham ha-Shalem, (Jerusalem, according to the Warsaw ed. 
of 1878); Abudarham, (Piotrkow, 1930). 
128 Chron., loc.cit. 
129 Radak, comm. to II Chron. 21:2. 
130It is quite remarkable that all op1n1ons are in agreement 
that Elijah 's letter could only have been written in human form. 
Yet, although Elijah has a long record of being a scribe (~iz., 
Lev. R., ch. xxxiv; Ruth R., ch. v; Kid. 70b; Zohar Hadash, ed. 
Margaliot, 2nd ed. [Jerusalem: Massad ha-Rav Kook, 1978], p-. 29; 
Ginzberg "Index," Legends, Vol. VII, s.v. Elijah "scribe"), not one 
opinion utilizes Elijah's profession of scribe as proof of Elijah 's 
existence in human form. Consequently we must conclude that Elijah's 
vocation in Scripture can only be interpreted as allegorical. 
This conclusion seems to be born out from Radak himself in his comm. 
to Mal. 3:16, "'A book of remembrance was writ ten before Him, ' This 
is an allegory, employing colloquialism, as in angels writing a 
book of remembrance. I .e., there is no forgetfullness [before Him]." 
See Hirsch, Samson Raphael, "Phinehas-Elijah, " Judaism Eternal, 
ed. Grunfeld I., (London: Soncino Press, 1959), Vol. II, p. 299, on 
the allegorical significance of Elijah's vocation as chronicler. 
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131Gen. 5:24; Arama, Akedat Yitzchak, (Salonika, 1522), ch . cv. 
132suk. Sa. 
133soR ch. i, end; See Ratner, SOR, ibid., n. 53 and Ratner 's 
note from AAN. See also Friedmann, "Intro-:-EO SER," p. 16: 
"the ftlain meaning of 'and is still existing' means in body and in 
soul.' Cf. also, Pesikta, ed. Friedmann, (Vienna, 1880), ch. ix, 
76a, Lev. R., ch. xxvii, 4; Midrash Tanhuma, ed. Buber, (Wilna, 1885), 
ch . iii, 90; Tanh., Emor ix; all of Which retain Hai ve-Kayyam = 
alive and existing. The identical capitulation of R. Jose in SOR, 
is recorded anonymously in B.B. 121b. 
134soR h .. , C • XVll. 
135Friedmann, "Intro. to SER, " p. 16; although Ratner, SOR 
loc.cit., n. 12, interprets nignaz as referring both to body and soul, 
and Ginzberg, Le~ends, Vol. vr;- p:- 323, n. 32, remarks: "Friedmann's 
statement that t e old sources [i.e., SOR], refer to the transition 
of Elijah 's soul but not to his body, is a rationalistic conception 
entirely alien to the old sources," nevertheless, Friedmann's 
presumption is entirely convincing and seems the only possible way 
to resolve R. Jose's usage of the term nignaz to its classical 
connotation. 
136Shab. 88b; B.M. 86b. 
137suk., 1 · OC.Clt. j Maharsha, B.M., loc.c_:i.:.!_; see also infra, 
n. 161. 
138It is recorded in Pesikta Rabbati, ch. v, p. 15,16 and appears 
also in Midrash Mishle, and Numb. R.: "R. Tanhum b. Abbah expounded, 
'hlho hath ascended up to Heaven' [ Prov. 30 : 4], [this refers to] 
Elijah for it is written 'And Elijah went up by a whirlwind into 
heaven' [II Kings 2:11]." Friedmann posits (Intro. to SER, p. 18), 
that R. Tanhum's opinion is commensurate with the opinion that Elijah 
lives uniformly in body and soul- since the same proverbial verse 
is expounded upon in another opinion as referring to Moses. One 
must conclude, says Friedmann, that just as Moses ascended in body 
so did Elijah. Friedmann's reasoning however, is invalidated by 
the opinion that Moses' ascent to heaven was also in form of soul. 
This point will be discussed further in chapter iii.~· 
139Radak, II Kings 2:1. 
140R. Jose's statement in Mekhilta, ba-Hodesh, ch. iv: "Moses 
and Elijah never ascended on high etc., 11 is also given to inter-
pretation according to each remonstration of R. Jose in Suk. 
141 Supra, n. 125. 
142 Supra, n. 123 and Nach., Gen. 2:17. 
143Responsa Hatam Sofer, Likkutim, Vol. VI, No. 104. Sofer 




144Koh. Rab., ch. iii, 18. See Bahya b. Asher b. Hlava, 
"Kad ha-Kemakh," Kitvei Rabbenu Bachya, ed. Chavel, (Jerusalem: 
Massad ha-Rav Kook, 1970), s.v. Abel,~o asserts that the eternal 
existence of Elijah and Enoch is testimony that had Adam not sinned 
he would have attained eternality likewise. 
145s . ee prev~ous note. 
146Prov. 30:4; Ex. 24:13; II Kings 2:11; Ex. 19:20; Ex. 24:18, 
17; Zohar, Ex. 187a. Ashla~, Judah Leib ha-Levi, Perush ha-Sullam, 
(London, Jerusalem; n.p., 197~, Zohar, ibid., Vol. V, p. 455, explains 
that the words, "Here too," refer to the verse, ."And to Moses He 
said, come up to the Eternal," Ex. 24:1. 
1470n celestial garments see Scholem, "Garment of the Souls," 
Tarbiz, ed. Epstein,J.N., (Jerusalem, 1955), Vol. XXIV; Zohar, Va-
Yakhel, p. 210; "Garments of the Soul," Sha'arei Zohar, ed. Marga-
liot, R., 2nd ed. (Jerusalem: Massad ha-Rav Kook, 1978), p. 134. 
148s . ee prev~ous note. 
149It is somewhat intriguing to note that Hatam Safer devoted 
an entire responsum to explain in detail Nach.'s dismissal of the 
contention of the Aristotele.an philosophers (supra, n. 143) yet 
nevertheless he was able to suggest a schism in an earlier responsum 
(see supra, ch. iii.1) whereby Elijah' s body separated itself from 
soul- a conclusion which is virtually unacceptable to Nach. -
apparently posed no contradiction toR. Safer. 
150" ... for the heavenly soul gives eternal life and the Divine 
Will which was with it during its emanation will adhere to it for-
ever and will maintain it eternally.'' Nach. , Gen. 2: 17. 
15ihis is thetheory that body and mind are linked together by 
an inner envelope of the soul, which is less material than fleshy 
body and survives its dissolution, yet has not the pure immateriality 
of mind. Dodds, E.R., ed., Proclus Ltcius surnamed Diadochus: 
The Elements of Theology, 2nd ed., (Ox ord: Claredon Press, 1963), 
Appendix II, "The Astral Body in Neoplatonism," p. 313. 
152 'Eratosthenes and Ptolmey the Platonist' followed by Iam-
blichus and Hierocles. This view connects itself with Aristotelean 
psychology. Dodds, Proclus, p. 320, n. 7. 
153Plotonis, Prophy and the Chaldean Oracles. This latter 
view connects itself with 'Himmelfahrt' and astral mysticism, Doqds, 
Proclus, p. 320, n. 1. This is also closely related to the zoharitic 
view in Gen. 81a: "Upon death, man's ruach leaves this world and 
detaches itself from its nefesh which remains hovering over the grave 
and enters Paradise of this world. And there [Paradise] it [ruach] 
enclothes itself in the air of Paradise as the heavenly angels who 
descend this world dress-uhemselves in the air of this world as they 
descend upon it • '' 
154 Gen. 2:17; Zohar Hadash, Gen. 18a. 
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155 Zohar, Numb., Shlach Lecho 59a; See also Zohar, Ex., 
beShalach 55a: "I found in the bOok of Enoch, that after G-d caused 
him [Enoch] to ascend and showed him all the King's treasures of 
above and below, He showed him [Enoch] the Tree of Life and the tree 
that was forbidden to Adam. And He showed him Adam's place in the 
Garden of Eden. And he [Enoch] saw that had Adam kept this one 
commandment he could have attained eternal life and lived there for-
ever. [However, since] he did not observe the Lord's command; he 
went out in trial and was punished." 
156Th· b . . . f . d" . . t f ~s o servat~on ~s ~n act ~n ~cat~ve ~n our exerp rom 
Zohar, supra n. 155: "Behold, had Adam not sinned he would not have 
savoured the taste of death in this world ••. " In this world he would 
not have savoured death, however, his passage to another would have 
resulted in death. See Perush ha-Sullam, Zohar, ibid. 
157Le R h . . 4 V. • , C • XXV~~, ; also in Pesikta, ch. ix, 76a; 
Tanh. B. , xc; Tanh. , Emor, ix. 
158 'Rishonim,' literally means the early authorities. The 
term serves to indicate the standing and authority of preceeding 
scholars, between the period of the Geonim and the Rabbinate (Aharonim), 
in relation to the scholars at the time in the domain of halakic 
ruling and interpretation of Torah. Although this period is a 
more or less well defined period in the history of rabbinic literature, 
the exact dates of these periods are not precise and unchallenged. 
See "Rishonim," E.J., Vol. XIV, p. 191. 
159 Gen. 2:17; Responsa of Radbaz, Part I, No. 256. 
160see Rabinovitch, Nachum L., "Halacha and Other Systems of 
Ethics," Modern Jewish Ethics, ed. Fox, pp. 89ff. 
161In fact Chajes, comm. to Suk Sa, cites R. Joshua b. Levi's 
statement in Shab. 88b: "When Moses ascended on High, the Ministering 
Angels spoke before the Holy One Blessed be He, 'Soverign of the 
Universe, What business has one born of woman among us?" in evidence 
that Elijah and Moses were not transformed to angels upon their 
ascensions. For had they been transformed to angels, what possible 
objection could they have to Moses' presence among them. See also 
Safer, Moses, Tarat Moshe, Mahadura Telitai, 3rd ed., (Jerusalem: 
Hatam Safer Inst., 1977), Numb., Nasa, p. 55, s.v. vela, who states 
that Elijah's ascension into the whirlwind would not automatically 
render him an angel. 
162R. Isserlein's ruling "the wife of his fellow man is prohi-
bited and not the wives of angels," was rendered in regards to both 
Elijah and R. Joshua b. Levi. Although there are various traditions 
which report that Elijah became in reality an angel, there isn't a 
tradition other than DEZ, based on Ket. 77b, which states that R. 
Joshua b. Levi entered Paradise during his lifetime. Thus, it would 
appear that R. Isserlein considered the immortals of DEZ to have 
attained the status of angels by virtue of their evasion of death, 
rather than their becoming in reality as such. 
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163M· k" "I . . d f h k ~r ~n comments: t ~s perm~tte to exaggerate or t e sa e 
of peace, " comm. to Gen. R., ch. lxxi, 9, "Elijah the Prophet is 
alive and exists. In glory and in self he appeared before the Sages ." 
Mirkin's remark, is not substantiated by either school. Even the 
school which purports that Elijah's body died, still maintained 
that Elijah occasionally appeared before the Sages in human form . 
Joseph Hayyim ben Elijah al-Hakham of Baghdad, Rav Pe'alim: Sod 
Yesharim, (Jerusalem: Hanzur Pub., 1970), No. 2, also ascribes to 
this view, stating that Elijah's own body died. He appeared before 
the Tannaim in various other bodies. See also Stern, Joseph Zechariah, 
Tahalukhot ha-Aggada, (Warsaw, 1902), ch. vii, pp. 26-28. 
164Zohar, Numb., Shelac~ supra, n. 155,and Resp . of Radbaz, supra, 
n. 159. 
165Yalk., Prov. 14:1; Eger, Akiba ben Moses Guens, Gilyon ha-
Shas, (printed in std. eds. of Talmud), B.M. 114b. 
166Attar, Hayyim b. Moses, Ohr ha-Hay~im, (printed in std. 
editions of the Pentateuch), Numb. 1:20. 
167Bornstein, Avnei Nezer, (Piotrkow, 1912), OH, No. 466. 
168waldenberg, Tzitz Eliezer, (Jerusalem, n.d.), Vol . XIII, 
No . 90. Abraham-Safer Abraham is author of Lev Avraham: Medical 
Halaka, (Jerusalem: Feldheim, 1977-78). 
169 Responsa Hatam Safer, YD, No. 337. 
170see also Teomim, Abraham, Responsa Hesed Avraham, (Levov, 1938), 
EE, no. 14, in which he maintains, according to same passage in Nid. 70h , 
that although the deceased conveys impurity to others, the deceased 
does not necessarily possess intrinsic impurity of its own and 
therefore would not defile itself upon resurrection. Teomim's 
responsum will be dealt with further in chs. v, and vi.l. 
171Th . 1 . h . t wh 1 t. e quest~on on y perta~ns to t ose ~ns ances ere p as ~c 
surgery does not involve the saving of human life. For wherever:.:. 
saving of human life is involved, the impurity laws are waived 
Towards the conclusion of his responsum, R. Waldenberg finds other 
reasons to permit the priest to undergo plastic surgery of this 
nature. Nevertheless, the question of whether a corpse or limb 
possesses intrinsic impurity was an important consideration in 
resolving this issue. 
172zikkukim de-Nura, SER, ch. xv, [22]; Responsa Tirosh ve-
Yitzhar, No . 70, p. 179. Other sources which Michaelson cites in 
support of this opinion are: Book of Emanation (Azilut), printed ~n 
~at Bereshit , (Vilna, 1802), 52b; Zohar Ruth, 100b, s.v. R. 
Johanan said, 'He belongs to the tribe of Gad .' The page of the 
last source cited by Michaelson appears to be in error and is found 
in the Levorno, 1866, ed . of Zohar page 103 and in the Ashlag ed., 
Vol. X, p. 99, no. 444. 
173I Chron. 16:22, R. Isserlein'smurce that Elijahs ' wife is 
not classified as eshet reiyehu (a fellow man's wife) is probably 




174Gen. 1:26; Midbar Kedemoth, Ma'arekhet Aleph, (Levorno, 1792), 
No. 27. Hida's source is YalkUt Reuven~ (Amsterdam, 1700), 9d, 
on the verse "Let us make man," Gen. 1:26. Hida refers to the 
words included in brackets as "etc." Our citation follows the quote 
as it appears in Yalk. Reuveni. 
175oan. 8:12; Midrash Talpiyyot, ed. ha-Itamari, Elijah ha-
Cohen, (Smyrna, 1736), s.v. Elijah. 
176Bacharach, Naphtali, Emek ha-Melekh, (Amsterdam 1648); 
Cordovero, Moses, Pardes Rimmonim, (Cracow, 1592), Part XXIV, ch. xiv; 
Margaliot, Reuben, Malakhei Elyon, (Jerusalem: Massad ha-Rav Kook, 
1945), p. 154, n. 26; Legends, Vol. IV, pp. 201-02; Hag. 13b. 
177Kid. 70a. 
178eordovero, loc.cit., p. 53 
179see aslo Numb. R~ xvii, 1, which relates that Phinehas who 
is Elijah was able to make himself invisible because he was an 
angel. Since this incident occured long before Elijah's ascension 
and his transcendance to angel, this source must be of the opinion 
that Elijah originated as an angel. 
180see Laniado, Samuel, Keli Yakar, (Venice, 1603), comm. to 
II Kings 2:1; and Hida, op.cit. 
181Ber. Sb·, P d 1 · ar es, oc.c1t. 
182see Sha'arei Zohar, Ber. 4b, s.v. Elijah be-arbah. 
183Petah Einayim, (Jerusalem, 1959), comm. to B.B., Vol. II, 
ch. viii, 109b. 
184Michaelson, op.cit.; Zikkukim de-Nura, SEZ, ch. xiv, [22]. 
185Shab. 12b; Teshuvoth ha-Geonim, ed. Harkavy, A., (Berlin, 
1885), No. 373, p. 189; Ozar ha-Geonim, ed. Levine, Benjamin, 
(Haifa-Jerusalem, 1928-42), Shab. 12b. 
186 Harcavy, op.cit., p. 372, n. 189. 
187s rh · s k · d 161 ee utaJes, u ., c1te supra, n. . 
188see Friedmann, "Intro. to SER," p. 18, who compares the two 
ascensions saying: "Just as Moses ascended in body so did Elijah." 
Were the ascensions different in nature, they would not have been 
compared with each other. 
189oeut. 33:1; I Kings 17:18; II Kings 2:1; Ex . 24:16; 
Pesikta iv, p. 2; Yalk., Kings, no. 209. The citation lists 
no less than 27 separate incidents of which Moses and Elijah were 
compeltely alike. See Pesikta and Yalk, ibid., in entirety. 
190 Yalk., Ex., 406, p. 238; see also Yalk., Ex., 363; Gen. 
R., ch. xlviii; Ex. R., ch. xlvii, 4; Numb. R., ch. x, 6. Fbr 
Moses on the mountain, see Ex. 34:28 On, "Do we deduce the impossible 
from the possible?" see Suk. SOb; '1Do we deduce the possible from the 
impossible?" The bread from heaven is described in Ex. 16:4. Moses is called 
an Ish Elokim in Deut. 33:1. Reischer, Shebut Ya 'akov, No.9. 
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191Th· l . . "d . l M h h B M 86 d lS exp anatlon lS l entlca to a ars a, . . a, an 
Ashkenazi, Samuel Jaffe, Yafeh To'ar, (printed in std. eds. of Midrash 
Rabbah), Ex. R., ch . ccxvi,5. 
192Although Jacobs, TheoloRy in the Res~nsa, P,· 192, prefers 
to translate hiddud as "playful rather than witty', remarking: 
"not to be taken seriously','-we will see further on that Reischer was 
indeed serious . In fact, this second explanation of Reischer is 
identical with the llain meaning of the Midrash given by Einhorn, 
Ze'ev Wolf b. Israe Isser, Maharzu, (printed in std . eds. of Midrash 
Rabbah), corrm . to Ex . R., ch . xlvii, 5. The comparison between 
Moses' angelhood to Elijah the angel is strengthened by the fact the 
Midrash recorded the angels ' partaking in Abraham's repast in addition 
to Moses' ascension. According to Spira, Berakh, (Zera Berakh, 
[Amsterdam, 1730], Gen. 2:18), Elijah the angel appeared to man in 
the identical form in which the angels appeared to Abraham. See 
also Laniado, Keli Yakar, II Kings 2. 
193J b . aco s, op .clt., p. 191. 
194Nid. 69b . 
195s · f 197 ee ln ra, n . . 
196Sh. Ar . , OH, 468 :4. 
197That the edict, "When you come to a town, behave as its 
inhabitants do," is synonymous with thefrlict, "One should never 
break away from the local custom [B . ~1 . 86b], " is born out from the 
fact that both sources use identical examples to establish their re-
pective edicts .. Furthermore, Reischer, in his aggadic comm . 
Iyyun Ya'akov on the above passage, speaks of these edicts inter-
changeably. The edict appears in DEZ as, "One nus t not break away 
from the custom of the people ." It is furthermore evident that our 
Midrash is demonstrating the Law of Conformity from Maharal (Gur 
,y h, [Prague, 1578-79J, conm . to Rashi, Gen . 18 :8),: "Nevertheless, 
t for the law that one must not deviate from local custom, G-d 
would not have sent the angels to him [Abraham] since it is not their 
custom to eat .'' Yalk . , Ex . 406, includes the incident of the angels ' 
descent to Abraham to demonstrate the same Law of Conformityin addition to the 
incident of Mo~es ' ascent to the angels . 
198Sh . Ar . , loc .cit. 
199 Deut . 14:1 . Although the verse is usually translated as, 
"You shall not cut yourself ," the Talmud in Yeb. 13b takes on a 
form of the world eged - to bind, implying the formation of separate 
groups . 
200sofer, Kaf-ha-Hayyim, (Jerusalem, n .d . ), Sh.Ar . , OH, 468:4 . [55] . . 
201Jaffe, Mordekhai, Levush ha-Techelet, (Lublin, 1590), Sh. Ar . , 
OH, 2:4 and Pallagi, Rachamim Isaa~ Yaffe la-Lev, (Izmir, 1872), 
Vol . II, no . 468 :3. 
202 Gen. 18 :2; see comms . , ad . loc . 
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203 See Bahya b. Asher b. Hlava, Perush Rabbenu Bachya al ha-Torah, 
ed. Chavel, (Jerusalem: Massad ha-Rav Kook, 1974), comm. to Gen . 
18:8; and Tosaf., B.M. 86b, s.v. nirim. 
204Ber . 25b. 
205 ' One shouHnot, however conclude from here that a Jew who 
ventures into a Gentile society should become absolved of command-
ments in order to conform to the local custom of that society. 
There is no inherent value in a Jew's conforming to Gentile practice . 
Indeed, it is even proscribed: "Ye shall not walk in their ordinances ." 
Lev. 18:3. 
206sifri, Deut. 34:5; Midrash Tannaim, ed. Hoffmann, David 
Zevi, (Berlin, 1908-9); Sot. 13b; Ginzberg, Legends, Vol. VI, 
p. 161, n. 951. 
207Deut. 34:5,6., Reischer, Iyyun Ya'akov, Sot. 13b; See also 
Reisher's comm. to Ta'an.5b where he similarly reconciles the opinion 
that "Jacob, our Patr:Larch, is not dead," despite Genesis ' explicit 
statement that Jacob was bewailed, embalmed, and buried. Reischer 
supports his ·explanation by referring to Ket. 103a which relates 
that Rabbi desisted from revisiting his home every Sabbath eve after 
his death in order not to cause discredit to the earlier righteous 
men who were denied the privilege of revisitin{; their homes. See 
also Epstei~ Barukh , Torah Temima, (Vilna, 1904), Deut . 34:5, who 
asks whX the Talmud did not object to the opinion that "Moses did 
not die' by challenging: "Was it for naught that he was bewailed 
and embalmed and buried?" as it objected to the opinion "Jacob, 
the Patriarch, is not dead,'' in Ta 'an. , loc. cit. Epstein reso 1 ves 
that there is no question re?arding embalming, since G-d attended to 
Moses' body. However, Jacobs children attended to Jacob's body and 
therefore, embalmed him. The bewailing of Moses by the children of 
Israel is not difficult either as they did not bewail Moses' death, 
but rather bewailed his departure. Just as people bewail one who 
leaves his native country, although he is still alive. 
See also Maharsha, comm. to Sot., loc.cit., who explains the opinion 
that Moses never died resulted in response to the Talmud's query in 
B. B. 15b: "How is it possible that Moses being dead could have 
written the \vords : 'And Moses died there? ' [ Deu t. 34: 5] . " 
208Gen. 14:18; E~istle to the Hebrews, 7:1-7; Justin ~~rtyr 
Dialogue , 33 and 96;Melchizedek," E.J., Vol. XI, p. 1287. 
209see Ginzberg, Legends, Vol. VI, p. 325. 
210 Ned . 32b; Gen. 14:19; Legends, Vol . V, p. 226, n. 104. 
See also "Act of Pilate," in New Testament Apocrypha, ed. Henneke , E., (Lon-
don:SCM Press, 1964), p. 464, where the Elijah ascension is related 
to Jesus . 
211Ginzberg , op.cit., Vol. V, p. 225, n. 102, lists all sources 
\mich identify Melchizedek with Shem. 
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212 Zech. 2:3; Suk. 52b, Munich codex of the Talmud. See also 
Song R., ch. ii,10: "And the Lord showed me four craftsmen: 
And these are them, Elijah, the King-Messiah, Melchizedek, and the 
annointed one for War." Other uses of Suk., loc .cit., retain "Cohen 
Zedek" (in lieu of ~1elc.hizedek). He is identified by Rashi as 
Melchizedek the son of Shem who is designated as a carpenter because 
he assisted Moses in building the ark. 
Since Rashi belongs to the school which opposed Elijah's origination 
as an angel, it is surprising to find that Rashi identified "Cohen 
Zedek" as Melchizedek. Friedmann, in "In tro. to SER," p. 8, makes 
the following comment concerning Rashi' s explanation: "Who \vould 
not agree that this [Rashi'~ explanation is far fetched ..• And they 
were called carpenters because of their future activity and not 
because of their past activities [i.e., building the ark]." It is 
clear from Friedmann's comment that Rashi intentionally assigned 
Melchizedek a past experience of being a carpenter rather than the 
more obvious futuristic connotation. Possibly then, Rashi assigned 
Melchizedek a past activity in order to strip Melchizedek of all 
eschatological and soteriological character. 
It is furthermore plausible that other MSS of the Talmud retained 
"Cohen Zedek" (i.e., Phinehas, see Friedmann, "Jntro. to SER," p. 9) 
rather than Melchizedek because of the said opposition to the doc-
trine of the Melchizedekites. 
213Gen. 5:24; II Kings 2:3; Ezek. 24:16; Gen. R., ch. xv,1 . 
214Targum Onkelos, (printed in std. eds. of the Bible), 
Gen. loc. cit. Alternate renditions of Onkelos read: "And he was 
forever, for the Lord did not slay him," see Hezekiah b. Manoach, 
Hizzekuni, (Cremona, 1559)--cen., ibid; Kasher, Menahem, Torah 
Shelemah, (Jerusalem, 1926), Gen., ibid., r· 357. However, Adler, 
Nathan Marcus, Netina le-Ger, (Vilna, 1875), comm. on Targum Onkelos, 
_loc .cit.; Tosaf., Yeb. 16b, s.v. pasuk; David b. Samuel ha-Levi, 
Divrei David, ed., Chavel, (Jerusalem: Mossad ha-Rav Kook, 1978), 
comm. to Rashi, Gen., loc.cit., all confirm our citation as the 
correct rendition. The identical problem of opposite renditions 
concerns the Targum Yerushalmi to Gen ., ibid. Many of the editions 
of Targum Yerushalmi were rendered as our citation of Targum Onkelos . 
See Sabionite ed. of Targum Yerushalmi; Hizzekuni, loc.cit.; 
Tosaf., loc.cit., Berkowitz, Ben Zion Judah, Lehem ve-Simlah, (Vilna, 
1850), comm. to Targum Onkelos, loc.cit. Rapoport, Solomon Judah 
Leib, (Iggeroth Shir, Letters to Samuel David Luzzato, ed. Braeber, 
S.E., [Przemsyl: Shatiel Isaac Gruber, 1885], Letter no. 3), 
establishes the correct reading of Targum Yerushalmi as, "and he was 
no more.'' 
215see continuation of Gen. R., loc.cit., "A matron asked R. 
Jose etc .," and Samuel b. Meir, Rashbam, (printed in std . eds . of 
Talmud), B.B. 121b, s.v. kiplu. 
216Yalk., Chron., no. 1082; see Rashi, Gen ., loc.cit., who 
maintains that G-d slew Enoch prematurely because his mind was 
easily induced to turn from his righteous ways and become evil. 




Legends, Vol. V, p. 156, n. 58. Enoch is conspicuous ly 
absent from the Talmud's list of the seven righteous shepherds ; 
see Suk. 52b. 
218
Gen., loc.cit; Deut. 33:1; II Kings 2:1; Midrash ha-Gadol 
ed. Margulies, Mordekhai, (Jerusalem: Massad ha-Rav Kook, 1947), 
Gen. 5:24, p. 132. Although MHG quotes this as a supposed tannaitic 
source ("A Tanna taught. •• "), we find no author for this source in 
the entire tannaitic literature. We must therefore assume that 
the source of this tannaitic citation disappeared. See MHG, ibid., 
n. 8. --
219Tarfum Yerushalmi and Targum Yonathan b. Uziel, (printed in 
std. eds • o Bible) , Gen , loc. cit. AI though there are opposite 
renditions of Targum Yerushalmi, (supra, n. 214), nevertheless the 
comms. of Radak, Luzzato, (Samuel David, Ohev Ger, [Cracow, 1895]), 
Krinsky, (Judah, Mehokkekai Yehudah, [Pietrkow, 1907]), Bahya, Gen. 
loc.cit., all maintain that the correct rendition of the Targum 
Yerushalmi corresponds to our citation of Jonathan b. Uziel. 
Septuagint is also very likely to be understood that Enoch ascended 
heaven; see Legends, Vol. V, p. 157, n. 58. 
220"R. Ishmael said: 'I said to Metatron, Why are you called 
in the name of your Maker by seventy names, and you are higher 
than all angels and are more beloved than all the ministers and 
more glorious than all the hosts and greater than all the powerful 
rulers in greatness and in glory. And why are you called in the 
Upper Heavens youth?' He answered and told me: 'Because I am 
Enoch the son of Yered etc."' Heikaloth, known as the Book of Enoch, 
in Beit ha-Midrash, ed. Jellinek, A., (Leipsic, 1853-77), Part V. 
221 Tosaf., Yeb. 16b, s.v. pa~b~; Rashbam, B.B. 121a, s.v. 
kiplu; Shitta Mekubbetzet, B.B., ~~d. 
222Midrash ~ada, ed. Buber, (Vienna, 1893), Gen., loc.cit.: 
"Because he [EnoCh was righteous the Lord took him away from 
among men and made him an angel, who is Metatron. And there is 
a controversy between R. Akiba and his colleagues concerning this 
matter. And the Sages say that Enoch was at times righteous and 
at times wicked. The Lord said: 'Whilst he is still righteous 
I will remove him from the world. In other words, I will slay 
him.' And it is written 'Behold I will take from thee the desire 
of thine eyes with a stroke [Ezek. 24:16]." The viewpoint in 
Midrash Aggadah which attests Enoch's transcendence to an angel 
is confirmed as the opinion of R. Akiba, which parallels the opinion 
of the heretics quoted in Gen. R., loc.cit. 
223Gen. 5:23; Maim., Perakim be-Hatzlacha, ed. Davidovitch, 
S.Z., notes by Bennet, D.Z., (Jerusalem, 1939), Gerim, ch. iii, 
quoted in Krinsky, op.cit., Karnei Ohr. See supra, n.207, on 
similar discussion concernin~ the opinions that Moses and Jacob 
never died despite the Torah s recording of their death and years. 
224ziyyoni, Menahem, Sefer Ziyyoni, (Cremona, 1559), quoted by 
Kasher, Torah Shelemah, Gen., loc.cit., p. 360, n. 65; Radak, Ibn 
Ezra, Abraham (printed in std. eds. of Bible), Gen. ibid, Ginzberg, 
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op.cit., Vol. V, p. 157, avers: "The official doctrine of the 
Synagogue is that Enoch came to heaven after his death." 
225Radak, in his second explanation to Gen., loc.cit.; Bahya, 
Gen., ibid.; Nach., Lev. 18:4. 
226 See supra, n. 223. 
227 Legends, Vol. V, p. 156, n. 58. 
228wisdom 15:11; Philo, Quaestiones in Gen. 1, 82-86; De 
Abrahamo 3; and De Praemiis 3. These sources are noted by Ginzberg, 
op.cit. 
229The view of R. Akiba as quoted in Midrash Aggada, loc.cit. 
Nach. refers to MHG as proof that Enoch attained eternal life. 
See Perush Nach., ed. Chavel, Lev. 18:4, p. 100, n. 40. It has 
been remarked that the later midrashic literature which upheld 
Enoch 's ascension, was largely influenced by the pseudepigraphic 
view of Enoch. For example Midrash Aggada to Genesis relates: 
"Together with angels Enoch walked. For three hundred years he 
was together with them in Paradise. And from them he learned the 
science of intercalation, the r.eriods of the equinox, the constel-
lations and numerous sciences.' Kasher, (Torah Shelema, Gen., loc. 
cit., p. 357, n. 58), annotates the identical view expounded upon 
in the pseuoepigraphic work, the Book of Jubilees, and the Hebrew 
book of Hanoch. 
230 Tosaf., Hul. 60a, s.v. pasuk. 
231Hul. ibid; see Ba'alei ha-Tosafoth, (Jerusalem: Levin 
Epstein, 1967~en. 1:12, p. 2; and Malakhei Elyon, p. 79, n. 3, 
in entirety. 
232rorah Shelemah, loc.cit. 
233This reservation is expressed by Zikkukin de-Nura, DEZ, 
ch. xv.[22]. 
234 Legends, Vol. VI, p. 325, n. 40. 
235 Abrabanel, comm. to Gen., loc.cit. 
236sanh. ' 98a. 
237Isa. 53:5; Midrash Bereshit Rabbati, Ex libra Moshe ha-
Darshan , ed. Albeck, H., (Jerusalem, 1940), pp. 96-97. See 
"Disputation of Nach. v.s. the Apostate Pablo Christiani," \oJritings 
and Discourses of Nach., p. 312, where Pablo challenged that this 
Messiah refers to Jesus. See Nach.' s refutation thereon. For 
a parallel account of Messiah in Paradise who suffers the sufferings 
of Israel, see Zohar, Ex., Va-Yakhel, 212a, and Menahem Azaria of 
Fano, Asarah Ma'amaroth, (Cracow, 1640), Ma'amar Hikkur Din, Part 
II, ch. v. 
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238s R h. s h 1 . wh . d . f. h II • ee as 1, an ., oc.c1t., o 1 ent1 1es t e c1ty 
gates" where Messiah sat as that part of Paradise directly above the 
city gates of Rome. 
239 Zohar, Ex., 76. 
240Ps. 2:7; Vital, Zohar ha-Raki'a, (Korets, 1785), p. 49. 
241Midrash Lamentations, ed. Buber, (Wilna, 1899), ch. i, 
pp. 89-90; Ber. 2,5a; Aggadat Bereshit, ed. Buber (Cracow, 1902), 
ch. lxvii, p. 133; Vital, op.cit. 
242If R. Safer had one of the numerous renditions of DEZ 
\vhere Messiah is omitted there would be no difficulty. See our 
discussion on the various renditions of DEZ, further on. 
243see Margaliot, Sha'arei Zohar, Gen. R., p. 141, and Vital, 
Zohar ha-Raki'a, loc.cit. Vital's first explanation is identical 
with our exposition of Hatam Safer. 
Alternatively one could resolve that in effect' there will 2ventuate 
two Messiahs. One who already pre-exists in Paradise and another, 
of greater stature, who will succeed him and is to be born in 
the future. This alternative explanation is similar to the talmudic 
position that G-d will raise up in the future another David, while 
the former David will be an emperor and a viceroy, Sanh. 98b. 
In fact, Menachem Azaria of Fano identifies David as the one who 
suffered the woes of his people near the city Gates of Rome, \vho 
abodes in Paradise. See supr5 n. 237. 
244see supra, ch. iii.1, end, and notes thereon, especially 
with regards to Messiah's propensity to sin and his ability to judge 
by the seen t • 
245Although Midrash Bereshit Rabbati speaks of Messiah's fore-
fathers --the Kings of the House of David-- and many other sources 
speak of Messiah being an offspring of David, this merely refers 
to the 7enealogy of Messiah's body but not to the genealo7y of 
Messiah s essence. See our earlier discussion on Elijah s metem-
psychosis, supra, ch. iii.1 . . 
246 Dan. 7:13; Zech. 9:7; Sanh. 98a. 
247see Margaliot, Margaliot ha-Yam, comm. to Sanh., ibid., 
who comments that Messiah's coming from the "clouds of heaven' 
symbolizes Heavenlr, supervision. By the same token one could 
also say that the 'clouds of heaven" represents Messiah's heavenly 
character. 
248Targum to I Chron. 3:24; Tanh. B., ch. i, 140; Yalk. 
Zech., no. 571; Legends, Vol. VI, p. 381, n. 136. See also Sanh. 
96b, "Bar Nafle" as designation of Messiah, assumed to represent the 
Greek "son of the clou:ls." Freedman, Soncino ed., Sanh ., p. 654, 
n. 2. Margaliot ha-Yam, loc.cit., comments that nefel in Aramaic 
also denotes 'star' and for this reason Bar Cokhba, who was assumed 
to be the Messiah was so called, which means "son of the star." 
See also Cordovero Sefer Pardes, ch. xiv: "For this reason it is 
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written 'Anani', i.e., referring to Elijah who was an angel from 
the beginning of creation." 
249s Ma 1· · h " ·d· " t ee rga ~ot, op.c~t., w o says r~ ~ng on an ass represen s 
the aspect of being a free man rather than Kingship. By the same 
token one could say that this represents humility and human character. 
250Landau, Eliezer, Derekh Hayyim, (Tel Aviv, 1971), comm. to 
DEZ, identifies the Messiah who entered Paradise during his lifetime 
as King David, based on the epithet "David King of Israel lives 
forever." Landau's explanation is curious, since this epithet, 
in the context which it is found in R.H. 25a, simply refers to the 
restoration of David's Kingdom and does not indicate that King David 
himself is still alive. In fact, Shab. 30a,b, specifically recounts 
the circumstances leading to David's death. There are, however, 
Midrashim which relate of David's soul in Paradise, viz., Perek 
Gan Eden, ed. Jellinek, Bet ha-Midrash, Part II, (Leipsic, 1853-77), 
cited in Legends, Vol. V, p. 31, n. 90. See also "David in Paradise," 
Legends, Vol. IV, pp. 114-116, and Vol. V, p. 32. It is possible 
that Landau sided with the Sofer-Kluger school and maintained a 
schism whereby David's soul separated from body and entered Paradise. 
Possibly still, the expression "David King of Israel lives forever;' 
induced Landau . to interpret DEZ in its literal sense, i.e., that 
David entered Paradise during his lifetime in body and soul. In 
which case DEZ disputes the aggadic account of David's death related 
in Shab., loc.cit. According to this view, David- the future 
Messiah- already exists in body and in soul in Paradise. It then 
follows tl1at the entire discussion concerning the controversy over 
the existential reality of Elijah, Enoch and Messiah, including 
\vhich form he will take on upon his eventuation, is equally relevant 
to David. It is not alarming to find that DEZ and the epithet 
"David King of Israel lives forever" discord with the talmudic 
account of David's death, as virtually the identical account of 
Elija~sdeath is related of Elijah in SER, ed. Friedmann, ch. v, 
p. 23, despite the expression "Elijah the Prophet lives forever." 
See supra,n. 133. See also Friedmann's discussion on the asso-
ciation of the similarity between the two deaths, "Intra to SER,11 
pp. 16,17. On the identity of David as the promised Messiah see 
Legends Vol. VI, p. 272, n. 128. 
251an the sources which identify Elijah as the Messiah, see 
Legends, Vol. VI, p. 339, n. 105, andGinzberg's comment thereon. 
252 Yalk, Ezek., no. 367. 
253 Supra , n. 131. 
254Alphabeitum Siraeidis, ed. Steinschneider, (Berolini, 1858), 
p. 28b and MS reading, p. 36a; 2 Alphabet of Ben Sira, (Berlin, 1858), 
MS. reading p. 36a. Ginzberg remarks that the renditions which 
begin, "others say" rather than "eleven," is an obvious error due 
to an incorrect reading of the Hebrew abbreviation of the number 
eleven which was incorrectly transposed to "others say" rather 




see previous note. Messiah and Elijah are also absent from 
the list of immortals in Mann, Jacob, Texts and Studies, (New York , 
1972), Vol. I, p. 512. Messiah is absent from the list of immortals 
in MS of Pirkei Rabbenu ha-Kadosh, and in the list of Bereshit 
Rabbati, Gen. 24:27, cited in Epstein, Abraham, Mi-Kadmoniyyoth 
ha-Yehudim, (Jerusalem: Massad ha-Rav Kook, 1957), p. 102, n. 4. 
256
This is provable in that even the editions of Alphabet of 
Ben Sira, loc.cit, which retain Elijah and Messiah, begin with 
"others escaped death with them and are living in Eden," rather than 
"people of the sons of men, etc." 
257
see DEZ, ed. Tawrogi, A., (Koni&sberg, 1885), p. 9, nn. 1, 
1a; and Mahzor Vitri, ed. Wertheimer, (Berlin, 1889), cited in 
Legends, Vol. V, p. 164. 
258Pirkei Rabbenu ha-Kadosh, ed. Gruenhut, (Lemberg, 1877), 
Likkutim, Perek Assaroth; Torah Shelemah, Ge~. 5:25, p. 358, 
n. 60 . 
259Yalk., Ezek., no. 367; Pirkei Rabbenu ha-Kadosh, loc.cit.; 
Dhamari , Sa'id b. David, Midrash ha-Be'ur, cited in Torah Shelema, 
loc. cit. , end; Marx, Alexander, "Arabishe-Bus tanai Bereich t," 
~~a-Zikkaron, in hommage to Dr. Poznanski, Adler Codex, p. 80 ; 
Bereshit Rabbati, Gen. 2:7; Mi-Kadmoniyyoth ha-Yehudim, loc.cit. 
260orah le-Hayyim, (Jerusalem, 1960), comm. to Numb., Pinchas , 
p. 324. 
261 Supra, n. 254. 
262 Perush Radak al ha-Torah, ed. Kamelhar, (Jerusalem: Mossad 
ha-Rav Kook, 1970), Gen. 5:24. 
263Mehokkekai Yehuda, Yahel Ohr, Gen. 5:24. 
264This identical thesis is promoted by Umberto Cassuto in 
his discussion of the "taking" or "receiving" of Enoch: "That also 
in the Bible there is a more important parallel, namely, ' But G-d 
will ransom my soul from the power of Sheol, for he will receive m~ 
(Ps . 56:15). The Torah's intention, apparently is not to convey 
that Enoch did not die, but only that his death was not like the 
death of other people, and when he died he did not descend to Sheol, 
but G-d redeemed him from the power of Sheol." Cassuto, Commentary 
on Genesis , (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1978), Gen. 5:24, p. 286 . 
1his contention of escaping the power of Sheol is substantiated by 
R. Bahya in his description of the various categories of death 
merited by the righteousin his comro. to Gen. 25:9, end, ed. Chavell, 
pp . 218-19. 
265see Tawrogi, op.cit., p. 8, n. 1a, who brings both renditions. 
266In Mann, Texts and Studies, Vol. I, p. 512, Messiah and 
Elijah are absent from the list of nine immortals who merited Para-
dise and in their stead, are included Kilav the son of David, and 
Benjamin the son of Jacob. Mann comments that although Kilav and 
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Benjamin are absent from all texts cited by Tawrogi, they are 
nevertheless among the four related in B.B. 17a who died by r eason 
of the original sin. To this extent, the ommission of Messiah 
and Elijah, and their substitution by Kilav and Benjamin is quite 
significant. Since Benjamin and Kilav are related in B.B ., ibid. 
to have died, it might have been felt that this same fate was 
shared by the other seven, who like Kilav and Benjamin, only merited 
entry to Paradise in soul. This, however, was not the case for 
Elijah and Messiah and consequently their names were substituted . 
The difficulty with this explanation, however, as pointed out in 
the main text, is that since the same philosophical considerations 
concern all the immortals equally, the existential reality or any 
one should be identical with the others. 
2671o · G. b · h d f ·1 · f h u1s 1nz erg approx1mates t e ate o comp1 at1on o t e 
last four chs. of DEZ to the 9th century. However, the first four 
chs. of DEZ of which our quotation is included, date from a much 
earlier period. These first four chs. are an independant collection 
which were already in existence during the tannaitic period. See 
Ginzberg, "DEZ," J.E., (1901-06), Vol. IV, p . 529. 
268 Sages , pp. 155 ff. Urbach brings Sifri, Numb . 103 and its 
parallel sources in support of the views that man was placed as 
an "elite above the angels." 
269 Legends, Vol. I, p. 61; Sages, p. 155. 
270 Legends, Vol. V, p. 24, n. 66, and p. 65, n. 6; Gen . R., 
ch. xxi,5, and ch. xiv, 3,4. 
271 Ex. 22:8; Dan. 3:25; Sanh . 93a; Maharsha, Sanh., ibid . 
For parallel sources on "the righteous are greater than angels, 
see Gen . R. lxxxviii, 1; Midrash Tehillim, ed. Buber, (Vilna, 1891), 
ch . xci , p. 398 and ch. ciii, 438; J.T. Shab. 6; Deut. R. ch . i, 
12; Tanh. B., 1; Midrash Tannaim, Einhorn, Ze'ev Holfe (\-Jilna, 1859), 
ch. xxxiii , 18; Legends, loc.cit.; Margaliot ha-Yam, Sanh., loc.cit. 
272 Sages, Vol. I, pp. 158-59. 
273 Gen. 20:7; Beit Yosef, comm. of Caro, Joseph to Tur, EE, 
17; Beit Shemuel, comm. of Samuel b. Uri Shraga Phoebus to Sh . Ar., 
EE, ibid.; Ibn Paguda, Bahya b. Joseph, Hovoth ha-Levavoth, tr. 
by Ibn Tibbon, Judah b. Shaul, (Venice, 1548), Josh. 5:14; Gen . 
23:6; Zech. 3:5, 7; Landau, Israel Jonah, Me'on ha-Berakoth, 
(Dyhernfurth, 1816), comm. to Ber. lOb, p. 246. 
274The Midrash to the psalmist verse, "Bless the Lord ye angels 
of His ," relates that "angels" in this verse refers to the prophets , 
as the Midrash equates the prophets with the angels. Midrash 
Tehillim , Ps. 103, p. 438, no. 17. In another Midrash we read : 
"From whence do we know that the prophets are like angels?" Numb . 
R., ch. xvii,1. In fact, in Maim. 's division of the various 
levels among angels, the division of angels which communicates to 
the prophets is called ishim (manlike), because they are so closely 
attached to the level of man's intellect. \-Jhen Saul received 
prophetic spirit he attained the angel level of ishim and therefore 
- 426 -
III. NOTES 
is described as an ishaher (man unlike other men), Yad, Yesodei 
ha-Torah, ii 7, vii, I. In other words, according to Maim., not 
only do prophets carry angel status, the angels themselves of this 
level are called ishim (manlike). Moreover, Maharsha has pointed 
out that the wise men are called Elokim, Ymereas the angels are of 
a lower level, as they hold the inferior rank of Bar Elokim, ~upra ., n.271. 
275Margaliot ha-Yam, Sanh. 98b . 
276 Ber. 4b. 
277s F · dma ee r1.e nn, "Intra to SER, " p. 16. 
278 Sef er P ardes , Hekhaloth, Part XXIV, ch. xii. 
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1 Shab. 30a. 
2cited supra, ch. iii.2. 
3cited supra, ch. iii.2. 
4Ibid. 
5Falcon differs from Kluger in that Kluger understands that 
Elijah observes the commandments willfully because he is not 
entirely "free of Torah and Mitzvot" since in reality he did not 
die as other men. Falcon, on the other hand, considers Elijah 
entirely "free." The only justification he can find for Elijah 's 
adherence is that he willfully observes the commandments. 
6zera Yitchak, Pileplet Kol She-hu, No. 11. 
7This view is supported by Bordjel, Joseph, Va-Yikken Yosef, 
(Levorno, 1852), No. 30:1, p. 108, who explicitly states that R. 
Isserlein intentionally did not apply the dictum to Elijah as Elijah 
is still considered alive. However, with regards to divorce, 
since Elijah became an angel, his wife is no longer the "wife of 
one 's fellow man" and therefore she is permitted to other men. 
8see the practical application of this question regarding the 
Law of Conformity, supra, ch. iii.4. 





1Lev. 18:5; Shab. 30a; Isserles, Darkhei Moshe (printed in 
standard editions of Tur), comm. to Tur, EE, 17.[51;--- Beit Shemuel, 
Sh. Ar., EE, 17 .[11];-Goldbaum, Resp0nsa Birkath Shalom, (Warsaw, 
1889), No. 5, p. 21. 
2sedei Hemed, Ma'arekhet Gimel, no. 18, p. 44. 
3Ket. 103a; Judah ben Samuel he-Hasid, Sefer Hasidim, ed. 
Margaliot, R., (Jerusalem: Massad ha-Rav Kook, 1957), no. 1129, 
p. 564. 
4Hida, Berit Olam, comm. to Sefer Hasidim, ibid., ad.loc. 
5sedei Hemed discusses several sources which seem to imply 
that even the righteous are absolved of commandments after death 
and he dismisses each source in turn by reinterpretting them other-
wise. 
6Although Ashkenazi, Nissim Abraham b. Raphael, (Nehmad le-
Mareh, [Salonika, 1732], J.T. Kil., p. 103), contests this claiming 
that the pious observe the commandments only to the extent of those 
who fulfill them volitionally out of zeal and are not enjoined, 
Sedei Hemed, loc.cit., dismisses Ashkenazi's contention. 
7Mishna, Yeb., ch. iv ,13. 
8see Lipman~ Isaac Benjamin tJolf b. Eliezer, Nahalat Binyamin, 
(Amsterdam, 1682), p. 52. 
9 See Palache, Rachamim Isaac, Yaffe la-Lev, (Izmir, 1872), OH, 
no. 32. 
10rndeed, -Ben Zion Firrer in the 1970 issue of Noam, (annual 
halakic publication, ed. Kasher, Menahem, [Jerusalem~70]), 
opines that Mitzvot are incumbent upon man only in his terrestrial 
habitat earth. Therefore, man is not obligated to observe Mitzvot 
on the moon since Mitzvah observance is specifically a function of 
the place of man's terrestrial abode -earth. See however, Bleich, 
J. David, "Mitzvot on the Moon," Contemporary Halachic Problems, 
(New York: Yeshiva Univ. Press, 1977), Vol. I, pp. 221-12, in 
which he brings the contrary opinion of Menachem Kasher who declares 
that halakic obligations are personal ones and are incumbant upon 
Jews in any and all places where they may find themselves. In 
the same article Bleich records the view of Shelomo Goren who 
opines that Mitzvot are a function of time rather than place, and 
s ince time is measured by twenty four hour day night sequences, 
these do not existoncelestial bodies. Therefore, man is exempt 
from commandments on the moon -- not because of the place factor 




11 See Maharsha, Shab. 30a. 
12see opinions of Hida et.aL,in Sedei Hemed, loc.cit. 
13Kluger's view is identical with the view of Nehmad le-Mareh, 
loc.cit. 
14Palache, op.cit. According to Nahalat Binyamin (Mitzvah 104, 
p. 136) however, the injunction not to eat from the Tree of Knowledge 
was based on the 613 commandments. As according to the opinion 
that the forbidden fruit was a grain of wheat, and the opinion that 
the world was created in the month of Nisan, Adam was forbidden to 
eat from the new grain (hadash) until after bringing an omer of 
the first fruits; Lev. 23:10-14. See Tosaf., Sanh . 56b, s.v. lo 
ni tz taveh. -
15Nid. 61b; a halakic consequence of this op~n~on is that the 
dead are permitted to be buried in shrouds made from Kilayim (a wool 
and linen mixture). 
16 Ezek . 27; Kovetz Chiurim, (Baranowicze, 1944), no. 29, p. 52. 
17wasserman, ibid. See also Albo, Joseph, Sefer ha-Ikkarim, 
ed . Husik, I., (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1946) , 
Part III, ch. xvi, in which Albo disputes Maim.'s contention that 
belief in the eternality of Mitzvot is one of the thirteen articles 
of faith . 
18Ye t, the opinion which contends that the commandments will 
be abolished in time, included the righteous as well. Unless one 
conteds as Ritba, (Hiddushei ha-Ritba), and Rashba (Hiddushei ha-
Rashba, [Warsmv, 1922]), novellae to Nid., loc.cit., that the opinion 
which maintains that the commandments will be abolished in the time 
to come, only maintains this regarding the dead while they are dead 
and not once they are restored to life. 
19 Meg. 7b; Hida, 
20unless Hida was 
R. Zeira 's wife only. 
Hida. 
Birkei Yosef, (Vienna, 1860), Sh. Ar., EE, 17. 
referring to the marriage laws concerning 
This however, is not intimated anywhere by 
21sanh. 92b: "R. Eliezer the son of R. Jose the Galilean said : 
'The dead whom Ezekiel revived went up to Palestine, married wives 
and begat sons and daughters.' R. Judah b. Bathyra rose up and 
said: 'I am one of their descendants, and these are the tefillin 
which my grandfather left me as a heirloom for them." See Rashba 
and Ritba, Novellae to Nid., loc.cit. 
22 See supra, n. 17. 
23 Deut. 24:4; Al-Hakham, Sod Yesharim, No. 2; ~f. Luke 20:28-36 . 
24 See Responsa Hatam Sofer, YD, No. 336 . 
25Bordjel draws the identical distinction between the two types 
of death in va-Yikken Yosef, p. 108b. 
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26see Zimmerman, Chaim, who writes in his work, Torah and Reason: 
"\.Jhat is required is not the definition of death but rather the 
definition of life •.. The definition of life is that as long as 
there is any qualitative functioning of life observable in the 
realm of our mundane life- he is alive. 
"The means available for bringing a man back to observable qualita-
tive functioning of life change from generation to generation. 
For example, in the case of a man who was considered dead a thousand 
years ago, if the case were presented to us now and we could revive 
him with medical techniques then for us he would be considered alive. 
But since there were no means whatever available then for bringing 
him back to observable functioning of life, the man was halachically 
dead. He was no longer a living being in relation to olam haze. 
The issur of Retzicha [prohibition of murder] did not apply ..• and 
the same is with Pikuach Nefesh [saving a life] ... 
"The above definition is therefore operational and practical. From 
it fol ows that the status of Retzicha and the application of Pikuach 
Nefesh change from generation to generation. The same man dying 
under same circumstances today, where we have means-- technological, 
medical, chemical or therapeutic-- to bring him back to a quantitative 
functioning of life as indicated by observation, is halachically 
determined to be alive. If we kill him we take away his life--
Retzicha. The mitzva of Pikuach Nefesh also applies and demands 
that we use all those modern means to indeed bring him back to 
observable functioning of life. 
"The usefulness of our definition is manifest in that it establishes 
the principle that the Halacha does not find in the human bod a 
state of life - or a state o eath-- that is abso ute ixe and 
independant. Rather the Halacha deals with observational life in 
the human body. Therefore, the Halacha of Pikuach Nefesh and Ret-
zicha includes the requirement to use all available technology. 
This is the proper treatment of the problem." (Emphasis added.) 
Torah and Reason, (Jerusalem: Hed Press, 1979), ch. iv, "Torah 
Data and Scientific Discovery," pp. 32-34. 
Zimmerman's definition of life is an extension of Hida's version 
that death is not determined by the state of the individual corpse 
but rather by the state of death experienced by all men. Zimmer-
man expands Hida's definition to include the scientific resources 
available to all men at every point in history. 
27Nevertheless he must be treated as dead upon the cessation 
of life since one doesn't know at the time of death whether or not 
he will return to dust. 
28 See supra, n. 25. 
29 Gen. 3:19. 
30Pardo, Jacob b. David, (Appe Zutre, [Venice, 1797], EE, 17:1), 
writes that alternatively, the possible intention of Birkei Yosef 
was to distinguish between a resurrection which takes place before 
burial to one which occurs afterwards. If one is miraculously re-
stored after the burial then the matrimony (ishut) has already 
terminated and is not resumed. However, if restoration occurs before 
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burial the ishut remains. This distinction however, would require 
clear cut proofs. 
31 t.Jaks, Responsa Nefesh Hayyah, (Pietrkow, 1876), No . 3. 
32 See Tosaf., Kid. 45b, s.v. be-pheirush. 
33Bornstein bolsters his arguement by citing Rema, YD, 267:65, 
who employs this principle in a similar case. Avnei Nezer, EE, 
No. 56. 
34Teomim, Hesed Avraham, EE, No. 14. See supra ch. iii.2, n. 17~ 
3511Be • II nven1ste, E.J, Vol. II, p. 559. 
36Benveniste, Keneset ha-Gedolah, (Lemberg, 1861), Sh. Ar., 
EE, 17.[2]. 
Sh . 
370ur explanation of Benveniste concurs with Ozar ha-Posekim, 
Ar., EE, 17:1. [ 4]. 
38 Shab. 112b; Erub. 24a; B.K. 96b; Sod Yesharim, loc.cit. 
39This is evident from the fact that Benveniste proves that 
in the time to come the original marriage partners will return to 
one another because if a dead partner were to be miraculously 
resurrected at present the marital status would automatically resume. 
40see following note. 
41various instances are related in the Talmud which indicate 
a continuous relationship between husband and wife even after the 
death of one of the partners. To wit: Yeb. 55b, expounds the 
word "carnally" in Lev. 18:20, "Thou shalt not lie carnally with 
thy neighbours wife," to exclude the case of intercourse with a 
dead woman who died a married woman. Since a wife even after her 
death is described as ''his kin" (she'ero), Lev. 21:2, one would 
have assumed that one should be as guilty for having intercourse 
with such a woman as with a married woman. Rashi, Lev., ad .loc., 
explains that the word "carnally" teaches that although the kinship 
remains after ¢eath, one is nevertheless exonerated from having 
intercourse with such a woman. Tosaf., Yeb., loc.cit., s.v. le-
achor, however, explains that the word "carnally" teaches that-
the kinship does not continue after death. 
It is possible that the argument between Benveniste and Teomim is 
the same argument of Rashi and Tosaf. In that Benveniste learned 
thaalthough the matrimony (ishut) is frozen upon death, the kinship 
(she ' er) relationship nevertheless remains. Teomim however, held 
like Tosaf., that both matrimony and kinship lapse together with 
death:--Far without matrimony there is no longer kinship. Polotsky, 
Meir Dan, (Keli Hemdah, [Piotrkow-Warsaw, 1900-38], Parshat Va-yigash) , 
avers that the controversy between Maim. and Nach. on whether the 
Laws of Mourning between husband and wife are Pentateuchal or 
Kabbinic is also contingent on whether the she'er relationship 
continues after death. There is evidence of a continued relation-
ship between husband and wife even after divorce. To wit: J.T., 
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Ket., ch. xi,3; "R. Jacob b. Aha in the name of R. Johanan, R. 
Hila in the name of R. Leazer said: Just as a man spares the honour 
of his widow so must he spare the honour of his divorcee, as it is 
written, 'And thou hide not thyself from thy own flesh' Isa. 58:7." 
From here we see that even in the case of a divorcee there remains 
enough of a kinship after divorce for her to still be referred to 
as "thy flesh," despite her matrimony being completely terminated. 
Gen . R., ch. xvii,3 . and Yalk., Vol. I, nos. 23, 665, also apply 
the words "thy flesh" from Isa. to one's divorcee. · Again it may 
be argued that "thy flesh" refers to her status prior to divorce; 
see Margolies, Moses, Penei Moshe, (printed in std. eds. of Jeru-
salem Talmud), J.T., Ket., loc.cit. Or else, she may still be 
considered "thy flesh" to for61d h1m from marrying her mother or 
sister; see Sod Yesharim, loc.cit., end. 
42oeut. 22:19; Landau, Urah Shahar, (Przemysl, 1882), 
[86]; Lebovic, Shulchan ha-Ezer, (Dees-Berehovo, 1929-32), 
26. [3]. 
No . 1, 
No . 1: 
43As for example in Yeb. 87b, where a woman, who because she 
bore a son from her deceased husband was exempted from undergoing 
a levirate marriage, and after her remarriage a brother is suddenly 
born . Tosaf., Yeb. 17b. On the principle of darkhei noam see 
"Darkehi Noam," T.E., Vol. VII, p. 712. 
44Although the Sages expressed the belief that, "the Tishbite 
will resolve quandaries and disputations" (see Tosaf. Yom Tov, Eduy ., 
end) , it is doubtful whether they had in mind anytn1ng so highly 
involved as this. If they did, it is no small wonder that they 
regarded Elijah's heralding that period as absolutely essential. 
4i-1ishna Kid., ch. i,1; . Kid. 13b; Isa. 26:19; Ezek. 37:13; 
Aszod, Yehudah Ya'aleh, (Levov-Pressburg, 1873), EE, No. 4. On 
the principle of "we may only rise to a higher level of sanctity 
but may not degrade to a lower level," see Ber. 28a; Shek., ch. vi, 
3; Eccles. R., ch. xi,?; Men. 98b. 
46Although Aszod does attempt an alternative explanation in 
reconciling Terumat ha-Deshen, it is this explanation which he 
relies upon and considers in the main. This is indicative in his 
appending the words "So it seems to me" to the end of this explana tion. 
47see Hartman, Philos. Quest, p. 70, how knowledge of the Horld 
to Come influences actions in this world. See also ibid., p . 81: 
"Olam l-13.-ba is a description not only of the future lite of the 
disembOdied intellect, but also of an individual's evalution of the 
significance of his everyday religious behaviour." 




1Hirschler, "Halakic Problems with a Test Tube Baby," Halaka 
and Medicine, ed. Hirschler, (Jerusalem-Chicago: Regenshberg Inst., 
1980), Vol. I, p. 312 ff. 
22sanh. 65b; Gen. 9:6; Hakham Zevi, No. 93. See our discus-
sion concerning Hatam Safer's application of this responsum, supra, 
ch. iii.2. 
3Hirschler proves from Terumat ha-Deshen that the existence 
of life is insufficient qualification for a definition of manhood 
since Elijah is alive and is nevertheless classified as dead. 
Sedei Hemed, Vol. I, Ma'arekhet Aleph, no. 151, p. 293, however, 
reports an opinion that the definition of manhood (adam) remains 
after death. According to this opinion, even if EII}ah were con-
sidered dead, he could still qualify for a definition of manhood, 
and Hirschler would have no proof. We may, however, suggest the 
following distinction: When a person originally qualified as a 
'man' he retains this definition even after death. However, if 
whilst he is still alive he loses his definition of manhood, then 
he would no longer retain this definition when later considered dead. 
4see our elaboration on this in our concluding chapter. 
5 Isa. 54:1. 
6sacks, "Test Tube Babies," South Africa Zionist Record and 
South Africa Jewish Chronicle, 30 April 1982. 
7Friedrich, Otto, "A Legal, Moral, Social Nightmare," Time, 
10 September, 1984, no. 37. The above statements were made oy--
Capron, Freed, and Gorovitz, respectively. 
8zimmerman, (Torah and Reason, ch. iv, "The Truth of Torah 
Data and its Precedence for Scientific Discovery," pp. 29-49), 
specifies several examples which evince how modern scientific 
developments which have only recently been discovered, had already 
found clear cut halakic precedents in the ancient rabbinic writings. 
9Tzitz Eliezer, Vol. X, (Jerusalem, 1970), No. 26, p. 165. 
10see Guide, Part I, ch. lxxii. 
11Duran, Simeon b. Zemah (Rashbaz), Yavin Shem'uah, (Levorno, 
1744), No. 7; Beit David, No. 40, cited in Waldenberg, op.cit. 
12 See Abrabanel, comm. to Guide, Part I, ch. xxxix. 
13 Zohar, Numb. 161. 
14 I 
Jer. 2:27. 
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1894), Vol. III, No. 29; Horowitz, Abraham Jacob, Responsa Tzur 
Ya 'akov, (Bilgoraj, 1932), No. 28. 
no. 
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21M. d 1ran a, 
22 Palache, 
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23s · s d "Mo · s · " 1nger . , e . , rn1ng erv1ce, Daily Prayer Book, (London: 
H.M. Printers, 1962), p. 7. 
24Minhat Hinnukh, No. 203. 
25Tendler, Moses and Rosner, Fred, Practical Medical Halaka, 
(Jerusalem-New York: Feldheim Publishers, 1980), p. 44. See also 
Kluger, Hokhmat Shelomo (printed in std. eds. of Sh. Ar.), Sh . Ar., 
EE, 17.[1], Who understood Isserlein as saying that Elijah relates 
to his new status. However, Kluger disagrees with Isserlein and 
rules that Elijah retains his former status with all its halakic 
ramifications. This would also account for the variant ruling con-
cerning transsexual surgery. It is surprising to note that in Tuv 
Ta'am ve-Da'at (see supra, ch. iii.2)" Kluger accepts Isserlein~ 
ruling yet in Hokhmat Shelomo rejects him. 
26 See supra, n. 8. 
27Lev. 21:14, Mishna, Kid., ch. i,1! 
28Kid. 13b. 
29s . ee prev1ous note. 
30see B.M. 38b: "I know that their wives shall be widows 
and their children fatherless; why then is it written, 'and your 
wives shall be almanot etc.?' This teaches that their wives will 
seek to remarry and not be permitted." Thus the Talmud applies 
the term 'Almanot' to describe Agunot. See also II Sam. 20: "So 
they were shut up unto the day ot their death, in widowhood [Almanot] 
with their husbands alive." 
31see Al-Hakham, Responsa Rav Pe'alim, Vol. II, No. 1. 
32s . ee prev1ous note. 
33 ·Sh. Ar., EE, 17, glosses and cooms., ad loc. 
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34 'fur, EE, 17. 
35oarkhei Moshe, (printed in std. eds. of 'fur), 'fur, EE, 17.[5]. 
36 Sh. Ar., . EE, 17:3. 
37 • Sh ' I 1 l11] Be1.t emu e...., Sh. Ar., 17:3 • 
38Rabbi Professor E.J. Duschinski shared this remarkable insight 
with me. 
39Sh. Ar., EE, 17:1; see glosses and comms. of Ashkenazi, 
Judah, Ba'er Heitev, (printed in std. eds. of Sh. Ar.); Eisenstadt, 
Abraham Hirsch ben Jacob, Pitchei Teshuva, (printed in std. eds. of 
Sh. Ar.); Hokhmat ~helomo; Ozar he-Posekim; Sh. Ar., ibid. See 
the remainder of this law in Sh. Ar. thereon. 
40 'fur, EE, 44; Minhat Hinnukh, loc.cit. 
41 Responsa Igra Rama, (Warsaw, 1885), EE, No. 28; Kid. 41b, 
Sh. Ar., EE, 123:2, 141:31,33, 35:6; Beit Shemu'eJ, EE, 141:33.[47] 
end. 
42 Yeb. 49b. 
43A . M'll I• :vne1. 1. u 1.m, rpt. (Jerusalem, 1970), EE, no. 18, p. 39. 
44 Yeb. 79a. 
45Tosaf., Yeb. 9b, s.v. harei. On the halizah ceremony of 
removing the shoe in the law of levirate see Deut. 24:5-9. 
46Sh. Ar., EE, 15:13. The additional qualification of per-
mitting therapedwoman's daughter only after the woman's death 
is a rabbinical injunction which was regulated as a precautionary 
measure to prevent the man from coming in further contact with this 
woman who would invariable frequent her daughter's home. 
47 Sanh. 76b. 
48 Sefer Yehoshua, (Zolkiew, 1829), No. 332. 
49Namely: 1) One could not infer from the Shulchan Arukh that 
if the original party with whom the marriage was in effect reached 
a stage where marriage to the same party could not take effect -
were the marriage entered into-ar-that point -that there would 
be no need for divorce. Elijah's case is exceptional; His original 
marriage did not become invalidated upon his becoming an angel with 
whom marriage is not effective. But rather because of his trans-
cendence, he is considered halakically dead. 
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